Category: Economics, Finance, and Political Economy

  • SENTENCES TO TREMBLE BY From Tyler Cowen —“It is far from clear whether Europe

    SENTENCES TO TREMBLE BY

    From Tyler Cowen

    —“It is far from clear whether Europe can act as an engine of world recovery.”—


    Source date (UTC): 2015-05-27 04:51:00 UTC

  • MY PURPOSE IN REFORMING AUSTRIAN ECON: SCIENCE (from elsewhere) Peter, Thanks fo

    MY PURPOSE IN REFORMING AUSTRIAN ECON: SCIENCE

    (from elsewhere)

    Peter,

    Thanks for the response. Sorry this is long, but it takes what it takes.

    —“Read one way….read another way”—

    Well of course. But then, that is the difference between analytic (empirical criticism) and continental (rational justification). Or more precisely, that’s the difference between science and philosophy.

    But it is not just a binary choice. I can read it a third way: that Mises was a member of the cosmopolitan enlightenment and subject to the category errors of that movement. Just as anglos, french and germans were subject to the errors of their enlightenments: the attempt to universalize local competitive group strategies into general moral rules. That is the goal of each of the enlightenment movements: Anglo island, French imperial, German Territorial, and Jewish diasporic strategies expressed as rational rather than mythological arguments.

    I think it’ might help to understand the purpose for my criticism:

    (1) It’s necessary to the defeat of the broader problem of cosmopolitan pseudoscience, anglo neo-puritanism, postmodern propagandism, and less so, german idealism – in all disciplines.

    (2) It’s necessary to undermine the libertarian problem-children: Rothbardians, who promote psudosicence, objective immorality, pseudorationalism, and justificationism. (People who I am very proud to have done substantial damage to over the past year – and will continue to.)

    3) It’s necessary to restate western liberty in scientific rather than rational terms in order to save the rule of law, and with it, liberty.

    So if I am hard on Mises, it’s because of these three reasons. I have to be. Because without institutionaliing a means of ending deceit, where loading, framing, overloading via propaganda and pseudoscience are principle tools of coercion, there is no possible means of reconstructing liberty.

    I am such an admirer of yours because you are a good and moral man; a great communicator; arguably one of the great teachers in the field; but your incentives as such are sympathetic and explicative, not corrective. Mine are corrective and revolutionary: the problem of pseudoscience (which has a very precise meaning) in economics, which Romer has tried to bring to the forefront, is central to the perceived Heterodoxy of Austrian economics (or more correctly “Moral Economics”).

    Mises was right in this regard: if any economic statement cannot be constructed through subjectively testable operations (human judgements in response to available information) then no proof has been demonstrated. A proof is not confirmation, it is merely a criticism. A means of falsification. If a statement survives a proof, then it is at least existentially possible.

    If it took very smart people in mathematics to create the foundations of mathematics, it will take very smart people in economics to create the foundations of economics – because the well is poisoned. Mises was very close, but for cultural reasons endemic to his era, he failed.

    This is a very complex problem, or someone else would have solved it by now. I am just lucky to live in the internet era, and have had the luxury of studying all of the disciplines, and stumbling upon Mises by accident via Hoppe’s inverted but still brilliant application of economic language to moral argument. All his other errors aside, his pedantic rigor was the first application of operational analysis using property and voluntary exchange to all of social science.

    The operational revolution failed: Minsky in Computer Science, Mises in economics, Bridgman in physics, Brouwer in Math, Popper in Philosophy.

    Einstein demonstrated the problem (frame) and instigated both Brouwer and Bridgman: no premises are certain. None.

    Economics can be the study of objective morality or of objective immorality. At present, the fallacy of majority rule provides incentive to justify objectively immoral economics, and to sideline as heterodox moral economics.

    So saving the west, saving rule of law, saving economics, saving philosophy, saving western truth, and correcting the century of pseudoscience, are all identical problems: completing the minimum set of warranties of due diligence necessary to testify that one has eliminated imaginary content, error, bias, and deceit.

