Curt Doolittle

Theme: Science

  • I DIDN’T REALIZE THE POWER OF MY ARGUMENT AGAINST LIBERTARIAN PERCEPTION OF REAL

    I DIDN’T REALIZE THE POWER OF MY ARGUMENT AGAINST LIBERTARIAN PERCEPTION OF REALITY.

    But that’s the final nail in the coffin of praxeology. If we are morally blind (and science says that we are) for the reasons that I’ve stated (genetics, reproductive strategy, discounting of the dependence upon others for information and opinion, and higher intelligence discounting of transaction costs) then that which is possible to apprehend in the context of voluntary exchange, is open to, and the victim of, cognitive biases – just like all other judgements.

    As such, the logic of cooperation must forever be empirically and instrumentally derived as a theoretic construct, and can only be treated as theoretic construct, not an axiomatic one. (Given the strict difference between axiomatic-non-correspondent-with-reality and theoretic-correspondent-with-reality systems.)

    So I have finally put an end to the argument that ethics, and the logic of cooperation are axiomatic, and we can discard praxeology.

    Have to run now, but I’ll continue with this argument over the next month or two as I refine it further.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    KIev

    Source date (UTC): 2014-04-11 08:26:00 UTC

  • ARGUMENTATIVE METHODS Mythical (Allegorical) Psychological (Moral) Rational (Kan

    ARGUMENTATIVE METHODS

    Mythical (Allegorical)

    Psychological (Moral)

    Rational (Kantian)

    Historical ( analogical)

    Empirical (positivist)

    Ratio-empirical ( scientific )

    Descriptive (purely descriptive statements free of analogy).

    QUESTION:

    Which philosophers who advocate liberty rely on which argumentative methods?

    Source date (UTC): 2014-04-06 12:06:00 UTC

  • I'm Criticizing Rothbardian Ethics, Not Hoppeian Institutions

    CRITICISM IS LIMITED TO ETHICS AND CLAIMS THAT PRAXEOLOGY IS A SCIENCE RATHER THAN A LOGIC. [I] criticize the NAP and Rothbardian ethics because they are insufficient in scope for the rational voluntary formation of a polity (of other than sociopaths). Rothbardian ethics are parasitic. High trust ethics are productive. And no polity has EVER chosen parasitic ethics. Gypsies, Jews, and to a lesser degree eastern europeans and mediterraneans as well as Arabs and some nomads practice parasitic ethics outside the group, but not within the group. No group can persist (cooperate) under in-group parasitism. My solution is to define property as people define it by their actions, not as it is defined by intersubjective verifiability (hoppe’s definition). THE NECESSITY OF THE COMMON LAW AND A UNIVERSAL DEFINITION OF IN-GROUP PROPERTY RIGHTS. [A]nd the reason this definition of property matters, is that all libertarian institutional solutions are predicated on the assumption that a constitution defining property and requiring the common law, is sufficient ‘government’ that no ‘government’ capable of making laws need exist. Without the common law libertarianism fails to be ‘rational and calculable’ since without a common definition of property, disputes over property rights are unsolvable by rational means. Now I also argue that in addition to the common law, and a definition of property as people demonstrate property by their actions, no group can compete economically against other groups unless it can produce commons. And that the production of commons requires prevention of free riding, socialization of losses and privatization of the commons and gains from the commons. HOPPEIAN INSTITUTIONS ARE THE ANSWER TO MONOPOLY BUREAUCRACY [B]ut that is not a criticism of Hoppeian libertarian solutions to the problem of monopoly bureaucracy by the use of competing private insurance companies rather than that same insurance provided by the monopoly bureaucracy that we call the state. The problems with the state are (a) law-making (command issuance) given that laws cannot be made, only discovered, and (b) the self interest of all members of a bureaucracy and the unavoidable predation that results from bureaucracy. (c) Technically speaking the errors of democracy and majority rule are properties of one form of government, and not government per se. LIBERTARIANISM AS FREEDOM FROM CONSPIRATORIAL IMMORALITY: FREE RIDING BY THE BUREAUCRACY. [I]’ve been criticizing ‘stupid-tarians’, and ‘immoral-tarians’, ‘coward-tarians’ and ‘libertines’ of late, masquerading as libertarians. If you follow a rule based ethic (the NAP) rather than the outcome of human actions in producing liberty, you are really quite stupid, honestly, because it is quite clear that (a) the NAP is a failed test if we limit property contestable in court to ‘private property’, because it’s non-rational for people to choose an immoral and unethical polity and as such they will not eliminate demand for the state under NAP. And (b) because it’s pretty obvious to all but autistic and immoral people that the NAP permits – legally – immoral and unethical behavior: thefts via indirection, deception and externality. (c) that only outcomes, not observance of rules determines the success or failure of any set of rules. And Rothbardianism is a failed, ridiculed, illogical, immoral, ethical system. So, libertarian then means ‘working for liberty that is logically and empirically achievable. If it means something else to you, then you’re just a stupid-tarian, immoral-tarian, or libertine, and not a libertarian: one who places liberty above all other moral values. If libertarian means stupid, unethical, immoral, cowardly, and libertine, then we must rescue liberty and the terminology from the stupid, unethical, immoral, cowardly and libertine. Liberty, as a brand, as a meme, as a term, and as a political objective, is not open for capture by the stupid, unethical, immoral, cowardly and libertine. That would be immoral. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

