Theme: Truth

  • The End Of Moral Intuitionism And The Rise Of Moral Realism

    (meaningful) [M]ost philosophical debate degenerates to a recursive discourse on norms. That’s because human beings really enjoy the ease of introspection, and the self reinforcing reward of moral intuitionism. But if Propertarianism is correct, and I am pretty certain that it is, then moral truths can be expressed as purely rational arguments, and introspection merely tells you about your own reproductive strategy, class strategy, culture strategy, and cognitive biases. That means an end to moral intuitionism. Propertarianism allows us to produce a formal logic of ethics and morality, that denies us our cognitive biases and rational limitations. And that is why we need formal logics.

  • THE ATTESTATION THEORY OF TRUTH I supposed I should state this clearly, and prob

    THE ATTESTATION THEORY OF TRUTH

    I supposed I should state this clearly, and probably write a little history of Truth in order to get across why we tend to use Platonic truth. But I’ll have to get to that in my chapter on Truth.

    If we require, as does science, that we reduce all statements to operational language, then what action are we describing when we use the term ‘Truth”?

    We are using its original meaning as “as true as possible given the best of my abilities”.

    All other truths are platonist.

    Described as human action, ‘Truth’ can only describe attestation because it is only such attestation that can be brought into observable existence.

    This solves the long standing problem of the hierarchy of truth.

    Cheers.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-03-30 13:00:00 UTC

  • THE END OF PRAXEOLOGY AS A PSEUDOSCIENCE Proofs are properties of axiomatic syst

    THE END OF PRAXEOLOGY AS A PSEUDOSCIENCE

    Proofs are properties of axiomatic systems. Axiomatic arguments are complete by definition. Proof and completeness are why axiomatic systems merely state internal consistency not external correspondence. As such axiomatic systems allow us to construct proofs – not truths.

    One cannot prove a theory, only falsify it. A theory corresponds with reality, but is forever incomplete, or it is not a theory but a tautology. Axiomatic arguments are bounded only by the imaginary, and theoretic arguments are bounded by correspondence with reality.

    This is why axiomatic systems are argumentatively weak (as we have seen in postwar physics) and theoretic arguments are strong: because the set of all possible and falsifiable theories is smaller than the set provable axiomatic statements.

    This delta in ability is why axiomatic systems are useful for assisting us in the construction of theoretical systems. Mathematics for example can represent more possible relations than the universe can represent since the combinations of elementary particles is smaller than can be represented by natural numbers. Logic can represent more combinations of language than humans can organize into meaningful statements. In both language and mathematics external correspondence is required, and axiomatic arguments are merely exploratory devices to help us in the further construction of theories.

    Economic statements allow us to test the rationality of actions and incentives. And we must always retest them if they are more than reductio statements, because no economic circumstance is unique enough that we can categorize it. That human interpretations are constant is not the same as saying that the circumstance is constant.

    Problem Theory Test stated correctly would be:

    Intuitive pattern->Imagination->theory->test of internal consistency->test of external correspondence->test of falsification->increase in knowledge->new intuitive pattern.

    Hoppe’s arguments for example make these same errors: (from “Economic Science and the Austrian Method – Praxeology and Economic Science”

    1 —” Whenever two people A and B engage in a voluntary exchange, they must both expect to profit from it. And they must have reverse preference orders for the goods and services exchanged so that A values what he receives from B more highly than what he gives to him, and B must evaluate the same things the other way around.”—

    However, this is not correct. They must expect satisfaction from it, not profit. As an axiomatic statement it is false.

    –“Whenever an exchange is not voluntary but coerced, one party profits at the expense of the other.”—

    This is not correct. All we can know is that on party is unsatisfied with the exchange. Involuntary restitution is unsatisfying or it would be unnecessary. The statement is not axiomatic, it’s false.

    —“Whenever the supply of a good increases by one additional unit, provided each unit is regarded as of equal serviceability by a person, the value attached to this unit must decrease.”—

    Subjective value is not moderated on a unit basis but on a utility basis. As such this statement is not axiomatic (its false)

    —“Of two producers, if A is more productive in the production of two types of goods than is B, they can still engage in a mutually beneficial division of labor. This is because overall physical productivity is higher if A specializes in producing one good which he can produce most efficiently, rather than both A and B producing both goods separately and autonomously.”—

    But demonstrably this is untrue, since the effort to produce an inferior good at a lower profit does not remove it’s portfolio value, and as such profibabilty is a property of the set of effort and risk involved, not the price and profiablity of any element of the portfolio of goods and services. Again, this statemetn is not axiomatic, and it’s false.

