Curt Doolittle

Category: Epistemology and Method

  • ARGUMENTATIVE ASSISTANCE FOR STUDENTS OF DEBATE 1 – “Anecdotal evidence is a con

    ARGUMENTATIVE ASSISTANCE FOR STUDENTS OF DEBATE

    1 – “Anecdotal evidence is a contradiction in terms. One either has sufficient data to eliminate more parsimonious alternatives, wishful thinking, and error, or one is engaged in justification of a prior, with or without your knowledge and understanding of it.”

    2 – “Outliers do not distributions make. The terms Men, Women, Class, Race, and Culture refer to distributions not outliers. Outliers are not evidence of anything except noise.”

    3 – “The central objective of political representation is to do no harm, not to find an imaginary perfect candidate, and not to give everyone a chance to rule. Exceptional people are marginally indifferent and learn by doing.”

    Source date (UTC): 2016-01-06 06:25:00 UTC

  • What is the Difference Between Information and Statement

    [I]’m working through Kripke again because I know it’s a half truth and I can’t quite put my finger on what’s missing. I know what is wrong with analytic philosophy (sets): their construction destroys information, causation, and operational construction, and therefore existential possibility. I know what’s right with information analysis: marginal difference (cause of change in state). So analytic philosophy is a sort of dead end in the sense that language is always informationally incomplete. But his understanding of names is correct. Even if his examples are not (the referent Aristotle isn’t identical to the referent Aristotle if he dies at age two and never creates the set of properties Aristotle). We cannot construct the references to the two year old without the reference to the man Aristotle. Therefore operationally, the example cannot exist. I can refer to Aristotle at the age of two, but I cannot refer to a greek two year old with the name of Aristotle. and convey any meaning without the existence of the aforementioned Aristotle as an accomplished adult. Meaning does not tell us much about truth – if anything. And the verbalists (analyticals and rationalists) are working with too little information to achieve much. Existence tells us a great deal about truth. Even if other methods tell us a lot about meaning. But even where they tell us about meaning, they tell us nothing about truth. And I think this is the area of confusion, because of hermeneutic conflation. We see this coming out of judaism and christianity and into law, where it did not previously exist. But this conflation of truth and meaning has imposed a catastrophically damaging influence on western thought. And in both the ancient(agrarian), modern(industrial), and current (information) eras, it has constituted a revolt against truth and the undesirability of truth for the parasitic and unproductive classes, peoples, and cultures. Meaning is dependent upon the content of one’s mind, and analogy to experience, but has little to no dependence upon truth content. Truth is dependent upon reality that is independent of the content and mechanism of of one’s mind – even if it is dependent upon the reduction to analogy to experience so that the mind can grasp it. But meaning is required as part of the process of free association. It is useful in obtaining information (hypotheses) that we may pursue and turn into truth candidates. It is useful in the transfer of experiences whether or not those experiences contain truth content. We must construct hypotheses out of concepts we can grasp, and we can only grasp concepts reducible to analogies to experience. So we must accumulate analogies to experience in sufficient number that we are able to run tests for possibility. This is one of the reasons for the value of scientific thinking (theories of general rules) since they reduce the informational content we must process in order to identify patterns and test perceptions and information against them. My hope (my suspicion) is that truthfulness once practiced like any other set of general rules will have an equally influential impact on human demonstrated intelligence and cooperation as has science. My concern is that we have passed peak human and are damaging our gene pool, and that we must reverse our century and a half of dysgenia before the accumulated damage is not correctable through assortative mating. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Lviv Ukraine

