Curt Doolittle

Theme: Reciprocity

  • No limit to love for the good, no limit to wrath for the bad

    No limit to love for the good, no limit to wrath for the bad.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-25 05:14:00 UTC

  • OBJECTIVE MORALITY AND REPRODUCTIVE STRATEGY (good piece) Whenever any organism

    OBJECTIVE MORALITY AND REPRODUCTIVE STRATEGY

    (good piece)

    Whenever any organism that can cooperate, chooses to cooperate, it confronts the problem of free riding, which eliminates the value of cooperation.

    By suppressing free riding we force others to engage in production themselves. Many hands make lighter work, and the more of us are engaged in production the more productive we are. Moral prohibitions both prohibit free riding and as a consequence provide an incentive to produce.

    Property then is the necessary consequence of the prohibition on free riding. And given that cases of kin selection are not in fact cases of free riding (child rearing), constraints on property in-family, in-group, and out-group can be quite different. Property rights are those necessary within a given structure of production utilizing a given reproductive structure (family). Those property rights represent the necessary rules for the suppression of free riding within that order.

    Colloquial language encourages imprecise usage of precise terms. While the terms “crime, ethics and morals” each describe very different prohibitions, we conflate them frequently, which obscures their differences: Crimes describe physical transgressions. Ethics describe trust transgressions internal to an exchange. Morals describe trust transgressions into the commons. Unfortunately, while it is easy to determine whether crimes refer to cases of free riding , and largely easy to determine whether ethical prohibitions refer to cases of free riding, it is somewhat difficult to determine which moral rules refer to free riding on the commons, which are merely ritual (signal costs) and which are random error. It is difficult, but not impossible.

    For these reasons, we can determine whether or not a given criminal, ethical, or moral prohibition is a case of free riding, all objective morals are ascertainable. In any given structure of production and reproduction, we can determine whether any criminal, ethical, and moral prohibition is a matter of free riding or kin selection or familialism (insurance) within that structure of production.

    The difference is not subjective but instead a necessity of competition given available productive and reproductive structures. in other words, moral codes that suppress more free riding in broader division of knowledge and labor will allow the expression of talents held by members of the polity. Conversely, increases in free riding within the division of knowledge and labor compensate for weaknesses in the talents held by members of the polity.

    Rothbardianism fails because aggression is a means of violation not a definition of property independent if means of transgression. Furthermore NAP/IVP only limits crime, and not only does not limit, but licenses unethical and immoral actions.

    No group demonstrates this rothbardian low level of trust in-group. And those that demonstrate it out-group are the subject of persecution and genocide. Rightfully so since they are engaging in predation and parasitism, not cooperation.

    As such, morals are not subjective but objective. They are necessities of competition in a given structure of production, under a given family structure.

    In a homogenous polity of closely related outbred individuals with exceptional talents, very expansive property rights are useful for movement of the group against other groups. In a diverse polity of not-closely related inbred individuals, expansive property rights inhibit the parasitism of groups on other groups.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Philosophy of Aristocracy

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev Ukraine

    “North Eurasian and Circumpolar hunter-gatherers (Hutterites and Amish, Puritans) will be more prone to altruistic punishment than those from Middle Old World culture area (Jews, Gypsies, Chinese)…. Puritan groups seem particularly prone to bouts of moralistic outrage directed at those of their own people seen as free riders and morally blameworthy.” -Kevin MacDonald

    –MORE–

    See: Family Types

    http://www.propertarianism.com/glossary/#kin

    Families as unity of cultural production

    http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/04/27/families-as-the-unit-of-cultural-production-in-a-civilization/

    *The Unique Culture of the North Sea Peoples

    http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/02/15/on-the-north-sea-peoples/

    The Culture That Suppresses All Discounts, All Free-Riding, All Involuntary Transfer, All Unethical And Immoral Action

    http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/04/27/7158/

    The Uniqueness of the North Sea Peoples

    http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/02/15/on-the-north-sea-peoples/

    The Ethics of the high trust northerner europeans

    http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/04/03/descriptive-high-trust-ethics-of-northern-europeans/

    Circumpolar Altruistic Punishment

    http://www.propertarianism.com/2013/11/26/but-is-it-genetic/

    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-24 01:23:00 UTC

  • A.E.L. PRINCIPLES 1) Property rights are obtained by entering into a contract fo

    A.E.L.