  • I’m Criticizing Rothbardian Ethics, Not Hoppeian Institutions

    CRITICISM IS LIMITED TO ETHICS AND CLAIMS THAT PRAXEOLOGY IS A SCIENCE RATHER THAN A LOGIC. [I] criticize the NAP and Rothbardian ethics because they are insufficient in scope for the rational voluntary formation of a polity (of other than sociopaths). Rothbardian ethics are parasitic. High trust ethics are productive. And no polity has EVER chosen parasitic ethics. Gypsies, Jews, and to a lesser degree eastern europeans and mediterraneans as well as Arabs and some nomads practice parasitic ethics outside the group, but not within the group. No group can persist (cooperate) under in-group parasitism. My solution is to define property as people define it by their actions, not as it is defined by intersubjective verifiability (hoppe’s definition). THE NECESSITY OF THE COMMON LAW AND A UNIVERSAL DEFINITION OF IN-GROUP PROPERTY RIGHTS. [A]nd the reason this definition of property matters, is that all libertarian institutional solutions are predicated on the assumption that a constitution defining property and requiring the common law, is sufficient ‘government’ that no ‘government’ capable of making laws need exist. Without the common law libertarianism fails to be ‘rational and calculable’ since without a common definition of property, disputes over property rights are unsolvable by rational means. Now I also argue that in addition to the common law, and a definition of property as people demonstrate property by their actions, no group can compete economically against other groups unless it can produce commons. And that the production of commons requires prevention of free riding, socialization of losses and privatization of the commons and gains from the commons. HOPPEIAN INSTITUTIONS ARE THE ANSWER TO MONOPOLY BUREAUCRACY [B]ut that is not a criticism of Hoppeian libertarian solutions to the problem of monopoly bureaucracy by the use of competing private insurance companies rather than that same insurance provided by the monopoly bureaucracy that we call the state. The problems with the state are (a) law-making (command issuance) given that laws cannot be made, only discovered, and (b) the self interest of all members of a bureaucracy and the unavoidable predation that results from bureaucracy. (c) Technically speaking the errors of democracy and majority rule are properties of one form of government, and not government per se. LIBERTARIANISM AS FREEDOM FROM CONSPIRATORIAL IMMORALITY: FREE RIDING BY THE BUREAUCRACY. [I]’ve been criticizing ‘stupid-tarians’, and ‘immoral-tarians’, ‘coward-tarians’ and ‘libertines’ of late, masquerading as libertarians. If you follow a rule based ethic (the NAP) rather than the outcome of human actions in producing liberty, you are really quite stupid, honestly, because it is quite clear that (a) the NAP is a failed test if we limit property contestable in court to ‘private property’, because it’s non-rational for people to choose an immoral and unethical polity and as such they will not eliminate demand for the state under NAP. And (b) because it’s pretty obvious to all but autistic and immoral people that the NAP permits – legally – immoral and unethical behavior: thefts via indirection, deception and externality. (c) that only outcomes, not observance of rules determines the success or failure of any set of rules. And Rothbardianism is a failed, ridiculed, illogical, immoral, ethical system. So, libertarian then means ‘working for liberty that is logically and empirically achievable. If it means something else to you, then you’re just a stupid-tarian, immoral-tarian, or libertine, and not a libertarian: one who places liberty above all other moral values. If libertarian means stupid, unethical, immoral, cowardly, and libertine, then we must rescue liberty and the terminology from the stupid, unethical, immoral, cowardly and libertine. Liberty, as a brand, as a meme, as a term, and as a political objective, is not open for capture by the stupid, unethical, immoral, cowardly and libertine. That would be immoral. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

