Curt Doolittle

Category: Epistemology and Method

  • SHORT COURSE IN TESTIMONIAL TRUTH (worth repeating)

    http://www.propertarianism.com/2015/06/28/a-short-course-on-propertarianisms-testimonial-truth/A SHORT COURSE IN TESTIMONIAL TRUTH

    (worth repeating)

    Source date (UTC): 2015-07-20 09:28:00 UTC

  • So a problem in math is quite different from a more complex problem in economics

    So a problem in math is quite different from a more complex problem in economics.

    Source date (UTC): 2015-07-19 19:56:16 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/622857507149643776

    Reply addressees: @SanguineEmpiric

    Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/622534270104395776

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    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/622534270104395776

  • What Is Critical Rationalism?

    [C]ritical Rationalism is an epistemology developed for scientific inquiry. It is the inverse of justificationary rationalism. ASSERTIONS: 1) That justificationism tells us us nothing about truth content (you can support something as much as you want but that does not make it true.) 2) That the means of creating an hypothesis are irrelevant. Instead, if hypothesis survives all possible criticism, it remains a truth candidate. 3) That the evolutionary sequence: intuition, hypothesis, theory, law, and tautology applies universally, and that justificationary language is merely false. 4) That even if we identify a very parsimonious truth candidate with broad explanatory power, we may never know if it is the most parsimonious truth candidate possible (“the truth”). 5) That we cannot choose between the likelihood of competing theories (“critical preference”). (I see this as a guiding logical or moral principle but not an empirical one.)

    SUMMARY One’s testimony (promise of truth) can rely upon: ……..1) Justification: An Impersonal Proof of Truth; –or– ……..2) Criticism: A Personal Warranty against imaginary content, error, bias, wishful thinking, and deception. Since the first is impossible, we are left with the second. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine (London)

  • What Is Critical Rationalism?

    [C]ritical Rationalism is an epistemology developed for scientific inquiry. It is the inverse of justificationary rationalism. ASSERTIONS: 1) That justificationism tells us us nothing about truth content (you can support something as much as you want but that does not make it true.) 2) That the means of creating an hypothesis are irrelevant. Instead, if hypothesis survives all possible criticism, it remains a truth candidate. 3) That the evolutionary sequence: intuition, hypothesis, theory, law, and tautology applies universally, and that justificationary language is merely false. 4) That even if we identify a very parsimonious truth candidate with broad explanatory power, we may never know if it is the most parsimonious truth candidate possible (“the truth”). 5) That we cannot choose between the likelihood of competing theories (“critical preference”). (I see this as a guiding logical or moral principle but not an empirical one.)

    SUMMARY One’s testimony (promise of truth) can rely upon: ……..1) Justification: An Impersonal Proof of Truth; –or– ……..2) Criticism: A Personal Warranty against imaginary content, error, bias, wishful thinking, and deception. Since the first is impossible, we are left with the second. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine (London)

  • How Can I Reform Critical Rationalists?

    (important question) [I]s it hopeless? In other words, I think I understand the (libertarian) cognitive bias that draws people to critical rationalism. But that bias is in favor of stimulation junkies – novelty and the signaling value of superior intellect.
    1) Now, first, how do I show that it’s one thing to acknowledge the necessity of critical rationalism (theoretical darwinism), and another thing to PREFER critical rationalism because it suits a cognitive bias. It’s one thing to prefer invention and another thing to say that if critical rationalism is true, then why can’t we place the same constraints on public speech in economics and politics that we place upon publishing of scientific papers? If we can punish people for fraudulent publication in the physical sciences (we do) then why can’t we punish people for fraudulent publication in the social sciences? If we can punish liars in court then why can’t we punish liars in in politics, when politics is a vehicle for theft? There isn’t any difference. When we use justificationism then we argue that something is true. When we use criticism – testimonialism – we argue only that we have done due diligence against falsehoods. When we place goods and services in the market we require implied warranty and due diligence from harm, and often we require bonding and insurance. So why can we not require the same for political speech? We don’t allow physical hazards, we don’t allow verbal hazards (fire in a theatre), so why do we allow political and economic hazards? 2) Second, that the critical process of truth telling (laundering imaginary content, error, bias, wishful thinking, deception and lying) is universal, not specific to science? That the scientific method as used in the physical sciences is merely incomplete? That it is also usually mis-stated(falsification, limits, parsimony, existence proof.) That there is no difference between production of a good, the invention of a process, or the development of a theory, other than the value one places on the output? So that science, testimony and philosophy are synonyms if not tautologies? 3) Third, that it appears that critical preference is a logical but not empirical constraint. In practice it appears that in both human cooperation (social science) and physical science, that the least cost means of investigation does appear to provide the shortest path to discovery, because physical processes, evolutionary processes, and rational incentives operate by the shortest path. While greater empirical content may be found by other means, the least cost appears to be the most predictably productive for both falsification and for discovery. I don’t tolerate the invectives of some of the ideologues, but it would be interesting if someone who was capable could help me understand if this is possible or not. Thanks Curt