    PRINCIPLES

    1) Property rights are obtained by entering into a contract for reciprocal insurance of one another’s property by the promise of violence to defend it.

    2) Property is that which humans demonstrate as their property: that which they act to obtain by homesteading or voluntary exchange, with

    the expectation of possession. (See categories of property below)

    3) Voluntary Exchange: Moral and ethical exchanges are defined as voluntary, fully informed, warrantied, exchange, free of negative externality.

    4) Morality is objective and is prohibition on the transgression of the property of another : the necessary prohibition on free riding for any cooperative organism. We evolved these instincts, and our extreme intolerance for ‘cheating’ out of necessity, and these instincts remain. (see criminal, unethical, and immoral propositions below)

    5) The law must sufficiently mirror known morality at any given time to suppress demand for an authority to suppress immoral actions, or the violence that results from immoral actions. While criminal and ethical standards are universal and objective, moral prohibitions consist of (a) necessary prohibitions on involuntary imposition of costs, (b) ritual and signal costs that members of a polity are use for signaling commitment, and which should not be enforced by law, but can be enforced by ostracization, (c) errors that are not reducible to free riding, and cannot be enforced by law, nor should they be enforced by ostracization.

    6) Transaction costs of immoral and unethical behavior increase with a decrease in capacity to defend against them. Therefore it is not rational to expect people to choose a voluntary polity in the absence of a state without sufficient suppression of transaction costs to compete with the costs of the state that does suppress either the immoral and unethical behavior, or the violence that results from immoral and unethical behavior. AS such the moral and ethical standard embodied in the common law, necessary for a polity is determined by the relative transaction costs and opportunities of different polities. Since the highest trust polities demonstrate both the most suppression of unethical and immoral actions, as well as the highest velocity of risk, production and trade, it is an empirical question as to the level of suppression of unethical and immoral action that is required to maintain a competitive polity. But in no case will people rationally choose an unethical polity, and they never have. The opposite is true: unethical polities have been the victims of conquest, oppression and genocide.

    CATEGORIES OF PROPERTY

    Humans demonstrably act as though there are four categories of property:

    I. Several (Personal) Property

    – Personal property: “Things an individual has a Monopoly Of Control over the use of.”

    – Physical Body

    – Actions and Time

    – Memories, Concepts and Identities: tools that enable us to plan and act. In the consumer economy this includes brands.

    – Several Property: Those things we claim a monopoly of control over.

    II. Interpersonal (Relationship) Property

    Cooperative Property: “relationships with others and tools of relationships upon which we reciprocally depend.”

    – Mates (access to sex/reproduction)

    – Children (genetic reproduction)

    – Familial Relations (security)

    – Consanguineous Relations (tribal and family ties)

    – Racial property (racial ties)

    – Status and Class (reputation)

    III. Institutional (Community) Property

    Institutional Property: “Those objects into which we have invested our forgone opportunities, our efforts, or our material assets, in order to aggregate capital from multiple individuals for mutual gain.”

    – Informal (Normative) Institutions: Our norms: manners, ethics and morals. Informal institutional property is nearly impossible to quantify and price. The costs are subjective and consists of forgone opportunities.

    – Formal (Procedural) Institutions: Our institutions: Religion (including the secular religion), Government, Laws. Formal institutional property is easy to price. costs are visible. And the productivity of the social order is at least marginally measurable.

    IV. Artificial Property

    Artificial Property: “Can a group issue specific rights to members?”

    – Shares in property: Recorded And Quantified Shareholder Property (claims for partial ownership)

    – Monopoly Property such as intellectual property. (grants of monopoly within a geography)

    – Trademarks and Brands (prohibitions on fraudulent transfers within a geography).