    —“Whenever the quantity of money is increased while the demand for money to be held as cash reserve on hand is unchanged, the purchasing power of money will fall.”—

    First, the question remains as to whether demand for cash on hand CAN remain constant, or if there is value to holding it constant, because while money is neutral, it is only neutral over time, and as such it is not unclear that even savers benefit (profit) if consumption is increased during the period, OR whether it is moral to refrain from encouraging consumption simply so that savers can obtain higher interest rates than consumers can consume and producers profit. So no, the statemetn is not axiomatic and I at least suspect it is either questionably moral, if not empirically false.

    —” is the validation process involved in establishing them as true or false of the same type as that involved in establishing a proposition in the natural sciences?”—

    Evidently, yes. As we have just seen, economic statemsts are set-theoretical and incomplete, general rules. Not axiomatic, complete, and open to deduction absent empirical test.

    What separates economic science from the physical sciences both of the material world (physics et al) and cognitive science, Is that we require instrumentation to test statements about the physical world to compensate for the limits of our sense and perception, and likewise we require instrumentation to test the mind – since our senses are limited at the act of introspection. HOwever, economic statements that are reduced to operational language – a series of steps of human action in sequence – are universally perceptible or we could not take those actions.

    As such economic statements are testable by sympathetic experience. We are marginally indifferent in our reactions to specific circumstances, and as such over subjective sympathy can be expressed as a general rule (theory). But given the uniqueness of every experience in time, these can never be more than general rules (theories), and are subject to testing each example incident.

    One may say that economics is a science in which we need not rely upon instrumentation for testing statements. One may say that we can produce a logic of human action, consisting of the empirically derived theories.

    Man’s reaction may be consistent throughout time, and consistent across all humans – at least to some degree. But since no two instances are the same, economics remains a theoretical rather than axiomatic discipline. Theories do not require completeness and axioms do by definition.

    This post should be one of the more profound arguments that you will have encountered on a FB – that’s pretty likely from my experience.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev

    (PS very dense above. I may have to edit and expand it for additional clarity. But as an argument it’s pretty rock solid. And eventually I expect to put a permanent bullet in Misesian nonsense with it.)


    Source date (UTC): 2014-03-30 11:34:00 UTC

  • WHICH IS MORE CRANKISH? SIMPLE SCIENCE AND LOGIC, OR RATIONALIST PSEUDOSCIENCE?

    WHICH IS MORE CRANKISH? SIMPLE SCIENCE AND LOGIC, OR RATIONALIST PSEUDOSCIENCE?

    I am pretty confident that the praxeological line of reasoning, as currently constructed, is a dead end, as I’ve argued elsewhere. In no small part because it cannot compete with the universality of the language and processes of the ratio-scientific method. But while an inferior method, it’s still a useful method. And if it helps people understand micro and ethics then that’s good enough.

    The challenge at this inflection point in intellectual history, is that Hoppe has created the formal language of political ethics and political economy, and taught most of us to argue politics ethics and morality in economic terms. Yet that language is unnecessarily dependent upon Argumentation, Continental Rationalism, and a misguided attempt to conflate logic and science, in order to defend against a positivism that is not present in the philosophy or practice of science – if it ever was.

    Logic is axiomatic, and therefore both prescriptive and deductive. Science is theoretic, and therefore descriptive and deductive.

    But we can make statements in logic that are internally consistent yet not externally correspondent, yet we cannot make theories that fail external correspondence, whether or not our language is internally consistent.

    But the empirical test is obvious: if praxeology and rothbardian ethics are correct, then why are they both rejected almost universally? If these things are true, then why do we fail?

    Comparative ethics, empirically studied, yields a universal descriptive ethics that is theoretically rigid and more sustainable from criticism than rothbardian ethics.

    —“in all cultures and all civilizations, manners, ethics and morals reflect the necessary rules for organizing reproduction (the family) and the polity of families, such that they may cooperate in whatever structure of production is available to them. The content of those rules, under analysis, can be represented as property rights, each of which is distributed between the individual to the commons. Demand for third party authority as a means of resolving differences (the state) is determined by the degree of suppression of free riding (parasitism), and the number of competing sets of rules (family structures and classes) within any given structure of production. These sets of rules can be expressed as a simple formal grammar, which allows us to render all moral and ethical systems commensurable.”—

    Macro economics, experimental psychology, and cognitive science have contributed all economic insights over the past three decades, and none of these insights were deducible (cognitive biases in particular), or were emergent effects of economic cooperation (stickiness of prices, the time delay until money achieves neutrality, and the quantitative impact on interest and production in the interim, within each sustainable pattern of specialization and trade.)

