Curt Doolittle

Category: Epistemology and Method

  • So, is Operationalism (ethical realism) the natural consequence of the failure o

    So, is Operationalism (ethical realism) the natural consequence of the failure of the analytic movement? Is that the final result of incorporating science and abandoning the pretense of rationalism?

    It is, I guess.

    Interesting.

    Science slowly consumes philosophy.

    If not, it is either error, deception by obscurantism, or deception by mysticism.

    Didn’t really plan on that big a program. lol.

    Oh well. At least I know what I am doing with the rest of my life….. 😉

    Source date (UTC): 2014-06-09 12:30:00 UTC

  • DRAFT – IMPROVING LESTER – OPERATIONALISM (I have to do more work on this but I’

    DRAFT – IMPROVING LESTER – OPERATIONALISM

    (I have to do more work on this but I’m running out of gas today. You probably can see what I’m doing.

    From Lester’s Leviathan:

    —“1. Interpersonal liberty exists to the extent that people do not impose costs on each other.”—JCLester

    (Note: Before we get going, note that I use the terms “Free Riding” and “Involuntary Transfer” as if to say “One free rides upon the actions of others when he causes an involuntary transfer of the other’s property. I prefer my terms as anyone would, but for all intents and purposes, the act of causing another a loss of property that he has accumulated is the same description regardless of whether we use the terms “imposed cost, involuntary transfer, theft, or free-riding” all of which semantically differ only in the point of view of the observer expressing the term and the historical loading associated with the terms.)

    -Interactions-

    Let us distinguish between the different possible forms of group interaction: (direct->)(Gv1)Genocide, (Gv2)Conquest, (Gv2)Conflict, (Gc)Competition, (Gp)Cooperation, (Ge) Exchange (production), (Gr1) Charity, (Gr2)Parasitism, (Gr3)Predation (<-indirect) because cooperation and conflict an be conducted by multiple means of severity and method.

    (show graph 1)

    -Conflict-

    Let us define conflict as the imposition of costs upon others; and let us define cooperation as the avoidance of the imposition of costs upon others.

    -Relations-

    Let us further distinguish between cooperation upon (Ck)Kin, (Ce) Ends, (Cm) Means, and (Ca) Avoidance/Boycott. (Because all relations are not equally important to us, and our kin are more important to us than those with whom cooperation is of little use.)

    (show graph 2)

    Let us define costs. Costs must be imposed against something? What is the definition of those things that we impose costs against? What is the positive assertion of the negative prohibition? We call that “Property” such that the negative prohibition on free riding (imposed costs) can be stated as positive examples that are possible to enumerate.

    -Property-

    Let us define property as (i) (Pa) that which I have homesteaded, (Pb) that which I have received in exchange, and (Pc) that which I have transformed from that which I have homesteaded or exchanged; and (ii) where under (Pa),(Pb), and (Pc), I acted with the presumption of a monopoly of control over private property, or in the construction of a commons (shareholder asset) that I may use but not ‘consume’, or in payment for a commons, that I constantly consume and must keep replenished (property rights are such a norm that is a constant unending cost).

    -Costs-

    So, costs are those actions which cause a decrease in property. Furthermore, let us define that which is not property, as that which it is impossible to impose costs upon.

    -Terms-

    Let us convert the spectrum of impositions into common language so that we can discuss legal, moral, and ethical violations in familiar terms..

    (1-Interpersonal-)

    Criminal

    Unethical

    (2-Impersonal-)

    Immoral

    (3-Organized-)

    Conspiratorial

    (4-External-)

    Invasion

    Conquest

    (Show graph 3)

    -Liberty- Let us define liberty as a successful implementation (habituation in a body of people) of a normative contact that forbids the involuntary imposition of costs upon others, and under which we can somehow logically resolve disputes by rational and non-subjective, means.

    If we have succeeded in constructing a normative contract, whether expressly stated, or merely habituated and intuited, for non predatory, non-parasitic and therefore productive, voluntary cooperation, and by consequence, for the voluntary organization of production, then we can claim to have constructed a condition of liberty, by constructing a contract for the condition of liberty. For a condition of liberty to exist, individuals must succeed in constructing a normative contract, and the means of resolving disputes under the terms of that contract.