    Austrian economics and conservative social mores are empirical: when the evidence forces change in behavior, then norms and law should reflect it – not before. This is an empirical and anti-hubristic philosophy. But Austrian econ and Conservative social philosophy are not yet scientific: meaning not yet truthfully stated and warrantied.

    That is what I am trying to accomplish (and think I have.)

    Cheers

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine


    Source date (UTC): 2015-05-24 03:45:00 UTC

  • Why do we conduct economic analysis in monetary terms rather than work hours? Yo

    Why do we conduct economic analysis in monetary terms rather than work hours? You can judge the productivity of those hours – sure. But consumption must be measured in hours, production in hours. Everything else is basically some sort of deception of convenience?

    Talk about ‘mathiness’? OMG. The only measure of consumption was caloric. Now its both caloric and informational. Any ‘family’ metric is another deceit.

    Pseudoscience is too prevalent in macro.

    IT might sound like I am a neophyte making an ancient argument, but that’s not the case. The problem is that political issues are driven by time and stress. And that consumption in information eras cannot be easily measured in physical terms.


    Source date (UTC): 2015-05-21 07:51:00 UTC

  • CORRUPTION DOESN”T GREASE THE WHEELS. IT”S RUST. —Whether demands for bribes f

    http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/05/12/wber.lhv001.abstractNO. CORRUPTION DOESN”T GREASE THE WHEELS. IT”S RUST.

    —Whether demands for bribes for particular government services are associated with expedited or delayed policy implementation underlies debates around the role of corruption in private sector development. The “grease the wheels” hypothesis, which contends that bribes act as speed money, implies three testable predictions. First, on average, bribe requests should be negatively correlated with wait times. Second, this relationship should vary across firms, with those with the highest opportunity cost of waiting being more likely to pay and facing shorter delays. Third, the role of grease should vary across countries, with benefits larger where regulatory burdens are greatest. The data are inconsistent with all three predictions. According to the preferred specifications, ceteris paribus, firms confronted with demands for bribes take approximately 1.5 times longer to get a construction permit, operating license, or electrical connection than firms that did not have to pay bribes and, respectively, 1.2 and 1.4 times longer to clear customs when exporting and importing. The results are robust to controlling for firm fixed effects and at odds with the notion that corruption enhances efficiency.—


    Source date (UTC): 2015-05-19 21:27:00 UTC

  • Using Income as a Measure Is a Pseudoscientific Distraction

    [T]he question is better served by how we spend our time, what we consume, and what we worry about, than any measure of income. Income is a poor proxy for measuring inter-temporal changes in consumption, and is only a useful measure of temporal asymmetry. What is for example, the cost of not fearing the soviet union, the change in crime in Boston and new York?

    Conversely, what is the cost of increase in political friction due to immigration? What is the cost of the conflict over Obamacare? What is the cost of maintaining the post-war empire (probably neutral). What is the cost of outsourcing? What is the cost of failing to reform education? Income is the least important of these measures. And that is precisely why it’s the topic of conversation: because it is the least important but the most emotionally loaded topic. It is an elaborate pseudoscientific distraction for purely political purposes.
  • Using Income as a Measure Is a Pseudoscientific Distraction

    [T]he question is better served by how we spend our time, what we consume, and what we worry about, than any measure of income. Income is a poor proxy for measuring inter-temporal changes in consumption, and is only a useful measure of temporal asymmetry. What is for example, the cost of not fearing the soviet union, the change in crime in Boston and new York?

    Conversely, what is the cost of increase in political friction due to immigration? What is the cost of the conflict over Obamacare? What is the cost of maintaining the post-war empire (probably neutral). What is the cost of outsourcing? What is the cost of failing to reform education? Income is the least important of these measures. And that is precisely why it’s the topic of conversation: because it is the least important but the most emotionally loaded topic. It is an elaborate pseudoscientific distraction for purely political purposes.
  • Territorial, Institutional, Normative,  and Technological Competitive Value

    (profound) [I]’ve been arguing for two decades that we have had 500 years of ‘unusual’ as we spread the voluntary organization of production around the world (often by force), and conquered and exploited two new continents. And that what we see is the new normal. There aren’t enough asymmetries to exploit any longer to maintain the prior asymmetry of wealth.

