by Simon Ström
We may choose at all times to cooperate, disassociate or aggress. The market equilibrium of such agency produces an institutional phenotype which reflects the distribution of agency, and tends to approximate the highest possible degree of voluntary cooperation between peers, because that is most mutually beneficial.–Until it’s not.
A great discrepancy in agency between agents creates more incentives for the superior part to aggress, to the point of *that* no longer being most profitable (e.g. destruction of the subjugated).
Natural law maximizes cooperation but only among those who willingly cooperate–the militia.
It does so as much as it discourages the granting of discounts to outgroups for a reason that in no way is profitable for the ingroup.
A militia of sovereigns is contingent on some degree of homogeneity of agency which is why its membership is generally limited to a subset of a population.
And, is why the age of American ‘liberty’ was also one of colonialism, ethnic cleansing and conquest, and slavery and segregation.
(curt: well done)
Source date (UTC): 2017-08-08 14:17:00 UTC
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