  • How Can I Reform Critical Rationalists?

    (important question) [I]s it hopeless? In other words, I think I understand the (libertarian) cognitive bias that draws people to critical rationalism. But that bias is in favor of stimulation junkies – novelty and the signaling value of superior intellect.
    1) Now, first, how do I show that it’s one thing to acknowledge the necessity of critical rationalism (theoretical darwinism), and another thing to PREFER critical rationalism because it suits a cognitive bias. It’s one thing to prefer invention and another thing to say that if critical rationalism is true, then why can’t we place the same constraints on public speech in economics and politics that we place upon publishing of scientific papers? If we can punish people for fraudulent publication in the physical sciences (we do) then why can’t we punish people for fraudulent publication in the social sciences? If we can punish liars in court then why can’t we punish liars in in politics, when politics is a vehicle for theft? There isn’t any difference. When we use justificationism then we argue that something is true. When we use criticism – testimonialism – we argue only that we have done due diligence against falsehoods. When we place goods and services in the market we require implied warranty and due diligence from harm, and often we require bonding and insurance. So why can we not require the same for political speech? We don’t allow physical hazards, we don’t allow verbal hazards (fire in a theatre), so why do we allow political and economic hazards? 2) Second, that the critical process of truth telling (laundering imaginary content, error, bias, wishful thinking, deception and lying) is universal, not specific to science? That the scientific method as used in the physical sciences is merely incomplete? That it is also usually mis-stated(falsification, limits, parsimony, existence proof.) That there is no difference between production of a good, the invention of a process, or the development of a theory, other than the value one places on the output? So that science, testimony and philosophy are synonyms if not tautologies? 3) Third, that it appears that critical preference is a logical but not empirical constraint. In practice it appears that in both human cooperation (social science) and physical science, that the least cost means of investigation does appear to provide the shortest path to discovery, because physical processes, evolutionary processes, and rational incentives operate by the shortest path. While greater empirical content may be found by other means, the least cost appears to be the most predictably productive for both falsification and for discovery. I don’t tolerate the invectives of some of the ideologues, but it would be interesting if someone who was capable could help me understand if this is possible or not. Thanks Curt

  • I’m Prosecuting You. It’s not a Debate.

    [W]e aren’t debating, or discoursing. We can’t debate or discourse until we’re not lying. Until we’re not lying we’re in conflict. So I am prosecuting your ideas to ensure you’re not lying. Only after you’re no longer lying, can we say that we are negotiating an exchange. But if we start from your premise of lying, and your premise of falsehoods, an honest exchange is not possible. If an honest exchange is not possible, then violence is preferable. So I am not trying to discover the truth. The truth is unknowable. I am not trying to discover an optimum solution, because it may be unknowable. I am only trying to ensure that you are not engaging in error, bias, wishful thinking, and deception. At that point, what remains is but truth. And all truthful exchanges of mutual benefit are ‘true’ and ‘optimum’. And all lies and thefts by lie are neither true nor optimum. So you start from the position of maximizing benefit. I start from the position of needing a reason not to kill you for lying.

    (PS: If you combine ethical propertarianism with personal stoicism you are probably the very best thinker that man can be.)

  • I’m Prosecuting You. It’s not a Debate.

