Curt Doolittle

Theme: Truth

  • Learning From Debating Moral But Misguided People

    —“What is unscientific is the claim that a subjective being can be represented by a method that does not recognize subjectivity. No data can contain the information that it ‘supposedly’ contains. This is misrepresentation. And no person can interpret the data associated with another person since they are not that person at that time and place. This is not science it is hearsay. …. What the hermeneutic does not realize or care to reveal is that there is no alternative to the methodology of subjectivism in the human sciences if science is the pursuit. Science is not the captive of methodology but rather methodology (and it has to be the correct one) is the lens of science.”—Bruce Koerber


    [B]ruce,

    You know, you seem like a moral man, a deeply sentimental moral man, and I really don’t like fighting with moral men. But I have a job to do. And I think it’s an important job. And frankly you aren’t a problem because you are visibly a moral man. Like a wondering christian missionary you are trying to do good albeit doing good with mythology. And really, mythology is enough for simple people. Mythology conveys meaning by analogy. Meaning is all that is available to them since truth is too complicated for them to access and convert into new meaning. Truth devoid of meaning is expensive. Mentally expensive. And time intensive.


    So I am sorry that I stepped on you in the FB forum. In my world I am just doing my job. And I think it is an important one: to rescue moral economics from the lunatic fringe, by restating it scientifically – meaning truthfully. But it’s my moral duty, as a moral man, to do this job. That is how I see it.

    So lets look at your argument here and I’ll expose it for what it is:

    –“What is unscientific is the claim that a subjective being can be represented by a method that does not recognize subjectivity.”—

    AND
    —“No data can contain the information that it ‘supposedly’ contains.”—

    No one supposes data contains anything. That is a false argument. Facts exist within theories. They correspond to theories or they do not correspond to theories. We ether seek to falsify theories (criticism) or we seek to ‘support’ theories (confirmation bias). If we seek to falsify a theory and the result does not falsify it, but continues to confirm it, then the theory survives. Some theories defeat other theories by this means. And we largely defeat theories by narrowing their scope (parsimony). Because few theories outside of the mystical are non-correspondent (that is why we come up with them), but they fail under criticism (they are insufficiently correspondent). So the argument you are making assumes positivism not observation and criticism. Science progresses not through positivism, but through observation (empiricism) and criticism, in which we attempt to launder imaginary relations (content) from our theories, so that what remains is truth candidate.

    —“This is misrepresentation. And no person can interpret the data associated with another person since they are not that person at that time and place. This is not science it is hearsay. “—


    If this is true then no study of deductive human action is possible – you have falsified your how hypothesis. Instead, your statement is only true at the experiential level not at the demonstrated level. We cannot predict an individuals action at any given moment, but we can do two things (a) explain it afterward given the conditions – or at least falsify some large number of the possibilities (b) collect records of preferences demonstrated under similar conditions. So like any empirical observation we cannot predict the state of any very small thing (a molecule of hydrogen in a cloud), however, we can construct general rules of aggregate movements (we can describe cloud formation, and we can describe general rules of human aggregate behavior in an economy: economic laws).


    —“What the hermeneutic does not realize or care to reveal is that there is no alternative to the methodology of subjectivism in the human sciences if science is the pursuit. Science is not the captive of methodology but rather methodology (and it has to be the correct one) is the lens of science.”—

    This is demonstrably false. While we may not claim something is true unless we can explain it as a series of possible (rational, arational and irrational) human actions, (and in Propertarianism, further constrained by fully informed voluntary exchange), meaning that we have subjected it to operational and intuitionistic (subjective) testing, we certainly CAN use empirical observations in an attempt to understand the phenomenon that we cannot deduce.
    (continued…)
    (…continued)
    This does not mean that you cannot attempt to perform deductive analysis and research. It means that you cannot claim empirical analysis is unscientific, nor that economic analysis must be constrained to the deductive.