  • What is the Difference Between Information and Statement

    [I]’m working through Kripke again because I know it’s a half truth and I can’t quite put my finger on what’s missing. I know what is wrong with analytic philosophy (sets): their construction destroys information, causation, and operational construction, and therefore existential possibility. I know what’s right with information analysis: marginal difference (cause of change in state). So analytic philosophy is a sort of dead end in the sense that language is always informationally incomplete. But his understanding of names is correct. Even if his examples are not (the referent Aristotle isn’t identical to the referent Aristotle if he dies at age two and never creates the set of properties Aristotle). We cannot construct the references to the two year old without the reference to the man Aristotle. Therefore operationally, the example cannot exist. I can refer to Aristotle at the age of two, but I cannot refer to a greek two year old with the name of Aristotle. and convey any meaning without the existence of the aforementioned Aristotle as an accomplished adult. Meaning does not tell us much about truth – if anything. And the verbalists (analyticals and rationalists) are working with too little information to achieve much. Existence tells us a great deal about truth. Even if other methods tell us a lot about meaning. But even where they tell us about meaning, they tell us nothing about truth. And I think this is the area of confusion, because of hermeneutic conflation. We see this coming out of judaism and christianity and into law, where it did not previously exist. But this conflation of truth and meaning has imposed a catastrophically damaging influence on western thought. And in both the ancient(agrarian), modern(industrial), and current (information) eras, it has constituted a revolt against truth and the undesirability of truth for the parasitic and unproductive classes, peoples, and cultures. Meaning is dependent upon the content of one’s mind, and analogy to experience, but has little to no dependence upon truth content. Truth is dependent upon reality that is independent of the content and mechanism of of one’s mind – even if it is dependent upon the reduction to analogy to experience so that the mind can grasp it. But meaning is required as part of the process of free association. It is useful in obtaining information (hypotheses) that we may pursue and turn into truth candidates. It is useful in the transfer of experiences whether or not those experiences contain truth content. We must construct hypotheses out of concepts we can grasp, and we can only grasp concepts reducible to analogies to experience. So we must accumulate analogies to experience in sufficient number that we are able to run tests for possibility. This is one of the reasons for the value of scientific thinking (theories of general rules) since they reduce the informational content we must process in order to identify patterns and test perceptions and information against them. My hope (my suspicion) is that truthfulness once practiced like any other set of general rules will have an equally influential impact on human demonstrated intelligence and cooperation as has science. My concern is that we have passed peak human and are damaging our gene pool, and that we must reverse our century and a half of dysgenia before the accumulated damage is not correctable through assortative mating. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Lviv Ukraine

  • Criticisms: Admitting Your Own Ignorance

    [I]gnorance isn’t a criticism. (Instead, say “I don’t know that subject”.) Lack of understanding isn’t a criticism. (Instead, say “I don’t understand”.) Difficulty in learning isn’t a criticism. (Instead say “this is hard, so I don’t understand.”) Falsification of meaning isn’t falsification of a central argument is a criticism. (instead say “I don’t think the example supports the theory”) Falsification requires you both understand and can falsify a central argument. (the theory). Like the wise man says: in any technical field people will say “I don’t know”. Btu when we talk of epistemology, ethics, morality, politics and economics, for some reason the average idiot has a vested interest in his nonsense opinion. Now, this is rational because we must make use of epistemology, ethics, morality and politics, while we probably do not need to make use of other disciplines. But that doesn’t mean it isn’t exhausting.

  • Criticisms: Admitting Your Own Ignorance

    [I]gnorance isn’t a criticism. (Instead, say “I don’t know that subject”.) Lack of understanding isn’t a criticism. (Instead, say “I don’t understand”.) Difficulty in learning isn’t a criticism. (Instead say “this is hard, so I don’t understand.”) Falsification of meaning isn’t falsification of a central argument is a criticism. (instead say “I don’t think the example supports the theory”) Falsification requires you both understand and can falsify a central argument. (the theory). Like the wise man says: in any technical field people will say “I don’t know”. Btu when we talk of epistemology, ethics, morality, politics and economics, for some reason the average idiot has a vested interest in his nonsense opinion. Now, this is rational because we must make use of epistemology, ethics, morality and politics, while we probably do not need to make use of other disciplines. But that doesn’t mean it isn’t exhausting.

  • INFORMATION VS KNOWLEDGE VS UNDERSTANDING Some predictions require information (

    INFORMATION VS KNOWLEDGE VS UNDERSTANDING

    Some predictions require information (facts within the context).

    Some predictions require knowledge (of operations and processes)

    Some predictions require understanding (of deterministic relations and limits)

    Most predictions requires all of the above.

    The difficulty of a prediction is the inverse of the information, knowledge and understanding available, times the volatility (limits) in our understanding.

    Taleb’s interesting question is whether we can somehow quantify this ratio.

    Which I intuit is possible but assume we need vastly more precise data than we have today.

    Source date (UTC): 2016-01-05 10:18:00 UTC

  • Ignorance isn’t a criticism. (Instead, say “I don’t know that subject”.) Lack of

    Ignorance isn’t a criticism.

    (Instead, say “I don’t know that subject”.)

    Lack of understanding isn’t a criticism.

    (Instead, say “I don’t understand”.)

    Difficulty in learning isn’t a criticism.

    (Instead say “this is hard, so I don’t understand.”)

    Falsification of meaning isn’t falsification of a central argument is a criticism.

