Category: Economics, Finance, and Political Economy

  • Definitions: Regulatory Capture and Rent-Seeking and Corruption

    Definitions: Regulatory Capture and Rent-Seeking and Corruption https://t.co/jkoPPlOvLJ

  • Definitions: Regulatory Capture and Rent-Seeking and Corruption

    Definitions: Regulatory Capture and Rent-Seeking and Corruption https://propertarianism.com/2020/05/31/definitions-regulatory-capture-and-rent-seeking-and-corruption/


    Source date (UTC): 2020-05-31 23:57:43 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1267243893063639040

  • Definitions: Regulatory Capture and Rent-Seeking and Corruption

    REGULATORY CAPTURE (THE RESULT) Regulatory capture is a corruption of authority that occurs when a political entity, policymaker, or regulatory agency is co-opted to serve the commercial, ideological, or political interests of a minor constituency, such as a particular geographic area, industry, profession, or ideological group. When regulatory capture occurs, a special interest is prioritized over the general interests of the public, leading to a net loss for society. Government agencies suffering regulatory capture are called “captured agencies.” Regulatory capture is the result of “rent-seeking” and political failure; client politics “occurs when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, reasonably small interest (e.g., industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers).” RENT SEEKING (THE PRIVATE SECTOR) Rent-seeking in public choice theory, as well as in economics, involves seeking to increase one’s share of existing wealth without creating new wealth. Rent-seeking results in reduced economic efficiency through misallocation of resources, reduced wealth-creation, lost government revenue, heightened income inequality, and potential national decline. Attempts at capture of regulatory agencies to gain a coercive monopoly can result in advantages for the rent seeker in a market while imposing disadvantages on their incorrupt competitors. This is one of many possible forms of rent-seeking behavior. CORRUPTION (THE POLITICAL SECTOR) Corruption is dishonesty or criminal activity undertaken by a person or organization entrusted with a position of authority, often to acquire illicit benefit, or, abuse of entrusted power for one’s private gain. Corruption may include many activities including bribery and embezzlement, though it may also involve practices that are legal in many countries. Political corruption occurs when an office-holder or other governmental employee acts in an official capacity for personal gain. Corruption is most commonplace in kleptocracies, oligarchies, narco-states and mafia states. Corruption can occur on different scales. Corruption ranges from small favors between a small number of people (petty corruption), to corruption that affects the government on a large scale (grand corruption), and corruption that is so prevalent that it is part of the everyday structure of society, including corruption as one of the symptoms of organized crime. Corruption and crime are endemic sociological occurrences which appear with regular frequency in virtually all countries on a global scale in varying degree and proportion. Individual nations each allocate domestic resources for the control and regulation of corruption and crime. Strategies to counter corruption are often summarized under the umbrella term anti-corruption.

  • Definitions: Regulatory Capture and Rent-Seeking and Corruption

    REGULATORY CAPTURE (THE RESULT) Regulatory capture is a corruption of authority that occurs when a political entity, policymaker, or regulatory agency is co-opted to serve the commercial, ideological, or political interests of a minor constituency, such as a particular geographic area, industry, profession, or ideological group. When regulatory capture occurs, a special interest is prioritized over the general interests of the public, leading to a net loss for society. Government agencies suffering regulatory capture are called “captured agencies.” Regulatory capture is the result of “rent-seeking” and political failure; client politics “occurs when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, reasonably small interest (e.g., industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers).” RENT SEEKING (THE PRIVATE SECTOR) Rent-seeking in public choice theory, as well as in economics, involves seeking to increase one’s share of existing wealth without creating new wealth. Rent-seeking results in reduced economic efficiency through misallocation of resources, reduced wealth-creation, lost government revenue, heightened income inequality, and potential national decline. Attempts at capture of regulatory agencies to gain a coercive monopoly can result in advantages for the rent seeker in a market while imposing disadvantages on their incorrupt competitors. This is one of many possible forms of rent-seeking behavior. CORRUPTION (THE POLITICAL SECTOR) Corruption is dishonesty or criminal activity undertaken by a person or organization entrusted with a position of authority, often to acquire illicit benefit, or, abuse of entrusted power for one’s private gain. Corruption may include many activities including bribery and embezzlement, though it may also involve practices that are legal in many countries. Political corruption occurs when an office-holder or other governmental employee acts in an official capacity for personal gain. Corruption is most commonplace in kleptocracies, oligarchies, narco-states and mafia states. Corruption can occur on different scales. Corruption ranges from small favors between a small number of people (petty corruption), to corruption that affects the government on a large scale (grand corruption), and corruption that is so prevalent that it is part of the everyday structure of society, including corruption as one of the symptoms of organized crime. Corruption and crime are endemic sociological occurrences which appear with regular frequency in virtually all countries on a global scale in varying degree and proportion. Individual nations each allocate domestic resources for the control and regulation of corruption and crime. Strategies to counter corruption are often summarized under the umbrella term anti-corruption.