    (Show liberty on the graph 4)

    That seems to be fairly settled reasoning. I guess, I’d have to ask, why such a thing was so unnatural that we would have to define it with such care and effort.

    ROTHBARDIAN LIBERTINISM

    The problem with the NAP/IVP is that it only addresses category #1-Criminal- property violations. And since humans universally demonstrate extraordinary willingness to apply even costly violence to punish violators of the entire spectrum, and that the state is necessary either to suppress such violations, or to suppress punishment of violators, the NAP/IVP is an insufficient definition of property for the rational formation of a voluntary polity. In other words, it doesn’t make sense to join a voluntary polity – the transaction costs are too high compared to a statist or high trust polity. Furthermore, the evidence is that (in the case of gypsies and jews) that periodic extermination is the punishment for relying upon rothbardian ethics. Or, as is the case in Muslim countries and Asia, high demand for both corruption and the state to suppress violence because of the permissibility of violations of property.

    More later

    Source date (UTC): 2014-06-09 12:07:00 UTC

  • Aphorisms are informationally dense. But argumentatively parsimonious. And they

    Aphorisms are informationally dense. But argumentatively parsimonious.

    And they are very hard to craft. They must ring true.

    The secret is that they must be well constructed sets.

    As well constructed sets, they are self evident.

    And composing well constructed sets, requires knowledge of construction.

    Not mere knowledge of use.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-06-07 05:06:00 UTC

  • We Require Exchange and 'Calculability', Not Yet Another Arbitrary Moral Argument

    Regarding: New Libertarians: New Promoters of a Welfare State johnmccaskey.com John. [G]ood piece. Although, I’m critical of philosophical pretense in social justice as much as I am in the market. If any judgment is beyond our perception, and any concept of social justice is, then we must, as in all other matters where complexity exceeds our perception, develop some kind of instrumentation and means of calculation such that we can reduce that which we cannot perceive, to some analogy to experience that we can perceive. Moral rules are not sufficient for achieving that kind of instrumentation, or performing that kind of calculation. The problems (of instrumentation and calculation) require formal institutions as a means of calculation. For example, we have the market for cooperating on means even if we disagree on ends. We have the government for forcing cooperation on means and ends by majority rule. We have accounting to assist us in the perception of that which we cannot possibly grasp without it. And we have economics to attempt to measure our success. But we have no such instrumentation and means of calculating “social justice” – or even defining such a thing as social justice. (Which current psychologists and economists suspect is reducible to status seeking, and insurance against risk, and nothing more.) Hayek addresses this thoroughly in TCoL. While we might continue to try to rely upon the methods of the past (philosophy), and attempt to concoct yet another empty incalculable moralism for the purported common good, these results are value judgements and nothing more. They are incalculable. Non Empirical. Unascertainable. [M]ost of the post-enlightenment philosophical effort has considered society a monopoly, in contrast to the pre-enlightenment condition of most urban cities, as federations of minorities denied access to political power, and forced to compete outside of politics, in the market. So the idea of social justice is an artifact of monopoly democracy rather than a federation of disparate interests. This is a fallacy. We have no common goals, only common means of cooperating to achieve disparate goals. However, libertarians rightly argue that the only moral test is that of voluntary exchange free of violent coercion. I argue that this ‘test’ is incorrect, since no in-group human organizations demonstrate that low a level of trust, And instead all groups demonstrate and require higher standards of trust, tah also forbid free riding, deception, cheating, as well as burdening other group members indirectly. However, whether we accept a low trust society and high demand for external authority that low trust societies demonstrate, or a high trust society and the low demand for external authority that high trust societies demonstrate, the underlying argument that the only test of moral action is voluntary exchange. So the effort that political philosophers left, libertarian and right have expended under the universalist assumption of the enlightenment has been to find some justification for moral decision making even if the knowledge to make such decisions is impossible both in the market, and afterward, using the profits created from the market. The question instead, is how to construct institutions with which groups can conduct voluntary exchanges, which are by definition moral. Majority rule does not allow this. Majority rule is sufficient for the selection of priorities in homogenous polities with homogenous interests. The market is the means by which heterogeneous polities cooperate on means despite different interests on ends. But how can we construct an institutional system that allows the construction of commons, and other exchanges between groups and classes, but is not dependent upon a monopoly bureaucracy, majority rule, or representatives open to influence, special interest, and corruption? Because a government of contracts, not laws, would allow the exchange of say, adherence to traditions and norms, or requirements for married families in order to obtain redistribution. This would make government a means of cooperation rather than the source and facilitator of conflict. Cheers Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