    Or rather, normative asymmetries (institutions) are terribly productive and last for generations if maintained, territorial asymmetries are almost as productive, and can last for generations if trade routes are maintained, while technological asymmetries are decreasingly durable. Or as technologists tend to say: “technology is not a competitive advantage” because it is so easily neutralized. Conversely, territorial, trade route, and normative asymmetries produce for the long run. Hence my (and Taleb’s) concern about fragility. And my concern that the progressive fantasy of technology as savior, and norm as inhibitor is backwards.

    Source: Curt Doolittle

  • To Nassim Taleb re: A Decline in Violence is Not a Decline in Predation – But A Shift.

    [N]assim (re: violence) I’d like to add an economist’s point of view: that the use of the term ‘violence’ is obscurant. (In my lexicon that is equivalent to pseudoscientific). Humans engage in a vast spectrum of parasitism whenever possible, and in production only when easy or necessary. Parasitism can be performed by violence, theft, fraud, fraud by omission, fraud by obscurantism, imposed cost by indirection, free riding, privatization of commons, socialization of losses, conspiracy to extort, by normative conversion, by immigration, asymmetric reproduction, conquest, and genocide. Conversely, mutually beneficial, productive, warrantied, fully informed, cooperation by voluntary exchange is, by contrast, a very narrow field of human activity in a vast spectrum of parasitism. Over the centuries we have increasingly abstracted assets (that which we seek to consume by parasitism), from the physical to, fragments of a value chain, to mere numerical promises (accounts), so that violence is almost useless as a means of obtaining wealth. However, the volume of predation and parasitism performed by violence, is currently performed by various forms of pseudo-scientific and pseudo-moral fraud instead of violence. But the parasitism remains. Humans are open to coercion by only three technologies: Gossip(religion and morality), remuneration(trade, credit, tax and redistribution), or threat of violence(law,military). Although at any times some people specialize in some axis of coercion (public intellectuals:gossip, government:violence, corporations:purchasing influence.) So if we have exchanged parasitism via violence, for parasitism via pseudoscientific fraud (which is one aspect of what I believe you are investigating), then the form of parasitism has changed, but not the parasitism itself. We might argue that some form of parasitic equilibrium is actually some sort of Pareto optimum. But that is very different from saying that parasitism no longer exists, or has decreased. So as far as I am able to tell, net change in parasitism is zero, or perhaps as some people argue, we have seen a dramatic increase. It is just that we have created sufficient technology that our parasitism by pseudoscience does not injure production as much as parasitism by violence does. Furthermore, all the great syntopical historians have, as far as I know, come to the same conclusion: that since 1945, the Pax Americana is only paralleled by the Pax Romana. I argue rather frequently (as do many historians) that all economic measures since 1600 are little more than the reflection of the distribution of consumer capitalism, accounting, and rule of law around the world at the point of British gunships. So to address violence instead of parasitism, is to blind one’s self to the rest of the spectrum of human criminality in order to congratulate one’s self on having invented a more effective form of crime. Affections. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine. Source: Curt Doolittle – Nassim Nicholas Taleb (re: violence) I’d like…

  • To Nassim Taleb re: A Decline in Violence is Not a Decline in Predation – But A Shift.

