Theme: Science

  • THE PROSECUTION CONTINUES. 🙂 PROSECUTE LIARS. —-“Kurt, whenever I hear someon

    THE PROSECUTION CONTINUES. 🙂 PROSECUTE LIARS.

    —-“Kurt, whenever I hear someone say the laws of science prove X, I know that they do not know the history of science. Science never speaks for all time and it never has. I am saying that the use of history as if it were an experiment of science is fallacious. So the entire beginning of your conversation above is without any meaning. I was merely being polite.”—-

    Well, you didn’t hear that right? In fact, the first sentence of my response says just the opposite. So are you creating a straw man? Do you err or do you lie? And moreover, You are not being polite. You just do not understand what youre talking about and can’t defend it. So you avoid articulating it. You hide behind a lie. A pretense.

    (a) economic phenomenon are emergent and non-deducible. That is what defines an economic phenomenon.

    (b) emergent economic phenomenon are empirically observable, and are not directly observable.

    (c) causes of observable phenomenon can either be constructed out of subjectively testable existentially possible operations, or they cannot be true, because we cannot construct an existence proof

    (d) all general rules of arbitrary precision possess limits.

    (e) for this reason, rational justification (apriorism) can be used only for contractual and moral justification (informationally complete statements), not for the the criticism of truth propositions (informationally incomplete statements).

    (f) we can identify any hypothesis by free association – the means of constructing the hypothesis conveys no truth content.

    (g) But since we can identify an hypothesis by free association, we must eliminate the imaginary content, leaving only the existential content. So the purpose of criticism is to eliminate imaginary content and leave only possible content.

    We can test any hypothesis only by attempts to criticize it to see if it survives. We cannot justify it – ever.

    We can list the means of criticism from the most rudimentary through each additional dimension until we have exhausted all possible dimensions known to us.

    i. identity (category)

    ii. internal consistency (logic)

    iii. external correspondence (often called explanatory power)

    iv. existential possibility (existence proof)

    v. limits (falsification) (often called parsimony)

    vi. full accounting (prohibition on selection bias)

    vii. morality (consisting of voluntary transfers)

    Even if we pass all of these tests, this only tells us that we have a truth candidate. We can never know if we have found the most parsimonious truth.

    Mises engaged in multiple verbal conflations not the least of which were conflating science and logic, and conflating truth and morality. On top of it he relied upon the fallacy of justificationary german rationalism, rather than criticism. Like Hoppe he confuses empiricism (observation – existential testing) with positivism. He uses half-truths to obscure his failure: that man acts, but not why he evolved action, nor why he acts: to acquire. He avoided the smithian insight that cooperation is the scarcest good, and that it is cooperation we spend most of our efforts in obtaining.

    Science is the discipline of truth telling by laundering imaginary content from our hypotheses. Philosophy is the discipline of truth telling. Science and philosophy are identical under this assertion.

    Economics is no different from any other discipline other than we can subjectively test first principles (rational incentives) but we cannot test the first principles of the universe yet, because we do not know them – although mathematics is nearly good enough, since axiomatic systems cannot lose information the way theoretical systems can.

    Economics is scientific because science is merely the discipline of truth telling by sanitizing our theories of error, bias, wishful thinking and deceit.

    I ended mises. Deal with it. Move on.

    I ended rothbard. deal with it. Move on.

    I ended intersubjectively verifiable property as sufficient for the formation of a voluntary polity. Move on.

    The cosmopolitan branch of libertarianism is dead. I killed it. Forever. It’s in the dustbin of history.

    The only liberty that remains is aristocracy. The violent suppression of parasitism in all its forms. through the definitions of property as property-en-toto (demonstrated property that humans will retaliate against aggressions against), and the use of rule of law under the common law to incrementally suppress aggressions against property en toto in all walks of life.

    There is no free riding. No liberty at a discount. No empty words by which we obtain liberty.

    Liberty does not exist unless it is made. It is made by men with arms killing or threatening those who impose upon that which they have acquired without imposing costs against property en toto upon others.

    Now you can go run to hans, or any other libertarian smart enough to hold an argument with me and I will defeat them.

    What you cannot do is state that you hold a position that you cannot defend except by error, foolishness, or pretense of deceit.

    Cosmopolitanism is dead. The century of pseudoscience and deceit is over.

    Welcome to the new age.

    Thus endeth the lesson.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Philosophy of Aristocracy

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine


    Source date (UTC): 2015-07-18 15:21:00 UTC

  • Well saying we don’t agree is to use a rhetorical fallacy. Statements are true,

    Well saying we don’t agree is to use a rhetorical fallacy. Statements are true, false, or incomplete, whether we agree with one another or not.

    1) There exist no laws of science itself. There exist, and we have evolved, procedures that we use to eliminate error, bias, wishful thinking and deceit from our hypothesis. These processes do not tell us a statement is true, they tell us only that it remains a truth candidate if it survives that set of criticisms.

    2) There exist intuitions, hypothesis, theories, laws, and tautologies, because we have constructed them, and demonstrate them as such.

    3) But there exist no non-tautological, yet certain premises: in other words, in any statement of arbitrary precision, we must seek limits, because all general rules possess limits. This is where mises failed by attempting to make use of justificationary Kantian rationalism instead of critical Popperian rationalism:science. Since there are no certain premises there are no certain deductions. Since there are laws we may deduce from them outcomes of equal precision. But if these are imprecise, then so are our deductions.

    4) We can construct descriptive statements (theories) that are true, but inactionable, because they lack sufficient precision. A regularity may be so slow (business cycles, political cycles, generation cycles, and civilizational cycles) that no matter what we do within them, it is merely noise.

    Mises proposition that history is non-regular is based upon the presumption that each exchange is unique because it is both subjective and momentary.

    But he also proposes that we can empathize (sympathize) with economic statements and thereby test the rationality of any incentive.

    This pair of propositions constitutes is a logical contradiction. Since we can decide whether an incentive is rational, and we can test the rationality of others decisions (it’s how we test liars in court), then our judgements are marginally indifferent. If they are marginally indifferent, then they can be represented as constants.

    So at one end of the spectrum, decisions are marginally indifferent and we have tested this in thousands of ways in both economics and experimental psychology.

    And at the other end his purported axioms (action), and his purported laws (inflation, the neutrality of money, minimum wage) are both sufficiently imprecise as to be inactionable. When in fact, it is possible to produce intentional externalities by intentionally mainpulating these behaviors caused by assymetric information and resource distribution.

    And we can (quite accurately) measure those distortions. So it is not that these systems are not regular (they are), or that they are not deterministic (they are), or that they are not actionable (they are actionable), and therefore they are scientifically testable.

    Instead of being impervious to science in the development of general rules, it’s that these actions are immoral: they cause involuntary transfers from people with lower/longer time preference, to those with higher/shorter time preference, and thereby not only steal, but deprive the commons of behavioral change necessary to preserve extended time preference.

    ie: mises confused a moral theft, with a scientific truth.

    This is just one of his many failings in developing his pseudoscientific kantian nonsense – for which he was outcast from the profession, justifiably.

    His second main failing was that he did not grasp that he intuited (as did brouwer in math and bridgman in physics) that praxeology produced proofs of construction, but was insufficient for deduction.

    A proof of construction is necessary (not only in economics but in mathematics) to demonstrate that an economic statement is existentially possible. It is a means of attempting to falsify a statement.

    But most economic effects are not deducible, they are only observable empirically, and then explainable. They are explainable by attempting to construct them from a sequence of rational operations. If they cannot be constructed, then we cannot construct an existence proof, and as such a statement cannot be possible.

    It is possible to construct existence proofs for human actions under Keynesianism. But these proofs tell us that such manipulation is an act of deception that causes involuntary transfers (thefts). It is not that such actions are unscientific.

    As such mises was incorrect. He convused the immoral and the unscientifc. He confused justifiacationism under moral contract, with truth-candidates that survive criticism.

    This is a non-trivial subject. It is probably one of the most important philosopihical questions that hte 20th century philosophers failed to solve. As did all those before them.

    But it’s solved now.

    Mises was just wrong. He was a cosmopolitan, and an austro-hungarian both, and he simple failed. He failed worse than brouwer and bridgman. And because he failed, and hayek failed, we were subject to a century of deceit.


    Source date (UTC): 2015-07-18 09:17:00 UTC

  • Untitled

    http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/20/the-really-big-one?utm_source=SFFB


    Source date (UTC): 2015-07-16 12:37:00 UTC

  • PEOPLE I WANT TO SEE: Ray Scott Percival (Discuss the completeness of popper’s p

    PEOPLE I WANT TO SEE:

    Ray Scott Percival (Discuss the completeness of popper’s program. And the scientific method’s status)

    Haille Mariam-Lemar (Universalist Strategy – is it possible.)

    Andy Curzon (limits to commons)

    David McDonagh (Apologize for past sins)

    And anyone else who is willing. 🙂


    Source date (UTC): 2015-07-14 04:03:00 UTC

  • Critique vs Criticism

    [C]RITIQUE VS CRITICISM


    – Critique is a cosmopolitan discipline(as in Culture of Critique).
    – Criticism is a scientific discipline (as in Popperian Criticism).
    – Criticism is necessary in order to determine whether a theory survives attempts to falsify it. Critique is a means of loading, framing, framing, overloading, and constructing suggestion by means of deceit.

    Moralizing is very different from constructing models of transfers to determine whether thefts have occurred.

    –“Are correct incentives what others have called the kool-aid?”–


    Correct incentives are those that do not create hazards thereby encouraging parasitism (involuntary transfer), but instead construct incentives for productive voluntary transfers. The counter proposition is that deceit and parasitism are somehow objective ‘goods’, rather than providing a disincentive for cooperation, increasing transaction costs, lower trust, lower economic velocity, lower production and lower consumption. In order to counter this argument one would have to provide a different method of decidabily in the conduct of human interactions. (which will be very difficult)

    —“write as more idealistic than moralistic, “—


    Well I don’t have to think of it ‘like’ anything, I can categorize it as analogical appeal to subjective preference rather than operation description without appeal to subjective preference.

    Source: Curt Doolittle

  • Critique vs Criticism

    [C]RITIQUE VS CRITICISM


    – Critique is a cosmopolitan discipline(as in Culture of Critique).
    – Criticism is a scientific discipline (as in Popperian Criticism).
    – Criticism is necessary in order to determine whether a theory survives attempts to falsify it. Critique is a means of loading, framing, framing, overloading, and constructing suggestion by means of deceit.

    Moralizing is very different from constructing models of transfers to determine whether thefts have occurred.

    –“Are correct incentives what others have called the kool-aid?”–


    Correct incentives are those that do not create hazards thereby encouraging parasitism (involuntary transfer), but instead construct incentives for productive voluntary transfers. The counter proposition is that deceit and parasitism are somehow objective ‘goods’, rather than providing a disincentive for cooperation, increasing transaction costs, lower trust, lower economic velocity, lower production and lower consumption. In order to counter this argument one would have to provide a different method of decidabily in the conduct of human interactions. (which will be very difficult)

    —“write as more idealistic than moralistic, “—


    Well I don’t have to think of it ‘like’ anything, I can categorize it as analogical appeal to subjective preference rather than operation description without appeal to subjective preference.

    Source: Curt Doolittle

  • Universities are Repositories for Discarded Theories

    [P]riceless

    —“Universities may see themselves as bastions of knowledge and intellectualism, but they have long since forfeited this role. Instead, they have become repositories for theories long since discarded in the region and which bear little resemblance to reality today. The more professors prioritise theory over fact, the more they will condemn themselves to irrelevance. Unfortunately, when policymakers embrace blindly their untested conventional wisdom, the consequences can be far worse.”—–

    I could not have done this work in the Academy.  It wouldn’t have been possible.  You can’t really assemble degree in this kind of philosophy, this kind of economics, this kind of politics. The system is the problem. Source: Curt Doolittle

  • Universities are Repositories for Discarded Theories

    [P]riceless

    —“Universities may see themselves as bastions of knowledge and intellectualism, but they have long since forfeited this role. Instead, they have become repositories for theories long since discarded in the region and which bear little resemblance to reality today. The more professors prioritise theory over fact, the more they will condemn themselves to irrelevance. Unfortunately, when policymakers embrace blindly their untested conventional wisdom, the consequences can be far worse.”—–

    I could not have done this work in the Academy.  It wouldn’t have been possible.  You can’t really assemble degree in this kind of philosophy, this kind of economics, this kind of politics. The system is the problem. Source: Curt Doolittle

  • Retrospect. Babbage Could Have Saved Us A Century?

    [W]ell, I in retrospect I understand why no one else solved the problem of the Wilsonian synthesis: the merger of science and philosophy. Why no one else came up with testimonialism, propertarianism, and operational criticism. Also in retrospect, I am fairly certain that had Babbage’s machine been built and worked, that the synthesis would have happened in Hayek’s generation, instead of mine. But I am still suspicious that anything could have stopped the travesty of marxism, socialism, postmodernism, and feminism, as a war against truth. Why? Women did an amazing amount of damage with their enfranchisement.

  • Retrospect. Babbage Could Have Saved Us A Century?

    [W]ell, I in retrospect I understand why no one else solved the problem of the Wilsonian synthesis: the merger of science and philosophy. Why no one else came up with testimonialism, propertarianism, and operational criticism. Also in retrospect, I am fairly certain that had Babbage’s machine been built and worked, that the synthesis would have happened in Hayek’s generation, instead of mine. But I am still suspicious that anything could have stopped the travesty of marxism, socialism, postmodernism, and feminism, as a war against truth. Why? Women did an amazing amount of damage with their enfranchisement.