Author: Curt Doolittle

(Second Draft)

— PART I — MAN —

1) Acquisitiveness: To survive and reproduce, humans must acquire and inventory many categories of resources, and evolved to demonstrate constant acquisitiveness of those resources.

2) Property: The scope of those things they act upon, or choose not to act upon, in anticipation of obtaining as inventory (a store of value), constitute their demonstrated definition of property-en-toto.* (See Butler Schaeffer) “That which and organism defends.”

3) Value: Human emotions evolved to reflect changes in state of property-en-toto.* As such nearly all emotions can be expressed in terms of reactions to property. (imposed costs here, pre-moral, but also pre-cooperation, and only defense and retaliation, not cooperation)

4) Non-Conflict: That which humans act to obtain without imposition upon in-group members they evolved to intuit as their property, and demonstrate this intuition by defense of their inventory, and by their punishment of transgressors.

5) Cooperative Production: That which humans act in concert with one another to produce. (Important take-away is that the purpose of cooperation is material and reproductive production.)

6) Moral (cooperative) Intuitions(instincts): Moral intuitions reflect prohibitions on free riding by members with whom one cooperates in production and reproduction. (This is where free riding enters.)

7) Distribution of Intuitions by Reproductive Strategy: Moral intuitions vary in intensity to suit one’s reproductive strategy. This intensity and distribution of moral intuition varies between males and females, as well as between classes and between groups.

8) Variation By Family Structure: Moral rules reflect prohibitions on free riding given the structure of the family in relation to the necessary and available structure of production.

9) Resolution of Disputes: Property rights were developed in law as the positive enumeration in contractual form, of those moral rules which any polity (corporation) agrees to enforce with the promise of violence for the purpose of restitution or punishment. Conversely, any possible property rights not expressed, the community (corporation) is unwilling to adjudicate, restore or punish, or has not yet discovered the need to construct.

10) Instrumentation: Property rights are necessary for the instrumental measurement of moral prohibitions because of the unobservability of changes in human emotional states, and our inability to determine truth from falsehood. And as such we require an observable proxy for evidence of changes in state.

11) Family: As a general rule, as the division of knowledge and labor increases, so must the atomicity of property rights, and as a consequence, the size of the family must decline {Consanguineous, Punaluan, Pairing (Serial Marriage), Hetaeristic, Traditional, Stem, Nuclear, Absolute Nuclear}.

12) Transaction Costs: As the division of labor increases, relationships increase in distance from kin, increase in anonymity, decrease common interest, and the incentive to seize opportunities rather than adhere to agreements increases. This decrease creates the problem of trust, which increases costs of insuring any agreement is fulfilled, and decreases the overall number of possible agreements and the number of participants in any structure of production.

13) Trust (ethics in production): As a general rule, for the size of the family to decrease, and division of labor to increase in multi-part *complexity* then trust must increase, and trust can only increase with expansion of property rights to include prohibitions on unethical actions. Mere ostracization, boycotting and reputation are insufficient to preserve agreements (contracts).

14) Moral Competition (ethics in political production): (morals property rights, cheating) As a general rule, the scope of moral prohibitions expressed as property rights, must increase to limit demand for authority.

15) Demand for Authority: As a general rule, if a delay in the production of property rights evolves, then demand for authority will fill the vacuum with some form of authority to either suppress retaliation (conflict) or to prevent circumstances leading to conflict, or both.

— PART II– PRODUCTION OF COMMONS (Including the market as a commons)

1) Competition (Market): ……………

2) Competition (Commons): ………..

3) Free Riding on Commons: ……….

4) Prohibition On Privatizing/Socializing Commons …. (necessity) ……….

5) Calculability. Commensurability of Property Rights (as a weight and measure)

(…………)

999) Monuments. The production of monuments (burials, temples, churches, parks)

— PART III — CENTRALIZATION AND ELIMINATION OF RENTS

1) Governments, particularly empires (of which states, cities, and local polities, are merely a smaller class), in an effort to first create a standard “weight and measure” in the practice of law, so that disputes can be rationally adjudicated, imposed uniform rules (property rights) on sub groups, for all subgroups under their management. And secondly, they centralize rent seeking. As such we trade local and pervasive transaction costs for infrequent but expensive centralized costs.

Whether empire, state, polity, tribe, family or class, the same problem is faced between all cooperating groups: without individualized property rights, neither the construction of contracts, nor rational adjudication is not possible. Without individualized property rights, rents cannot be circumvented (or centralized). Without individualized property rights, individual incentives are not possible. Without individualized property rights production cannot be planned. Without rational adjudication of differences, the ability to circumvent rents, the possibility of individual incentives, and the capacity to plan, transaction costs exceed the ability of people to construct the voluntary organization of production, even if they wished to.

2) Commands: Governments then expanded the law as a standard of weights and measures, to include commands, distorting the voluntary structure of production, and therefore not only uniform only uniform weights and measures. Thereby conflating the imposition of standards of law, with the creation of commands holding the status of law – commands that were only law by analogy.

3) Centralized Rents: Governments, by homogenizing law, centralized law (and command), and by centralizing law (and command), centralized rent-seeking (and later, as a monopoly, increased it.) Note: Centralization often forced tribal leaders and family elders out of rent seeking and power, and into production, thus lowering transaction costs for production and trade at the expense of increasing overall costs of the parasitic bureaucracy.

21) Aristocracy sought to prevent centralization (of rents) in favor of competing jurisdictions that focus owners on creation, and adapt quickly. Bureaucracy sought to centralize a homogenous jurisdiction that focus administrators to seek rents, and to provide certainty (stability) in rents – expanding rents to the maximum tolerable.

22) Professionalization of military under aristocracy

22) Extension of franchise to bankers, producers, traders from land holders.

22) Scale: Increased demand for commons

23) Management: Problem of managing commons

24) Extension of weights and measures (min-empires – local state conquest)

— PART IV —

1) Libertarians: (classical liberals), seek to purge rent seeking, from the central system, and return to aristocracy

2) Libertines: (cosmopolitans) seek to restore unethical and immoral action – and non-conflict (non-cooperation) rather than moral and therefore productive cooperation.)

3) Socialists: (………….)

4) Liberty: ……….(liberty as tariff , slavey, right to local law and custom, libertarianism as standard weight and measure) – not free riding however.