  • I'm Criticizing Rothbardian Ethics, Not Hoppeian Institutions

    CRITICISM IS LIMITED TO ETHICS AND CLAIMS THAT PRAXEOLOGY IS A SCIENCE RATHER THAN A LOGIC. [I] criticize the NAP and Rothbardian ethics because they are insufficient in scope for the rational voluntary formation of a polity (of other than sociopaths). Rothbardian ethics are parasitic. High trust ethics are productive. And no polity has EVER chosen parasitic ethics. Gypsies, Jews, and to a lesser degree eastern europeans and mediterraneans as well as Arabs and some nomads practice parasitic ethics outside the group, but not within the group. No group can persist (cooperate) under in-group parasitism. My solution is to define property as people define it by their actions, not as it is defined by intersubjective verifiability (hoppe’s definition). THE NECESSITY OF THE COMMON LAW AND A UNIVERSAL DEFINITION OF IN-GROUP PROPERTY RIGHTS. [A]nd the reason this definition of property matters, is that all libertarian institutional solutions are predicated on the assumption that a constitution defining property and requiring the common law, is sufficient ‘government’ that no ‘government’ capable of making laws need exist. Without the common law libertarianism fails to be ‘rational and calculable’ since without a common definition of property, disputes over property rights are unsolvable by rational means. Now I also argue that in addition to the common law, and a definition of property as people demonstrate property by their actions, no group can compete economically against other groups unless it can produce commons. And that the production of commons requires prevention of free riding, socialization of losses and privatization of the commons and gains from the commons. HOPPEIAN INSTITUTIONS ARE THE ANSWER TO MONOPOLY BUREAUCRACY [B]ut that is not a criticism of Hoppeian libertarian solutions to the problem of monopoly bureaucracy by the use of competing private insurance companies rather than that same insurance provided by the monopoly bureaucracy that we call the state. The problems with the state are (a) law-making (command issuance) given that laws cannot be made, only discovered, and (b) the self interest of all members of a bureaucracy and the unavoidable predation that results from bureaucracy. (c) Technically speaking the errors of democracy and majority rule are properties of one form of government, and not government per se. LIBERTARIANISM AS FREEDOM FROM CONSPIRATORIAL IMMORALITY: FREE RIDING BY THE BUREAUCRACY. [I]’ve been criticizing ‘stupid-tarians’, and ‘immoral-tarians’, ‘coward-tarians’ and ‘libertines’ of late, masquerading as libertarians. If you follow a rule based ethic (the NAP) rather than the outcome of human actions in producing liberty, you are really quite stupid, honestly, because it is quite clear that (a) the NAP is a failed test if we limit property contestable in court to ‘private property’, because it’s non-rational for people to choose an immoral and unethical polity and as such they will not eliminate demand for the state under NAP. And (b) because it’s pretty obvious to all but autistic and immoral people that the NAP permits – legally – immoral and unethical behavior: thefts via indirection, deception and externality. (c) that only outcomes, not observance of rules determines the success or failure of any set of rules. And Rothbardianism is a failed, ridiculed, illogical, immoral, ethical system. So, libertarian then means ‘working for liberty that is logically and empirically achievable. If it means something else to you, then you’re just a stupid-tarian, immoral-tarian, or libertine, and not a libertarian: one who places liberty above all other moral values. If libertarian means stupid, unethical, immoral, cowardly, and libertine, then we must rescue liberty and the terminology from the stupid, unethical, immoral, cowardly and libertine. Liberty, as a brand, as a meme, as a term, and as a political objective, is not open for capture by the stupid, unethical, immoral, cowardly and libertine. That would be immoral. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