    This is why economics is no different from any other discipline. Truthful testimony must follow the same constraints no matter what discipline we discover. However, certain disciplines study different properties, and as such some disciplines such as chemistry rarely place contingency upon involuntary transfer (morality) and some such as economics and law always place contingency upon involuntary transfer. As such, in chemistry moral proof is an infrequent necessity, while as in economics it is a permanent necessity.


    As I have stated, (a) science is a moral discipline enumerating warranties that must be given for truthful testimony, (b) economics is bound by those same morals, and (c) operationalism and intuitionism are necessary constraints in all fields, and (d) morality is a necessary constraint in many fields – just less visible).


    Likewise internal consistency is necessary in mathematics, but external correspondence isn’t. Whereas in physics internal consistency and external correspondence and operational definitions are necessary, but morality is rarely a consideration. Whereas in economics, internal consistency, external correspondence, operational construction (proof of existence/falsification against imagination) and morality (falsification of involuntary transfer) are always necessary.


    This approach justifies Austrian economics, as a scientific and moral discipline. Whereas the misesian/rothbardian/hoppeian claims are both pseudoscientific and false both logically and demonstrably.


    So you see, I am trying to save Austrian Economics from the lunatic fringe by restating it as the moral discipline, consistent with all other disciplines, and where all disciplines are equally constrained by moral warranty.


    This is a profound innovation, and reconstruction of western thought and you should ponder it.

    Affections.

    Curt.

  • Learning From Debating Moral But Misguided People

    —“What is unscientific is the claim that a subjective being can be represented by a method that does not recognize subjectivity. No data can contain the information that it ‘supposedly’ contains. This is misrepresentation. And no person can interpret the data associated with another person since they are not that person at that time and place. This is not science it is hearsay. …. What the hermeneutic does not realize or care to reveal is that there is no alternative to the methodology of subjectivism in the human sciences if science is the pursuit. Science is not the captive of methodology but rather methodology (and it has to be the correct one) is the lens of science.”—Bruce Koerber


    [B]ruce,

    You know, you seem like a moral man, a deeply sentimental moral man, and I really don’t like fighting with moral men. But I have a job to do. And I think it’s an important job. And frankly you aren’t a problem because you are visibly a moral man. Like a wondering christian missionary you are trying to do good albeit doing good with mythology. And really, mythology is enough for simple people. Mythology conveys meaning by analogy. Meaning is all that is available to them since truth is too complicated for them to access and convert into new meaning. Truth devoid of meaning is expensive. Mentally expensive. And time intensive.


    So I am sorry that I stepped on you in the FB forum. In my world I am just doing my job. And I think it is an important one: to rescue moral economics from the lunatic fringe, by restating it scientifically – meaning truthfully. But it’s my moral duty, as a moral man, to do this job. That is how I see it.

    So lets look at your argument here and I’ll expose it for what it is:

    –“What is unscientific is the claim that a subjective being can be represented by a method that does not recognize subjectivity.”—

    AND
    —“No data can contain the information that it ‘supposedly’ contains.”—

    No one supposes data contains anything. That is a false argument. Facts exist within theories. They correspond to theories or they do not correspond to theories. We ether seek to falsify theories (criticism) or we seek to ‘support’ theories (confirmation bias). If we seek to falsify a theory and the result does not falsify it, but continues to confirm it, then the theory survives. Some theories defeat other theories by this means. And we largely defeat theories by narrowing their scope (parsimony). Because few theories outside of the mystical are non-correspondent (that is why we come up with them), but they fail under criticism (they are insufficiently correspondent). So the argument you are making assumes positivism not observation and criticism. Science progresses not through positivism, but through observation (empiricism) and criticism, in which we attempt to launder imaginary relations (content) from our theories, so that what remains is truth candidate.

    —“This is misrepresentation. And no person can interpret the data associated with another person since they are not that person at that time and place. This is not science it is hearsay. “—


    If this is true then no study of deductive human action is possible – you have falsified your how hypothesis. Instead, your statement is only true at the experiential level not at the demonstrated level. We cannot predict an individuals action at any given moment, but we can do two things (a) explain it afterward given the conditions – or at least falsify some large number of the possibilities (b) collect records of preferences demonstrated under similar conditions. So like any empirical observation we cannot predict the state of any very small thing (a molecule of hydrogen in a cloud), however, we can construct general rules of aggregate movements (we can describe cloud formation, and we can describe general rules of human aggregate behavior in an economy: economic laws).