    So, WHICH IS MORE PARSIMONIOUS A THEORY?

    Which theory is easier to understand?

    Which theory is more obscurant?

    Which more accurately reflects reality?

    I can explain and demonstrate this theory to anyone with a ratio-scientific background. I know this because it is simply an advancement to Ostrom’s work on institutions and she was able to do so.

    Cheers.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-03-29 06:08:00 UTC

  • MORE ON THE AXIOMATIC(CONSISTENT) VS THEORETIC(CORRESPONDENT) 1 – axiomatic (ind

    MORE ON THE AXIOMATIC(CONSISTENT) VS THEORETIC(CORRESPONDENT)

    1 – axiomatic (independent of action and observation) versus theoretic (action and observation)

    a) Axiomatic systems allow us to make statements independent of any correspondence with reality.

    b) Theoretical systems require us to make statements dependent upon correspondence with reality.

    c) It is universally possible to create axiomatic systems by copying theoretical statements.

    d) But it is not universally possible to create theoretical statements by copying axiomatic statements.

    2 – Testing against our perception in an empirical test. Not a logical one. If economic statements are reduced to human actions which we can observe, then we are not in fact making a logical test, but an empirical one.

    3 – What separates economics from the other sciences, (where science means observation) is that we can sense and perceive changes in state without the use of instrumentation. That does not mean that because we do not require instrumentation, we are not making observations. Introspection is still observation. Our statements are not logical, they are empirical because they are based upon that form of observation we call introspection.

    4 – Praxeology, if it’s a science, cannot depend on axiomatic statements since sciences are not axiomatically based, but theoretically based. But if we claim it is axiomatic then it does not require observation and if it does not require observation than must include a prohibition on introspection as a means of testing, and that all such tests are truth or false independent of our sense perception.

    5 – metaphysics states that reality is deterministic or knowledge of the universe is impossible. This stipulation required prior theory or axiom. Reason is impossible without it. We must assume regularity of the universe, even if we tend to construct history in retrospect for our ease of use.

    BACKWARDS

    Mises got it backwards. Economics is an observational science which we have the power of introspection to test. We can, from those observations both introspective and external, We can test the rationality of any statement (it’s truth content) but we cannot deduce much of anything from it. Because complex properties of action are emergent and impossible to forecast.

    Kant was an intellectual criminal, and the continental and cosmopolitan schools have done nothing to help us eliminate obscurantism and pseudoscience favored by the left. In fact, All the triumvirate have seemed to want to do is create yet another pseudoscience.

    I can’t save Hoppe unless I can fix this problem. Otherwise our movement is done when he is. Either we reform this nonsense, or libertarianism dies as a continental and cosmopolitan pseudosciences like the rest of the 20th century pseudosciences, or we convert libertarian language from the pseudoscientific to the scientific.

    Science won. Cognitive science, experimental psychology, and empirical economics have provided all the insights. Meanwhile we’ve spent thirty to forty years now masturbating with a pseudoscience only an autistic moron could possibly fall for.

    Time for libertarians to grow up.

    If you can’t answer my objections above, with statements of human action you’re just a sucker for pseudoscience. Because that’s what Praxeology is. It doesn’t have to be. But that’s what it is.

    LIBERTARIANS OUGHT TO STUDY MORE THAN “SCRIPTURE”. Because while knowledgable about economics, libertarians tend to be absolutely ignorant of anything outside the approved canon. I gain more understanding of the autistic nature of libertarians every day. Even though I’m one of them. I see that the lack of empathic comprehension applies to all disciplines.

    Time to grow up kiddies.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-03-28 18:47:00 UTC

  • LOGIC VS SCIENCE (on praxeology) (getting closer) (attestation theory of truth)

    LOGIC VS SCIENCE

    (on praxeology) (getting closer) (attestation theory of truth)

    So, if the defining property of the discipline of science is observation, and praxeology is purely deductive independent of observation, then how can praxeology honestly be termed a science? It cannot. Praxeology can be defined as a logic, but not a science. Formal Logic and mathematics are branches of logic that produce proofs, but not truths. Truth, to have any universal meaning at all must mean correspondence to reality with increasingly weaker definitions in niche application as we move into various branches of logic.

    Yet while truth is constrained by reality, axiomatic systems are not constrained by reality. We may produce theories, and rigid theories at that, but correspondence with reality is never axiomatic – axioms are limited to internal consistency. We are certainly missing a logic of cooperation with which to repair ethics. (I think I have articulated the criterion for that logic as voluntary transfer, symmetrically informed, warrantied, and free of externality.) But, I do not yet understand why we require a logic of action – or if there is any value in such a thing. But regardless of that question, logics are not identical to sciences and sciences not identical to logics, any more than proofs are identical to truths, or axioms identical to theories.

    We may pretend for amusement purposes that human actions are, by analogy, functionally axiomatic rather than functionally theories in a given context, but this is a mere pretense. Theoretic systems must retain correspondence with reality, while axiomatic systems are not bound by correspondence with reality. Human actions occur within reality and are bounded by reality. Axiomatic systems are imaginary and are only bounded by imagination. For this reason human actions can only be theoretically constructed as correspondent with reality, just as logical systems can only be axiomatically constructed.

    As such axiomatic systems tell us only about the internal consistency of our statements, and theoretical systems tell us only about the external correspondence of our theories – but not the internal consistency of our descriptions of those theories. If we use both tests of internal consistency and tests of external correspondence, and our statements are demonstrably valid proofs, and our theories are demonstrably valid tests, and both proofs and theories are stated operationally, then we can attest to the truth of our theories.

    And the only means by which we can subjectively test either axiomatic or theoretic statements is to reduce them to analogies to experience, by stating them in operational sequence – which we call “Constructionism”.

    If we cannot test the internal consistency or our arguments and external correspondence of our actions, then we cannot EVER honestly attest that our theories are true to our knowledge and understanding.

    This is the only standard of truth for any theory that I know of: attestation. If a theory is both externally correspondent, internally consistent, operationally stated, and falsifiable, then to our current knowledge that theory as stated is true – one can attest to its truth, and not commit unethical attestation. This does not mean that the theory cannot be improved upon. But it means one’s attestation about it is true. And that is the best that we can ever hope for.

    There is a great difference between a true theory and a complete theory. At some point any theory must evolve into a tautology, at which point one cannot attest to one’s hypothesis (theory, conjecture). Than is non-sensical. So a theory free of attestation is merely complete – tautological. Identical. Not correspondent dependent upon attestation ‘true’, nor imaginary and proven ‘proof’.)

    Getting closer. It should be possible, if difficult, to follow that argument. I bet within six months I can get lightbulbs to come on. Not quite there yet. But very close. This approach reduces all statements to human actions and truth to attestation rather than the platonic.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-03-28 15:45:00 UTC

  • ADDING KANT TO HISTORY’S MOST DESTRUCTIVE MINDS I’m going to add Kant (obscurant

    ADDING KANT TO HISTORY’S MOST DESTRUCTIVE MINDS

    I’m going to add Kant (obscurant anti-realism), to the ranks of history’s most destructive minds: Cantor(obscurant Pseudoscience), Freud(obscurant pseudoscience), Marx(pseudoscience), Napoleon (total war), Constantine(christianization of Europe), Plato (the Republic), Abraham(monotheism), Zoroaster (divine scripture).

    Intellectual Sainthood

    – Aristotle

    – Machiavelli

    – Bacon, Newton and Leibniz

    – Smith, Hume and Jefferson

    – Jevons, Menger, Walras, Marshall, Böhm-Bawerk, Wieser;

    – Pareto, Durkheim, Weber and Hayek.

    – Poincaré, Mandelbrot, Brouwer, Bishop, Taleb

    Now, if I could get Hoppe off his Continental and Kantian platonism, then he would have be the first person to succeed in reducing all rights to property rights. Even if his definition of property is incomplete he would have done it. He managed to articulate the morality of states, but not the morality of polities necessary for the voluntary organization of production. And possibly, that was his only goal. Whereas with propertarianism, I’ve illustrated the definition of property necessary for the formation of a polity capable of voluntary organization of production in the absence of a state. But he isn’t a candidate for intellectual sainthood if he’s stuck in Kantian nonsense.

    Failing that I’m stuck with doing it myself. And while I feel I have mastered ethics better than anyone else, I do not feel the same for philosophy proper. And while I’m getting there, I’m not there yet. I’m getting there. But the standard of measure is not my own comprehension, but the structure of my arguments. And I am just getting, after a year of solid hard work, to where I feel I can construct those arguments.

    Einstein was right (even if a plagiarist) that most of doing something innovative is just working at it longer than anyone else.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-03-28 11:07:00 UTC

  • ARGUMENTATIVE STANCES Argument as appeal. Argument as persuasion. vs Argument as

    ARGUMENTATIVE STANCES

    Argument as appeal.

    Argument as persuasion.

    vs

    Argument as discovery.

    Argument as test of argument (falsification)


    Source date (UTC): 2014-03-27 09:31:00 UTC

  • MATCHSTICKS Philosophy is too much like giving children matches to play with. An

    MATCHSTICKS

    Philosophy is too much like giving children matches to play with. And as Durant said, there are really no answers there. History is the only evidence of the nature of man, and the answers to our political nature are there. Philosophy is, at best, just a tool that helps us reduce our ever-present tendency to err. It is more often a tool by which we increase our errors. At its worst, it is a tool for self deception, or the deception of others.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-03-27 09:02:00 UTC

  • BURNING OBSCURANT AND PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY ON THE PYRE OF DECEPTION Most of my at

    BURNING OBSCURANT AND PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY ON THE PYRE OF DECEPTION

    Most of my attacks on a priorism are tests to see if the delta in utility between ratio-empirical and ‘Real’, and aprioristic-deductive and platonic, is sufficient to compel a change in method, but I am clearly dealing with very habituated people, and not giving them enough of a breadcrumb trail. And worse, I’m leading them into a dark and unfamiliar conceptual forest where they don’t want to follow. What do moral men do, when moral intuition fails them? They can’t do much until they learn enough new tools with which to restate their emotional intuitions in different terms now that the old terms are invalidated.

    Even the best people, who tend to be technologists, conflate general rule, theory, and axiom, into a single utilitarian category. Yet again demonstrating the difference between knowledge of use and knowledge of construction.

    I suppose I will just keep attacking a priorism as incomplete, and utilitarian, but now also as immoral obscurantism, and part of the continental-kantian and cosmopolitan-hermeneutic forms of deception. Part of the revolt against ratio-scientific.

    Although since I’ve already outed Rothbardian ethics as parasitic, and stated that Misesian praxeology was an error, I suppose that adding that a priorism (or any kantian construct) is immoral obscurantism, and part of the continental-cosmopolitan attack on human reason so loathed by Rand is just a continuation of my criticisms.

    So libertarianism as constructed, prior to its ratio-scientific expression in Propertarianism, is:

    a) parasitic

    b) insufficient for the production of a voluntary polity.

    c) argumentatively obscurant and immoral

    d) fails the test of its claims (deducibility of the scope of economics)

    e) inferior to ratio-scientific method for the accumulation of general rules of human behavior.

    But with Propertarianism, all of these faults are corrected.

    Of course people being as simple as they are, and even the best philosophers fairly weak, it’s probably lost that my attack on a priorism is an attempt to delegitimize on the right and libertarian spectrum, the same as I delegitimize on left-postmodern and socialist programs.

    I can’t kill off the obscurantist deceptions of the left without killing off the same techniques on the libertarian corner of the political spectrum. No matter what corner of the political spectrum one advocates, the prohibition on obscurantism that invalidates the arguments of the others, invalidates one’s own as well.

    All I have to do with the right is to give them a rational language. Most of what they believe is right in the first place. They just don’t have the ability to talk about it in rational terms – and perhaps once I focus there, I’ll be equally frustrated by their lack of intellectualism and mindless dependence on moral intuition. And perhaps at that point I will have to fight the battle against religion. But I think that religion cohabitates with propertarianism as comfortably as does capitalism.

    BUT LIBERTARIANS DON’T GET A FREE PASS. I’m burning continental philosophy, cosmopolitan philosophy, psychological philosophy (classical liberal), and marxist-socialist-postmodern philosophy on the same pyre. And it is a bonfire unlike any before it.

    The Ratio-scientific form of argument under Propertarianism (moral realism) is all that remains. Because it is the only moral form of discourse on ethics itself. Everything else is deception, fraud or worse.

    Burn, baby, burn.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-03-27 08:49:00 UTC