  • We Require Exchange and ‘Calculability’, Not Yet Another Arbitrary Moral Argument

    Regarding: New Libertarians: New Promoters of a Welfare State johnmccaskey.com John. [G]ood piece. Although, I’m critical of philosophical pretense in social justice as much as I am in the market. If any judgment is beyond our perception, and any concept of social justice is, then we must, as in all other matters where complexity exceeds our perception, develop some kind of instrumentation and means of calculation such that we can reduce that which we cannot perceive, to some analogy to experience that we can perceive. Moral rules are not sufficient for achieving that kind of instrumentation, or performing that kind of calculation. The problems (of instrumentation and calculation) require formal institutions as a means of calculation. For example, we have the market for cooperating on means even if we disagree on ends. We have the government for forcing cooperation on means and ends by majority rule. We have accounting to assist us in the perception of that which we cannot possibly grasp without it. And we have economics to attempt to measure our success. But we have no such instrumentation and means of calculating “social justice” – or even defining such a thing as social justice. (Which current psychologists and economists suspect is reducible to status seeking, and insurance against risk, and nothing more.) Hayek addresses this thoroughly in TCoL. While we might continue to try to rely upon the methods of the past (philosophy), and attempt to concoct yet another empty incalculable moralism for the purported common good, these results are value judgements and nothing more. They are incalculable. Non Empirical. Unascertainable. [M]ost of the post-enlightenment philosophical effort has considered society a monopoly, in contrast to the pre-enlightenment condition of most urban cities, as federations of minorities denied access to political power, and forced to compete outside of politics, in the market. So the idea of social justice is an artifact of monopoly democracy rather than a federation of disparate interests. This is a fallacy. We have no common goals, only common means of cooperating to achieve disparate goals. However, libertarians rightly argue that the only moral test is that of voluntary exchange free of violent coercion. I argue that this ‘test’ is incorrect, since no in-group human organizations demonstrate that low a level of trust, And instead all groups demonstrate and require higher standards of trust, tah also forbid free riding, deception, cheating, as well as burdening other group members indirectly. However, whether we accept a low trust society and high demand for external authority that low trust societies demonstrate, or a high trust society and the low demand for external authority that high trust societies demonstrate, the underlying argument that the only test of moral action is voluntary exchange. So the effort that political philosophers left, libertarian and right have expended under the universalist assumption of the enlightenment has been to find some justification for moral decision making even if the knowledge to make such decisions is impossible both in the market, and afterward, using the profits created from the market. The question instead, is how to construct institutions with which groups can conduct voluntary exchanges, which are by definition moral. Majority rule does not allow this. Majority rule is sufficient for the selection of priorities in homogenous polities with homogenous interests. The market is the means by which heterogeneous polities cooperate on means despite different interests on ends. But how can we construct an institutional system that allows the construction of commons, and other exchanges between groups and classes, but is not dependent upon a monopoly bureaucracy, majority rule, or representatives open to influence, special interest, and corruption? Because a government of contracts, not laws, would allow the exchange of say, adherence to traditions and norms, or requirements for married families in order to obtain redistribution. This would make government a means of cooperation rather than the source and facilitator of conflict. Cheers Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

  • THERE IS ONLY ONE. ALL ELSE IS FALLACY. 1) There is only one means of expressing

    THERE IS ONLY ONE. ALL ELSE IS FALLACY.

    1) There is only one means of expressing the truth: operationally. All else is fallacy: they are mere analogies.

    2) There is only one set of numbers: the natural numbers. All else is a fallacy: they are mere functions.