    [N]assim (re: violence) I’d like to add an economist’s point of view: that the use of the term ‘violence’ is obscurant. (In my lexicon that is equivalent to pseudoscientific). Humans engage in a vast spectrum of parasitism whenever possible, and in production only when easy or necessary. Parasitism can be performed by violence, theft, fraud, fraud by omission, fraud by obscurantism, imposed cost by indirection, free riding, privatization of commons, socialization of losses, conspiracy to extort, by normative conversion, by immigration, asymmetric reproduction, conquest, and genocide. Conversely, mutually beneficial, productive, warrantied, fully informed, cooperation by voluntary exchange is, by contrast, a very narrow field of human activity in a vast spectrum of parasitism. Over the centuries we have increasingly abstracted assets (that which we seek to consume by parasitism), from the physical to, fragments of a value chain, to mere numerical promises (accounts), so that violence is almost useless as a means of obtaining wealth. However, the volume of predation and parasitism performed by violence, is currently performed by various forms of pseudo-scientific and pseudo-moral fraud instead of violence. But the parasitism remains. Humans are open to coercion by only three technologies: Gossip(religion and morality), remuneration(trade, credit, tax and redistribution), or threat of violence(law,military). Although at any times some people specialize in some axis of coercion (public intellectuals:gossip, government:violence, corporations:purchasing influence.) So if we have exchanged parasitism via violence, for parasitism via pseudoscientific fraud (which is one aspect of what I believe you are investigating), then the form of parasitism has changed, but not the parasitism itself. We might argue that some form of parasitic equilibrium is actually some sort of Pareto optimum. But that is very different from saying that parasitism no longer exists, or has decreased. So as far as I am able to tell, net change in parasitism is zero, or perhaps as some people argue, we have seen a dramatic increase. It is just that we have created sufficient technology that our parasitism by pseudoscience does not injure production as much as parasitism by violence does. Furthermore, all the great syntopical historians have, as far as I know, come to the same conclusion: that since 1945, the Pax Americana is only paralleled by the Pax Romana. I argue rather frequently (as do many historians) that all economic measures since 1600 are little more than the reflection of the distribution of consumer capitalism, accounting, and rule of law around the world at the point of British gunships. So to address violence instead of parasitism, is to blind one’s self to the rest of the spectrum of human criminality in order to congratulate one’s self on having invented a more effective form of crime. Affections. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine. Source: Curt Doolittle – Nassim Nicholas Taleb (re: violence) I’d like…

  • JUSTIFICATION OF MAINSTREAM MACRO BY CREATIVE DEFINITION (I am on a roll today)

    http://crookedtimber.org/2015/05/18/the-political-is-personal/IMMORAL JUSTIFICATION OF MAINSTREAM MACRO BY CREATIVE DEFINITION

    (I am on a roll today)

    John,

    This might come across as offensive, but we all have jobs to do in defense and preservation of the informational commons, and this is mine.

    1) Fascism was a ‘good’. A necessary means of combating communism. Persisting in the denigration of authors who supported it is merely conflating a utility in time of stress with a truth of social science. Fascism was a good. By any measure.

    2) Hayek completed his journey by correctly identifying the common law as the source of liberty, which is how he perceived western exceptionalism. Most of his work an be seen as a series of investigations in various fields into solving the problem of the social sciences. It took him most of his life but he got there. Prior works can only be seen in this light. Most of his work is partly correct. His movement across fields is evidence that he ran into dead ends in all of them.

    3) The jury is out on social democracy, and at present, despite the rather obvious self interest of the state and academy, those of us who work the subject are fairly certain that democracy is little more than a temporary luxury for the redistribution of a civilizations windfall, rather than a system that constructs liberty and prosperity.

    4) Mises failed to solve the problem of economics because he failed, like everyone else in his generation, to solve the problem of operationalism. (Mises:economics, Brouwer:math, Hayek:Law, Bridgman:physics. And countless others in philosophy.) Everyone failed.

    They failed, and Hayek’s prediction that the 20th century would be seen in retrospect as an era of mysticism appears to be true. He didn’t get it quite right, because pseudoscience and mysticism perform the same obscurantist functions differently. But it is becoming clear that the 20th century (macro included) will be seen as an era of pseudoscience, and most of us will be cast as fools because of it.

    Hayek is not to be disrespected for having failed if so many thinkers failed in every other field of human inquiry. I made this mistake myself by crucifying Mises for a time. They were men of their time. They could sense something was wrong, but they were not able to solve it. Strangely enough, Brouwer and Bridgman do so, but not thoroughly enough to grasp that the problem was material in morality, epistemology, law, economics, and politics. Helpful in physical science. and only tepidly meaningful in mathematics. Its both telling and interesting that psychology – a pseudoscientific field totally absent any empirical content – saved itself by adopting Operationalism – and in doing so produced all the innovative content that it has in just twenty years – nearly overturning the century of pseudoscience.

    Economics requires this reformation as well. Mises could sense but not construct it. In simple terms Keynesian macro is the the study of how much we can ‘lie’ in order to achieve a suspected good by increasing consumption despite the negative externalities for mankind by doing so. So objectively, mainstream macro is very much the study of immoral politics The operational view, and the moral study of economics (Austrian) is predicated on attempting to improve voluntary transfers so that all lying is eliminated from human cooperation.

    They were great minds working desperately hard against an existential threat to man. But they failed. That does not mean we have to.

    Neither does it mean that we should consider luxuries not of our own construction, as measures of our merit. They are not. If anything we merely consume twenty thousand years of western development in a century.

    So, economics is the study of human cooperation. We can perform that study toward immoral ends (dysgenia, consumption, and lying), or we can perform that study toward moral ends (eugenia, accumulation, and truth).

    There is only one ‘law’ of human cooperation: that is that the only moral criteria that one can imposed costs upon another, is by productive, fully informed, warrantied, voluntary exchange, free of negative externality. Under no other condition is cooperation rational. That single statement explains all moral biases.

    The purpose of economics is to complete the sequence of training the human mind to understand cause and effect at different levels of complexity. Perception(existence), counting(scale), arithmetic, mathematics(ratio), geometry(space), calculus(relative motion), economics(equilibria), relativity(frames).

    Only with this understanding can man understand and apply this general rule to human affairs such that we can calculate all worlds determined by an action, and choose between them. But only once we have determined the full circuit of consequences in each.

    Only with this understanding can man apply this general rule to human affairs so that we can use monetary prices to sense and compare complex phenomenon at a given point in time.

    Only with this understanding can we make policy decisions that allow us to justify takings and givings as producing a common good.

    But only if we include all costs: Genetic, Territorial, Institutional, Normative, Pedagogical (Knowledge), Material, can we say we have accounted for all costs.

    Otherwise, we are just engaged in an obscurant means of justifying our preferences.

    5) You (John) have an extremely Australian view of the world, and your definition of economics and your interpretation of what ‘economics is reducible to’ is a justification of that Australian view. That Australian view is, like that of the English, Canadian and Americans: a North Sea islander’s view: one who is insulated by the seas from the pressures common to territorial peoples. If your tradition and genetics originated in the steppe or the levant you would hold very different views.

    So it appears (obvious) that your perception is a cognitive bias that you are seeking to justify, not a scientific truth that describes necessary properties of human cooperation. It is terribly apparent to me (as I would assume it was to any intellectual historian) that you are confusing a luxury of circumstance with a ‘good’ that one should aspire to.

    So as far as I can tell your selected definition is one that justifies your conclusion. It’s creative accounting so to speak by selective ‘ben franklin’ accounting of costs and benefits.

    By carefully defining a preconception as a good, we can justify anything.

    And that is what your two laws do.

    6) The alternative argument I would like to put forward. “Every forced transfer, is a lost opportunity for mutually beneficial exchange.”

    We do need a means of constructing commons. Physical and institutional commons are a unique western competitive advantage, second only to our most valuable commons: truth-telling. But why is it that commons must be constructed monopolistically? Why is not government constructed to facilitate exchanges, rather commands?

    There isn’t an answer justifies that question that does not violate the only law of human cooperation: that cooperation must be rational.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine


    Source date (UTC): 2015-05-18 13:40:00 UTC