WHY ARE RATIONALISTS SO AFRAID OF SCIENCE? Praxeologists argue that deduction is

WHY ARE RATIONALISTS SO AFRAID OF SCIENCE?

Praxeologists argue that deduction is apodictically certain, but in no case other than the axiomatic and therefore tautological CAN it be apodictically certain. (Which we’ll see below)

All concepts that we use in premises must always remain theoretical if they are other than names of entities at an instant in time within a specific context.

If, as Einstein demonstrated, we cannot count on the concepts of length, or time, both of which were conceived as immutable, then how can we count on any concept? Well we can’t. Other than that which is trivial.

In order to create examples for use as models, most logicians and philosophers and amateurs as well, rely on trivial examples – but likewise, only to trivial examples do such things apply. Why? Well because trivial (reductio) examples that we can test with our mere reason, are limited to those that we **CAN** test with our mere reason. Whereas any question complex enough that we must apply deduction in any meaningful sense – meaning that we need tools of logic or mechanical devices to draw conclusions – is by definition beyond our senses.

The concept of length is not consistent beyond human scale – and quickly becomes meaningless. If we cannot count on so simple a concept as ‘length’ to be constant, then how can we count on any other statement to be constant? All knowledge is contextually useful but if reduced to a general rule, the general rule remains theoretical, because we cannot anticipate the conditions under which that measurement (and that is the operation – transformation – that a concept performs for us).

We can construct recipes, but general rules are always and forever theoretically not axiomatically bound, unless they are tautological. There is no escaping from this argument under any conditions other than the reductio fallacies. Recipes either work or they don’t Theories work as long as concepts (Premises) upon which the recipes function. (Elsewhere I’ve shown how Hoppe’s examples all fail, but that is to distracting to revisit here.)

Praxeology is merely an erroneous application of the principle that an empirical observation requires proof of construction, in order for (a) an hypothesis to be both possible and (b) free of the addition of imaginary content and (c) free of deceptions whether original or inherited and (d) free of errors of mere concepts no longer applicable in the context.

This requirement for construction says nothing about the means under which a theory was constructed. No means upon which a theory is constructed has any persuasive value unless the means of theory construction is identical to the means of operational construction – as it nearly is (although is not quite) in mathematics.

In mathematics this is an example of the problem created by a general rule of arbitrary precision – at some point, the theoretical no longer applies to the physical – so the general rule fails. Length is not infinitely extensible, and infinity cannot be brought into existence any more so than unicorns can be found in primeval forests, or the square root of two can be determined. None can be. A

Operational definitions constitute an existence proof. Operations must exist, and when we find an operation that does not exist, we also have found a concept (a premise) that no longer is true – whether the operation conducted in the mind is logical or conducted in physical reality is possible. Operational definitions allow us to observe changes in state of the concepts (premises) upon which our general rules (theories) depend.

But there is nothing unique to economics in the demand for operational definitions. Science requires them to every extent possible – excepting the problem of different resources available for different tests; If math did it we would eliminate mathematical platonism, and probably reform mathematics within a generation. Psychology DID it and did reform itself within a generation. And the principle that law should be operationally written, or at least that changes to the extant law should be conducted operationally (what we call original intent and strict construction).

Unlike the study of the physical world beyond that exists beyond human scale (whether that mean above human scale, or below human scale), we can sympathetically test, with our sense, perception, experience and reason, whether any operation that a human would have to perform, is possible and rational.

Whereas we cannot sympathize with the first principles of the physical world – we lack senses for that – so we create a model to compensate for the weakness of our sense perception, by modeling the real world as some sort of analogy to experience – and therefore reducing what we cannot experience to that which we can. We reduce the imperceptible to the perceptible by means of instruments – physical and logical instruments – by searching for regularities and changes in those regularities, and then using those regularities to govern what operations (transformations) are possible in the real world. This instrumentation functions as a means of extending our sense, perception, experience and reason.

But while we can know whether a phenomenon in human affairs – a human action – is both operationally possible (in mind and action), and desirable (an incentive or a counter-incentive), we cannot know the same about the physical universe – or we cannot know until we reduce the universe to some set of first principles from which all are deterministic. So while we can attest to within some reasonable margin of error what humans can do, we cannot (yet) attest to within some reasonable margin of error what will unfold in the universe. There is no equivalent (yet) in physical science to the sensation (“yes I would do that”) – at least not yet at the subatomic level.

We have proven beyond a doubt that many (most) economic phenomenon (observed regularities) are not deducible from the operations that man is naturally capable of, without the instruments necessary to measure, convert to sensations, perceptions, and experiences, that we can even observe without the aid of instruments.

The examples are the phenomenon of sticky prices, the myth of the rational voter, and the fact that people act morally not economically when the must choose between indifferent actions, and act morally at great personal cost if they wish to mete out either immoral and unethical punishment or altruistic punishment.

So it is not a matter of open opinion whether economic phenomenon are DEDUCIBLE from first principles. They aren’t. They aren’t imaginable. At present, (it’s my hypothesis) that economists have not compensated for moral bias, just as economists had not compensated for cognitive bias.

We have proven beyond a doubt that all non-axiomatic (prescriptive not descriptive), non-trivial deductions cannot be apodictically certain, in any field of endeavor.

So while we cannot deduce all economic phenomenon, we can however, if we work at it, in economics, attempt to explain these phenomenon by deducing how they exist, by explaining how these phenomenon can be brought into existence operationally.

We tend to call this an analysis of incentives, but while we may experience the influence of incentives, we must also perform many operations (actions whether mental or physical) to bring them about, so the operations must be possible AND the incentives must be ‘rational’ for the individual to follow.

So the statement: no economic proposition can be true unless we can explain it operationally- is not the same as saying that economics is not an empirical discipline which we use our extant knowledge of human capacities and instruments to explain that phenomena may existentially be possible. But given the our concepts instruments and at least our mental abilities evolve via these rules, it is

Economics is no different from any other discipline – it is the attempt to speak truthfully about what we observe. That has nothing to do with science. It has everything to do with speaking truthfully.

So to answer my question above, I do know the reason rationalists are afraid of science: because it invalidates the cult of nonsense language that they have developed to signal their wit at outwitting some opponent equally armed only with wit – and places them in the difficult position of having to do difficult work of speaking truthfully rather than constructing artful obscurantism.

Status signals earned by obscurantist deception are still thefts.

As far as I can tell, engineers are the only saints, soldiers tell the truth out of need, scientists tell truth by accident. Social scientists lie by accident, vector or intent. Whereas verbalism is to be suspect at all times. Because for the past century and a half it has been used primarily for the purpose of deception, parasitism, amusement, and to obtain unearned status signals in the academy.

There is no difference at all between selling indulgences and selling diplomas.

Truth telling matters.

Punish the wicked.