    3) There is only one cause of prohibited action, and property rights: the prohibition on free riding (involuntary transfer, imposition of costs). All else is fallacy. Justification of argument, and nothing more.

    4) There is only one test of moral action: fully informed, voluntary, productive exchange, backed by warranty. All else is a fallacy: justification for theft and nothing more.

    5) There is only one law and that is property. All else is a fallacy: they are mere commands.

    6) There is only one moral form of government: anarchy. All else is fallacy: they are mere justifications for the failure of sufficient articulation of property and property rights.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-06-06 11:39:00 UTC

  • We Can Now Objectively And Scientifically Judge Good Philosophers And Bad Philosophers

    (suggestions wanted) [I]f we acknowledge that democracy is a failure, and all philosophers who attempted to justify democracy failures, and all philosophers who attempted to expand democracy into socialism and postmodernism failures, we are left with instrumentalists (empiricists) and reactionaries of various fields. Philosophy as a discipline, must face the uncomfortable fact, that (a) the metaphysical program failed and was solved by cognitive science, and (b) the democratic program failed and was solved by economists (c) therefore the political program failed, and was solved by heterodox philosophers (d) the ethical problem failed and was solved by economists and heterodox philosophers. The reason for this is obvious: the incentives in Academia to attempt to replace the church’s mysticism with some sort of collectivist democratic rationalism, had it’s predictable influence. Philosophers can produce good neutral and bad influences. Unfortunately, the greater body of philosophers that have been influential since the american revolution, have been more destructive than beneficial. We can never forgive Marx and Freud, any more than we can forgive Kant and Rousseau. “Thou Shalt Not Harm” not only applies to doctors, but to philosophers, and to all of us. I give great weight to computer science because unlike the logic of language and unlike abstract and mathematical logic, computer science does not drop the property of operationalism in real time from its reasoning. As such it has higher correspondence with actionable reality than mathematics, and farm more so than formal logic. And if we seek to make informal logic of any value we must learn from computer science and return the property of operationalism to philosophical discourse. Because without it, it certainly appears to consist almost entirely of nonsense built upon linguistic deception. == 99. Aristotle 99. Niccolo Machiavelli 99. Adam Smith 99. Max Weber 99. Emile Durkheim 99. David Hume 99. John Locke 99. G.W.F. Hegel 99. Friedrich Nietzsche (lesser candidates) 99. Robert Michels 99. Steven Pinker 99. Jonathan Haidt == 99. Rene Descartes 99. Alan Turing 99. Karl Popper 99. Gottlob Frege 99. W.V.O. Quine 99. Saul Kripke THE BAD PHILOSOPHERS 99. Immanuel Kant 99. Ludwig Wittgenstein 99. Karl Marx 99. Soren Kierkegaard 99. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 20. John Rawls 99. Martin Heidegger 99. Jacques Derrida 99. Michelle Foucault 99. Jean-François Lyotard 99. Jean Baudrillard 99. Murray Rothbard THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL’S BAD PHILOSOPHERS Max Horkheimer Theodor W. Adorno Herbert Marcuse Friedrich Pollock Erich Fromm Otto Kirchheimer Leo Löwenthal Franz Leopold Neumann Siegfried Kracauer Alfred Sohn-Rethel Walter Benjamin Jürgen Habermas Claus Offe Axel Honneth Oskar Negt Alfred Schmidt Albrecht Wellmer

  • We Can Now Objectively And Scientifically Judge Good Philosophers And Bad Philosophers