  • I’m Criticizing Rothbardian Ethics, Not Hoppeian Institutions

    CRITICISM IS LIMITED TO ETHICS AND CLAIMS THAT PRAXEOLOGY IS A SCIENCE RATHER THAN A LOGIC. [I] criticize the NAP and Rothbardian ethics because they are insufficient in scope for the rational voluntary formation of a polity (of other than sociopaths). Rothbardian ethics are parasitic. High trust ethics are productive. And no polity has EVER chosen parasitic ethics. Gypsies, Jews, and to a lesser degree eastern europeans and mediterraneans as well as Arabs and some nomads practice parasitic ethics outside the group, but not within the group. No group can persist (cooperate) under in-group parasitism. My solution is to define property as people define it by their actions, not as it is defined by intersubjective verifiability (hoppe’s definition). THE NECESSITY OF THE COMMON LAW AND A UNIVERSAL DEFINITION OF IN-GROUP PROPERTY RIGHTS. [A]nd the reason this definition of property matters, is that all libertarian institutional solutions are predicated on the assumption that a constitution defining property and requiring the common law, is sufficient ‘government’ that no ‘government’ capable of making laws need exist. Without the common law libertarianism fails to be ‘rational and calculable’ since without a common definition of property, disputes over property rights are unsolvable by rational means. Now I also argue that in addition to the common law, and a definition of property as people demonstrate property by their actions, no group can compete economically against other groups unless it can produce commons. And that the production of commons requires prevention of free riding, socialization of losses and privatization of the commons and gains from the commons. HOPPEIAN INSTITUTIONS ARE THE ANSWER TO MONOPOLY BUREAUCRACY [B]ut that is not a criticism of Hoppeian libertarian solutions to the problem of monopoly bureaucracy by the use of competing private insurance companies rather than that same insurance provided by the monopoly bureaucracy that we call the state. The problems with the state are (a) law-making (command issuance) given that laws cannot be made, only discovered, and (b) the self interest of all members of a bureaucracy and the unavoidable predation that results from bureaucracy. (c) Technically speaking the errors of democracy and majority rule are properties of one form of government, and not government per se. LIBERTARIANISM AS FREEDOM FROM CONSPIRATORIAL IMMORALITY: FREE RIDING BY THE BUREAUCRACY. [I]’ve been criticizing ‘stupid-tarians’, and ‘immoral-tarians’, ‘coward-tarians’ and ‘libertines’ of late, masquerading as libertarians. If you follow a rule based ethic (the NAP) rather than the outcome of human actions in producing liberty, you are really quite stupid, honestly, because it is quite clear that (a) the NAP is a failed test if we limit property contestable in court to ‘private property’, because it’s non-rational for people to choose an immoral and unethical polity and as such they will not eliminate demand for the state under NAP. And (b) because it’s pretty obvious to all but autistic and immoral people that the NAP permits – legally – immoral and unethical behavior: thefts via indirection, deception and externality. (c) that only outcomes, not observance of rules determines the success or failure of any set of rules. And Rothbardianism is a failed, ridiculed, illogical, immoral, ethical system. So, libertarian then means ‘working for liberty that is logically and empirically achievable. If it means something else to you, then you’re just a stupid-tarian, immoral-tarian, or libertine, and not a libertarian: one who places liberty above all other moral values. If libertarian means stupid, unethical, immoral, cowardly, and libertine, then we must rescue liberty and the terminology from the stupid, unethical, immoral, cowardly and libertine. Liberty, as a brand, as a meme, as a term, and as a political objective, is not open for capture by the stupid, unethical, immoral, cowardly and libertine. That would be immoral. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

  • Definition of "Pseudoscience"

    DEFINITION: “PSEUDOSCIENCE” pseu·do·sci·ence ˌso͞odōˈsīəns noun: pseudoscience; plural noun: pseudosciences; noun: pseudo-science; plural noun: pseudo-sciences 1. is a claim, belief or practice which is presented as scientific, but does not adhere to the scientific method. [I] use the following criteria to determine whether something is a pseudoscience: 1) One must claim it is scientific 2) Yet the method does not adhere to the scientific method. That is the minimum criteria. The following criteria serve to further falsify claims: 3) (optional) Method does not produce results it claims to. 4) (optional) Is not or cannot be stated in operational language. 5) (optional) Is not or cannot be constrained by testable correspondence with reality. By these criteria Praxeology fails as a science, as all axiomatic systems must fail as sciences. However, it is possible to state that we can study the science of cooperation (economics) and as such produce theories that for deductive purposes we may treat axiomatically, although the results of that deduction must still be tested by correspondence with reality, and falsified. Emergent properties must be tested empirically, and experiential properties can be tested experientially, if articulated as human actions. For these reasons human cooperation can be termed a science, and we can construct a formal grammar of cooperation. Something akin to praxeology can be constructed as a formal logic of cooperation, but it will, as all axiomatic systems must be, constrained by correspondence with reality.