    FORMS OF INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER

    1-Direct Interpersonal

    – Murder

    – Violence

    – Destruction

    – Theft

    – Theft by Fraud

    – Theft by Fraud by omission

    2 – Indirect Interpersonal

    – Theft by Impediment

    – Theft by Externalization

    3 – Indirect Social

    – Theft by Free riding

    – Theft by privatization

    – Theft by socialization

    4 – Conspiratorial Social

    – Theft by Rent seeking

    – Theft by Complexity, Rule, Process or Obscurantism

    – Theft by Extortion

    5 – Conquest

    – Murder, Destruction and Theft by War

    – Immigration

    – Conversion

    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-20 16:53:00 UTC

  • THE GREAT DECEPTION : THE FALLACY OF AGGRESSION Aggression is a deception. A con

    THE GREAT DECEPTION : THE FALLACY OF AGGRESSION

    Aggression is a deception. A convenient libertine ruse, to define property as that which is aggressable against, rather than property as that which people instinctually defend, as a violation of the terms of cooperation necessary for any species that does cooperate: free riding.

    Aggression by definition legalizes unethical and immoral actions. As such it is, incontestably, the definition of LIBERTINISM , and NOT libertarianism.

    I really can’t understand how we were misled by this fallacy for so long. Other than out of desperation and natural cognitive biases endemic to the autistic end of the spectrum.

    Liberty is like truth: there is always more of it to be had, as we constantly innovate our means of cooperation. It’s not a state. It’s a process.

    It is a lie, a deceptoin, a fraud, a moral crime against men who whish to be free, to perpetuate the fallacy that property is defined by aggression rather than transgression defined by property.

    The means of transgression is immaterial.

    The only rule we need is property.

    The origin of property is the prevention of free riding.

    Free riding, as in, the imposition of costs, the imposition of involutary transfer, or any other means other than the fully informed, warrantied, voluntary exchange of property.

    Period.

    Rothbard is dead. His ideas are dead. His movement is dead. And we should spit on his grave for the damage he has done.

    Aristocratic Egalitarianism:

    1) Property rights are obtained by reciprocal insurance of one anther’s property by the promise of violence to defend it.

    2) Property is that which humans demonstrate as their property: that which they act to obtain by homesteading or voluntary exchange, with the expectation of possession.

    3) Morality is objective and is prohibition on the transgression of the property of another : the necessary prohibition on free riding for any cooperative organism.

    4) The law must sufficiently mirror known morality at any given time to suppress demand for an authority to suppress immoral actions, or the violence that results from immoral actions.

    Welcome to aristocracy. We take all comers. But not libertines. They’re free riders. Immoral and unethical by definition.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-20 15:02:00 UTC

  • LIBERTINES. MASQUERADING AS LIBERTARIANS Block is the poster child for unethical

    https://www.lewrockwell.com/2014/05/walter-e-block/pure-libertarianism/PURE LIBERTINES. MASQUERADING AS LIBERTARIANS

    Block is the poster child for unethical, immoral, ghetto libertarianism, and he hurts the movement every time he opens his mouth. Rockwell is barman

    of the lunatic fringe, and Kinsella the bouncer of ignorance and dogmatism — they’re the three stooges of the red-flag rothbardian conspiracy to cause the failure of the western liberty movement – and the’re live onstage, nightly.

    Our enemy is the state. It’s not ethics or morality. The libertarian’s only moral question is how to maintain a moral and ethical high trust society while getting rid of the state, and all possible demand for the state.

    Libertines are a cancer. There isn’t any ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ libertarianism. That’s another ruse to obscure the red flag operation of the libertines to undermine the high trust society we have slowly built for millennia.

    Aristocratic egalitarianism is the only source of liberty that ever was or will be. The enfranchisement of the willing in the reciprocal insurance of one another’s property by the promise of organized violence to defend it. That is “Right” libertarianism. The wealth and liberty that comes from Right libertarianism, makes possible the LUXURY of left libertarianism’s moral appeals for charity. But libertines are merely parasites on aristocratic necessity and charitable luxury.

    Non-aggression is a ruse. A lie. A convenient distraction. A false flag. The means of violating our property is immaterial. All that is necessary is that property is violated in whatever creative manner than man invents.

    Hoppe was right. We need no more than property for our freedom.

    And we have no use for libertines: parasites by any other name.

    Moral Realism, Propertarianism, Aristocratic Egalitarianism.

    The virtue of violence.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev Ukraine

    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-18 12:36:00 UTC

  • REQUIREMENTS FOR VOLUNTARY COOPERATION (worth repeating) We are only ‘voluntaril

    REQUIREMENTS FOR VOLUNTARY COOPERATION

    (worth repeating)

    We are only ‘voluntarily cooperating’ if we have a choice to cooperate or not. We use the term ‘cooperate’, originating with human voluntary cooperation, and by analogy apply it to other creatures who simulate voluntary cooperation.

