Curt Doolittle

Theme: Truth

  • “Reality is that which, when we stop believing in it, doesn’t go away.” – Philip

    “Reality is that which, when we stop believing in it, doesn’t go away.” – Philip K. Dick

    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-08 16:08:00 UTC

  • Another watershed couple of days. I have my arms around the problem of mathemati

    Another watershed couple of days.

    I have my arms around the problem of mathematical platonism, and therefore all platonism. And I can argue that platonism, like obscurantism, is immoral, at least in public speech. And since I can prove platonism is unnecessary, and a remnant of primitive religion, then one must choose to perpetuate the immoral for convenience.

    But perhaps, more importantly, I can sort of sense, in a tip-of-the-tongue sort of way, the degree to which ‘babylonian magic’ still remains in western thought. A kind of dependence on the dream state that is not present in the germanic mythos, but is pervasive in monotheistic thought.

    What does it mean for our society when we emphasize the real, versus the dream? The acting versus the observing?

    Again, from the naturalist view, we have only so much time to think about what corresponds with reality, OR dream about what does not. Is then, magian thought, simply lost opportunity cost? And is that the entire point of magianism? To deprive people of the opportunity of thinking about alternatives in the real?

    Is the magian the ultimate source of Popper’s ignorance?

    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-08 06:54:00 UTC

  • I am out of people’s comfort zones. lol Sorry. I’m not searching for justificati

    I am out of people’s comfort zones. lol

    Sorry. I’m not searching for justification. I’m looking for answers. Looking for justification is why libertarians failed.

    If you are looking for scientific truth then you don’t get to dislike the results. They are what they are.

    And you must alter your strategy accordingly.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-08 05:19:00 UTC

  • ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY – EVENTUALLY, IT WILL LOOK LIKE THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD Academ

    ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY – EVENTUALLY, IT WILL LOOK LIKE THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD

    Academic philosophy is pretty much a zombie profession. It’s actually humorous to read how bad the papers are. Every few months I just grab a dozen or two and read through them.

    And the consequences speak for themselves: the funding for philosophy departments, and administration’s tendency to group them in with religion has led to the progressive decline of departments.

    Conversely, economics and psychology together have pretty much taken over the social sciences. And that was probably a deterministic outcome, when late in the 19th century the analytical movement made the choice to try to make philosophy into a science, it was a pretty sizable bet that failed. And it was followed by a flurry of attempts to justify socialism in an effort to stay relevant. That failed too.

    It’s not that the study of philosophy has no value, it’s that except for very notable exceptions (Dennett) where philosophers are trying to integrate ethics and the product of scientific investigation, it’s pretty barren – like the study of medieval and ancient literature.

    **And given what I’ve learned from my own work, I’d argue that we can, within at most two generations, solve the problem of the logic of the social sciences. And when we do, I suspect that philosophy will, in practice, look not very much different from the scientific method, with each of the logical systems we have developed: language, logic, math, physics, and economics (cooperation), merely specializations for isolating one property of the universe or another, so that we are capable of reducing it to analogy to experience and therefore understanding it.**

    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-07 17:37:00 UTC

  • WERE THE CONSERVATIVES RIGHT ALL ALONG? (interesting) We cannot, like mathematic

    WERE THE CONSERVATIVES RIGHT ALL ALONG?

    (interesting)

    We cannot, like mathematicians tried to do, define something into existence. We can define rules of deduction, but not define something into existence. Truth consists of correspondence and cause, not definition. Definitions are our choice. Truth is not. That is the entire purpose of ‘truth’ – that which we cannot choose.

    So, if instead of some artificial scheme, we understand that PROPERTY is nothing but what remains, after we suppress all possible DISCOUNTS, by every means possible. Then, does that mean that the conservatives were right all along?