  • Marxian Economics Do Not Merit More than A Footnote

    Marxian Economics Do Not Merit More than A Footnote https://t.co/dQfNkQf81i

  • Marxian Economics Do Not Merit More than A Footnote

    Marxian Economics Do Not Merit More than A Footnote https://propertarianism.com/2020/05/31/marxian-economics-do-not-merit-more-than-a-footnote-2/


    Source date (UTC): 2020-05-31 17:00:17 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1267138842647240705

  • Marxian Economics Do Not Merit More than A Footnote

    by Daniel Gurpide Having been proved empirically wrong, Marxian economics do not merit more than a footnote. Marx’s lasting enthusiasm for the working class was due to his belief that within the framework of bourgeois society the factory hand would be condemned forever to a life of misery in eternal bondage. He never realized that modern technological society, with or without exploitation, could ever provide the working man with a middle-class existence. The New Left had to abandon its innermost hopes for a revolutionary rising of a no longer existing proletariat now integrated with all its material interests into the process of production. In addition, no modern industrialist wants merely to exploit his workers- they should be happy, well-paid consumers. The utter inanity of Marxian economics is so evident that the person who is first and foremost a revolutionary and merely seeks for a rational excuse to preach the overturn of the existing order has to look in other directions, towards other social layers to whom preach the revolutionary gospel. That’s why the New Left, Cultural Marxism and Postmodernists appeal to the outcasts of modern society, to the eternal Lumpenproletariat, the term understood not in a sociological sense.

  • Marxian Economics Do Not Merit More than A Footnote

    by Daniel Gurpide Having been proved empirically wrong, Marxian economics do not merit more than a footnote. Marx’s lasting enthusiasm for the working class was due to his belief that within the framework of bourgeois society the factory hand would be condemned forever to a life of misery in eternal bondage. He never realized that modern technological society, with or without exploitation, could ever provide the working man with a middle-class existence. The New Left had to abandon its innermost hopes for a revolutionary rising of a no longer existing proletariat now integrated with all its material interests into the process of production. In addition, no modern industrialist wants merely to exploit his workers- they should be happy, well-paid consumers. The utter inanity of Marxian economics is so evident that the person who is first and foremost a revolutionary and merely seeks for a rational excuse to preach the overturn of the existing order has to look in other directions, towards other social layers to whom preach the revolutionary gospel. That’s why the New Left, Cultural Marxism and Postmodernists appeal to the outcasts of modern society, to the eternal Lumpenproletariat, the term understood not in a sociological sense.

  • War is the most profitable enterprise – but like socialism, you eventually run o

    War is the most profitable enterprise – but like socialism, you eventually run out of other people’s wealth. And under both conquest and socialism, you eventually lack the resources and incentives to govern and tax the conquered, which is much harder than conquest and looting whether by military or political means.

  • War is the most profitable enterprise – but like socialism, you eventually run o

    War is the most profitable enterprise – but like socialism, you eventually run out of other people’s wealth. And under both conquest and socialism, you eventually lack the resources and incentives to govern and tax the conquered, which is much harder than conquest and looting whether by military or political means.