http://www.capitalismv3.com/?p=2576Judith Curry discovers Hayek. I complain that scientists aren’t operating ethically. And we should be able to sue scientists the way we sue doctors, lawyers and accountants.
Source date (UTC): 2011-04-21 09:48:00 UTC
So, this silly person sends me a religious diatribe quoting scripture and all manner of other deists as if it’s some scientific and scholarly work that will convince me that it’s the will of god that I do this or that. What I love most about their arguments, is a failure to account for the ‘other gods’. The majority of people worship some ‘other god’. They have some other doctrine. Some other set of social assumptions. Yet they all take on faith that their god is the right one, their prophet the correct one, and their interpretation the best one. But if we look at the OUTCOME of worshipping a particular god as the measure of any religious philosophy, the LAST god you want to worship is Jehova or his Janus-masked inverse Allah. They’re a near guarantees of social, economic, political, and technological failure. Or the poor Russians, who, because of their trade relationship with Byzantium, the Czar chose Byzantine Christianity over Western Christianity, and forever exacerbated their cultural and economic problems. And under that analysis, the Chinese repression of organized religion is a much wiser strategy than is our convenient and commercially beneficial strategy of “tolerance”. Now, I’m not anti-christianity by any means. I understand the value of Christian monarchy, and the christian ethos. But I also realize that christianity is european paganism more so than it is biblical. But you can’t argue with these people using reason. You have to meet them on their turf. It gives them nowhere to do. So I use this kind of argument pretty frequently. It almost always works. And the outcome is almost always humorous:
There is only one true god, and only one true religion. Zeus. Jupiter. Dios Pater. Dyaus Pitar. Sky Father. Sun God. The God of Indo-European peoples. His prophets are Homer and Aristotle, his acolytes are the rational philosophers, his ministers lawyers and judges, his clerics are the scientists and technologists, his disciples are the warriors and craftsmen, his laws The Natural Law for men, and Science for the universe. Their tools are reason, technology, and the transformation of the earth for the benefit of man, in order to make the universe a heaven for man. Zeus desires only that his children join him, and take their place next to him, among the gods. He asks nothing in return. He only offers wisdom. The other prophets, the prophets of the false gods, are all dupes of the devil. They do the devil’s bidding. They serve the devil’s ends. They spread the devil’s lies. Jehova is the devil. He teaches submission. Only the devil wishes submission. Only the devil would wish submission. Submission is the end of man and the beginning of slavery. Jehova is the devil. The god of the hindus, buddhists, jews and muslims is a god that creates ignorance and poverty. This is the truth that history reveals to us. Allah is the devil. The god of muslims. He asks submission, and in return, his worshippers live in ignorance, poverty, violence and are the lowest peoples of the earth. The Hindus, and the Buddha teach followers to ignore the real world. To pretend it does not exist. And they live in poverty and ignorance because of it. Zeus is the one true god, and reason is the one true religion, and history is the one true mythology, and study and accomplishment are the one true ritual. We worship Zeus by with our achievements. We listen to his advice. We honor him by raising ourselves from animals to gods. Only reason, history, study and technology make it possible for man to join the gods, by transforming the real world into heaven. Only a devil would want man to seek submission and ignorance. Jehova is the devil in disguise. Selling the slavery of ignorance and pover under the ruse of false salvation and submission. Zeus seeks nothing in exchange. Jehova has nothing to trade. Allah has nothing to offer but ignorance. Hail Odin! Zeus! Jupiter! Dios Pater! Dyaus Pitar! Sky Father! Sun God! ((Thanks to the Monliari Society for inspiration.))
http://mitnse.com/Why I am not worried about Japan’s nuclear reactors – MIT’s Oehmen
Source date (UTC): 2011-03-15 05:22:00 UTC
http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.101.1.1The Top 20 Articles Of The Past 100 Years from American Economic Review. http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.101.1.1
Source date (UTC): 2011-03-13 18:48:00 UTC
Copied here from http://judithcurry.com/2011/03/06/climate-story-telling-angst. On Climate ETC: Judith Curry writes:
If climate scientists were to use their past accomplishments to bolster their current claims, there would be less controversy, as it’s more difficult to undermine the credibility of established achievements.
