—“Curt do you believe in the notion of a universally verifiable truth?”—Mark Joyner (FWIW apparently this post was interpreted by mark as offensive. I didn’t mean it to be.) Um. You probably can’t comprehend how …. sophomoric that question is, because it’s so common a sophomoric question that like belief in flying donkeys it’s a given. 1) A person may speak truthfully… if you know what that means: For every phenomenon there exists a most parsimonious description possible in a language that can be uttered by man. To state the most parsimonious description of possible one needs perfect knowledge. We are rarely if ever possessed of perfect knowledge. When we are, it is all but certain we speak of a tautology or a triviality (reductio) – and meaningless. So even if we speak the most parsimonious description possible we may not know we do, and as such must assume our description is forever contingent. Ergo all *testimony* (truth claim) of any substance is forever contingent. 2) We can speak in at least three categories: axiomatic, theoretic, and fictional(analogistic). We can verify the internal consistency of an axiomatic statement, and we can attempt to construct of proof of such an axiomatic statement – assuming that the axioms themselves are internally consistent. We can declare axioms. We call internally consistent tests ‘true’ but they are merely proofs, not truths. Mathematics is axiomatic. They are only contingent upon the declared axioms. We can only try to falsify the theoretical, and see if it survives falsification. We cannot declare laws, only discover them. We call theories (descriptions) true if they are consistent, correspondent, possible, complete, and coherent. This is a far higher standard that the must ‘simpler’ axiomatic. Real world phenomenon are theoretic. We do not recognize the need to test the internal consistency or external correspondence (operational possibility) or coherence of fictions (analogies). Imaginary phenomenon only need be meaningful, nothing else. One can verify the existence of evidence. But this tells us only that the evidence exists and therefore claims are not false. It does not tell us that the theory is true. So, one does not ‘verify’ a truth proposition, only a test of internal consistency of axioms. One tests the survivability of a theory. Because it is forever contingent. Hence why we have juries.
Category: Epistemology and Method
-
Truth is an adjective not a noun.
By Bill Joslin Truth is an adjective not a noun. The subtle difference between truth as semantic axioms and truth as an asymptotic correspondence resolves the above. The ability to test a statement against a criteria (correspondence, coherence , utility, meaning or any combination thereof) makes “true” possible (the only time “true” us relevant) – thus “true” exists as a property of speech and thought (not a prooerty of the world or reality).
-
Truth is an adjective not a noun.
By Bill Joslin Truth is an adjective not a noun. The subtle difference between truth as semantic axioms and truth as an asymptotic correspondence resolves the above. The ability to test a statement against a criteria (correspondence, coherence , utility, meaning or any combination thereof) makes “true” possible (the only time “true” us relevant) – thus “true” exists as a property of speech and thought (not a prooerty of the world or reality).
-
“THE GRID” axiomatic,….theoretic,…….and analogistic. deductive…..inducti
“THE GRID”
axiomatic,....theoretic,.......and analogistic. deductive.....inductive, ......and abductive. proof, .......truth, ..........and meaningful. ideal,........real,............and imaginary. consistent....correspondent,...and coherent
-
“THE GRID” axiomatic,….theoretic,…….and analogistic. deductive…..inducti
“THE GRID”
axiomatic,....theoretic,.......and analogistic. deductive.....inductive, ......and abductive. proof, .......truth, ..........and meaningful. ideal,........real,............and imaginary. consistent....correspondent,...and coherent
-
A Little Deeper Understanding of The Ludic Fallacy and Why I Rarely Use Any Variation on “probable”.
The Ludic Fallacy consists in the error that probability can be calculated on unclosed systems, whereas outliers are of greater influence on consequences that change state than are regularities that maintain state. In other words, there are very few conditions under which dice are a model for probability, and the ratio of influence (change) is a log of the tail. Dice are closed systems. There are no outliers. Whereas in all other categories (real world) we are almost always measuring variations in a norm, not possible outliers – which although rare, are far more influential than the regularities we measure. In other words, we get what we measure but what we measure is largely unimportant, because it’s obvious and not influential. What we don’t measure is that which is not obvious and rare, but influential. When we predict the future we depend upon regularities. but if regularities exist then there is no profit to be made. it is from outliers that profits are made. This is a via negativa strategy, just as is falsification. Or stated otherwise, the unimaginable and improbable is more influential than the imaginable and probable. This is – reductio version – the whole point of Taleb’s work. And Taleb is, even if he doesn’t succeed, the counter to Keynesian Probabilism, the same way I am counter to Marxist pseudoscience.
-
A Little Deeper Understanding of The Ludic Fallacy and Why I Rarely Use Any Variation on “probable”.
The Ludic Fallacy consists in the error that probability can be calculated on unclosed systems, whereas outliers are of greater influence on consequences that change state than are regularities that maintain state. In other words, there are very few conditions under which dice are a model for probability, and the ratio of influence (change) is a log of the tail. Dice are closed systems. There are no outliers. Whereas in all other categories (real world) we are almost always measuring variations in a norm, not possible outliers – which although rare, are far more influential than the regularities we measure. In other words, we get what we measure but what we measure is largely unimportant, because it’s obvious and not influential. What we don’t measure is that which is not obvious and rare, but influential. When we predict the future we depend upon regularities. but if regularities exist then there is no profit to be made. it is from outliers that profits are made. This is a via negativa strategy, just as is falsification. Or stated otherwise, the unimaginable and improbable is more influential than the imaginable and probable. This is – reductio version – the whole point of Taleb’s work. And Taleb is, even if he doesn’t succeed, the counter to Keynesian Probabilism, the same way I am counter to Marxist pseudoscience.
-
Any Sufficiently Complex Theory Will Be Indistinguishable from Magic
—“Most people won’t understand the basis for [the Propertarian] legal theory, and it will need explanation in mythological terms. To the people who require this form of explanation it will essentially be a religion.”– Eric Orwoll You know, sometimes you just need someone to reframe it for you. Thanks Eric. That’s smart. You could ahve told me that three years ago and saved me six months… lol
-
Bottom Up, Top Down
BOTTOM UP, TOP DOWN Sometimes operational before descriptive, and sometimes descriptive before operational. by Dan Fodor I sometimes get ‘operational’ before I get ‘descriptive’ : I can spend hours running “simulations” of the math problem I’m trying to solve in my head (simple ex: visualize a cube to deduce its properties). This gets problematic if I forget to eat or forego attention to various mundane details around me. Anyway, the point is, when getting descriptive (or when passing from operational to descriptive), I need the lenience to speak vaguely (even if only to myself) before I can speak clearly.I suspect this is true for any new concept. Something must first be thought of before it can be spoken of. (a subtle bit of genius)
-
Bottom Up, Top Down
BOTTOM UP, TOP DOWN Sometimes operational before descriptive, and sometimes descriptive before operational. by Dan Fodor I sometimes get ‘operational’ before I get ‘descriptive’ : I can spend hours running “simulations” of the math problem I’m trying to solve in my head (simple ex: visualize a cube to deduce its properties). This gets problematic if I forget to eat or forego attention to various mundane details around me. Anyway, the point is, when getting descriptive (or when passing from operational to descriptive), I need the lenience to speak vaguely (even if only to myself) before I can speak clearly.I suspect this is true for any new concept. Something must first be thought of before it can be spoken of. (a subtle bit of genius)