THE WEAKNESS OF POPPERIAN TRUTH : PRESERVING PLATONISM My understanding of CR’s

THE WEAKNESS OF POPPERIAN TRUTH : PRESERVING PLATONISM

My understanding of CR’s concept of Truth is Popperian via Tarsky: which in crudest form suggests that Statements are true if they are internally consistent. And furthermore, the truth content of any proposition (verisimilitude) consists of the explanatory power minus the falsificationary power. (I tend to follow Kripke on internal consistency for technical reasons.)

This position narrows the value of explanatory power, improving truth claims, but is still a much looser definition of truth, and one that accommodates the platonic (Metaphysical realism). This is evident by the failure to unite the various definitions of truth into some coherent system.

Whereas, in an effort correct Metaphysical Realism and to expunge platonism and obscurantism – and therefore obtain Scientific and Ethical Naturalism – I’ve tried to argue that the narrower criteria (the above comment) is the test of BOTH realism AND ethical action.

I’ve stated before that I thought popper denied socialists the field, by making it impossible to argue that political preferences (scientific socialism) was in fact scientific enough that central planners could make claims necessitating that we be compelled to comply with their ideas. However, his definition of truth was insufficient to deny obscurantism and platonism. This is not a criticism it’s just a statement of insufficiency for prevention of abuse by way of popular government.

This is a lot to grasp. But I thought I’d throw it out there.

I didn’t think I would be able to get to it but it’s troubled me enough that I’m getting close.

Thanks.