POPPER’S COSMOPOLITANISM
(worth repeating)

I increasingly position Popper as trying to defend against the authoritarian use of science promoted by the (pseudo)scientific socialists. And his moral propositions are true, albeit not much of an advance on Socrates’ less elaborate one: that wisdom is knowing our ignorance, and being none-to certain of anything, that we are willing to coerce others to common ends.

And like all cosmopolitans he is ALSO, at every moment resisting anglo empiricism, political truth, and the requirement that we contribute to the commons. Like the rest, he seems to want to preserve ethical dualism, central to the cosmopolitan mission. Whereas objective truth is a political construct, cosmopolitan truth is not – it is either authoritarian on one hand, or dualistic, preserving choice independent of objective truth, but never political. (This is a really complicated and really fascinating line of thought I’m working on, and I haven’t reduced it to something tolerably digestible yet. But as someone else said, I think it’s a superior to the Hegelian hypothesis of cultural differences.)

But like all the cosmopolitans, Popper seems to have resorted to their strange fascination with getting it only half right, and fudging the rest with elaborate conflation of existence, experience, and objective experience through the mere use of experiential language. This is very consistent with jewish literature, which is the most sophisticated justificationary philosophy humans have ever invented. Muhammed couldn’t rely on the same intellect so he just reduced the same ideas to authoritarian commands. The Chinese wrote in hedged moralisms justified by harmony (balance) – but they honestly could not solve the problem of politics, because the very idea was an anathema. The europeans celebrate aspirational falsehoods (democracy) in part because politics is an aristocratic status signal – and in most of the west, participation and contribution mandatory.

I see what the cosmopolitans are doing now, but I am not sure how it’s possible. I mean, in Heidegger you can see it and in Kant you can see it, but in both cases it’s in the aristotelian sense: objective. These are products brought to market. Cosmopolitan ideas are authoritarian prognostications positioned as truths. While all of the cosmopolitans retain subjectivity by verbal conflation.

I want to ask Agassi about this because he dances all around the subject in his recent book, which I’ve read, twice now, but I think I might piss him off. (Honestly I got more out of his analysis of popper’s context than all other writers combined. It’s literally delicious to read. I dont think I really understood Feyerabend’s motives until I read Agassi.)

So, I think, probably within a year or at the outside two, I will figure out they how, what and why, of the technique they are using, and I can put an end to that form of obscurantism too. Not that I care about Popper, but because of all the less noble applications of that technique.

Curt.