    (instead say “I don’t think the example supports the theory”)

    Falsification requires you both understand and can falsify a central argument. (the theory).

    Like the wise man says: in any technical field people will say “I don’t know”. Btu when we talk of epistemology, ethics, morality, politics and economics, for some reason the average idiot has a vested interest in his nonsense opinion.

    Now, this is rational because we must make use of epistemology, ethics, morality and politics, while we probably do not need to make use of other disciplines.

    But that doesn’t mean it isn’t exhausting.

    Source date (UTC): 2016-01-05 08:59:00 UTC

  • WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INFORMATION AND STATEMENT? I’m working through Kr

    WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INFORMATION AND STATEMENT?

    I’m working through Kripke again because I know it’s a half truth and I can’t quite put my finger on what’s missing. I know what is wrong with analytic philosophy (sets): their construction destroys information, causation, and operational construction, and therefore existential possibility. I know what’s right with information analysis: marginal difference (cause of change in state).

    So analytic philosophy is a sort of dead end in the sense that language is always informationally incomplete.

    But his understanding of names is correct. Even if his examples are not (the referent Aristotle isn’t identical to the referent Aristotle if he dies at age two and never creates the set of properties Aristotle). We cannot construct the references to the two year old without the reference to the man Aristotle. Therefore operationally, the example cannot exist. I can refer to Aristotle at the age of two, but I cannot refer to a greek two year old with the name of Aristotle. and convey any meaning without the existence of the aforementioned Aristotle as an accomplished adult.

    Meaning does not tell us much about truth – if anything. And the verbalists (analyticals and rationalists) are working with too little information to achieve much. Existence tells us a great deal about truth. Even if other methods tell us a lot about meaning. But even where they tell us about meaning, they tell us nothing about truth. And I think this is the area of confusion, because of hermeneutic conflation. We see this coming out of judaism and christianity and into law, where it did not previously exist. But this conflation of truth and meaning has imposed a catastrophically damaging influence on western thought. And in both the ancient(agrarian), modern(industrial), and current (information) eras, it has constituted a revolt against truth and the undesirability of truth for the parasitic and unproductive classes, peoples, and cultures.

    Meaning is dependent upon the content of one’s mind, and analogy to experience, but has little to no dependence upon truth content.

    Truth is dependent upon reality that is independent of the content and mechanism of of one’s mind – even if it is dependent upon the reduction to analogy to experience so that the mind can grasp it.

    But meaning is required as part of the process of free association. It is useful in obtaining information (hypotheses) that we may pursue and turn into truth candidates. It is useful in the transfer of experiences whether or not those experiences contain truth content. We must construct hypotheses out of concepts we can grasp, and we can only grasp concepts reducible to analogies to experience. So we must accumulate analogies to experience in sufficient number that we are able to run tests for possibility.

    This is one of the reasons for the value of scientific thinking (theories of general rules) since they reduce the informational content we must process in order to identify patterns and test perceptions and information against them.

    My hope (my suspicion) is that truthfulness once practiced like any other set of general rules will have an equally influential impact on human demonstrated intelligence and cooperation as has science.

    My concern is that we have passed peak human and are damaging our gene pool, and that we must reverse our century and a half of dysgenia before the accumulated damage is not correctable through assortative mating.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Philosophy of Aristocracy

    The Propertarian Institute

    Lviv Ukraine

    Source date (UTC): 2016-01-04 05:25:00 UTC

  • If you speak the truth, then there is no difference between scientist, philosoph

    If you speak the truth, then there is no difference between scientist, philosopher and prophet. If you do not speak the truth then there is a great difference between them.

    Source date (UTC): 2015-12-26 03:46:00 UTC

  • Political Philosophy is a lot easier when you just start from the premise that a

    Political Philosophy is a lot easier when you just start from the premise that all goods are hypothetical, all bads are not, and that the only means of accumulating the knowledge to determine good from bad is exchange. This eliminates the fallacy that any of us know what is in fact good for all, other than institutions that allow us to choose any possible good but prohibit us from pursuing any known bad are a defacto good by prohibiting bads.

    This is contrary to human cognition because we evolved for negotiating cooperation not truth telling. It is contrary to human desire, because we desire consensus. It is contrary to political incentive because it limits political power.

    We all think we are ‘right’. But the only ‘right’ we can know is trade. Just as the only way we know whether we engaged in production or engaged in waste, consumption, or entertainment, is if others trade for what we create.

    Information and volition tell us what ‘right and wrong’ do not.

    Source date (UTC): 2015-12-23 02:13:00 UTC