    (suggestions wanted) [I]f we acknowledge that democracy is a failure, and all philosophers who attempted to justify democracy failures, and all philosophers who attempted to expand democracy into socialism and postmodernism failures, we are left with instrumentalists (empiricists) and reactionaries of various fields. Philosophy as a discipline, must face the uncomfortable fact, that (a) the metaphysical program failed and was solved by cognitive science, and (b) the democratic program failed and was solved by economists (c) therefore the political program failed, and was solved by heterodox philosophers (d) the ethical problem failed and was solved by economists and heterodox philosophers. The reason for this is obvious: the incentives in Academia to attempt to replace the church’s mysticism with some sort of collectivist democratic rationalism, had it’s predictable influence. Philosophers can produce good neutral and bad influences. Unfortunately, the greater body of philosophers that have been influential since the american revolution, have been more destructive than beneficial. We can never forgive Marx and Freud, any more than we can forgive Kant and Rousseau. “Thou Shalt Not Harm” not only applies to doctors, but to philosophers, and to all of us. I give great weight to computer science because unlike the logic of language and unlike abstract and mathematical logic, computer science does not drop the property of operationalism in real time from its reasoning. As such it has higher correspondence with actionable reality than mathematics, and farm more so than formal logic. And if we seek to make informal logic of any value we must learn from computer science and return the property of operationalism to philosophical discourse. Because without it, it certainly appears to consist almost entirely of nonsense built upon linguistic deception. == 99. Aristotle 99. Niccolo Machiavelli 99. Adam Smith 99. Max Weber 99. Emile Durkheim 99. David Hume 99. John Locke 99. G.W.F. Hegel 99. Friedrich Nietzsche (lesser candidates) 99. Robert Michels 99. Steven Pinker 99. Jonathan Haidt == 99. Rene Descartes 99. Alan Turing 99. Karl Popper 99. Gottlob Frege 99. W.V.O. Quine 99. Saul Kripke THE BAD PHILOSOPHERS 99. Immanuel Kant 99. Ludwig Wittgenstein 99. Karl Marx 99. Soren Kierkegaard 99. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 20. John Rawls 99. Martin Heidegger 99. Jacques Derrida 99. Michelle Foucault 99. Jean-François Lyotard 99. Jean Baudrillard 99. Murray Rothbard THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL’S BAD PHILOSOPHERS Max Horkheimer Theodor W. Adorno Herbert Marcuse Friedrich Pollock Erich Fromm Otto Kirchheimer Leo Löwenthal Franz Leopold Neumann Siegfried Kracauer Alfred Sohn-Rethel Walter Benjamin Jürgen Habermas Claus Offe Axel Honneth Oskar Negt Alfred Schmidt Albrecht Wellmer

  • The Measure of A Philosopher: Beneficially Novel, Good, Bad(wrong), And Dangerous

    (Discussion on Bleeding Heart Libertarians: The Measure of an Economist or a Philosopher) All, [A] good economists provides us with insights into the state of affairs we live in. A novel economists provides us with new general rules (a theory). A good philosopher explains or re-explains the changes in the world to us in current language. A novel philosopher provides us with a new general rule (a theory). It is not better to be good or novel. It is most important that one not be dangerous. Freud, Marx and Cantor reintroduced mysticism in the form of obscurantism. Russell compounded that new mysticism. The postmoderns have been terribly damaging to institutions, morality and language. Rothbard did more damage than good. Most of his history is quite good. His ethics were a catastrophe and set us back by decades. A disaster I have been struggling to correct. So one can be novel, one can be good, one can be wrong and one can be destructive. I don’t care much about the first three. The fourth quadrant is what I worry about most. Because bad and dangerous philosophy turns out to spread far faster than good and beneficially novel philosophy. Just like bad news spreads faster than good. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute. Kiev.

  • The Measure of A Philosopher: Beneficially Novel, Good, Bad(wrong), And Dangerous

    (Discussion on Bleeding Heart Libertarians: The Measure of an Economist or a Philosopher) All, [A] good economists provides us with insights into the state of affairs we live in. A novel economists provides us with new general rules (a theory). A good philosopher explains or re-explains the changes in the world to us in current language. A novel philosopher provides us with a new general rule (a theory). It is not better to be good or novel. It is most important that one not be dangerous. Freud, Marx and Cantor reintroduced mysticism in the form of obscurantism. Russell compounded that new mysticism. The postmoderns have been terribly damaging to institutions, morality and language. Rothbard did more damage than good. Most of his history is quite good. His ethics were a catastrophe and set us back by decades. A disaster I have been struggling to correct. So one can be novel, one can be good, one can be wrong and one can be destructive. I don’t care much about the first three. The fourth quadrant is what I worry about most. Because bad and dangerous philosophy turns out to spread far faster than good and beneficially novel philosophy. Just like bad news spreads faster than good. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute. Kiev.