    That, since discounts, as a spectrum, are suppressible by a spectrum of actions which include the organized threat of violence, ostracization, boycott, reduction of opportunity, and the consequential limits on consumption, then the conservatives, correctly value NORMATIVE CONFORMITY TO SUPPRESSION OF DISCOUNTS, and that the model of property articulated by rothbard, taken as it was from the low trust society he was familiar with,

    In effect, Rothbard’s ethics are an attempt to preserve ‘cheating’ as a viable means of profiting from others, whereas conservative, aristocratic, ‘high trust’ ethics are an effort to suppress ALL cheating. Rothbard masks this cheating by stating that competition will suppress such cheating. But empirically, and praxeologically, this is demonstrably and logically false. So what are we left with no possible conclusion that either he committed a significant error or, that Rothbard’s ethics are an attempt, intentionally, to preserve cheating: which is precisely what the left correctly argues – albeit in their amateurish terms.

    The formation of a government, which is a monopoly that suppresses violence and theft, and then by taxation, suppresses free riding on the government’s suppression of violence, then, as a consequence, because of its monopoly, only displaces free riding with rents.

    The formal question remains the same, which is that rule of law, or liberty, is a prohibition on discretionary compulsion, but is only possible by the prohibition of all discounts. And the only possible means of both suppressing discounts, and preventing the conversion of free riding into rents, is to rely on competition for the suppression of these discounts.

    That is, I think, the fundamental equilibrial analysis of political order.

    The sequence is:

    1) Suppression of discounts results in property rights.

    2) Property rights lead to the division of labor, and prosperity.

    3) Property (capital) and prosperity lead to greater opportunity for discounts.

    4) The cost of suppressing discounts increases demand for specialized suppression.

    5) The specialized suppressing discounts leads to free riding (fee avoidance)

    6) The specialized suppression of free riding (taxation) leads to opportunity for rent seeking.

    7) Opportunity for rent seeking leads to bureaucracy.

    8) Bureaucracy leads to subjugation and expropriation.

    9) Expropriation leads to circumvention (Religiosity, black markets, tax evasion, nullification, secession and revolt and revolution)

    10 (fragmentation)

    The only solution is rule of law: no state, merely laws, and judges who resolve disputes. Governments must be local and under direct democracy. Everything else provided competing firms.

    CHEERS

    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-07 06:54:00 UTC

  • THOUGHTS ON TRUTH THE TWO QUESTIONS OF MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY –“If you ask a p

    https://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~wtg10/philosophy.htmlMORE THOUGHTS ON TRUTH

    THE TWO QUESTIONS OF MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY

    –“If you ask a philosopher what the main problems are in the philosophy of mathematics, then the following two are likely to come up: what is the status of mathematical truth, and what is the nature of mathematical objects? That is, what gives mathematical statements their aura of infallibility, and what on earth are these statements about ?” —

    ON THE PAPER

    Nothing new or interesting. I still can’t figure out if the problem of what mathematicians consider ‘arbitrary precision’ is one that they are conscious of or not. (Correspondence and utility in context. )

    What I can tell you is that mathematicians do not define truth, that philosophers do. Conversely, the craft of math requires a language for the production of proofs that humans can manipulate symbolically. Just like we need language that humans can speak and use, not language which would be more ‘true’.

    However, if at some point we want to test whether our mathematics or our language is in fact ‘true’ – in that whatever content we construct corresponds to reality – we must be able to express it in operational language. If we cannot, then it is not in fact ‘true’. I can tell a story about a fantasy world with a certain form of gravity. I can write a proof using certain assumptions. However, these cannot correspond to reality, and therefore, can be consistent with their definitions (internally consistent) but they cannot ever be ‘true’ (correspondent).

    This is important otherwise truth has no meaning, and reality is indistinguishable from dream.

    More later.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-06 16:54:00 UTC

  • IN THIS STRANGE LITTLE BIT OF LANGUAGE, BROUWER PROVIDES THE ANSWER TO PLATONIST

    IN THIS STRANGE LITTLE BIT OF LANGUAGE, BROUWER PROVIDES THE ANSWER TO PLATONISTS.

    (emphasis mine)

    “…mathematics is an essentially languageless activity of the mind having its ***origin in the perception of a move of time.*** This perception of a move of time may be described as the falling apart of a life moment into two distinct things, one of which gives way to the other, but is retained by memory. If the twoity thus born is divested of all quality, it passes into the empty form of the common substratum of all twoities.” — Brouwer.

    Genius.

    NELSON’S CRITIQUE

    –“Since the advent of digital computers, attention has turned from effective methods — functions computable in principle – to feasible algorithms and programs. There is strong evidence that polynomial time functions provide the correct formalization of the intuitive notion of a feasible computation, and unlike the situation for recursive functions there is a purely syntactical characterization of polynomial time functions. I am convinced that intuitionism reformulated in this context will become a powerful practical method for constructing and verifying feasible algorithms, and that Kleene’s realization predicate will provide an incisive tool for

    analyzing problems concerning interactive programs.”– Nelson.

    https://web.math.princeton.edu/~nelson/papers/int.pdf

    CURT: These are different contracts, for utility not different truths.

    As far as I can tell, if it is not computable it is questionable. But I need to learn more.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-04 18:00:00 UTC

  • DAVID MILLER : CONFUSING FACT AND VALUE ==DAVID MILLER== Regarding theories: –“

    http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/associates/miller/oxdocs/science-tech.pdfCONTRA DAVID MILLER : CONFUSING FACT AND VALUE

    ==DAVID MILLER==

    Regarding theories:

    –“they are nothing more than conjectures or guesses about the unknown state of the world.”–

    –“the principal function of experience in science is to eliminate mistakes”–

    –“The principal function of science in technology is again to eliminate mistakes.”–

    –“Neither experience in science, nor science in technology, can determine that a problem has been solved in an ideal way. The best that they can tell us is that we could have done worse.”–

    -David Miller

    ==COMMENT AND CRITICISM==

    I want to state David Miller’s arguments somewhat differently, by converting them from the language of perception and experience, to the language of action and economics in time. The reason is that objective language assumes discounts that are the equivalent of something more than platonism and less than magic.

    COSTS

    Solving something an ‘ideal way’ cannot be stated without consideration of time and cost. As such, the ‘idea way’ that something can be done to satisfy a need is the ideal at that is available at the lowest cost at that moment in time.

    Induction was a biological necessity given that costs for organisms competing in nature are extremely high, and kept high through competition, just as costs of time and opportunity are very high in the market due to competition.

    But, induction tells us only about available opportunities for further action, neither about (a) the probability of expanding explanatory power, or about (b) the limit of utility in expanding explanatory power.

    Induction as a statement of PROBABILITY is an example of the ludic fallacy. If we could determine probabilities that would mean the set of possible permutations would be finite. But given that we have no idea what the ideal solution is to most problems we cannot conduct probabilities. But this criticism is not the only one available. Since efficiency of any given figure action in any given future where we have more knowledge, is determined by the total cost of arriving at that minus the intermediate rewards of production. Further, there are points at which no further increase in precision (efficiency) provides a return that covers the cost of the investment, until we invent additional utility to be obtained from the investment that has been made to date.

    However, for the purposes of action, our guesswork is informed by induction as a means of identifying opportunities for expansion of our efforts, and it does tell us what further actions are available for us to investigate, and test.

    THE LOGICS AS INSTRUMENTATION

    The principle function of the ‘logics’ and ‘methods’ is to reduce error through physical and logical instrumentation. That instrumentation allows us to test our imagination (or theories) against the real world, and limits our mind’s biases in the interpretation of those real world stimuli. This testing is made possible by reducing that which we could not sense without instrument and method, to analogy to experience which we can sense, perceive, compare and test given the help of symbol, measure, instrument and method.

    CERTAINTY OF FALSEHOOD, UNCERTAINTY OF TRUTH

    While we cannot prove that a general statement about the world are true, we can prove that specific instances of statements about the world are false. As such, we can say that science has demonstrated X to be false, but we cannot state that science has demonstrated X to be true. We can say however, that given our current knowledge the current candidates for truth available for further action are A, B and C. And we can also say that any further refinement of A,B or C would not sufficiently change the current argument about X, such that it would make any difference at this moment.

    TRUTH CANNOT BE USED FOR ARGUMENT, ONLY FALSEHOOD

    You cannot be sufficiently certain of anything such that you can use it in an argument to demand my agreement. You can only seek to obtain my consent by eliminating the possibility or desirability of my position in contrast to yours. This constrains science to voluntary consent, and does not allow science to override the contract for voluntary cooperation we enter when we enter into debate.

    THE FALSE MYSTIQUE OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY.

    **The difference between physical science and engineering, as between mathematics and computer science, is simply the UTILITARIAN VALUE we attach to either (a) the product of the test and (b) the extension of deductive power that results from the test. In either case the method is the the same.**

    Scientific language is LOADED with these value judgements, and it is this LOADING of scientific language with VALUE JUDGEMENTS that generally distracts us (pretty much all of us) from the fact that there is no difference at all in our actions or methods no matter what theory we pursue, but there is a great difference in which products we value.

    Science can be LOADED with this language because unlike other fields, science ignores costs in exchange for pursuing truths. Whereas, in all other disciplines, costs and utility are the equivalent of truth, since truth is time dependent for the purpose of satisfying human wants and desires.

    ***By failing to articulate our ideas in operational language we hide these incentives, and reasons from our discourse. And we are rapidly confused when we argue as if they are differences in fact, when they are but a difference in value.***

    As such:

    **As opportunity costs decrease, demand for truth increases.**

    **As opportunity costs increase, demand for utility increases.**

    This is the supply demand curve for truth and utility.

    An individual who seeks to estimate his own costs and utility is different from another individual demanding costs from third parties regardless of utility.

    A DIFFERENCE ONLY IN VALUE OF OUTPUTS

    It is a subjective preference, but not a difference in method. All theorizing is the same. We may not make truth claims about our theories, but that does not mean that we cannot LOGICALLY choose how to act on them.

    IGNORING COSTS AS CHEAP STATUS SIGNALING

    I guess I should say more clearly that I see scientific pursuit of truth independent of opportunity cost, and necessity for production, as one of the ultimate signs of conspicuous consumption and privilege.

    The same applies to progressives who ignore the cost of norms and treat them as non-existent, as a means of signaling their conspicuous consumption.

    One of the externalities produced by western aristocratic philosophy, and its permanent placement in our values, is the demonstration of one’s independence from the market for norms, and the market for production, as the ultimate source of signaling their conspicuous consumption. This is the level that all artists, journalists, and public intellectuals all seek as well.

    REWARDS FOR ORGANIZING PRODUCTION, INFORMATION, RENTS AND STATUS SEEKING

    Unfortunately, the material rewards for ORGANIZING PRODUCTION in the private sector, and ORGANIZING EXTORTION in the private sector, are more materially rewarding, than organizing RENTS and STATUS SEEKING in the non-commercial sector.

    Just as economists should be better trained as philosophers, most philosophers would better trained if they understood economics. And both would be better of if they understood all human behavior was in fact, economic: equilibrium exchanges in pursuit of signals, opportunities, alliances, and mates.

    So as far as I can tell, the scientific method is a continuous one independent of any form of problems solving, and argument to the contrary is the use of obscurant language to ridicule others for the fact that they must pay costs in time, and that scientists can signal their privilege of acting independently in time – and nothing else.

    Science may be useful for signaling purposes, but we should not let our signaling purposes interfere with our understanding that all theoretical processes work the same, and must work that way, and that the criticism that we make of one another is over the ECONOMICS of using knowledge for the purpose of persuasion and signaling.

    As such, the output of any process can be easily categorized as (a) amusement, (b) production (transformation), (c ) knowledge and (d) signal , – or some combination of all four, in exchange for material and/or opportunity costs in real time. But truth, and honesty, and ethics dictate that we understand that any process we follow consist in the value we attach to each output and who benefits from each output at the cost of whom?

    — Curt Doolittle

    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-04 08:08:00 UTC

  • Does The Separation Between Mathematical Truth And Mathematical Proof Necessarily Imply A Platonist View Of Mathematics?

    Here is the debate as I understand it:

    (And forgive me if I mix language from multiple domains please.)

    The Intuitionists argue that all mathematics can be stated operationally, and as such, for all intents and purposes, all mathematical symbols other than the glyphs we use to name the natural numbers, are nothing more than names for functions (sets of operations).

    However, the intuitionist (‘recursive’) solution causes a problem in that the excluded middle is impermissible – but without it, much of mathematics because much more difficult, and harder to prove. So with that constraint on the excluded middle, the higher truth requirement of computational and constructivist, intuitionist logic has been deemed not useful for departmental mathematicians.

    So under the ZFC+AC and ‘spontaneous platonic imaginary’ creation of sets, we obtain the ability to do mathematics that include both double negation and the excluded middle. 

    This ‘trick’ separates Pure math in one discipline and  Scientific math, Computational mathematics, and philosophical realism into different discipline, each with different standards of truth. In fact, technically speaking, mathematics is absent truth (correspondence) and relies entirely on proof. ie: there are no true statements in pure mathematics.

    IF ANYONE  KNOWS —>> It does not appear that Brouwer or any of his followers understood why their method failed and the set method succeeded.  But even if they failed, I am trying to figure out if the Formalists understood their ‘hack’ and why it worked. 

    And lastly, if anyone at all understood how Intuitionist, constructivist, and computational logic could be improved to solve the problem of retaining correspondence (truth) while also retaining the excluded middle (even if it was burdensome). 

    Someone smarter than I am has got to have addressed this problem already although for the life of me I can’t find anyone who has.

    https://www.quora.com/Does-the-separation-between-mathematical-truth-and-mathematical-proof-necessarily-imply-a-Platonist-view-of-mathematics

  • Does The Separation Between Mathematical Truth And Mathematical Proof Necessarily Imply A Platonist View Of Mathematics?

    Here is the debate as I understand it:

    (And forgive me if I mix language from multiple domains please.)

    The Intuitionists argue that all mathematics can be stated operationally, and as such, for all intents and purposes, all mathematical symbols other than the glyphs we use to name the natural numbers, are nothing more than names for functions (sets of operations).

    However, the intuitionist (‘recursive’) solution causes a problem in that the excluded middle is impermissible – but without it, much of mathematics because much more difficult, and harder to prove. So with that constraint on the excluded middle, the higher truth requirement of computational and constructivist, intuitionist logic has been deemed not useful for departmental mathematicians.

    So under the ZFC+AC and ‘spontaneous platonic imaginary’ creation of sets, we obtain the ability to do mathematics that include both double negation and the excluded middle. 

    This ‘trick’ separates Pure math in one discipline and  Scientific math, Computational mathematics, and philosophical realism into different discipline, each with different standards of truth. In fact, technically speaking, mathematics is absent truth (correspondence) and relies entirely on proof. ie: there are no true statements in pure mathematics.

    IF ANYONE  KNOWS —>> It does not appear that Brouwer or any of his followers understood why their method failed and the set method succeeded.  But even if they failed, I am trying to figure out if the Formalists understood their ‘hack’ and why it worked. 

    And lastly, if anyone at all understood how Intuitionist, constructivist, and computational logic could be improved to solve the problem of retaining correspondence (truth) while also retaining the excluded middle (even if it was burdensome). 

    Someone smarter than I am has got to have addressed this problem already although for the life of me I can’t find anyone who has.

    https://www.quora.com/Does-the-separation-between-mathematical-truth-and-mathematical-proof-necessarily-imply-a-Platonist-view-of-mathematics