    —“What the hermeneutic does not realize or care to reveal is that there is no alternative to the methodology of subjectivism in the human sciences if science is the pursuit. Science is not the captive of methodology but rather methodology (and it has to be the correct one) is the lens of science.”—

    This is demonstrably false. While we may not claim something is true unless we can explain it as a series of possible (rational, arational and irrational) human actions, (and in Propertarianism, further constrained by fully informed voluntary exchange), meaning that we have subjected it to operational and intuitionistic (subjective) testing, we certainly CAN use empirical observations in an attempt to understand the phenomenon that we cannot deduce.
    (continued…)
    (…continued)
    This does not mean that you cannot attempt to perform deductive analysis and research. It means that you cannot claim empirical analysis is unscientific, nor that economic analysis must be constrained to the deductive.


    This is why economics is no different from any other discipline. Truthful testimony must follow the same constraints no matter what discipline we discover. However, certain disciplines study different properties, and as such some disciplines such as chemistry rarely place contingency upon involuntary transfer (morality) and some such as economics and law always place contingency upon involuntary transfer. As such, in chemistry moral proof is an infrequent necessity, while as in economics it is a permanent necessity.


    As I have stated, (a) science is a moral discipline enumerating warranties that must be given for truthful testimony, (b) economics is bound by those same morals, and (c) operationalism and intuitionism are necessary constraints in all fields, and (d) morality is a necessary constraint in many fields – just less visible).


    Likewise internal consistency is necessary in mathematics, but external correspondence isn’t. Whereas in physics internal consistency and external correspondence and operational definitions are necessary, but morality is rarely a consideration. Whereas in economics, internal consistency, external correspondence, operational construction (proof of existence/falsification against imagination) and morality (falsification of involuntary transfer) are always necessary.


    This approach justifies Austrian economics, as a scientific and moral discipline. Whereas the misesian/rothbardian/hoppeian claims are both pseudoscientific and false both logically and demonstrably.


    So you see, I am trying to save Austrian Economics from the lunatic fringe by restating it as the moral discipline, consistent with all other disciplines, and where all disciplines are equally constrained by moral warranty.


    This is a profound innovation, and reconstruction of western thought and you should ponder it.

    Affections.

    Curt.

  • THE WAR ON TRUTHFUL SPEECH : THE ECONOMICS OF LYING If truth is a group’s your r

    THE WAR ON TRUTHFUL SPEECH : THE ECONOMICS OF LYING

    If truth is a group’s your reproductive strategy, then they should try to destroy western civilization. The underclasses and Non-westerners *should* be trying to destroy western civilization: it’s to their evolutionary advantage to defeat successful competitors.

    Its just logical. It’s in their interest. And they’re doing it.

    Why? Because truth is meritocratic and eugenic, and requires voluntary exchange, while deception is parasitic, dysgenic, and allows escaping from the costs of voluntary exchange.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    L’viv Ukraine

    Source date (UTC): 2015-01-04 09:50:00 UTC

  • Philosophy, Morality, Science, and Law Should Be Identical Propositions

    [I]f philosophy, morality, science, and law are not identical propositions then something is very wrong. Because philosophy morality science and law can be constructed as identical propositions. Because truthful, due-diligent, warrantable, speech is consistent regardless of the discipline in which we utter it.
    Propertarianism.

  • Philosophy, Morality, Science, and Law Should Be Identical Propositions

    [I]f philosophy, morality, science, and law are not identical propositions then something is very wrong. Because philosophy morality science and law can be constructed as identical propositions. Because truthful, due-diligent, warrantable, speech is consistent regardless of the discipline in which we utter it.
    Propertarianism.

  • PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY, SCIENCE, and LAW If philosophy, morality, science, and law

    PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY, SCIENCE, and LAW

    If philosophy, morality, science, and law are not identical propositions then something is very wrong. Because philosophy morality science and law can be constructed as identical propositions. Because truthful, due-diligent, warrantable, speech is consistent regardless of the discipline in which we utter it.

    Propertarianism.

    Source date (UTC): 2015-01-02 08:48:00 UTC

  • PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY, SCIENCE, and LAW If philosophy, morality, science, and law

    PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY, SCIENCE, and LAW

    If philosophy, morality, science, and law are not identical propositions then something is very wrong.

    Because philosophy morality science and law can be constructed as identical propositions.

    Because truthful, due-diligent, warrantable, speech is consistent regardless of the discipline in which we utter it.

    Propertarianism.

    Source date (UTC): 2015-01-02 05:22:00 UTC

  • STRANGE CRITICISM FROM BRUCE KOERBER (from elsewhere) –Still not a peep about:

    STRANGE CRITICISM FROM BRUCE KOERBER

    (from elsewhere)

    –Still not a peep about: “Even though it is perfectly true and perfectly logical that humans are subjective beings there are some who cannot fathom a scientific subjective methodology.”– Bruce Koerber

    The question is not whether we can practice a subjective methodology. Nor is it honest to use psychologism as a criticism when the question is whether such a method is a logical possibility or is empirically demonstrable. (It is dishonest actually – and psychological criticism is immoral because it is dishonest.) Instead, the question is whether subjectivity yields results – empirically it doesn’t, empirically it hasn’t, and logically it can’t. This is because of a tragically simple reason: subjective testing is not axiomatic in that it is complete (the distinguishing property of an axiom). But it is instead, that economic laws, constitute “laws” (in the spectrum of intuition, hypothesis, theory and law) meaning that it they are general rules of limited precision, widely accepted, that we cannot find false.

    We can certainly TEST economic statements. But we cannot deduce economic phenomenon, nor can we observe economic phenomenon, particularly emergent economic phenomenon, without empirical methods. We can test data all day long. We do.

    The logical possibility does not exist. We cannot and do not imagine (deduce) economic phenomenon, because economic phenomenon are emergent and inter-temporally equilibrating without every reaching equilibrium. Man is also fraught with an increasing number of cognitive biases. In other words, those phenomenon are too complicated to observe and predict. This is why there are so many outstanding problems in economic theory – it’s terribly complicated.

    So the unique property of economics is that we can test first principles (human subjectivity),rather than resort to purely correlative tests. In this sense we can know if economic theories can be true, in a way that we cannot know if theories in other science can be true. And even if we know that they CAN be true, we do not know if they are ‘true’ in the metaphysical sense, of being the most parsimonious theory possible.

    We can for example, construct a mathematica proof given any set of axioms. this mathematical proof demonstrates that any mathematical expression is can be constructed using mathematical operations. We can also demonstrate a proof in economics if any economic statement can be constructed from sympathetically testable existentially possible, human operations. But mathematical models cannot demonstrate innovation due to self awareness, and intentionally bend or break axioms in order to satisfy self interest – but humans can, and do – that is what even Keyensian economics combined with trade, fiscal and monetary policy attempt to do – and successfully do.

    It is therefore immoral and unscientific (an abuse of science) to claim that economic theories that are not operationally tested are true and moral. Whether we use empirical methods to observe and test our observations of economic phenomenon is merely a necessity of observation, and a necessity of compensating for our cognitive biases that forever jaundice our reason.

    There is no exit from the above box. Sorry.

    (Plenty of ‘peeps’ in there.)

    Source date (UTC): 2015-01-02 05:05:00 UTC

  • TURNING RATIONALISM ON ITS HEAD – AS AUTHORITARIANISM (from elsewhere) Thanks An

    TURNING RATIONALISM ON ITS HEAD – AS AUTHORITARIANISM

    (from elsewhere)

    Thanks Andrew:

    In regard to my statement:

    —“So no statement that is not open to sympathetic testing (falsification) by operational means (sympathetic testing) can be ‘true’, nor ‘scientific’ since ‘scientific’ refers to morally warrantable constraint upon one’s statements.”—

    You argue:

    –“It is important to consider if this statement itself is scientific or ‘true’ by its own terms. “–

    Well, this is a rationalist position, not a scientific position. So what is important to a person who justifies arguments to see if they are true (a rationalist), and a person who criticizes hypotheses to see if they are provide predictive results (a scientist) is considerably different.

    A frequent fallacy of philosophical argument is that there are two, not three arguments. They are 1) Rationalist, 2) Empiricist, and 3) Scientific. 1 and 2 are philosophical justifications. 3 is not. It merely seeks what works. Philosophers attempt quite often to cast as justificationary (under their control) that which does not seek justification, but only seeks to perform.

    A scientist seeks to testify that he has done due diligence, he does not seek to make true statements. After his due diligence, and after the community’s due diligence, that which survives remains hypothesis theory or law.

    Science is not philosophical, but like law, practical. By practical application law evolves, and by practical applicatoin, science evolves. We philosophers attempt to explain this, but we do not inform science. We inform others about the progress of science. (Which in itself is an interesting phenomenon.)

    Science then does not bear a burden of analytic truth. It bears only its evolved polycentric, normative, laws against error, bias, and deception in the presentation of theories. Those laws are often poorly articulated (outside of experimental psychology). We can analyze those laws and translate them into philosophical terms as a warranty (promise) that theories are:

    i) internally consistent (logical)

    ii) externally correspondent (correlative)

    iii) empirical (observable)

    iv) operational (existentially possible)

    v) falsifiable

    vi) reasonably falsified

    Now, a good critical rationalist would say that all those criteria are means of falsification (criticism), not justifications, as most rationalists would attempt to assert. However, I see this as again, non-performative (verbalist) rationalist language. And instead that these are our evolved conditions of intellectual warranty, that have survived the test of time by eliminating error, bias, and deception.

    (a) “is the statement falsifiable?”

    My statement is reducible to “only existentially possible human operations – whether mental or physical – can exist”. This is a metaphysical not epistemological assertion. So the proposition that we must falsify a metaphysical statement is inapplicable. Without this stipulation no further argument is possible on any grounds.

    Just for fun: If we could state that existentially impossible human actions can exist, then yes it is falsifiable. Just as if we state that existentially impossible mathematical operations can exist. While both of these things are hard to conceive of, that does not mean that they cannot be constructed, just as we did not imaging that length was a local rather than absolute concept. (Einstein/Brouwer). all premises are theoretical, even metaphysical premises.

    Can something demonstrably exist, and can such a thing be observable? Since (this is the point of empiricist arguments) we can both sympathize with one another (or we could not cooperate on intentions) and observe our own reaction to incentive-producing phenomenon, we can in fact, make internal observations, and we can collect external, empirical observations from others. (We do. All the time. In many disciplines. )

    Now it is possible that say, the quantum theory of subconscious communication is possible, but that would only state that we were not conscious, not that we reacted to incentives (information). And that we could not observe it, just as we cannot observe many of our intuitionistic functions of the mind. They are hidden from us.

    Next;

    (b) “Not being an empirical statement, it cannot itself be empirically tested.”

    Well, it being a metaphysical statement that is its definition.

    But that said, this is a good example of the rationalist fallacy. Given that empirical means observable, that I know of, we cannot make non-empirical statements. This is the debate between empiricism and rationalism. Measurements are empirical observations. Internal observations of our own sensations are empirical observations. The question is whether we insert error, bias, and deception into those observations. We are not trying to assert observations are true, we are trying to assert that observations are reasonably free of all possible error, bias, and deception.

    Moreover, isolating and constructing a demonstrative test is useful only in those circumstances where we seek to uncover first principles (reduce variables). Not in those cases where we seek to discover emergent phenomenon in fully informed (existential) reality, in real time (study variables). Economics requires the latter. In physics the former. In economics we can subjectively test incentives – that is why we can cooperate, and why apes don’t (well). It is why we can use juries in courts. But we cannot deduce from incentives all possible emergent economic phenomenon, which while based upon simple rules produces fractal results (emergent complexity we cannot anticipate). In physics by contrast we do not know the first principles – we cannot empathize or sympathize with the physical universe (yet).

    Another rationalist fallacy: it is MORE accurate to collect unintentionally constructed data and see if it fits your model, than it is to construct an experiment and intentionally construct data. This is one of the benefits of economic data over other tests: we collect demonstrated preferences (performatively-true testimonies). Whereas we have demonstrated that we cannot collect performatively-true testimonies in most cases because of error bias and deception.

    (c) “There is the question of science vs. orthodoxy.”

    Orthodoxy is a justificationist position not a scientific one.

    So, actually, the question is normative (as practiced), juridical(survives criticism), and metaphysical(existentially possible). Philosophy as practiced is largely justificationary for ancient reasons. Science is demonstrative and theoretical for equally ancient reasons – largely to avoid the politically normative, which is highly loaded with error, bias and deception.

    For this reason it behooves us to recognize that philosophy as practiced is a political activity, not a scientific one. That is why the most sophisitcated deceptions in history have been constructed via rationalist means. First monotheism was developed argumentatively as an authoritarian vehicle. Next philosophical argument. Then pseudoscientific. Finally postmodern abandoned all truth and reason.

    So the problem is not that science, must meet philosophical standards, but that rationalists must prove that they do not practice world history’s most successful art of lying, bias, and error. Since most great deceptions were carried out by rationalist rather than scientific means. Not the least of which were the church’s integration of aristotelianism, Rousseau’s justification and responsibilty for the horrors of the revolution, Kant’s authoritarianism and responsibilty for making marxism possible, marx’s responsibility for the death of 100M, Keynesianism’s responsibilty for western civilization’s suicide, freudian psychology’s century long survival and all the damage it has done to individuals, cantorian sets and the platonization of math and physics, scientific socialism and the loss of eastern europe, and the postmodern and feminist attacks on the family – the central unit of reproduction.

    So rationalists must warrant that they do no harm, scientists must not warrant, and do not warrant that they speak the truth. Only that they have done due diligence against doing harm to the informational commons via error bias and deception. Could we hold a court to convict both rationalists and scientists on the harm done by error, bias and deception, the prisons would be filled with rationalists and nearly empty of scientists.

    Because the harm done by rationalists, is only exceeded by the great plagues. In that sense rationalism (justificationism) is an intellectual plague that we are justified in exterminating. (Which is to some small degree part of my work.)

    (d) ” it is an interesting philosophy that states that philosophy is to be excluded from consideration.”

    This statement requires that we agree on the term ‘philosophy’. Since in my work, I argue i think persuasively, that there isn’t any difference if both philosophy and science are subject to the same criterion. If science, philosophy, morality and law are not identical in content then someone is engaged in error, deception, or bias.

    Instead, I state that rationalism (at least german and jewish rationalism) is a justificationary, authoritarian cult that has produced catastrophic harm to man on the same scale as scriptural monotheism, and only slightly less terrible than the great plagues.

    And that is simply the result of looking at the evidence.

    CLOSING

    Hopefully I put this conversation into perspective, not only correcting a number of common rationalist fallacies.

    It might be a bit to swallow, but that’s just how it is.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    L’viv Ukraine.

    Source date (UTC): 2015-01-02 04:47:00 UTC

  • GETTING EASIER TO GET ACROSS THE MAIN MESSAGE (reposted from elsewhere) The scie

    GETTING EASIER TO GET ACROSS THE MAIN MESSAGE

    (reposted from elsewhere)

    The scientific method consists of a set of moral rules on what scientists must consider truthful testimony. Otherwise no ‘method’ exists. The scope of these moral rules has evolved during the twentieth century in ways that I think very few people, scientists included, understand. (I will go into this a bit later if need be.)||

    Scientists do not practice (or even pay any attention to) philosophy or philosophers. Philosophers tend to be justificationists, but scientists do not practice justification. So no, scientists do not defend arenas using logic at all. That is what philosophers do when they try to defend one epistemological justification or another. Scientists demonstrate. They do not justify. Philosphers justify. So no, they did not evolve nor are they practiced by similar means. Rationalism and science are practiced by opposite means: justification versus demonstration and warranty.

    Scientists, and the discipline of science operate upon these epistemological principles:

    (a) we know nothing for certain, and may never be able to know anything for certain. (the most parsimonious non tautological statement possible).

    (b) we know what works and what doesn’t work. Everything else we say is just hypothesis, theory and law

    (c) all knowledge is theoretical (intuition, hypothesis, theory, or law)

    (d) we can combine theories to create models, which themselves are theories.

    (d) To publish a theory (‘distribute an intellectual product for consumption’) one must subject it tests (Provide a Warranty) stating that it is:

    i) consistent (logical)

    ii) correspondent (correlative)

    iii) empirical (observable)

    iv) operational (existentially possible)

    v) falsifiable

    vi) reasonably falsified

    The scientific method consists, if anything, in meeting these moral constraints upon their statements. It is their job to speak truthfully. But they never claim to state the truth. Even mathematicians (of any degree of sophistication) will say that truth is a problem of philosophy, while proof is a problem of mathematics.

    Mises’ argument is false because there are no non-trivial, non-tautological, certain, premises. If, as Einstein demonstrated, even time and length are concepts that we cannot count upon (length is the argument used to demonstrate the fallacy of even geometric premises). While we may imagine a point or a line, we cannot construct one. While we may imagine infinite sets, we cannot construct one. While we may imagine the square root of two, it cannot exist without a physical context to determine its arbitrary precision and therefore its existence.

    So no. Mises’ rationalism is a good story. But it’s just a story. An analogy.

    In order to warranty a statement as truthfully represented, it must meet the criteria that scientists have put forward. Science is merely a moral discipline for the purpose of truth telling. If we cannot say it scientifically then we cannot warrant that we are saying it truthfully: free of all possible error, bias, and deception.

    Mises was trying to combat the abuse of pseudoscience in economics, but he did not, as Brouwer did in math and Bridgman did in physics, discover Intuitionism, Operationalism and Operationism: the necessary test of existential possibility that checks our premises against the context in which we apply them. Praxeology was very close. But he got it wrong. If we see him in this light, as failing in economics where others succeeded in math and science, we can see Mises as part of a triumvirate that tried to add a new moral constraint to the sciences consistent with, or perhaps as an extension of falsification.

    It is unfortunate, since the reason Brouwer and Bridgman were not influential was that they failed to grasp that they were making a moral argument to the externalities caused by failing to demonstrate tests of existential possibility. whereas in economics, EVERYTHING WE WORRY ABOUT IS A PRODUCT OF EXTERNALITIES.

    Had Mises gone with Science rather than Rationalism we might have saved a century of semi-pseudoscientific argument only recently overthrown. Because in economics, externalities matter. It matters that Keynesian macro is an attempt to justify the manufacture of vast, slowly accumulating, negative externalities that burn down social and genetic capital. It matters that mathematicians talk about a mathematical reality that does not and cannot exist; that Cantorian sets are a bit of verbal nonsense by which to substitute quantity in timeless state, with frequency in a state where time is present. It matters that mathematical physics has seem to be nearly fruitless compared to physical experimentation, and that the entire multiple-world hypothesis was as nonsensical as we intuited.

    Externalities matter. And that is before we start talking about postmodernism: the most elaborate lie developed since the invention of theism.

    So the truthful, testifiable statement, is not the one mises makes, but that no economic statement that cannot be reduced to sympathetically testable operations can be true. AND any economic proposition that has not been reduced to a sequence of sympathetically testable operations can be stated to be ethical and or moral.

    So no statement that is not open to sympathetic testing (falsification) by operational means (sympathetic testing) can be ‘true’, nor ‘scientific’ since ‘scientific’ refers to morally warrantable constraint upon one’s statements.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    L’viv, Ukraine.

    Source date (UTC): 2015-01-01 14:03:00 UTC