REALITY IS MORE LIMITED THAN IMAGINATION: THE MORAL NATURE OF TRUTH IN THE LOGICS AND SCIENCES

  1. We can mathematically represent more relations than can exist in reality.

And we can state more things than we can demonstrate correspond with reality. And we can suggest more means and ends of cooperation than can be organized in reality.

  1. Set theoretic axioms assist us in making internally consistent statements. But they may or may not correspond to reality.

  2. Tests of internal consistency reduce error. But since truth means and must mean correspondence, only external consistency (correspondence) is a test of truth.

  3. The value of our imagination, followed by our logical systems is in reducing the cost of testing our ideas about reality.

  4. The comparative value (goodness or less good, or even badness) of our spectrum of different logical systems, from:

i) the functionally descriptive, to

ii) the logically descriptive to

iii) the historically descriptive to;

iv) the mythically allegorical, and finally to;

v) the mystically allegorical;

– is the degree with which those systems reduce the cost of exploration by increasing degrees of correspondence. The error we make is in placing greater value on the network effect of existing logical networks (paradigms), than on the possibility of new correspondence with reality.

  1. The comparative MORALITY of different logical systems is in the degree to which they pose restraints upon the externalization of costs to those form whom exploration is involuntary, versus the externalizations of benefits to those for whom exploration is involuntary.

HIERARCHY OF TRUTH

That is, unless we state, that we must create a hierarchy of truth:

AXIS 1:

(i) that which is complete (reality) but the completeness of which is unknowable,

(ii) that which is incomplete but correspondent (action/science)

(iii) that which is incomplete but internally consistent (logics)

(iv) that which is incomplete, for which correspondence is unknown, and for which internal consistency is unknown. (theory)

(v) that which we are unaware of. (ignorance)

(I am not settled on the order of (ii) and (iii) since as far as I can tell, our arguments to internal consistency are verbal justification that merely improve our theory, while our actions are demonstrated preferences in favor of our theory.)

And the praxeological test of our confidence in our statements (our WARRANTY) for making true statements:

AXIS 2:

i) That which we do not know

ii) That which we intuit we can to act upon

iii) That which we we desire we can act upon

iiv) That which we can argue we rationally can act upon.

v) That which it is non rational to argue against.

vi) That which is self evident.

Error in science may be a privilege of rank. Science is largely outside of the market. Error in cooperation is not outside the market, and constitutes the market, and is necessity. My voluntary action requires only that I have confidence, since I warranty my own actions by necessity. But as we move from voluntary exchange, to corporate cooperation, to state monopoly corporation, the standard of truth increases, since others pay for any error. The only solution is that those who desire pay, and those that do not, do not.

Therefore, we also understand, that the prohibition on error in science is immaterial if unspoken and constrained to the self. But if science or any other discipline, makes public claims, we require a higher standard.

This prohibition is a MORAL one, because lower standards of truth in science externalize costs on to other scientists.

The standard of truth is inseparable from the moral impact that any statement will have.

I am not free to make any statement. We are not free to make any statement. We are free only to make true statements without punishment of some kind – even if it is just to be ignored and therefore boycotted. In many civilizations one is even prohibited from making true statements if they cause discomfort. In science we reverse this social intuition, and state that we specifically SEEK criticism, rather than confirmation.

If we take this argument all the way down to the very meaning of ‘debate’, we will grasp that the only reason we yield our opportunity for theft and violence, is on the presumption of honest discourse. (argumentation ethics). It is this sacrifice of violence, and grant of peerage in exchange for the cooperative pursuit of truth, that was the unique development of western civilization. And it is this one axiom that led to all of western science and reason. And why no other civilization developed it.

The only reason to argue against the requirement for moral public statements adhering to increasing standards of truth, is that one wishes to externalize costs onto others, or to not be held accountable for the externalization of costs onto others.

In other words, because one is an immoral individual, the definition of which is to externalize costs to the anonymous.

One can say, that like free speech in politics, we insure each other against ignorance and error. And some might say we insure each other against loading and framing. And some might say we insure each other against fraud by omission. And some might say that we insure each other against fraud by deception.

But insurance then, is limited to the willingness of others to pay for it. And our contract for this insurance in public debate has been dramatically loosened by the courts (by the left wing) such that we tolerate (insure) obscurant, immoral, deceptive and plainly fraudulent discourse, as well as eliminate the prior prohibition on libel and slander.

Insurance in any body cannot pay out more than it takes in. And in this case we are already paying out more than we take in.

So the policy must change so to speak.