Which is a distracting straw man argument that posits the climate issue as one of communication rather than credibility. I responded with:
[callout]Why do I know that what I say here will not make a difference? Because researchers in the physical sciences have perverse incentives because of the economic structure of labor in academic research. Therefore, scientists will not change their behavior because it would cause them to pay the cost of that change, and that cost is too high in relation to ALL THEIR OTHER COSTS AND BENEFITS. …. In other words: People in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.[/callout]
I’m an economist. (A political economist. I’m not an econometrician – the kind of people who in economics make the same mistakes as physical scientists – forecasting.) Whether economists are scientists is still open for debate, but we have a similar problem of credibility in our field, even though economics and politics are more naturally interdependent than are the physical sciences and politics. Regarding Past Achievements. If we study both the history of science, the history of political activism, and the history of marketing we end up with a very different conclusion than you state above, and storytelling wont’ cure it: 1) Science is riddled with as many faulty conclusions as successful achievements – in fact, of necessity, far more faulty conclusions than successful achievements. (Everything from the notorious Phlogiston theory, to the Mathusian error, to the 70’s fascination with ‘global cooling’ and the upcoming ice age. Furthermore, Apocalyptic pronouncements are almost universally false if we look at the history of ideas across all fields. The universe is far more equilibrial than we are. Christendom in particular, is anti-apocalyptic because the apocalyptic vision is attached to ancient sentiments.) 2) Far more than 90% of research papers that achieve public attention contain errors in reasoning that invalidate the premise. (Depends upon whose study you look at — but, it’s bad no matter how you look at it.) A random selection of papers from PhD’s and candidates from any number of fields from any university’s library will contain amateurish exaggerated conclusions from insufficient data, and erroneous interpretation. (Reasons? First, because graduate ‘training’ work is publicized, and second, because the short form peer reviewed process for scientific achievement appears to be far less valuable than the long form book process for scientific achievement.) 3) Nearly all research work that reaches the public contains overreaching editorial content that invalidates the research. This is a combination of the desire for attention by researchers and editorial license that seeks attention on the part of publishers. 4) Good science is meticulous. Bad science is not. (I lost a quarter of a million dollars of my own money backing climate science, and the November 09 scandal was the reason for it. The field must take responsibility for the shoddy science.) 5) It certainly seems that economics as a profession is more skeptical of it’s calculations than are the physical sciences, partly because economic variables are so complex that we are afraid to make pronouncements. We realize we can be descriptive of the past but we cannot be PREDICTIVE of the future in economics. The same applies for highly complex systems of all kinds, even the environment – the heuristics of which is not terribly different in intertemporal terms than are social constructs. And, as an economist I can observe that the physical sciences are reversing the accumulated prestige of the field for a single reason: the perverse incentives of the graduate training process in research universities. 6) Movements need to be skeptical of their acolytes. For example, certain musicians who employ the compositional structure of hymns to rock music, must sometimes specifically eschew association with Christian groups because they know it will impact their credibility with the broader audience. The fact that the international communist movement has effectively co-opted the green movement means that the entire research program is now effectively discounted as a political movement. The global warming movement must associate itself with commerce if it is to succeed. And it is not impossible to do so. Moral arguments are UNIVERSALLY masks for wealth transfers. Without exception. Scientists are notoriously ignorant of economics and politics. Where science succeeds, is where it unifies with the pragmatism of commerce. Not where it aligns with religion and politics. In economic terms, science as a profession is discounted in the marketplace because of a record of exaggerated claims and faulty advertising. It isn’t that scientists need to tell better stories. It’s that science needs to produce better work, and be extremely cautious with public pronouncements. Scientism is a religion if it believes it has a lock on forecasting the future, even of simple physical events. So, it’s about credibility. The degree to which the academic scientific community in the west, since the 1970’s has undermined scientific credibility is not understood in the incestuous circle of academia. To counter this effect: Write books that fully articulate an idea, not micro-papers. Falsify your own work. Seek to justify opposing views. Ruthlessly attack others who undermine scientific credibility in the public debate. Reduce the number of graduate students and hide their work unless it is extremely well argued. (this is a contrary incentive) It’s not about achievements. Because the achievements are currently dwarfed by a ocean of contrary-indicators. In fact, if we look at the data, it is not in academia that the great inventions are coming from. In fact, it’s not from the large commercial capital bureaucracies either – they only refine discoveries. Innovation appears to be coming almost entirely from the efforts of individuals. It’s not about storytelling. It’s about doing good science. And right now, climate science is insufficiently articulated for human beings to justify paying the huge cost associated with the apocalyptic visions. Human beings are rational. They just need a rational argument and to understand the costs and benefits in relation to ALL THEIR OTHER COSTS AND BENEFITS. Why do I know that what I say here will not make a difference? Because researchers in the physical sciences have pervers incentives due to the economic structure of labor in academic research, and the failure to separate research from teaching lines of business and faculty in large universities. Therefore, scientists will not change their behavior because it would cause them to pay the cost of that change, and that cost is too high in relation to ALL THEIR OTHER COSTS AND BENEFITS FOR THEM. In other words: People in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.
http://www.capitalismv3.com/?p=2404Controversial Topic Warning: The decline in scientific credibility in politics is due to perverse economic incentives in research universities, and the shoddy work that results from it.
Source date (UTC): 2011-03-06 14:37:00 UTC
Over on Climate Etc, Judith Curry writes Blame on Heartland, Cato, Marshall, etc.
The fossil fuel industries have been funding dedicated minions at the Heartland, Cato, and George C. Marshal Institutes (among others) to generate misinformation about global warming and global climate change. They have attempted to attack the climate science message (such attacks actually part and parcel of the scientific process), but without much success, since the foundations of climate science are more than strong enough to withstand such challenges. Having failed in discrediting the climate science message itself, they have resorted instead to attacking the climate science messengers with character assassination, political innuendo, stolen e-mails, etc.
To which I replied:
There is another answer: 1) Libertarians and libertarian theory are economic disciplines with economic history that they rely upon for judgement. Economics is a chaotic and mathematically rigorous discipline. It also consists of a long and deep history of narratives and logic within the history ideas. 2) Libertarians have, and continue, to represent the branch of logic that advocates that economic models are not predictive. Not only that they are not predictive, but that they CANNOT be predictive. Not only that they cannot be predictive but that statistical analysis is only relevant to closed systems – and economies, due to innovation, the plasticity of utility of resources, and changing human wants, renders categorical forecasting impossible. This logical framework is supported by the fact that economic models are in fact, not predictive. And this is one of the issues with current political methods: that we rely upon economic models for policy purposes despite the fact that they are decidedly not predictive. 3) External entities with economic interests fund libertarian institutions because they are disposed to view government solutions as detrimental to the economy, and because libertarians are naturally hostile to models which purport to be predictive. They are highly agitated because of the rapid increase in external competitive forces run by non-market governments, and their advantage is being weakened by both external competition and an increasingly academically unprepared and uncompetitive work force. 4) Libertarians do not generally take the position that AGW is true or false. Their position is that (a) the AGW models are highly questionable, (b) there are alternative explanations that seem more probable, and certainly that previous climate movements to date have been false, and (c) even if AGW is true, that the solution is to create a green social movement rather than a system of increased taxation. The current green movement is working. It has become a generationally dominant social value. People will not pay for the long term, whether it is saving, retirement, health care. They will not pay for what they suspect. The AGW movement will do far better and make better progress if it does not seek legislation and in fact, actively does NOT seek legislation, but eschews legislation. This will make it more acceptable. Otherwise all libertarians and conservatives hear is that it is an excuse to fund abusive government. It is hard for liberals to understand that they are the minority of 20%, and that libertarians are the thought leadership of the conservative party, and while they, like convicted marxists, are a minority, they provide the thought leadership of the majority and are more likely to, and have consistently created, more conservative policies – ie: policies that do not empower government to make economic decisions. We are in a period of economic and cultural and even political uncertainty. Until we exit this period (which according to economic history, may or may not ever happen) people will have nearer term priorities. They will not be charitable to future generations in the face of current circumstances of decline and uncertainty.
From Thinkmarkets: Scientism in the way of science by Gene Callahan. Gene takes critics of economics to task. I misunderstand it at first, (as does Ebeling), and the ensuing commentary is worth reading. (Originally posted there. Posted here for documentary purposes. -A nod to the few sites like Econlib that seem to think documenting one’s work this way is bad for some reason.)
I repeatedly find attacks on positions in the social sciences made based on extremely limited and, frankly, antiquated views of how the physical sciences proceed. I will give one example from a rightist criticism of a leftist view, and one that is a leftist criticism of a rightist view, to illustrate that my point has nothing to do with ideology — or perhaps, that it has to do with the way ideology can lead one to embrace flimsy criticisms of other’s positions. The first excerpt is from Hunter Lewis’s book, Where Keynes Went Wrong: “In chapter 15, we saw how Keynes wrote N = F(D), which means that employment, denoted N, is a function of demand. Demand however is defined as expected sales, not actual sales. We noted that expectations are not a measurable quantity and thus do not belong in an equation.” Well, one way to measure these expectations would be to walk around and ask the entrepreneurs “How much do you expect to sell this year?” then total up those amounts. Why in the world this would not be a fine measurable quantity is unclear. But perhaps even worse is Lewis’s contention that only a “measurable quantity” belongs in a mathematical equation. So, let us strike pi from all of our equations, and e, and, most certainly, i! All complex numbers must be banished, and negative numbers are fairly suspect as well. Furthermore, most of the entities dealt with by modern physics are not directly measurable. Instead, what we measure is a dial reading or a trail on a photographic plate, things which require a great deal of theory to connect them to entities like electrical fields or positrons. As the philosopher Susanne Langer wrote:
The sense-data on which the propositions of modern science rest are, for the most part, little photographic spots and blurs, or inky curved lines on paper. These data are empirical enough, but of course they are not themselves the phenomena in question; the actual phenomena stand behind them as their supposed causes… we see only the fluctuations of a tiny arrow, the trailing path of a stylus, or the appearance of a speck of light, and calculate to the “facts” of our science. What is directly observable is only a sign of the “physical fact”; it requires interpretation to yield scientific propositions… and [realizing this,] all at once, the edifice of human knowledge stands before us, not as a vast collection of sense reports, but as a structure of facts that are symbols and laws that are their meanings.
(Philosophy in a New Key) And surely this was what Keynes thought: aggregate demand may not be directly observable, but we can formulate laws by which itseffects are observable, for instance, in a recession. Now, whether he was correct or not is not my topic, but there is certainly nothing unscientific about his hypothesis. The second excerpt is from a history of marginalism at The New School for Social Research: “However, [marginalism’s] Achilles’ heel was the very notion of ‘marginal utility’. Marginal utility, let us be frank, is hardly a scientific concept: unobservable, unmeasurable and untestable, marginal utility is a notion with very dubious scientific standing.” Unobservable, unmeasurable and untestable — like, say, infinitesimals in calculus! (And people like Berkeley directed just such criticism at infinitesimals and other mathematical notions.) Once again, we have some unfounded belief that scientific entities must be directly observable, rather than observed by their hypothesized effects. (And certainly the theory of marginal utility predicts many observable phenomena, such as the lack of a price for air in normal circumstances.)
[callout] … probabilism in the social sciences as we understand it … is unscientific. Not simply beause the methods are logically false and because the predictive capacity of our methods are false, but because NOT USING THEM appears to produce better results than using them.[/callout]
I think that Gene’s argument is a bit clearer now that I have read comments by others. And perhaps I’m adding additional vectors of inquiry rather than debating his position. Gene’s argument is that people from the physical sciences argue that economics is not a science and counters the grounds on which their criticisms are based. I interpreted his posting that people from the psychological school were forming the criticism against positivism in economics. Gene’s criticisms are correct, in that mathematics relies upon incomplete approximations that are convenient contrivances, and that economic science relies upon similar assumptions, so he is attacking the physical sciences on their methods – saying their criticisms of social sciences are hypocritical. I would argue that since the velocity of the transfer and transformation of energy in time and space is knowable, and that the same velocity of knowledge is not yet knowable, that probabilism in the social sciences as we understand it – and as I have stated below, is unscientific. Not simply beause the methods are logically false, and because the predictive capacity of our methods are false, but because NOT USING THEM appears to produce better results than using them. And that while results in the physical sciences have neutral consequences (or perhaps do not have moral consequences – those that affect others without their consent) that consequences of failure necessary for testing in the physical sciences creates negative externalities, as well as being simply counter-productive in the social sciences. (I believe I understand how to discover the formula for that velocity, and how to know it, but not what it is, and that someone more intelligent, and most likely younger than I am will be required to solve it. But at least google is accumulating the data needed to determine it.)
Gene, Well, I think the argument against the use of models is different from that which you’re stating. There are three or four major lines of argument in your posting all making assumptions about ‘science’ and the scientific method. Marginal utility is an expression of the relativity and subjectivity of value, and the plasticity of utility, and the dynamic variability of value in real time. This creates a set of variables that lead to the effective uniqueness of each object in time for many (if not all) objects, which in turn leads to the categorical error of aggregation when applied to quantities, each of which includes necessary errors due to aggregation. And this error of aggregation is the reason for non-prediction. And therefore non-prediction is caused by the very reasons austrians stated. That in the aggregate much of this can be modeled, is true, at least for many commodities. Objects in physical space have a prior course. So do human events. We can measure the delta in the course of physical events, but CANNOT measure the delta in the course of social events. That is the simplest statement of the problem. It is that social events CANNOT be measured because they are temporally unique. And further, Marginal utility is absolutely testable (and has been.) So I don’t understand, or rather, you could be making any number of points, and its unclear which. Marginal utility is a categorical description of a visible, measurable process, whenever that process results in an exchange (at least.) True, we cannot know the opportunity costs paid by individuals, but we can measure whenever they do act to exchange goods or services. Instead, the criticism of models is not on grounds of material measurement of transactions, but that :
a) empirical models in the social sciences are not predictive and are even inversely predictive in relation to their utility in time.
b) that they are consistently not predictive (although they are descriptive of the past) and therefore false, and
c) that as demonstrably false, they are unscientific. That due to subjectivity and innovation, plasticity of utility, and the resulting heterogeneity of capital, and asymmetry of information, shocks and the vicissitudes of time, they are logically destined to be false. (ie: it is not the use of measurement, it is the use of measurement to determine causality – not correlation but causality – that is scientific.)
d) that the use of false, non-predictive, arguments are used to justify implementing dangerous risk-accelerating unscientific policy.
e) that we cannot model what might have been, had we not used false models to enact policy, and therefore calculate the real cost of policy. (ie: we cannot compare what might have been with what has come to pass, and sum our costs plus our profits.)
f) that by implementing such policies we expose ourselves to and indeed, encourage greater risk. Ie: the austrian business cycle of booms and busts.
g) that it appears, that in history, whenever the commercial sector grows faster than the state can regulate it or redistribute the capital from it, and form a predatory bureaucracy upon it, the results for the entire society, at least narratively if not certainly empirically, seem to be better than those where state intervention has occurred. Meaning that the Austrian criticism is that the use of the calculus of measurement in heuristic social processes will result in non-prediction and exacerbation of risk — or at least, such models will be limited to prediction based on the asymmetry of information discovered by the act of building the model, but not of the asymmetry of information yet to be developed by innovation or shocks, and therefore undiscoverable by the process of building a model. I would argue that Keynes covered these problems in A.T.O.P. Although I am not a scholar of his work. And that austrians agreed with him on many of those positions. But the PRACTICAL matter is that the profession is heavily invested in a technology that demonstrably does not work, yet is relied upon for policy decisions every day. Models are a superior means of describing causal processes where language and human limits to conception fail. However, tehy rely upon a mathematics derived from the much more simplistic physical sciences. And until we can measure the ‘natural forces’ of men’s mental capacity, which are largely the properties of memory in time when in the presence of vast information, we have no formulae by which we can call our efforts sufficiently scientific rather than simply a convenient means of toying with economies against the will of those struggling with knowledge and capital to avoid and circumvent all that toying. So either I don’t understand, or I do not think your criticism is founded. The people that criticize empiricism may not be using a substantive foundation either, and may justify sentiments and intuitions with false appeals to reason that they do not fully understand. But I do not see how your criticism is logical in the context. Looking forward, solving the problem of induction instead of relying on (false) equilibria relies that we understand, and develop a formulae what might best be called ‘velocity’, which is the rate of innovation given the limited ability of the human mind to make ‘jumps’. Therein is a formula of greater importance than E=mC^2. And because that velocity can be known, probabilism will have a rational boundary, rather than the irrational boundary we have conveniently constructed out of historicist necessity. I hope I have been sufficiently cogent on a subject of complexity that has admittedly exhausted many of our best minds. And apologize in advance for my failures. Cheers.
http://www.capitalismv3.com/index.php/2010/12/a-response-to-gene-callahan-scientism-in-the-way-of-science/An interesting conversation on the current state of criticism of mathematics in the social sciences.
Source date (UTC): 2010-12-05 17:53:00 UTC
Mr. Galdel, of Time Magazine, asks readers what questions he should put before Nassim Taleb, author of The Black Swan, and implies, without understanding his own cognitive bias, that the liberal belief in our own wisdom and control of our own destiny is unquestionable. http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2010/11/23/whats-wrong-with-bernanke-and-qe2-ask-nissam-taleb/
Taleb has recently been bashing Bernanke saying he doesn’t know what he is doing because he didn’t see the financial crisis coming. But Taleb has also said that the financial crisis was a Black Swan. But isn’t the definition of a black swan something that people don’t see coming. Yes, we should be ready for unusual events. But don’t think you can criticize someone for not see(ing) something that by definition was unpredictable, or at least very, very unlikely. What say you Taleb?
Mr. Gandel, “not see(ing) something that by definition was unpredictable, or at least very, very unlikely.” That’s the whole point. That statement expresses the entire difference between left and right political philosophies, and between quantitative economists, and the austrian school: namely, that the unforeseen is unpredictable because: 1) The foreseen is unquantifiable (this is the entire issue in economics) 2) the unquantifiable is unpredictable 3) the scale of the impact of unforeseen, unquantifiable, unpredictable events is likewise unquantifiable. Therefore risk is there for not probabilistically measurable by mathematical means. Therefore risk measurement, and quantitative probability as used in financial speculation is FRAUD if committed by those who understand these principles, and ERROR if used by those who do not. Since these ideas are hard to grasp, a few people commit fraud, and a very large number of people commit error. Taleb’s indictment of the Nobel Committee is the most serious because it was their awarding of prizes to econometricians that allowed those who wished to commit FRAUD, to convince a lot of people to commit error, and in doing so create this catastrophe. Taleb’s proposition is that we are applying the mathematics of closed, permutable systems (probability) to the open, innovative, dynamic system of human interaction. In effect this is the warning given by the Austrian school to all political economists: we know how to enable the greatest amount of creative innovation in a marketplace, and in doing so create the greatest competitive advantage and the lowest prices, for the benefit of all. But political systems must aim at enabling that process, not achieving any particular end, while assuming that that innovative process will tolerate infinite manipulation. Taleb’s recommendation in The Black Swan, is that we must build our nations such that we recognize the COMMON-NESS of disruptive, unforeseen events. Therefore we should seek stability, security, and safety, and not expose ourselves to risks. We should never have assumed that such a thing as complex derivatives would provide risk mitigation — regardless of corrupt rating companies and bankers. We should build policy that expects the unforeseen. We should avoid policy that invites fragility from the impact of the unforeseen. This is probably an anathema to Time’s editorial staff. Because Taleb’s premise is core of Conservative political philosophy: take small risks, work through the market, and do not empower politicians to expose us to risks: Maintain strength and capital, both human and material, so that we can survive the inevitable shocks to our system. Of course, if we just read Aesop’s Fables we can learn the single lesson that Aesop attempted to teach us: avoiding the error of hubris – overestimating our knowledge and understanding.