    [W]e aren’t debating, or discoursing. We can’t debate or discourse until we’re not lying. Until we’re not lying we’re in conflict. So I am prosecuting your ideas to ensure you’re not lying. Only after you’re no longer lying, can we say that we are negotiating an exchange. But if we start from your premise of lying, and your premise of falsehoods, an honest exchange is not possible. If an honest exchange is not possible, then violence is preferable. So I am not trying to discover the truth. The truth is unknowable. I am not trying to discover an optimum solution, because it may be unknowable. I am only trying to ensure that you are not engaging in error, bias, wishful thinking, and deception. At that point, what remains is but truth. And all truthful exchanges of mutual benefit are ‘true’ and ‘optimum’. And all lies and thefts by lie are neither true nor optimum. So you start from the position of maximizing benefit. I start from the position of needing a reason not to kill you for lying.

    (PS: If you combine ethical propertarianism with personal stoicism you are probably the very best thinker that man can be.)

  • “We don’t agree that…”– [W]ell saying we don’t agree is to use a rhetorical f

    –“We don’t agree that…”–

    [W]ell saying we don’t agree is to use a rhetorical fallacy. Statements are true, false, or incomplete, whether we agree with one another or not. 1) There exist no laws of science itself. There exist, and we have evolved, procedures that we use to eliminate error, bias, wishful thinking and deceit from our hypothesis. These processes do not tell us a statement is true, they tell us only that it remains a truth candidate if it survives that set of criticisms. 2) There exist intuitions, hypothesis, theories, laws, and tautologies, because we have constructed them, and demonstrate them as such. 3) But there exist no non-tautological, yet certain premises: in other words, in any statement of arbitrary precision, we must seek limits, because all general rules possess limits. This is where mises failed by attempting to make use of justificationary Kantian rationalism instead of critical Popperian rationalism:science. Since there are no certain premises there are no certain deductions. Since there are laws we may deduce from them outcomes of equal precision. But if these are imprecise, then so are our deductions. 4) We can construct descriptive statements (theories) that are true, but inactionable, because they lack sufficient precision. A regularity may be so slow (business cycles, political cycles, generation cycles, and civilizational cycles) that no matter what we do within them, it is merely noise. Mises proposition that history is non-regular is based upon the presumption that each exchange is unique because it is both subjective and momentary. But he also proposes that we can empathize (sympathize) with economic statements and thereby test the rationality of any incentive. This pair of propositions constitutes is a logical contradiction. Since we can decide whether an incentive is rational, and we can test the rationality of others decisions (it’s how we test liars in court), then our judgements are marginally indifferent. If they are marginally indifferent, then they can be represented as constants. So at one end of the spectrum, decisions are marginally indifferent and we have tested this in thousands of ways in both economics and experimental psychology. And at the other end his purported axioms (action), and his purported laws (inflation, the neutrality of money, minimum wage) are both sufficiently imprecise as to be inactionable. When in fact, it is possible to produce intentional externalities by intentionally mainpulating these behaviors caused by assymetric information and resource distribution. And we can (quite accurately) measure those distortions. So it is not that these systems are not regular (they are), or that they are not deterministic (they are), or that they are not actionable (they are actionable), and therefore they are scientifically testable. Instead of being impervious to science in the development of general rules, it’s that these actions are immoral: they cause involuntary transfers from people with lower/longer time preference, to those with higher/shorter time preference, and thereby not only steal, but deprive the commons of behavioral change necessary to preserve extended time preference. ie: mises confused a moral theft, with a scientific truth. This is just one of his many failings in developing his pseudoscientific kantian nonsense – for which he was outcast from the profession, justifiably. His second main failing was that he did not grasp that he intuited (as did brouwer in math and bridgman in physics) that praxeology produced proofs of construction, but was insufficient for deduction. A proof of construction is necessary (not only in economics but in mathematics) to demonstrate that an economic statement is existentially possible. It is a means of attempting to falsify a statement. But most economic effects are not deducible, they are only observable empirically, and then explainable. They are explainable by attempting to construct them from a sequence of rational operations. If they cannot be constructed, then we cannot construct an existence proof, and as such a statement cannot be possible. It is possible to construct existence proofs for human actions under Keynesianism. But these proofs tell us that such manipulation is an act of deception that causes involuntary transfers (thefts). It is not that such actions are unscientific. As such mises was incorrect. He convused the immoral and the unscientifc. He confused justifiacationism under moral contract, with truth-candidates that survive criticism. This is a non-trivial subject. It is probably one of the most important philosopihical questions that hte 20th century philosophers failed to solve. As did all those before them. But it’s solved now. Mises was just wrong. He was a cosmopolitan, and an austro-hungarian both, and he simple failed. He failed worse than brouwer and bridgman. And because he failed, and Hayek failed, we were subject to a century of deceit. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • “We don’t agree that…”– [W]ell saying we don’t agree is to use a rhetorical f