    But, how many of those creatures voluntarily cooperate, and how many of them only appear to, and possess no sentience (volition) at all? What is required of for voluntary cooperation?

    REQUIREMENTS

    – The capacity for shared intent.

    – The capacity to determine if shared intent is beneficial or not.

    – The capacity to choose to invest in that shared intent or not.

    – The capacity to signal consent to shared intent.

    – The capacity to punish defectors / cheaters, whether by refusal of future cooperation, punishment, or death.

    So while it is true that verbal language is not required, signaling is. And that’s enough.

    As far as I know, if you cannot choose, consent, and punish defectors then its not voluntary cooperation.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev Ukraine

    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-17 07:22:00 UTC

  • Ending The Debilitating Libertarian Dependence Upon Rothbard's NAP

    All, *Ending the debilitating libertarian dependence on Rothbardian Libertarianism and the NAP.* [T]here is a very great difference between a general rule of thumb, and the necessary basis for a body of law whose properties are reducible to property rights, that are sufficient for the resolution of conflicts between individuals, such that they do not desire an authority to resolve or prevent conflicts via means other than the law reducible to property rights. Furthermore, the means of violation of a persons’ property is not, as Hoppe has demonstrated, important, but instead, the definition of property regardless of how it is violated. To define property by aggression is to confuse cause and consequence. Aggression (NAP) against Intersubjectively Verifiable Property (IVP) as the basis for the law and resolution of disputes, is not only insufficient in the coverage of human disputes that require resolution, but NAP/IVP licenses deception and externalities, and prohibits retaliation for deception (unethical) and externalities(immoral). Meaning that objectively, the NAP/IVP licenses deception(unethical) and externalized (immoral) actions. The fact that very few human beings seem to be able to rationally articulate that NAP/IVP is immoral, or that Aggression is an insufficient prohibition for constraining unethical and immoral trade, or that defining property by means of prohibition rather than its origin as human action is non-logical, doesn’t seem to alter the fact, that the majority of humans simply intuit that something is ‘wrong’ with Rothbardian Libertarian Ethics. Jan Lester has taken the logical route to define property as logically reflecting human actions, and quite nearly found the correct answer with ‘imposed costs’ – at least he has been closer than anyone else. However, as we have stated above, we must reduce imposed costs, up what precisely? We must have a definition of property to impose costs against. (He does, but it’s not sufficient either – and will clarify in a moment.) So how do we define property that can be transgressed against; upon which we prohibit the imposition of costs; and limit legal transfers to and from, to voluntary, fully informed, warrantied exchange? We can try to rely upon reason, or we can instead, look empirically at what is necessary for the elimination of demand for the state. My first question is, how do we eliminate the state, by eliminating demand for the state? It is not “what should we ask people to believe?” But what basis of organic law is sufficient for elimination of demand for the state as either a suppressor of unethical and immoral action, or a suppressor of retaliation for unethical and immoral actions, regardless of what people believe or desire. Now, while It is difficult to imagine people wanting to enter into contracts that permit unethical behavior, if people want to enter into contracts that license various forms of immoral behavior, then that is entirely permissible – in fact it is desirable. It allows us to ‘trade’ immoralities between classes. It sets terms and limits on immoral behavior, gives contractual license, but does not redefine the fact that immoral behavior is in fact, the involuntary transfer, or consumption, of paid in capital, or the ‘imposition of costs’ upon others. As such contractual exchange allows us to conduct voluntary exchanges of ‘immoral behavior’ via market means. When no other such means of exchange is possible. So if you were to choose some normative violation, as long as you exchanged contractual terms with some other class, an exchange occurs, not a violation of property rights. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • Ending The Debilitating Libertarian Dependence Upon Rothbard’s NAP

    All, *Ending the debilitating libertarian dependence on Rothbardian Libertarianism and the NAP.* [T]here is a very great difference between a general rule of thumb, and the necessary basis for a body of law whose properties are reducible to property rights, that are sufficient for the resolution of conflicts between individuals, such that they do not desire an authority to resolve or prevent conflicts via means other than the law reducible to property rights. Furthermore, the means of violation of a persons’ property is not, as Hoppe has demonstrated, important, but instead, the definition of property regardless of how it is violated. To define property by aggression is to confuse cause and consequence. Aggression (NAP) against Intersubjectively Verifiable Property (IVP) as the basis for the law and resolution of disputes, is not only insufficient in the coverage of human disputes that require resolution, but NAP/IVP licenses deception and externalities, and prohibits retaliation for deception (unethical) and externalities(immoral). Meaning that objectively, the NAP/IVP licenses deception(unethical) and externalized (immoral) actions. The fact that very few human beings seem to be able to rationally articulate that NAP/IVP is immoral, or that Aggression is an insufficient prohibition for constraining unethical and immoral trade, or that defining property by means of prohibition rather than its origin as human action is non-logical, doesn’t seem to alter the fact, that the majority of humans simply intuit that something is ‘wrong’ with Rothbardian Libertarian Ethics. Jan Lester has taken the logical route to define property as logically reflecting human actions, and quite nearly found the correct answer with ‘imposed costs’ – at least he has been closer than anyone else. However, as we have stated above, we must reduce imposed costs, up what precisely? We must have a definition of property to impose costs against. (He does, but it’s not sufficient either – and will clarify in a moment.) So how do we define property that can be transgressed against; upon which we prohibit the imposition of costs; and limit legal transfers to and from, to voluntary, fully informed, warrantied exchange? We can try to rely upon reason, or we can instead, look empirically at what is necessary for the elimination of demand for the state. My first question is, how do we eliminate the state, by eliminating demand for the state? It is not “what should we ask people to believe?” But what basis of organic law is sufficient for elimination of demand for the state as either a suppressor of unethical and immoral action, or a suppressor of retaliation for unethical and immoral actions, regardless of what people believe or desire. Now, while It is difficult to imagine people wanting to enter into contracts that permit unethical behavior, if people want to enter into contracts that license various forms of immoral behavior, then that is entirely permissible – in fact it is desirable. It allows us to ‘trade’ immoralities between classes. It sets terms and limits on immoral behavior, gives contractual license, but does not redefine the fact that immoral behavior is in fact, the involuntary transfer, or consumption, of paid in capital, or the ‘imposition of costs’ upon others. As such contractual exchange allows us to conduct voluntary exchanges of ‘immoral behavior’ via market means. When no other such means of exchange is possible. So if you were to choose some normative violation, as long as you exchanged contractual terms with some other class, an exchange occurs, not a violation of property rights. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • Ending The Debilitating Libertarian Dependence Upon Rothbard's NAP

    All, *Ending the debilitating libertarian dependence on Rothbardian Libertarianism and the NAP.* [T]here is a very great difference between a general rule of thumb, and the necessary basis for a body of law whose properties are reducible to property rights, that are sufficient for the resolution of conflicts between individuals, such that they do not desire an authority to resolve or prevent conflicts via means other than the law reducible to property rights. Furthermore, the means of violation of a persons’ property is not, as Hoppe has demonstrated, important, but instead, the definition of property regardless of how it is violated. To define property by aggression is to confuse cause and consequence. Aggression (NAP) against Intersubjectively Verifiable Property (IVP) as the basis for the law and resolution of disputes, is not only insufficient in the coverage of human disputes that require resolution, but NAP/IVP licenses deception and externalities, and prohibits retaliation for deception (unethical) and externalities(immoral). Meaning that objectively, the NAP/IVP licenses deception(unethical) and externalized (immoral) actions. The fact that very few human beings seem to be able to rationally articulate that NAP/IVP is immoral, or that Aggression is an insufficient prohibition for constraining unethical and immoral trade, or that defining property by means of prohibition rather than its origin as human action is non-logical, doesn’t seem to alter the fact, that the majority of humans simply intuit that something is ‘wrong’ with Rothbardian Libertarian Ethics. Jan Lester has taken the logical route to define property as logically reflecting human actions, and quite nearly found the correct answer with ‘imposed costs’ – at least he has been closer than anyone else. However, as we have stated above, we must reduce imposed costs, up what precisely? We must have a definition of property to impose costs against. (He does, but it’s not sufficient either – and will clarify in a moment.) So how do we define property that can be transgressed against; upon which we prohibit the imposition of costs; and limit legal transfers to and from, to voluntary, fully informed, warrantied exchange? We can try to rely upon reason, or we can instead, look empirically at what is necessary for the elimination of demand for the state. My first question is, how do we eliminate the state, by eliminating demand for the state? It is not “what should we ask people to believe?” But what basis of organic law is sufficient for elimination of demand for the state as either a suppressor of unethical and immoral action, or a suppressor of retaliation for unethical and immoral actions, regardless of what people believe or desire. Now, while It is difficult to imagine people wanting to enter into contracts that permit unethical behavior, if people want to enter into contracts that license various forms of immoral behavior, then that is entirely permissible – in fact it is desirable. It allows us to ‘trade’ immoralities between classes. It sets terms and limits on immoral behavior, gives contractual license, but does not redefine the fact that immoral behavior is in fact, the involuntary transfer, or consumption, of paid in capital, or the ‘imposition of costs’ upon others. As such contractual exchange allows us to conduct voluntary exchanges of ‘immoral behavior’ via market means. When no other such means of exchange is possible. So if you were to choose some normative violation, as long as you exchanged contractual terms with some other class, an exchange occurs, not a violation of property rights. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • Ending The Debilitating Libertarian Dependence Upon Rothbard’s NAP

    All, *Ending the debilitating libertarian dependence on Rothbardian Libertarianism and the NAP.* [T]here is a very great difference between a general rule of thumb, and the necessary basis for a body of law whose properties are reducible to property rights, that are sufficient for the resolution of conflicts between individuals, such that they do not desire an authority to resolve or prevent conflicts via means other than the law reducible to property rights. Furthermore, the means of violation of a persons’ property is not, as Hoppe has demonstrated, important, but instead, the definition of property regardless of how it is violated. To define property by aggression is to confuse cause and consequence. Aggression (NAP) against Intersubjectively Verifiable Property (IVP) as the basis for the law and resolution of disputes, is not only insufficient in the coverage of human disputes that require resolution, but NAP/IVP licenses deception and externalities, and prohibits retaliation for deception (unethical) and externalities(immoral). Meaning that objectively, the NAP/IVP licenses deception(unethical) and externalized (immoral) actions. The fact that very few human beings seem to be able to rationally articulate that NAP/IVP is immoral, or that Aggression is an insufficient prohibition for constraining unethical and immoral trade, or that defining property by means of prohibition rather than its origin as human action is non-logical, doesn’t seem to alter the fact, that the majority of humans simply intuit that something is ‘wrong’ with Rothbardian Libertarian Ethics. Jan Lester has taken the logical route to define property as logically reflecting human actions, and quite nearly found the correct answer with ‘imposed costs’ – at least he has been closer than anyone else. However, as we have stated above, we must reduce imposed costs, up what precisely? We must have a definition of property to impose costs against. (He does, but it’s not sufficient either – and will clarify in a moment.) So how do we define property that can be transgressed against; upon which we prohibit the imposition of costs; and limit legal transfers to and from, to voluntary, fully informed, warrantied exchange? We can try to rely upon reason, or we can instead, look empirically at what is necessary for the elimination of demand for the state. My first question is, how do we eliminate the state, by eliminating demand for the state? It is not “what should we ask people to believe?” But what basis of organic law is sufficient for elimination of demand for the state as either a suppressor of unethical and immoral action, or a suppressor of retaliation for unethical and immoral actions, regardless of what people believe or desire. Now, while It is difficult to imagine people wanting to enter into contracts that permit unethical behavior, if people want to enter into contracts that license various forms of immoral behavior, then that is entirely permissible – in fact it is desirable. It allows us to ‘trade’ immoralities between classes. It sets terms and limits on immoral behavior, gives contractual license, but does not redefine the fact that immoral behavior is in fact, the involuntary transfer, or consumption, of paid in capital, or the ‘imposition of costs’ upon others. As such contractual exchange allows us to conduct voluntary exchanges of ‘immoral behavior’ via market means. When no other such means of exchange is possible. So if you were to choose some normative violation, as long as you exchanged contractual terms with some other class, an exchange occurs, not a violation of property rights. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine