Theme: Truth

  • The Immorality Of Platonism (Riffing Off A Critic)

    RIFFING A CRITIC: THE IMMORALITY OF PLATONISM (important piece) CRITIC: –“The word ‘operationalise’ is a mantra for you. I understand many things without being able to operationalise them, such as how to use English, how to ride a bicycle, etcetera . But it’s important to pint out that most of our understandings are incomplete – and sometimes for insuperable logical reasons. Understanding a scientific theory is never complete. It’s information content ( that set of statements that it logically excludes) is infinite and thus cannot be completely grasped by any mind. For example , newtons theory contradicts Einstein’ and therefore each is part of the information content of the other . It would be silly to require Newton to know this, and ipso facto silly to have required him to operationalise his understanding of his own theory. The point is understanding is much more than making operations.”– CURT: (a) operationalizing, demonstrating, constructing, using as instrument, each of these terms implies action in time. Each is is a test of whether something can exist or not; and whether something is loaded or not; and whether something is obscured or not. (b) There are many things I can do, but there are many things I should not do. I should not shout fire in a theater. And my question is whether it is moral, once understood, given that plantonism produces such externalities as it has, to refer to platonic NAMES as extant, rather than as names of functions for the purpose of brevity (and possibly comprehension.) I dont so much care about what one does in one’s bedroom, or in one’s math department, as I do about the construct of moral argument and law. However, since math is the gold standard of the logics (despite being the simplest of them), and contains the same errors, mathematical philosophy is useful in demonstrating the problem in a more simplistic domain. If such an error can occur in math (it does), then of course it can happen anywhere (it does). (c) In response to your question above, I would have to understand the meaning of “understand” as you use it. If you can ride a bike you can demonstrate it, whether you can articulate it or not. You understand how to RIDE. And it’s observable that you can ride. You can think without articulating it, and I an observe (and test via turing) that you appear to be thinking. But you would have to tell me how ‘understanding’ applies to abstract concepts like a large number (which you cannot imagine except as a name) or the square root of two, or, infinity. Both of which are concepts that you can use, but not understand. Because you can fail to use something. You can USE something even if you do not know how to construct it. You can construct something. You can possess the knowledge of how to construct something. But understanding of use is different from understanding of construction. And one must make different claims depending upon which of them one is referring to. You can say you understand how to USE something, but you may not in fact understand how to construct it. This lack of understanding (constructive vs utilitarian) places constraints upon your truth claims. Just as it places limits upon the math (which consists of proofs) and logic (which consists of proofs) but both of which may or may not correspond to reality – and instead only demonstrate internal consistency. In other words, internal consistency is a demonstration of internal consistency but it is not a demonstration of correspondence. Given a distinction between internal consistency and external correspondence, which is a higher standard of truth? What does internal consistency demonstrate and what does correspondence with reality demonstrate? What is the difference between that which is BOTH internally consistent and externally correspondent, and that which is EITHER internally consistent OR externally correspondent? (c) I am hardly scorning scholarship given that it’s pretty much what I do: read all day. But demonstrating the point that one can ride a bike and show me that he can, and one can conduct an argument and show me that he can, or one can say he can ride a bike, and one can say he can conduct an argument. But demonstration is a property of correspondence, which is a higher standard of truth than internal consistency. Because GENERAL RULES that are used for internal consistency come at the sacrifice of external correspondence – almost always because contextual correspondence provides greater precision (information) than does general rule independent of corespondent context. (d) Mathematics is quite simple because it is used to describe constant relations. It can describe more variation than the physical universe can demonstrate (which is both advantageous and a weakness). Economics does not consist of constant relations so that mathematics is of less use in predicting the future because those relations are not constant. Now, there is a great difference between internally consistent disciplines ( logic and math) and externally correspondent (science and economics). Mathematics and logic contain statements that are internally consistent yet not externally correspondent. Science and economics prohibit these statements. In those circumstances where there is a conflict, which is true? Furthermore, if something can be described in terms of correspondence why does one describe it in terms of internal consistency, except to create a general rule, through the loss of information provided by the context? (e) Now, the open questions apply to all of the logics: I can logically deduce general rules from the names of those functions that are incalculable and impossible (which is why mathematicians wish to retain the excluded middle, and require the axiom of choice). So why should I be prohibited from the logic of the excluded middle and the axiom of choice, when doing so comes at the cost of my ability to create general rules independent of context? Why should I be prohibited from using these deductive tools if their only purpose is to covert the analog (precision in context) to the boolean (general rule independent of context)? And the answer is, that of course, these “named functions” are entirely permissible for the purpose of creating and deducing general rules. These general rules demonstrably apply in a multitude of contexts. But just as calling fire in a theatre, or telling a lie, or stealing does in fact ‘work to achieve one’s ends’ that does not mean that it is moral to do so, because by such action, one externalizes the cost of one’s efficacy onto others (society). We do not permit theft. We do not permit fraud. We do not permit privatization of the commons. We resist privatizations of even the normative commons, and we try to resist socialization of losses. So, therefore why should we not resist efficacy in a discipline if it likewise produces externalities? Because that is what immorality and morality mean: the prohibition on the externalization of costs. Now, one could say that we should all have the right to pollute equally. One could say that we have the right to lie equally. One could say that we have the right to create obscurant language equally. One could say that we have the right to create Religious (magical) language equally. One could say that we have the right to create platonic language easily. Because in each of these circumstances, the utility to the users is in obtaining a discount on the cost of action, over the cost of NOT engaging in pollution, lying, obscurantism, mysticism, and platonism, because each is a form of theft from others for the purpose of personal convenience. So if you deny that one can use the falsehood of induction, or the falsehood of religion, or the falsehood of lying for utilitarian purposes, then why are you not equally prohibited from using the falsehood of infinity, and imaginary existence? Or are you selectively immoral when it suits you? CLOSING This should be a sufficient description of the relatedness of fields once they are united by morality. And that is the purpose of philosophy: comprehension that facilitates action by providing a framework for criticism of ideas. It should be sufficient for anyone with any philosophical or logical training to at least grasp. It should also be obvious that you will not be able to circumvent this argument. Thus endeth the lesson. Cheers

  • The Immorality Of Platonism (Riffing Off A Critic)

    RIFFING A CRITIC: THE IMMORALITY OF PLATONISM (important piece) CRITIC: –“The word ‘operationalise’ is a mantra for you. I understand many things without being able to operationalise them, such as how to use English, how to ride a bicycle, etcetera . But it’s important to pint out that most of our understandings are incomplete – and sometimes for insuperable logical reasons. Understanding a scientific theory is never complete. It’s information content ( that set of statements that it logically excludes) is infinite and thus cannot be completely grasped by any mind. For example , newtons theory contradicts Einstein’ and therefore each is part of the information content of the other . It would be silly to require Newton to know this, and ipso facto silly to have required him to operationalise his understanding of his own theory. The point is understanding is much more than making operations.”– CURT: (a) operationalizing, demonstrating, constructing, using as instrument, each of these terms implies action in time. Each is is a test of whether something can exist or not; and whether something is loaded or not; and whether something is obscured or not. (b) There are many things I can do, but there are many things I should not do. I should not shout fire in a theater. And my question is whether it is moral, once understood, given that plantonism produces such externalities as it has, to refer to platonic NAMES as extant, rather than as names of functions for the purpose of brevity (and possibly comprehension.) I dont so much care about what one does in one’s bedroom, or in one’s math department, as I do about the construct of moral argument and law. However, since math is the gold standard of the logics (despite being the simplest of them), and contains the same errors, mathematical philosophy is useful in demonstrating the problem in a more simplistic domain. If such an error can occur in math (it does), then of course it can happen anywhere (it does). (c) In response to your question above, I would have to understand the meaning of “understand” as you use it. If you can ride a bike you can demonstrate it, whether you can articulate it or not. You understand how to RIDE. And it’s observable that you can ride. You can think without articulating it, and I an observe (and test via turing) that you appear to be thinking. But you would have to tell me how ‘understanding’ applies to abstract concepts like a large number (which you cannot imagine except as a name) or the square root of two, or, infinity. Both of which are concepts that you can use, but not understand. Because you can fail to use something. You can USE something even if you do not know how to construct it. You can construct something. You can possess the knowledge of how to construct something. But understanding of use is different from understanding of construction. And one must make different claims depending upon which of them one is referring to. You can say you understand how to USE something, but you may not in fact understand how to construct it. This lack of understanding (constructive vs utilitarian) places constraints upon your truth claims. Just as it places limits upon the math (which consists of proofs) and logic (which consists of proofs) but both of which may or may not correspond to reality – and instead only demonstrate internal consistency. In other words, internal consistency is a demonstration of internal consistency but it is not a demonstration of correspondence. Given a distinction between internal consistency and external correspondence, which is a higher standard of truth? What does internal consistency demonstrate and what does correspondence with reality demonstrate? What is the difference between that which is BOTH internally consistent and externally correspondent, and that which is EITHER internally consistent OR externally correspondent? (c) I am hardly scorning scholarship given that it’s pretty much what I do: read all day. But demonstrating the point that one can ride a bike and show me that he can, and one can conduct an argument and show me that he can, or one can say he can ride a bike, and one can say he can conduct an argument. But demonstration is a property of correspondence, which is a higher standard of truth than internal consistency. Because GENERAL RULES that are used for internal consistency come at the sacrifice of external correspondence – almost always because contextual correspondence provides greater precision (information) than does general rule independent of corespondent context. (d) Mathematics is quite simple because it is used to describe constant relations. It can describe more variation than the physical universe can demonstrate (which is both advantageous and a weakness). Economics does not consist of constant relations so that mathematics is of less use in predicting the future because those relations are not constant. Now, there is a great difference between internally consistent disciplines ( logic and math) and externally correspondent (science and economics). Mathematics and logic contain statements that are internally consistent yet not externally correspondent. Science and economics prohibit these statements. In those circumstances where there is a conflict, which is true? Furthermore, if something can be described in terms of correspondence why does one describe it in terms of internal consistency, except to create a general rule, through the loss of information provided by the context? (e) Now, the open questions apply to all of the logics: I can logically deduce general rules from the names of those functions that are incalculable and impossible (which is why mathematicians wish to retain the excluded middle, and require the axiom of choice). So why should I be prohibited from the logic of the excluded middle and the axiom of choice, when doing so comes at the cost of my ability to create general rules independent of context? Why should I be prohibited from using these deductive tools if their only purpose is to covert the analog (precision in context) to the boolean (general rule independent of context)? And the answer is, that of course, these “named functions” are entirely permissible for the purpose of creating and deducing general rules. These general rules demonstrably apply in a multitude of contexts. But just as calling fire in a theatre, or telling a lie, or stealing does in fact ‘work to achieve one’s ends’ that does not mean that it is moral to do so, because by such action, one externalizes the cost of one’s efficacy onto others (society). We do not permit theft. We do not permit fraud. We do not permit privatization of the commons. We resist privatizations of even the normative commons, and we try to resist socialization of losses. So, therefore why should we not resist efficacy in a discipline if it likewise produces externalities? Because that is what immorality and morality mean: the prohibition on the externalization of costs. Now, one could say that we should all have the right to pollute equally. One could say that we have the right to lie equally. One could say that we have the right to create obscurant language equally. One could say that we have the right to create Religious (magical) language equally. One could say that we have the right to create platonic language easily. Because in each of these circumstances, the utility to the users is in obtaining a discount on the cost of action, over the cost of NOT engaging in pollution, lying, obscurantism, mysticism, and platonism, because each is a form of theft from others for the purpose of personal convenience. So if you deny that one can use the falsehood of induction, or the falsehood of religion, or the falsehood of lying for utilitarian purposes, then why are you not equally prohibited from using the falsehood of infinity, and imaginary existence? Or are you selectively immoral when it suits you? CLOSING This should be a sufficient description of the relatedness of fields once they are united by morality. And that is the purpose of philosophy: comprehension that facilitates action by providing a framework for criticism of ideas. It should be sufficient for anyone with any philosophical or logical training to at least grasp. It should also be obvious that you will not be able to circumvent this argument. Thus endeth the lesson. Cheers

  • Were The Conservatives Right All Along

    (interesting) We cannot, like mathematicians tried to do, define something into existence. We can define rules of deduction, but not define something into existence. Truth consists of correspondence and cause, not definition. Definitions are our choice. Truth is not. That is the entire purpose of ‘truth’ – that which we cannot choose. So, if instead of some artificial scheme, we understand that PROPERTY is nothing but what remains, after we suppress all possible DISCOUNTS, by every means possible. Then, does that mean that the conservatives were right all along? That, since discounts, as a spectrum, are suppressible by a spectrum of actions which include the organized threat of violence, ostracization, boycott, reduction of opportunity, and the consequential limits on consumption, then the conservatives, correctly value NORMATIVE CONFORMITY TO SUPPRESSION OF DISCOUNTS, and that the model of property articulated by rothbard, taken as it was from the low trust society he was familiar with, In effect, Rothbard’s ethics are an attempt to preserve ‘cheating’ as a viable means of profiting from others, whereas conservative, aristocratic, ‘high trust’ ethics are an effort to suppress ALL cheating. Rothbard masks this cheating by stating that competition will suppress such cheating. But empirically, and praxeologically, this is demonstrably and logically false. So what are we left with no possible conclusion that either he committed a significant error or, that Rothbard’s ethics are an attempt, intentionally, to preserve cheating: which is precisely what the left correctly argues – albeit in their amateurish terms. The formation of a government, which is a monopoly that suppresses violence and theft, and then by taxation, suppresses free riding on the government’s suppression of violence, then, as a consequence, because of its monopoly, only displaces free riding with rents. The formal question remains the same, which is that rule of law, or liberty, is a prohibition on discretionary compulsion, but is only possible by the prohibition of all discounts. And the only possible means of both suppressing discounts, and preventing the conversion of free riding into rents, is to rely on competition for the suppression of these discounts. That is, I think, the fundamental equilibrial analysis of political order. The sequence is: 1) Suppression of discounts results in property rights. 2) Property rights lead to the division of labor, and prosperity. 3) Property (capital) and prosperity lead to greater opportunity for discounts. 4) The cost of suppressing discounts increases demand for specialized suppression. 5) The specialized suppressing discounts leads to free riding (fee avoidance) 6) The specialized suppression of free riding (taxation) leads to opportunity for rent seeking. 7) Opportunity for rent seeking leads to bureaucracy. 8) Bureaucracy leads to subjugation and expropriation. 9) Expropriation leads to circumvention (Religiosity, black markets, tax evasion, nullification, secession and revolt and revolution) 10 (fragmentation) The only solution is rule of law: no state, merely laws, and judges who resolve disputes. Governments must be local and under direct democracy. Everything else provided competing firms. CHEERS

  • Were The Conservatives Right All Along

    (interesting) We cannot, like mathematicians tried to do, define something into existence. We can define rules of deduction, but not define something into existence. Truth consists of correspondence and cause, not definition. Definitions are our choice. Truth is not. That is the entire purpose of ‘truth’ – that which we cannot choose. So, if instead of some artificial scheme, we understand that PROPERTY is nothing but what remains, after we suppress all possible DISCOUNTS, by every means possible. Then, does that mean that the conservatives were right all along? That, since discounts, as a spectrum, are suppressible by a spectrum of actions which include the organized threat of violence, ostracization, boycott, reduction of opportunity, and the consequential limits on consumption, then the conservatives, correctly value NORMATIVE CONFORMITY TO SUPPRESSION OF DISCOUNTS, and that the model of property articulated by rothbard, taken as it was from the low trust society he was familiar with, In effect, Rothbard’s ethics are an attempt to preserve ‘cheating’ as a viable means of profiting from others, whereas conservative, aristocratic, ‘high trust’ ethics are an effort to suppress ALL cheating. Rothbard masks this cheating by stating that competition will suppress such cheating. But empirically, and praxeologically, this is demonstrably and logically false. So what are we left with no possible conclusion that either he committed a significant error or, that Rothbard’s ethics are an attempt, intentionally, to preserve cheating: which is precisely what the left correctly argues – albeit in their amateurish terms. The formation of a government, which is a monopoly that suppresses violence and theft, and then by taxation, suppresses free riding on the government’s suppression of violence, then, as a consequence, because of its monopoly, only displaces free riding with rents. The formal question remains the same, which is that rule of law, or liberty, is a prohibition on discretionary compulsion, but is only possible by the prohibition of all discounts. And the only possible means of both suppressing discounts, and preventing the conversion of free riding into rents, is to rely on competition for the suppression of these discounts. That is, I think, the fundamental equilibrial analysis of political order. The sequence is: 1) Suppression of discounts results in property rights. 2) Property rights lead to the division of labor, and prosperity. 3) Property (capital) and prosperity lead to greater opportunity for discounts. 4) The cost of suppressing discounts increases demand for specialized suppression. 5) The specialized suppressing discounts leads to free riding (fee avoidance) 6) The specialized suppression of free riding (taxation) leads to opportunity for rent seeking. 7) Opportunity for rent seeking leads to bureaucracy. 8) Bureaucracy leads to subjugation and expropriation. 9) Expropriation leads to circumvention (Religiosity, black markets, tax evasion, nullification, secession and revolt and revolution) 10 (fragmentation) The only solution is rule of law: no state, merely laws, and judges who resolve disputes. Governments must be local and under direct democracy. Everything else provided competing firms. CHEERS

  • Is The Immorality of Mathematical Platonism Enough To End It.

    Math was constructed from, and must, of necessity, consist of a series of operations. And consequently, all mathematics is reducible to a few simple operations. (Which is why computers can calculate.) In practice. everything we can think of can be reduced to adding or removing one, and the test of equality. (As an aside, this is why we can explain more possibilities with mathematics than the physical universe can demonstrate in reality: because the universe does not have this level of freedom due to the apparent complexity of its interacting forces.) The act of adding and subtracting the symbols we call numerals and positional numbers, is an obvious and common example of creating symbols to replace what would be tedious and incomprehensible repetitions. This necessity to use symbols to condense information into usable components (categories) is what our brains need to do. Imagine trying to do all operations by counting? It would be impossible. We could not function without these symbols. Furthermore, describing mathematical equations and proofs as operations is both verbally and syntactically burdensome. And since these operations are largely simple, and can be accurately reduced to symbols (named functions) there is little value in articulating them as operations. So mathematicians have developed a multitude of symbols and names for what are not extant objects, but names of functions (sets of operations) – just as every other discipline creates heavily loaded terms in order to allow informationally dense communication with fewer words. Most ‘numbers’ are anything but: they are names, glyphs and symbols, for functions that consist of large numbers of operations. “The natural numbers exist in nature, but all else is the work of man.” The reason for this complexity is that quantitative, and directional relationships are expressed as ratios, and while some ratios are reducible to numbers, others are not. Those that are not reducible must be expressed as functions. We have not invented a mathematical system that can circumvent this problem. It is possible such a thing cannot be done. Now aside from the practical utility of creating symbols, that obscure the operations, there is a practical value in using these names by disconnecting these names from their operations and from correspondence with any given scale. That is, that disconnection allows one to use the logic of mathematics independent of cause, correspondence and scale, to explore ONLY the properties of the relations between the entities in question. And this turns out to be extremely useful for deducing what causes we do not now. And this extraordinary utility has been responsible for the fact that the discipline has laundered time, causality and scale (precision) from the discipline. But one cannot say that a mathematical statement is true without correspondence with the real world. We can say it is internally consistent (a proof), but not that it is true (descriptive of reality via correspondence). Mathematics when ‘wrong’ most recently, with Cantor’s sets, in which he used imaginary objects, infinity, the excluded middle and the the axiom of choice, to preserve this syntactical convenience of names, and in doing so, completed the diversion of mathematics from a logic of truth (external correspondence), to one that is merely a logic of proof (internal consistency). Cantor’s work came at the expense of correspondence, and by consequence at the expense of truth. ie: mathematics does not determine truths, only proofs, because all correspondence has been removed by these ‘contrivances’, whose initial purpose was convenience, but whose accumulated errors have led to such (frankly, absurd) debates, . So the problem with mathematical platonism, which turns out to be fairly useful for the convenience of practitioners, is not so much a technical problem but a MORAL ONE. First, mathematicians, even the best, rarely grasp this concept. Second, since, because it is EASIER to construct mathematical proofs than any other form of logic, it is the gold standard for other forms of logic. And the envy of other disciplines. And as such mathematical platonism has ‘bled’ into other envious fields, the same way that Physics has bled into economics. Worse, this multi-axial new mysticism has been adopted by philosophers from Kant to the Frankfurt school to the postmodernists, to contemporary totalitarian humanists as a vehicle for reinserting arational mysticism into political debate – as a means of obtaining power. Quite contrary to academic opinion, all totalitarianism is, is catholicism restated in non-religious terms, with the academy replacing the church as the constructor of obscurant language. I suspect this fairly significant error is what has plagued the physics community, but we have found no alternative to current approaches. Albeit, I expect, that if we retrained mathematicians, physicists, and economists to require operational language in the expression of mathematical relations, that whatever error we are making in our understanding of physics would emerge within a generation. No infinity can exist. Because no operation can be performed infinitely. We can however, adjust the precision and scale of any proof to suit the context, since any mathematical expression, consists of ratios that, if correspond to reality, we can arbitrarily adjust for increasing precision. Mathematics cannot claim truth without correspondence. Correspondence in measures is a function of scale and the UTILITY of precision, in the CONTEXT of which the operation is calculated (limit). A language of mathematics that is described independent of scale in given context, can be correctly stated. It need not be magian. Fields can still be understood to be imaginary patterns. But the entire reason that we find such things interesting, is a folly of the mind, no different from the illusion of movement in a film. The real world exists. We are weak computers of property in pursuit of our reproduction and amusement. We developed many forms of instrumentalism to extend our weak abilities. We must use instruments and methods to reduce to analogies to experience, those things which we cannot directly do so. It’s just that simple. AGAINST THE PLATONIC (IMAGINARY) WORLD Why must we support imaginary objects, as extant? Especially when the constructive argument (intuitionist) in operational language, can provide equal explanatory power? Why must we rely on ZFC+AC when we have recursive math, or when we can explain all mathematics in operational language without loss of context, scale, precision and utility? Just ’cause it’s easier. But that complexity is a defense against obscurantism and platonism. So it is merely a matter of cost. I understand Popper as trying to solve a problem of meta ethics, rather than anything particularly scientific. And I see most of his work as doing the best he could for the purposes that I’ve stated. Anyone who disagrees with me would have to disagree with my premies and my argument, not rely on the existence of platonist entities (magic) in order to win such an argument. That this is impossible, is at least something that I understand if no one else yet does. I don’t so much need someone to agree with me as constantly improve my argument so that I can test and harden it until it is unassailable or defeated. I think that defeating this argument is going to be very, very, difficult. TIME AND OPERATIONS (ACTIONS) IN TIME One cannot state that abstract ideas can be constructed independent of time, or even that they could be identified without changes in state over time. Or that thought can occur without the passage of time. Or consciousness can occur without the passage of time. Whether I make one choice or another is not material. This question is not a matter of choice, it is a matter of possibility. I can make no choice without the passage of time. I think that the only certain knowledge consists of negations, and that all the rest is conjecture. This is the only moral position to take. And it is the only moral position since argument exists for the purpose of persuasion, and persuasion for cooperation. I keep seeing this sort of desire to promote the rather obvious idea that induction is nonsense – yet everyone uses it, as a tremendous diversion from the fact that induction is necessary for action in real time, whenever the cost of not acting is higher than the cost of acting. Description, deduction, induction, abduction, guessing and intuitive choice are just descriptions of the processes we must use given the amount of information at our disposal. Science has no urgency, and life threatening emergencies do. Popper (and CR-ists for that matter) seem to want to perpetuate either mysticism, or skepticism as religion, rather than make the very simple point that the demands for ‘truth’ increase and decrease given the necessity of acting in time. I guess that I could take a psychological detour into why people would want to do this. But I suspect that I am correct (as I stated in one of these posts) that popper was, as part of his era, trying to react against the use of science and academia to replace the coercive power of the church. So he restated skepticism by establishing very high criteria for scientific truth. And all the nonsense that continues to be written about his work seek to read into platonic tea leaves, when the facts are quite SIMPLE. (Back to Argumentation Ethics at this point.) The fact is that humans must act in real time and as the urgency of action increases so does the demand for truth. Conversely, as the demand for cooperation increases, the demand for truth increases. Finally at the top of the scale we have science, which in itself is an expensive pursuit, and as such one is forbidden to externalize costs to other scientists. (Although if we look at papers this doesn’t actually work that well except at the very top margin.) THE QUESTION IS ONE OF COOPERATION The problem is ECONOMIC AND COOPERATIVE AND MORAL, not scientific. It’s just that simple. We cannot disconnect argument from cooperation without entering the platonic. We cannot disconnect math from context without entering the platonic. We cannot disconnect numbers from identity without entering the platonic. Each form of logic constrains the other. But the logic that constrains them all, is action. Without action, we end up with the delusions we spend most of philosophical discourse on. It’s all nonsense. I understand the difference between the real and the unreal, and the necessity of our various logics as instruments for the reduction of that which we cannot comprehend (sympathize with) to analogies to experience that we can comprehend ( sympathize with). Which is profound if you grasp it. THE PROBLEM OF SYMBOLS AND ECONOMY OF LANGUAGE If you cannot describe something as human action, then you do not understand it. Operational language is the most important, and least articulated canon of science. I do not argue against the economy of language. I argue against the loss of causality and correspondence that accompanies repeated use of economizing terms. ( I am pretty sure I put a bullet in this topic along with apriorism in economics. ) MORAL STANDARDS OF TRUTH Requiring a higher standard of truth places a higher barrier on cooperation. This is most important in matters of involuntary transfer, such as taxation or social and moral norms. Religions place an impossible standard of truth. This is why they are used so effectively to resist the state. Religious doctrine reliant upon faith is argumentatively inviolable. As such, no cooperation can be asked or offered outside of their established terms. … It’s brilliant really. Its why religious groups can resist the predation of the state. I would prefer instead we relied upon a prohibition on obscurant language and the requisite illustration of involuntary transfers, such that exchanges were easily made possible, and discounts (thefts) made nearly impossible. This is, the correct criteria for CR, not the platonic one that is assumed. In this light CR looks correct in practice if incorrect in argument. (There. I did it. Took me a bit.) Curt Doolittle

  • Is The Immorality of Mathematical Platonism Enough To End It.

    Math was constructed from, and must, of necessity, consist of a series of operations. And consequently, all mathematics is reducible to a few simple operations. (Which is why computers can calculate.) In practice. everything we can think of can be reduced to adding or removing one, and the test of equality. (As an aside, this is why we can explain more possibilities with mathematics than the physical universe can demonstrate in reality: because the universe does not have this level of freedom due to the apparent complexity of its interacting forces.) The act of adding and subtracting the symbols we call numerals and positional numbers, is an obvious and common example of creating symbols to replace what would be tedious and incomprehensible repetitions. This necessity to use symbols to condense information into usable components (categories) is what our brains need to do. Imagine trying to do all operations by counting? It would be impossible. We could not function without these symbols. Furthermore, describing mathematical equations and proofs as operations is both verbally and syntactically burdensome. And since these operations are largely simple, and can be accurately reduced to symbols (named functions) there is little value in articulating them as operations. So mathematicians have developed a multitude of symbols and names for what are not extant objects, but names of functions (sets of operations) – just as every other discipline creates heavily loaded terms in order to allow informationally dense communication with fewer words. Most ‘numbers’ are anything but: they are names, glyphs and symbols, for functions that consist of large numbers of operations. “The natural numbers exist in nature, but all else is the work of man.” The reason for this complexity is that quantitative, and directional relationships are expressed as ratios, and while some ratios are reducible to numbers, others are not. Those that are not reducible must be expressed as functions. We have not invented a mathematical system that can circumvent this problem. It is possible such a thing cannot be done. Now aside from the practical utility of creating symbols, that obscure the operations, there is a practical value in using these names by disconnecting these names from their operations and from correspondence with any given scale. That is, that disconnection allows one to use the logic of mathematics independent of cause, correspondence and scale, to explore ONLY the properties of the relations between the entities in question. And this turns out to be extremely useful for deducing what causes we do not now. And this extraordinary utility has been responsible for the fact that the discipline has laundered time, causality and scale (precision) from the discipline. But one cannot say that a mathematical statement is true without correspondence with the real world. We can say it is internally consistent (a proof), but not that it is true (descriptive of reality via correspondence). Mathematics when ‘wrong’ most recently, with Cantor’s sets, in which he used imaginary objects, infinity, the excluded middle and the the axiom of choice, to preserve this syntactical convenience of names, and in doing so, completed the diversion of mathematics from a logic of truth (external correspondence), to one that is merely a logic of proof (internal consistency). Cantor’s work came at the expense of correspondence, and by consequence at the expense of truth. ie: mathematics does not determine truths, only proofs, because all correspondence has been removed by these ‘contrivances’, whose initial purpose was convenience, but whose accumulated errors have led to such (frankly, absurd) debates, . So the problem with mathematical platonism, which turns out to be fairly useful for the convenience of practitioners, is not so much a technical problem but a MORAL ONE. First, mathematicians, even the best, rarely grasp this concept. Second, since, because it is EASIER to construct mathematical proofs than any other form of logic, it is the gold standard for other forms of logic. And the envy of other disciplines. And as such mathematical platonism has ‘bled’ into other envious fields, the same way that Physics has bled into economics. Worse, this multi-axial new mysticism has been adopted by philosophers from Kant to the Frankfurt school to the postmodernists, to contemporary totalitarian humanists as a vehicle for reinserting arational mysticism into political debate – as a means of obtaining power. Quite contrary to academic opinion, all totalitarianism is, is catholicism restated in non-religious terms, with the academy replacing the church as the constructor of obscurant language. I suspect this fairly significant error is what has plagued the physics community, but we have found no alternative to current approaches. Albeit, I expect, that if we retrained mathematicians, physicists, and economists to require operational language in the expression of mathematical relations, that whatever error we are making in our understanding of physics would emerge within a generation. No infinity can exist. Because no operation can be performed infinitely. We can however, adjust the precision and scale of any proof to suit the context, since any mathematical expression, consists of ratios that, if correspond to reality, we can arbitrarily adjust for increasing precision. Mathematics cannot claim truth without correspondence. Correspondence in measures is a function of scale and the UTILITY of precision, in the CONTEXT of which the operation is calculated (limit). A language of mathematics that is described independent of scale in given context, can be correctly stated. It need not be magian. Fields can still be understood to be imaginary patterns. But the entire reason that we find such things interesting, is a folly of the mind, no different from the illusion of movement in a film. The real world exists. We are weak computers of property in pursuit of our reproduction and amusement. We developed many forms of instrumentalism to extend our weak abilities. We must use instruments and methods to reduce to analogies to experience, those things which we cannot directly do so. It’s just that simple. AGAINST THE PLATONIC (IMAGINARY) WORLD Why must we support imaginary objects, as extant? Especially when the constructive argument (intuitionist) in operational language, can provide equal explanatory power? Why must we rely on ZFC+AC when we have recursive math, or when we can explain all mathematics in operational language without loss of context, scale, precision and utility? Just ’cause it’s easier. But that complexity is a defense against obscurantism and platonism. So it is merely a matter of cost. I understand Popper as trying to solve a problem of meta ethics, rather than anything particularly scientific. And I see most of his work as doing the best he could for the purposes that I’ve stated. Anyone who disagrees with me would have to disagree with my premies and my argument, not rely on the existence of platonist entities (magic) in order to win such an argument. That this is impossible, is at least something that I understand if no one else yet does. I don’t so much need someone to agree with me as constantly improve my argument so that I can test and harden it until it is unassailable or defeated. I think that defeating this argument is going to be very, very, difficult. TIME AND OPERATIONS (ACTIONS) IN TIME One cannot state that abstract ideas can be constructed independent of time, or even that they could be identified without changes in state over time. Or that thought can occur without the passage of time. Or consciousness can occur without the passage of time. Whether I make one choice or another is not material. This question is not a matter of choice, it is a matter of possibility. I can make no choice without the passage of time. I think that the only certain knowledge consists of negations, and that all the rest is conjecture. This is the only moral position to take. And it is the only moral position since argument exists for the purpose of persuasion, and persuasion for cooperation. I keep seeing this sort of desire to promote the rather obvious idea that induction is nonsense – yet everyone uses it, as a tremendous diversion from the fact that induction is necessary for action in real time, whenever the cost of not acting is higher than the cost of acting. Description, deduction, induction, abduction, guessing and intuitive choice are just descriptions of the processes we must use given the amount of information at our disposal. Science has no urgency, and life threatening emergencies do. Popper (and CR-ists for that matter) seem to want to perpetuate either mysticism, or skepticism as religion, rather than make the very simple point that the demands for ‘truth’ increase and decrease given the necessity of acting in time. I guess that I could take a psychological detour into why people would want to do this. But I suspect that I am correct (as I stated in one of these posts) that popper was, as part of his era, trying to react against the use of science and academia to replace the coercive power of the church. So he restated skepticism by establishing very high criteria for scientific truth. And all the nonsense that continues to be written about his work seek to read into platonic tea leaves, when the facts are quite SIMPLE. (Back to Argumentation Ethics at this point.) The fact is that humans must act in real time and as the urgency of action increases so does the demand for truth. Conversely, as the demand for cooperation increases, the demand for truth increases. Finally at the top of the scale we have science, which in itself is an expensive pursuit, and as such one is forbidden to externalize costs to other scientists. (Although if we look at papers this doesn’t actually work that well except at the very top margin.) THE QUESTION IS ONE OF COOPERATION The problem is ECONOMIC AND COOPERATIVE AND MORAL, not scientific. It’s just that simple. We cannot disconnect argument from cooperation without entering the platonic. We cannot disconnect math from context without entering the platonic. We cannot disconnect numbers from identity without entering the platonic. Each form of logic constrains the other. But the logic that constrains them all, is action. Without action, we end up with the delusions we spend most of philosophical discourse on. It’s all nonsense. I understand the difference between the real and the unreal, and the necessity of our various logics as instruments for the reduction of that which we cannot comprehend (sympathize with) to analogies to experience that we can comprehend ( sympathize with). Which is profound if you grasp it. THE PROBLEM OF SYMBOLS AND ECONOMY OF LANGUAGE If you cannot describe something as human action, then you do not understand it. Operational language is the most important, and least articulated canon of science. I do not argue against the economy of language. I argue against the loss of causality and correspondence that accompanies repeated use of economizing terms. ( I am pretty sure I put a bullet in this topic along with apriorism in economics. ) MORAL STANDARDS OF TRUTH Requiring a higher standard of truth places a higher barrier on cooperation. This is most important in matters of involuntary transfer, such as taxation or social and moral norms. Religions place an impossible standard of truth. This is why they are used so effectively to resist the state. Religious doctrine reliant upon faith is argumentatively inviolable. As such, no cooperation can be asked or offered outside of their established terms. … It’s brilliant really. Its why religious groups can resist the predation of the state. I would prefer instead we relied upon a prohibition on obscurant language and the requisite illustration of involuntary transfers, such that exchanges were easily made possible, and discounts (thefts) made nearly impossible. This is, the correct criteria for CR, not the platonic one that is assumed. In this light CR looks correct in practice if incorrect in argument. (There. I did it. Took me a bit.) Curt Doolittle

  • Contra David Miller : Confusing Fact and Value

    ==DAVID MILLER== Regarding theories: –“they are nothing more than conjectures or guesses about the unknown state of the world.”– –“the principal function of experience in science is to eliminate mistakes”– –“The principal function of science in technology is again to eliminate mistakes.”– –“Neither experience in science, nor science in technology, can determine that a problem has been solved in an ideal way. The best that they can tell us is that we could have done worse.”– -David Miller ==COMMENT AND CRITICISM== I want to state David Miller’s arguments somewhat differently, by converting them from the language of perception and experience, to the language of action and economics in time. The reason is that objective language assumes discounts that are the equivalent of something more than platonism and less than magic. COSTS Solving something an ‘ideal way’ cannot be stated without consideration of time and cost. As such, the ‘idea way’ that something can be done to satisfy a need is the ideal at that is available at the lowest cost at that moment in time. Induction was a biological necessity given that costs for organisms competing in nature are extremely high, and kept high through competition, just as costs of time and opportunity are very high in the market due to competition. But, induction tells us only about available opportunities for further action, neither about (a) the probability of expanding explanatory power, or about (b) the limit of utility in expanding explanatory power. Induction as a statement of PROBABILITY is an example of the ludic fallacy. If we could determine probabilities that would mean the set of possible permutations would be finite. But given that we have no idea what the ideal solution is to most problems we cannot conduct probabilities. But this criticism is not the only one available. Since efficiency of any given figure action in any given future where we have more knowledge, is determined by the total cost of arriving at that minus the intermediate rewards of production. Further, there are points at which no further increase in precision (efficiency) provides a return that covers the cost of the investment, until we invent additional utility to be obtained from the investment that has been made to date. However, for the purposes of action, our guesswork is informed by induction as a means of identifying opportunities for expansion of our efforts, and it does tell us what further actions are available for us to investigate, and test. THE LOGICS AS INSTRUMENTATION The principle function of the ‘logics’ and ‘methods’ is to reduce error through physical and logical instrumentation. That instrumentation allows us to test our imagination (or theories) against the real world, and limits our mind’s biases in the interpretation of those real world stimuli. This testing is made possible by reducing that which we could not sense without instrument and method, to analogy to experience which we can sense, perceive, compare and test given the help of symbol, measure, instrument and method. CERTAINTY OF FALSEHOOD, UNCERTAINTY OF TRUTH While we cannot prove that a general statement about the world are true, we can prove that specific instances of statements about the world are false. As such, we can say that science has demonstrated X to be false, but we cannot state that science has demonstrated X to be true. We can say however, that given our current knowledge the current candidates for truth available for further action are A, B and C. And we can also say that any further refinement of A,B or C would not sufficiently change the current argument about X, such that it would make any difference at this moment. TRUTH CANNOT BE USED FOR ARGUMENT, ONLY FALSEHOOD You cannot be sufficiently certain of anything such that you can use it in an argument to demand my agreement. You can only seek to obtain my consent by eliminating the possibility or desirability of my position in contrast to yours. This constrains science to voluntary consent, and does not allow science to override the contract for voluntary cooperation we enter when we enter into debate. THE FALSE MYSTIQUE OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY. **The difference between physical science and engineering, as between mathematics and computer science, is simply the UTILITARIAN VALUE we attach to either (a) the product of the test and (b) the extension of deductive power that results from the test. In either case the method is the the same.** Scientific language is LOADED with these value judgements, and it is this LOADING of scientific language with VALUE JUDGEMENTS that generally distracts us (pretty much all of us) from the fact that there is no difference at all in our actions or methods no matter what theory we pursue, but there is a great difference in which products we value. Science can be LOADED with this language because unlike other fields, science ignores costs in exchange for pursuing truths. Whereas, in all other disciplines, costs and utility are the equivalent of truth, since truth is time dependent for the purpose of satisfying human wants and desires. ***By failing to articulate our ideas in operational language we hide these incentives, and reasons from our discourse. And we are rapidly confused when we argue as if they are differences in fact, when they are but a difference in value.*** As such: **As opportunity costs decrease, demand for truth increases.** **As opportunity costs increase, demand for utility increases.** This is the supply demand curve for truth and utility. An individual who seeks to estimate his own costs and utility is different from another individual demanding costs from third parties regardless of utility. A DIFFERENCE ONLY IN VALUE OF OUTPUTS It is a subjective preference, but not a difference in method. All theorizing is the same. We may not make truth claims about our theories, but that does not mean that we cannot LOGICALLY choose how to act on them. IGNORING COSTS AS CHEAP STATUS SIGNALING I guess I should say more clearly that I see scientific pursuit of truth independent of opportunity cost, and necessity for production, as one of the ultimate signs of conspicuous consumption and privilege. The same applies to progressives who ignore the cost of norms and treat them as non-existent, as a means of signaling their conspicuous consumption. One of the externalities produced by western aristocratic philosophy, and its permanent placement in our values, is the demonstration of one’s independence from the market for norms, and the market for production, as the ultimate source of signaling their conspicuous consumption. This is the level that all artists, journalists, and public intellectuals all seek as well. REWARDS FOR ORGANIZING PRODUCTION, INFORMATION, RENTS AND STATUS SEEKING Unfortunately, the material rewards for ORGANIZING PRODUCTION in the private sector, and ORGANIZING EXTORTION in the private sector, are more materially rewarding, than organizing RENTS and STATUS SEEKING in the non-commercial sector. Just as economists should be better trained as philosophers, most philosophers would better trained if they understood economics. And both would be better of if they understood all human behavior was in fact, economic: equilibrium exchanges in pursuit of signals, opportunities, alliances, and mates. So as far as I can tell, the scientific method is a continuous one independent of any form of problems solving, and argument to the contrary is the use of obscurant language to ridicule others for the fact that they must pay costs in time, and that scientists can signal their privilege of acting independently in time – and nothing else. Science may be useful for signaling purposes, but we should not let our signaling purposes interfere with our understanding that all theoretical processes work the same, and must work that way, and that the criticism that we make of one another is over the ECONOMICS of using knowledge for the purpose of persuasion and signaling. As such, the output of any process can be easily categorized as (a) amusement, (b) production (transformation), (c ) knowledge and (d) signal , – or some combination of all four, in exchange for material and/or opportunity costs in real time. But truth, and honesty, and ethics dictate that we understand that any process we follow consist in the value we attach to each output and who benefits from each output at the cost of whom? — Curt Doolittle

  • Contra David Miller : Confusing Fact and Value

    ==DAVID MILLER== Regarding theories: –“they are nothing more than conjectures or guesses about the unknown state of the world.”– –“the principal function of experience in science is to eliminate mistakes”– –“The principal function of science in technology is again to eliminate mistakes.”– –“Neither experience in science, nor science in technology, can determine that a problem has been solved in an ideal way. The best that they can tell us is that we could have done worse.”– -David Miller ==COMMENT AND CRITICISM== I want to state David Miller’s arguments somewhat differently, by converting them from the language of perception and experience, to the language of action and economics in time. The reason is that objective language assumes discounts that are the equivalent of something more than platonism and less than magic. COSTS Solving something an ‘ideal way’ cannot be stated without consideration of time and cost. As such, the ‘idea way’ that something can be done to satisfy a need is the ideal at that is available at the lowest cost at that moment in time. Induction was a biological necessity given that costs for organisms competing in nature are extremely high, and kept high through competition, just as costs of time and opportunity are very high in the market due to competition. But, induction tells us only about available opportunities for further action, neither about (a) the probability of expanding explanatory power, or about (b) the limit of utility in expanding explanatory power. Induction as a statement of PROBABILITY is an example of the ludic fallacy. If we could determine probabilities that would mean the set of possible permutations would be finite. But given that we have no idea what the ideal solution is to most problems we cannot conduct probabilities. But this criticism is not the only one available. Since efficiency of any given figure action in any given future where we have more knowledge, is determined by the total cost of arriving at that minus the intermediate rewards of production. Further, there are points at which no further increase in precision (efficiency) provides a return that covers the cost of the investment, until we invent additional utility to be obtained from the investment that has been made to date. However, for the purposes of action, our guesswork is informed by induction as a means of identifying opportunities for expansion of our efforts, and it does tell us what further actions are available for us to investigate, and test. THE LOGICS AS INSTRUMENTATION The principle function of the ‘logics’ and ‘methods’ is to reduce error through physical and logical instrumentation. That instrumentation allows us to test our imagination (or theories) against the real world, and limits our mind’s biases in the interpretation of those real world stimuli. This testing is made possible by reducing that which we could not sense without instrument and method, to analogy to experience which we can sense, perceive, compare and test given the help of symbol, measure, instrument and method. CERTAINTY OF FALSEHOOD, UNCERTAINTY OF TRUTH While we cannot prove that a general statement about the world are true, we can prove that specific instances of statements about the world are false. As such, we can say that science has demonstrated X to be false, but we cannot state that science has demonstrated X to be true. We can say however, that given our current knowledge the current candidates for truth available for further action are A, B and C. And we can also say that any further refinement of A,B or C would not sufficiently change the current argument about X, such that it would make any difference at this moment. TRUTH CANNOT BE USED FOR ARGUMENT, ONLY FALSEHOOD You cannot be sufficiently certain of anything such that you can use it in an argument to demand my agreement. You can only seek to obtain my consent by eliminating the possibility or desirability of my position in contrast to yours. This constrains science to voluntary consent, and does not allow science to override the contract for voluntary cooperation we enter when we enter into debate. THE FALSE MYSTIQUE OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY. **The difference between physical science and engineering, as between mathematics and computer science, is simply the UTILITARIAN VALUE we attach to either (a) the product of the test and (b) the extension of deductive power that results from the test. In either case the method is the the same.** Scientific language is LOADED with these value judgements, and it is this LOADING of scientific language with VALUE JUDGEMENTS that generally distracts us (pretty much all of us) from the fact that there is no difference at all in our actions or methods no matter what theory we pursue, but there is a great difference in which products we value. Science can be LOADED with this language because unlike other fields, science ignores costs in exchange for pursuing truths. Whereas, in all other disciplines, costs and utility are the equivalent of truth, since truth is time dependent for the purpose of satisfying human wants and desires. ***By failing to articulate our ideas in operational language we hide these incentives, and reasons from our discourse. And we are rapidly confused when we argue as if they are differences in fact, when they are but a difference in value.*** As such: **As opportunity costs decrease, demand for truth increases.** **As opportunity costs increase, demand for utility increases.** This is the supply demand curve for truth and utility. An individual who seeks to estimate his own costs and utility is different from another individual demanding costs from third parties regardless of utility. A DIFFERENCE ONLY IN VALUE OF OUTPUTS It is a subjective preference, but not a difference in method. All theorizing is the same. We may not make truth claims about our theories, but that does not mean that we cannot LOGICALLY choose how to act on them. IGNORING COSTS AS CHEAP STATUS SIGNALING I guess I should say more clearly that I see scientific pursuit of truth independent of opportunity cost, and necessity for production, as one of the ultimate signs of conspicuous consumption and privilege. The same applies to progressives who ignore the cost of norms and treat them as non-existent, as a means of signaling their conspicuous consumption. One of the externalities produced by western aristocratic philosophy, and its permanent placement in our values, is the demonstration of one’s independence from the market for norms, and the market for production, as the ultimate source of signaling their conspicuous consumption. This is the level that all artists, journalists, and public intellectuals all seek as well. REWARDS FOR ORGANIZING PRODUCTION, INFORMATION, RENTS AND STATUS SEEKING Unfortunately, the material rewards for ORGANIZING PRODUCTION in the private sector, and ORGANIZING EXTORTION in the private sector, are more materially rewarding, than organizing RENTS and STATUS SEEKING in the non-commercial sector. Just as economists should be better trained as philosophers, most philosophers would better trained if they understood economics. And both would be better of if they understood all human behavior was in fact, economic: equilibrium exchanges in pursuit of signals, opportunities, alliances, and mates. So as far as I can tell, the scientific method is a continuous one independent of any form of problems solving, and argument to the contrary is the use of obscurant language to ridicule others for the fact that they must pay costs in time, and that scientists can signal their privilege of acting independently in time – and nothing else. Science may be useful for signaling purposes, but we should not let our signaling purposes interfere with our understanding that all theoretical processes work the same, and must work that way, and that the criticism that we make of one another is over the ECONOMICS of using knowledge for the purpose of persuasion and signaling. As such, the output of any process can be easily categorized as (a) amusement, (b) production (transformation), (c ) knowledge and (d) signal , – or some combination of all four, in exchange for material and/or opportunity costs in real time. But truth, and honesty, and ethics dictate that we understand that any process we follow consist in the value we attach to each output and who benefits from each output at the cost of whom? — Curt Doolittle

  • CORRECTING POSTMODERN ACADEMIC MYSTICISM When some victim of postmodern indoctri

    CORRECTING POSTMODERN ACADEMIC MYSTICISM

    When some victim of postmodern indoctrination says, such and such people ‘believe’ such and such, they are engaging in deception, no different whatsoever, from those who say ‘god wills it’.

    Human “beliefs” are, universally, justifications – excuses. Under all justifications are some form of transfer of property. Or excuse for the failure of the individual to gain access to property because of an immoral social structure.

    Look for the cause: property, not the justifications. When you do, all human social interaction consists of acts of voluntary exchange.

    Where it doesn’t, it’s merely kin selection.

    Help stamp out Postmodern Mysticism in the social sciences.

    Refute a postmodern mystic at every opportunity.

    Its one of the most moral things you can do.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-02-10 11:24:00 UTC

  • DRAFT: UNIVERSAL, DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE ETHICS : ETHICAL REALISM (ethics)

    DRAFT: UNIVERSAL, DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE ETHICS : ETHICAL REALISM

    (ethics) (this is a very tight logical box and I will make it tighter yet)

    PART 1 : UNIVERSAL, DESCRIPTIVE ETHICS

    ———————————–

    I. All moral rules in all cultures are possible to translate into prohibitions that attempt to solve the fundamental problem of cooperation: the suppression of free riding; the involuntary transfer, extraction, or destruction of assets, while at the same time facilitating all cooperation that functions as a multiplier of productivity – leading to the division of knowledge and labor, and the constant reduction of costs from that division. We are not superior to cave men. We have just made everything infinitely cheaper through the division of knowledge and labor and the application of a host of technologies.

    II. Humans accumulate and defend many things, and they resent loss of them. They do so because they either must (life and kin) or because they have invested time, opportunity and effort in accumulating them. Cooperative Life cannot persist without these prohibitions.

    1) Life (time)

    2) Kin and Mates

    3) Relationships

    4) Territory

    5) Material Inventory

    6) Status

    7) Commons

    8) Norms, Myths, traditions, institutions.

    9) Plans, Beliefs, Recipes.

    III. Humans demonstrate vehement reaction to and prohibition of the following categories of involuntary deprivation of their assets:

    1) Criminal Prohibitions (Murder, harm, destruction, theft – physical extraction)

    2) Ethical Prohibitions (fraud, omission, interference – asymmetry of knowledge)

    3) Moral Prohibitions (privatization, socialization, free riding – absence of knowledge)

    4) Conspiratorial Prohibitions (rent seeking, corruption, extortion, protection, taxation)

    5) Conquest Prohibitions (war, displacement, immigration, religious conversion, cultural competition)

    IV. Variations in those moral rules are determined by a compromise between the following problems:

    1) the reproductive strategy of the gender, class and group.

    2) the structure of production (the economy).

    3) the structure of the family unit necessary in any given structure of production.

    4) the inheritance pattern once assets can be accumulated.

    5) the degree of outbreeding in the polity (the extent of the taboo on inbreeding)

    6) the metaphysical value judgements between man and nature that were determined during the formation of cultural norms out of feast celebrations in the ‘great transformation’ era.

    7) the genetic and cultural homogeneity or diversity of the local economy (Islands vs borders vs unlanded/diasporic vs gypsy/pastoral).

    V. ***All moral sentiments, in all societies, are reactions to the perception of changes in state of those assets as determined by the criminal, ethical and moral prohibitions. In all humans, in all cultures, in all civilizations.***

    PART 2: UNIVERSAL, PRESCRIPTIVE ETHICS

    ————————————

    I. Given that moral rules consist of the prohibition of criminal, unethical, immoral, conspiratorial and conquest behavior, what remains is voluntary exchange of assets according to the group’s portfolio of moral and ethical rules.

    II. Trust. (undone)

    1) (transaction cost and velocity)

    2) Low trust societies prohibit only crime, high trust societies prohibit unethical and immoral transfers, and currently no cultures persist in prohibiting conspiratorial behavior since it is a consequence state function, and as yet we have no technology for suppressing state monopoly bureaucracy and corruption while preserving the state’s use in suppressing criminal, unethical and immoral behavior.

    III. Humans rely upon these necessary reductions in transaction costs to continue to expand productivity.

    1) Humans Signal their moral commitment with manners, language, and consumption (dress, possessions, etc).

    2) Humans demonstrate preference for association with those who use the same signals because those signals communicate lower transaction costs.

    3) Status Signals are cheaper with higher return in-group than out-group except at the extreme margins.

    (… more on transaction costs…)

    4) Urbanization appears to both decrease opportunity costs, and increase productivity by 15-20% (and all the bad things too) with every doubling of the population. People in urban areas move, as under the european monarchies, into neighborhoods ‘with their own’. This appears to ostracize the middle class to the suburbs.

    IV. Moral rules reflect necessary group evolutionary strategies.

    1) the group cannot survive local competition (not to mention, guns germs and steel) without a successful evolutionary strategy.

    2) Groups demonstrate that they are materially different in their abilities, in the distribution of abilities, particularly verbal and spatial intelligence.

    3) Groups demonstrate that they are materially different in the distribution of desirability for mating (symmetry, proportion and thickness of skin.)

    4) Groups demonstrate significant differences in the distribution of impulsivity and ‘malleability’. (Appears to be testosterone)

    5) Aggressiveness (Appears to be more complex than just testosterone).

    6) The distribution of verbal intelligence appears to heavily determine three factors:

    a) Morality since it rapidly declines under 95IQ.

    b) Trust and therefore economic performance for the same reason.

    c) Sufficient distribution over ~105IQ to concentrate productive capital a Pareto distribution (80/20) in the hands of those who can make use of property for group benefit.

    V. It is impossible to rationally adjudicate conflicts across different moral codes. (Which is why America is ‘coming apart’.) But it is ALSO necessary for groups to follow different in-group evolutionary strategies. Therefore it is not possible to morally construct large scale societies that consist of high trust economies. (As we see the Nordic states are small homogenous absolute nuclear family states that are highly outbred). It would have been possible in American had we not destroyed the Absolute Nuclear Family as a normative requirement for citizenship, political participation, and economic survival. But since we have the only solution is fragmentation or tyranny.

    However, if it is not possible to adjudicate moral rules across heterogeneous polities, without committing genocide, it is possible to adjudicate commercial exchanges between heterogeneous polities with different moral codes, since commerce between disconnected polities is constrained only by violence, theft and fraud, as well as prohibitions on conquest. While local polities and local interactions are ADDITIONALLY constrained by manners, ethics, morals, and prohibitions on corruption and conquest. And those local polities must be otherwise they would be rendered economically immobile by high transaction costs (Somalia).

    VI. Meritocratic societies (that suppress free riding) that practice assortative mating and the nuclear family appear to produce sufficiently eugenic reproduction that it is possible to keep ahead of malthusian constraints and genetic regression toward the mean. While equalitarian societies (with pervasive free riding) whether they practice assortative mating in extended families or not, and particularly if they practice inbreeding, cannot appear to defeat Malthus nor the pressure of regression towards the mean.

    VII. THEREFORE

    Assuming that dysgenic reproduction is undesirable (and I admit that this is a preference, but certainly a scientifically and evolutionarily arguable one), the purpose of political institutions is:

    1) To facilitate cooperation between groups for on means, but not ends, where the market cannot satisfy means or ends, because competition or privatization of commons would result in extraction from the commons or free riding on the commons.

    2) To facilitate redistribution for consumption but not for reproduction.

    3) To encourage a multitude of small populations with heterogeneous moral codes suitable to their reproductive and evolutionary strategies – each of whom can negotiate trade, and thereby compensate for their differences in ability and preference.

    4) To construct a single universal commercial code (which the anglo civilization has been doing by force of arms for 500 years) that enforces prohibitions on violence theft and fraud regardless of in-group preferences.

    5) To replace the natural corruption of political representation, monopoly bureaucracy, and arbitrary legislation, with rule of law, contract, insurer of last resort, and private provision of public goods via competing insurance providers.

    6) To facilitate relative equality WITHIN groups with the same evolutionary strategy (if they so desire it) but not ACROSS groups with different evolutionary strategies.

    AND IT FOLLOWS

    When you interfere with manners, ethics, morals, family structure, and production, if you are not INCREASING the suppression of free riding, you are damaging someone’s reproductive strategy and status.

    PART III : ETHICAL RULES

    PART IV : LANGUAGE (undone)

    ——————

    ( analogy to experience, operational statements, loading, framing)

    ( problem of complexity and necessity of compression)

    ( the difference between the necessary honesty of law and exchange and the utility of literary loading and framing)


    Source date (UTC): 2014-02-05 19:43:00 UTC