    –“We don’t agree that…”–

    [W]ell saying we don’t agree is to use a rhetorical fallacy. Statements are true, false, or incomplete, whether we agree with one another or not. 1) There exist no laws of science itself. There exist, and we have evolved, procedures that we use to eliminate error, bias, wishful thinking and deceit from our hypothesis. These processes do not tell us a statement is true, they tell us only that it remains a truth candidate if it survives that set of criticisms. 2) There exist intuitions, hypothesis, theories, laws, and tautologies, because we have constructed them, and demonstrate them as such. 3) But there exist no non-tautological, yet certain premises: in other words, in any statement of arbitrary precision, we must seek limits, because all general rules possess limits. This is where mises failed by attempting to make use of justificationary Kantian rationalism instead of critical Popperian rationalism:science. Since there are no certain premises there are no certain deductions. Since there are laws we may deduce from them outcomes of equal precision. But if these are imprecise, then so are our deductions. 4) We can construct descriptive statements (theories) that are true, but inactionable, because they lack sufficient precision. A regularity may be so slow (business cycles, political cycles, generation cycles, and civilizational cycles) that no matter what we do within them, it is merely noise. Mises proposition that history is non-regular is based upon the presumption that each exchange is unique because it is both subjective and momentary. But he also proposes that we can empathize (sympathize) with economic statements and thereby test the rationality of any incentive. This pair of propositions constitutes is a logical contradiction. Since we can decide whether an incentive is rational, and we can test the rationality of others decisions (it’s how we test liars in court), then our judgements are marginally indifferent. If they are marginally indifferent, then they can be represented as constants. So at one end of the spectrum, decisions are marginally indifferent and we have tested this in thousands of ways in both economics and experimental psychology. And at the other end his purported axioms (action), and his purported laws (inflation, the neutrality of money, minimum wage) are both sufficiently imprecise as to be inactionable. When in fact, it is possible to produce intentional externalities by intentionally mainpulating these behaviors caused by assymetric information and resource distribution. And we can (quite accurately) measure those distortions. So it is not that these systems are not regular (they are), or that they are not deterministic (they are), or that they are not actionable (they are actionable), and therefore they are scientifically testable. Instead of being impervious to science in the development of general rules, it’s that these actions are immoral: they cause involuntary transfers from people with lower/longer time preference, to those with higher/shorter time preference, and thereby not only steal, but deprive the commons of behavioral change necessary to preserve extended time preference. ie: mises confused a moral theft, with a scientific truth. This is just one of his many failings in developing his pseudoscientific kantian nonsense – for which he was outcast from the profession, justifiably. His second main failing was that he did not grasp that he intuited (as did brouwer in math and bridgman in physics) that praxeology produced proofs of construction, but was insufficient for deduction. A proof of construction is necessary (not only in economics but in mathematics) to demonstrate that an economic statement is existentially possible. It is a means of attempting to falsify a statement. But most economic effects are not deducible, they are only observable empirically, and then explainable. They are explainable by attempting to construct them from a sequence of rational operations. If they cannot be constructed, then we cannot construct an existence proof, and as such a statement cannot be possible. It is possible to construct existence proofs for human actions under Keynesianism. But these proofs tell us that such manipulation is an act of deception that causes involuntary transfers (thefts). It is not that such actions are unscientific. As such mises was incorrect. He convused the immoral and the unscientifc. He confused justifiacationism under moral contract, with truth-candidates that survive criticism. This is a non-trivial subject. It is probably one of the most important philosopihical questions that hte 20th century philosophers failed to solve. As did all those before them. But it’s solved now. Mises was just wrong. He was a cosmopolitan, and an austro-hungarian both, and he simple failed. He failed worse than brouwer and bridgman. And because he failed, and Hayek failed, we were subject to a century of deceit. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine