Theme: Truth

  • The Virtue Of Critical Rationalism

    [T]he chief personal virtue that Critical Rationalism bestows upon you, is the understanding that you never know the ultimate truth, you merely know enough to take action given the knowledge at your disposal, and only by our failures do we learn more about the truth, than we knew before – confirmation may be efficient and rewarding but it does not increase our competitive ability against each other, or against the forces of universe itself.

  • Review: Misreading Popper

    REVIEW OF POPPER BY WAY OF REVIEW OF ‘MISREADING POPPER’. Great book. Got a chance to read it this morning. THOUGHTS [I] do not know if it is fair to say that people misread popper, or that popper failed to make his case, but that he failed to reduce his ideas to general assertions that obviate the need to sympathetically (intuitively) agree with him in the first place in order to understand his case. Popper attempts to speak analytically at times, but he remains (as Alex Naraniecki has pointed out) a cosmopolitan author. The Popperian work that needs to be written is the one that this one ALMOST is, and that is to construct assertions that render the criticisms unnecessary. The historical parts of this book are exceptional and contextual, and in my view the best to date. A few of Rafe’s insights are in the book and they are insights that I learned from him years ago. The most important of which was the project to develop a philosophy of the social sciences, and the multiple authors who failed to succeed at that project, and the consequences for all of us, not so much scientifically, but politically an economically , precisely because they failed to succeed in that project. However, of those authors, Popper appears, perhaps not so well as Hayek did with law, but better than Mises with his pseudoscience of praxeology, to have come closer to articulating general universal statement of epistemology than anyone else. None the less, all of these authors failed to complete the project. (I think I understand why now.) So, Popper did not, like Hume (or Kant who I despise) take us across the finish line. And I suspect, that as Rafe points out in the book, it is because he did not lay out his project, because he was unsure of what it was. He wanted to criticize a prevailing trend, and he succeeded in that criticism. But a criticism in itself is not a positive assertion reducible to analytic terms describing an analogy to experience: a usable theory. CR/CP can be reduced to a list of assertions. Falsification is not the central proposition, but a contingent one, and as Rafe points out, an unfortunate choice of words. The scientific method can be generalized as the universal epistemological method, independent of purpose. And perhaps solve the problem of the social sciences. However, that project is incomplete. Given that Popper was largely correct, and that Hayek was largely correct, ( do not value the other authors terribly much), it should be possible to complete this project. But as yet, no one has. So again, I think it is an unjust burden to place the error of interpretation upon readers, and instead, to place the failure to organize, prosecute, and articulate the program and his solution to it. It is instead, proper I think, to state that Popper made correct assertions, in CR/CP, left his effort at falsification incomplete, and failed to complete the program he intuited but could not articulate. Most of this I believe, is a problem of language and culture. He had the right pieces. But our minds are structured by the language we use, and the culture that we live in, and he could no more escape his than we ours. Hopefully someone will write that book. Hopefully the person who writes that book will complete the program. As someone who tries to complete the overarching program myself – although I do not see it as Popperian but as a general problem of false distraction by extant platonic concepts, and the near magical results of the mathematical program despite its platonic concepts and language – legitimizing Popper is not terribly interesting to me. Nor is further promotion of his work as it stands. Nor is suppressing the absurdly persistent human cognitive bias toward justification. The matter at hand is to complete the research program. Hero worship is for priests. Some of us are out working in the mines. And the answer lies there not in hermeneutic interpretation of Popper’s extant works, or those of his successors. Great book. I wouldn’t have given it this much thought if it wasn’t. Cheers Curt Misreading Popper www.amazon.com

  • Review: Misreading Popper

    REVIEW OF POPPER BY WAY OF REVIEW OF ‘MISREADING POPPER’. Great book. Got a chance to read it this morning. THOUGHTS [I] do not know if it is fair to say that people misread popper, or that popper failed to make his case, but that he failed to reduce his ideas to general assertions that obviate the need to sympathetically (intuitively) agree with him in the first place in order to understand his case. Popper attempts to speak analytically at times, but he remains (as Alex Naraniecki has pointed out) a cosmopolitan author. The Popperian work that needs to be written is the one that this one ALMOST is, and that is to construct assertions that render the criticisms unnecessary. The historical parts of this book are exceptional and contextual, and in my view the best to date. A few of Rafe’s insights are in the book and they are insights that I learned from him years ago. The most important of which was the project to develop a philosophy of the social sciences, and the multiple authors who failed to succeed at that project, and the consequences for all of us, not so much scientifically, but politically an economically , precisely because they failed to succeed in that project. However, of those authors, Popper appears, perhaps not so well as Hayek did with law, but better than Mises with his pseudoscience of praxeology, to have come closer to articulating general universal statement of epistemology than anyone else. None the less, all of these authors failed to complete the project. (I think I understand why now.) So, Popper did not, like Hume (or Kant who I despise) take us across the finish line. And I suspect, that as Rafe points out in the book, it is because he did not lay out his project, because he was unsure of what it was. He wanted to criticize a prevailing trend, and he succeeded in that criticism. But a criticism in itself is not a positive assertion reducible to analytic terms describing an analogy to experience: a usable theory. CR/CP can be reduced to a list of assertions. Falsification is not the central proposition, but a contingent one, and as Rafe points out, an unfortunate choice of words. The scientific method can be generalized as the universal epistemological method, independent of purpose. And perhaps solve the problem of the social sciences. However, that project is incomplete. Given that Popper was largely correct, and that Hayek was largely correct, ( do not value the other authors terribly much), it should be possible to complete this project. But as yet, no one has. So again, I think it is an unjust burden to place the error of interpretation upon readers, and instead, to place the failure to organize, prosecute, and articulate the program and his solution to it. It is instead, proper I think, to state that Popper made correct assertions, in CR/CP, left his effort at falsification incomplete, and failed to complete the program he intuited but could not articulate. Most of this I believe, is a problem of language and culture. He had the right pieces. But our minds are structured by the language we use, and the culture that we live in, and he could no more escape his than we ours. Hopefully someone will write that book. Hopefully the person who writes that book will complete the program. As someone who tries to complete the overarching program myself – although I do not see it as Popperian but as a general problem of false distraction by extant platonic concepts, and the near magical results of the mathematical program despite its platonic concepts and language – legitimizing Popper is not terribly interesting to me. Nor is further promotion of his work as it stands. Nor is suppressing the absurdly persistent human cognitive bias toward justification. The matter at hand is to complete the research program. Hero worship is for priests. Some of us are out working in the mines. And the answer lies there not in hermeneutic interpretation of Popper’s extant works, or those of his successors. Great book. I wouldn’t have given it this much thought if it wasn’t. Cheers Curt Misreading Popper www.amazon.com

  • LIBERTY IS LIKE TRUTH Liberty is like truth : there is infinitely more of it tha

    LIBERTY IS LIKE TRUTH

    Liberty is like truth : there is infinitely more of it than you have, no matter how much you have at present. Liberty is not a state. It’s a pursuit.

    (Critical Rationalism may not be perfect but it will cure a lot of intellectual ills.)


    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-15 07:54:00 UTC

  • THE VIRTUE OF CRITICAL RATIONALISM The chief personal virtue that Critical Ratio

    THE VIRTUE OF CRITICAL RATIONALISM

    The chief personal virtue that Critical Rationalism bestows upon you, is the understanding that you never know the ultimate truth, you merely know enough to take action given the knowledge at your disposal, and only by our failures do we learn more about the truth, than we knew before – confirmation may be efficient and rewarding but it does not increase our competitive ability against each other, or against the forces of universe itself.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-14 05:43:00 UTC

  • HUMOR AS TRUTH

    HUMOR AS TRUTH


    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-12 05:46:00 UTC

  • “Curt, some of them are afraid you are right.”— Well I know that. But my argum

    —“Curt, some of them are afraid you are right.”—

    Well I know that. But my argument is rock solid. They’ll catch on. I just have to create a bit of a problem in the space for long enough to get my point across. Then I’ll show them the way to reconcile it. It’s better if they reconcile it themselves before I do that so I will delay as long as possible. But I’ll show them how to reconcile their silly rothbardianism with reality.I’ll give them an out.

    Curt Doolittle


    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-10 02:48:00 UTC

  • WHY DID WE HAVE TO CREATE YET ANOTHER FORM OF MYSTICISM? Natural rights? Intrins

    WHY DID WE HAVE TO CREATE YET ANOTHER FORM OF MYSTICISM?

    Natural rights? Intrinsic rights?

    OMG. It was the 20th century for goodness sake. What kind of idiot would suggest you “had” (owned, possessed) the equivalent of a soul?

    The source of any property right is anothers grant of it in exchange for the same, for the duration of your cooperation.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-09 09:24:00 UTC

  • EFFECTIVE INTELLECTUAL ENGAGEMENT VS IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ARGUMENT. (I’m ri

    EFFECTIVE INTELLECTUAL ENGAGEMENT VS IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ARGUMENT.

    (I’m riffing off Peter’s point. Not so much countering it. Because political debate is not in the same class as intellectual and academic engagement.)

    Status Update

    By Peter Boettke

    Four rules of effective intellectual engagement — from Daniel Dennett

    How to compose a successful critical commentary:

    (1) You should attempt to re-express your target’s position so clearly, vividly, and fairly that your target says, “Thanks, I wish I’d thought of putting it that way.”

    (2) You should list any points of agreement (especially if they are not matters of general or widespread agreement).

    (3) You should mention anything you have learned from your target.

    (4) Only then are you permitted to say so much as a word of rebuttal or criticism.

    I was taught these rules by Don Lavoie, I wish I was good enough of a person and scholar to always follow them. I will strive to do better.

    ====

    Curt Doolittle

    Very victorian Peter. It depends on the sector and the consequences. The history of Ideological debate does not agree with your advice. The history of academic study does.

    I learned a hard lesson from Hayek’s gentlemanly failure, and Friedman, Rothbard and Krugman’s immediate impact: if you’re debating science then that’s a gentleman’s game. Science is a luxury good. Politics is a proxy for war, and ideology is the weapon of influence.

    Time is precious.

    (Affections as always.)

    Curt Doolittle

    –” This is granting several enormous assumptions; (1) that your fellow actually believes what he says, (2) that he is stating the same reasons that he actually has for his position, and (3) that the crowd or stakeholders actually believe his argument based on the publicly stated reasons.

    I find it entirely likely, if not 100% certainly the case that (1) The arguments are just publicly digestible justifications. (2) The fellow has actual motives and reasons that differ from the arguments given, and (3) the crowd believes in the position due to the hidden reasons, regardless of the stated reasons.

    To accept your methodology, in my opinion, is to admit that Public Choice Theory is not valid.”–

    OMG. STEALING THIS.

    Curt Doolittle

    Note: one of the problems those of us at the lofty reaches fall prey to is ‘smart people disease’. (Projection Bias) Because we are both better able to identify deception and error, and because we associate with people better able to identify deception and error, and because we and those we associate with encounter less deception and error, we discount the near universal presence of deception even if we do not discount the near universal presence of error. The biggest threat to rational discourse is not error, or fallacy, it is deception, obscurantism, and postmodernism. Against which, Victorian ethics are a handicap.

    CLOSING

    I try to draw blood.

    Because your opponent is less likely to walk away when wounded.

    And you can defeat him thoroughly.

    I’m not a gentlemen. I’m a warrior.

    And I understand the moral difference between the two.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-02 17:25:00 UTC

  • SO WAIT: IF I DON’T KNOW *HOW* TO SPEAK TRUTHFULLY, I CAN SPEAK HONESTLY BUT ERR

    SO WAIT: IF I DON’T KNOW *HOW* TO SPEAK TRUTHFULLY, I CAN SPEAK HONESTLY BUT ERR?

    (floundering on the obvious)

    Yet, if I *DO* know how to speak truthfully, and I do not, even if I repeat my prior statement, I am speaking dishonestly.

    So, then if a constitution defines honesty non-obscuranatly (operationally) then one cannot claim to NOT know it, yet at the same time argue within the constraints of the constitution? Right?

    Too simple.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-02 03:40:00 UTC