  • Definition of “Pseudoscience”

    DEFINITION: “PSEUDOSCIENCE” pseu·do·sci·ence ˌso͞odōˈsīəns noun: pseudoscience; plural noun: pseudosciences; noun: pseudo-science; plural noun: pseudo-sciences 1. is a claim, belief or practice which is presented as scientific, but does not adhere to the scientific method. [I] use the following criteria to determine whether something is a pseudoscience: 1) One must claim it is scientific 2) Yet the method does not adhere to the scientific method. That is the minimum criteria. The following criteria serve to further falsify claims: 3) (optional) Method does not produce results it claims to. 4) (optional) Is not or cannot be stated in operational language. 5) (optional) Is not or cannot be constrained by testable correspondence with reality. By these criteria Praxeology fails as a science, as all axiomatic systems must fail as sciences. However, it is possible to state that we can study the science of cooperation (economics) and as such produce theories that for deductive purposes we may treat axiomatically, although the results of that deduction must still be tested by correspondence with reality, and falsified. Emergent properties must be tested empirically, and experiential properties can be tested experientially, if articulated as human actions. For these reasons human cooperation can be termed a science, and we can construct a formal grammar of cooperation. Something akin to praxeology can be constructed as a formal logic of cooperation, but it will, as all axiomatic systems must be, constrained by correspondence with reality.

  • Definition of "Pseudoscience"

    DEFINITION: “PSEUDOSCIENCE” pseu·do·sci·ence ˌso͞odōˈsīəns noun: pseudoscience; plural noun: pseudosciences; noun: pseudo-science; plural noun: pseudo-sciences 1. is a claim, belief or practice which is presented as scientific, but does not adhere to the scientific method. [I] use the following criteria to determine whether something is a pseudoscience: 1) One must claim it is scientific 2) Yet the method does not adhere to the scientific method. That is the minimum criteria. The following criteria serve to further falsify claims: 3) (optional) Method does not produce results it claims to. 4) (optional) Is not or cannot be stated in operational language. 5) (optional) Is not or cannot be constrained by testable correspondence with reality. By these criteria Praxeology fails as a science, as all axiomatic systems must fail as sciences. However, it is possible to state that we can study the science of cooperation (economics) and as such produce theories that for deductive purposes we may treat axiomatically, although the results of that deduction must still be tested by correspondence with reality, and falsified. Emergent properties must be tested empirically, and experiential properties can be tested experientially, if articulated as human actions. For these reasons human cooperation can be termed a science, and we can construct a formal grammar of cooperation. Something akin to praxeology can be constructed as a formal logic of cooperation, but it will, as all axiomatic systems must be, constrained by correspondence with reality.

  • Definition of “Pseudoscience”

    DEFINITION: “PSEUDOSCIENCE” pseu·do·sci·ence ˌso͞odōˈsīəns noun: pseudoscience; plural noun: pseudosciences; noun: pseudo-science; plural noun: pseudo-sciences 1. is a claim, belief or practice which is presented as scientific, but does not adhere to the scientific method. [I] use the following criteria to determine whether something is a pseudoscience: 1) One must claim it is scientific 2) Yet the method does not adhere to the scientific method. That is the minimum criteria. The following criteria serve to further falsify claims: 3) (optional) Method does not produce results it claims to. 4) (optional) Is not or cannot be stated in operational language. 5) (optional) Is not or cannot be constrained by testable correspondence with reality. By these criteria Praxeology fails as a science, as all axiomatic systems must fail as sciences. However, it is possible to state that we can study the science of cooperation (economics) and as such produce theories that for deductive purposes we may treat axiomatically, although the results of that deduction must still be tested by correspondence with reality, and falsified. Emergent properties must be tested empirically, and experiential properties can be tested experientially, if articulated as human actions. For these reasons human cooperation can be termed a science, and we can construct a formal grammar of cooperation. Something akin to praxeology can be constructed as a formal logic of cooperation, but it will, as all axiomatic systems must be, constrained by correspondence with reality.