THE NEXT EVOLUTIONARY STEP IN CLASSICAL LIBERALISM I think the debate in classic

THE NEXT EVOLUTIONARY STEP IN CLASSICAL LIBERALISM

I think the debate in classical liberalism is unfortunately (as Hayek tried to inform us) too much on the structure of government (the market for the production of commons), and too little on the rule of law (the evolution of means of suppression of parasitism) and distracted by the artificial (false) demarcation in property rights, and totally absent of the debate on the problem of suppressing immorality (the total suppression of involuntary transfer, and the forcible removal of all alternatives to market participation).

Humans are want to reduce debates to single issues. Unfortunately, most issues are determined by equilibria not states. In the case of politics, the rule of law as the means of suppressing immorality and forcing people into productive activity is one topic. And the construction of commons that cannot be produced by the incentives of the market is something else.

As far as I know the solution to the rule of law is known. Two problems remain: (a) the problem with the production of commons – primarily because of the problem of free riding among tax payers; and because of the problem of bureaucratic incentives among administrators. And (b) because of the problem of the declining presence of means of participating in the market (employment) – a problem which we anticipate increasing.

The problem (b) is solvable by shareholdership and dividends, and loss of shareholdership in the event that one violates the shareholder agreement.

The problem (a) is solvable by eliminating monopoly decision making under majority rule, and instead, providing the individual commitment of funds. In other words, independent of whether we rely on (i)elected representatives, (ii)representatives chosen by lot (juries), or (iii)direct participation, if the total revenues were divided by the number of participants in i,ii,or iii, then we voted our dollars, we could pursue policies (commons) that interested us, and not pursue commons that did not. And competition would provide answers that reason cannot. There is no need for majority rule.

However, that is a prescription for the production of material commons, not of normative commons. And it is necessary to redistribute (de-centralize) the production of normative commons (rules of public behavior). Again, competition will drive adoption. And there is no value in normative tyranny.

This model allows us to federate insurance (universal insurance), cooperate in the production of material and economic commons, and to choose to compete in the production of normative commons.

As such the classical liberal method expanded such that the government remains a market for the production of cooperation on commons and mutual insurance, rather than a means of the projection of monopoly.

Curt Doolittle

The Propertarian Institute

Kiev, Ukraine