[W]ith private property rights, universal standing, the common (polycentric) law, shareholder dividends (what we think of as direct redistribution, but is constructed as a dividend), what policy is there for us to advocate? If we can’t justify stealing from one another by force of law then what can we try to do, without majority rule? Well, a lot of commons, a lot of contracts, but no thefts. Propertarianism leads us to contractual government. We separate the law, from our contracts. Our law remains constant but we construct voluntary contracts for whatever we need to. Contracts expire, have terms and conditions, and laws do not.
Theme: Property
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“”In answer to the Argives, who were disputing with the Spartans in regard to th
—“”In answer to the Argives, who were disputing with the Spartans in regard to the boundaries of their land and said that they had the better of the case, Lysander drew his sword and said, “He who is master of this talks best about boundaries of land.”— Eli Harman
Source date (UTC): 2014-07-28 03:24:00 UTC
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WITH PROPERTARIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS…. …universal standing, the common (polycen
WITH PROPERTARIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS….
…universal standing, the common (polycentric) law, shareholder dividends (what we think of as direct redistribution, but is constructed as a dividend), what policy is there for us to advocate? If we can’t justify stealing from one another by force of law then what can we try to do, without majority rule?
Well, a lot of commons, a lot of contracts, but no thefts. Propertarianism leads us to contractual government. We separate the law, from our contracts. Our law remains constant but we construct voluntary contracts for whatever we need to. Contracts expire, have terms and conditions, and laws do not.
Source date (UTC): 2014-07-27 02:20:00 UTC
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THE COMMON LAW (PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POLYCENTRIC EVOLUTION) ARE A SOLUTION TO POL
THE COMMON LAW (PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POLYCENTRIC EVOLUTION) ARE A SOLUTION TO POLITICAL ILLS THAT IS AWE INSPIRING.
Elegant: the common law will let us destroy socialism. It’s sort of like the universal solvent: water. It dissolves theft and deception regardless of form, as long as property rights (a protocol) exist to permit it to do its work.
Source date (UTC): 2014-07-27 01:50:00 UTC
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The Propertarian Criticism of Platonic Truth
(important piece)
–“We can speak about truth even without a warranty, and we don’t mean truthlike or agreed to be true, just plain true.”—Bruce
[Y]es, but how do we know you are speaking truthfully? How do we prevent pseudoscience? Or are you, like free speech advocates, saying that the damage that is done by error is less than the good that is achieved by tolerating it? Which is terribly pragmatic. It’s also demonstrably false. Propagating false arguments turns out to be much more effective than true ones. Or do you claim that scientists should be able to engage in untruthful speech? Or are you saying that because truth is unknown and never knowable, that I can never speak the truth? ***What is the material difference between a theory stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent), and a theory not stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent) yet excused as not being possible to be true, and therefore not subject to requirement that it is spoken truthfully?*** This isn’t an immaterial question. It is perhaps THE ethical question facing scientific investigation in ANY field. Evidence is that in hard science this rule is respected. Evidence is that outside of hard science it is not. Then difference is that hard science is a luxury good without opportunity cost, and everything else is — particularly politics and law, where laws do not perish like falsified theories. The communist manifesto, the labor theory of value, the possibility of a universally DESIRABLE moral code vs a universally moral set of laws. These are all false statements, because they are false in construction, not in prediction. You see, science is pretty much ‘irrelevant’ because it is a luxury good, but truth must apply universally no? or it is not truthful definition of truth? ***While it may be true that the ultimate truth (the most parsimonious statement possible) is the optimum definition of true, does that obviate us from pursuing it with truthful statements? Furthermore why not simply state the truth: that all truthfully constructed arguments and theories are true but incomplete, and constantly open to revision, rather than no theories are true except the one most parsimonious statement that we can never make?*** You see, you might think it’s clear and simple – but it’s not. It’s just experience that has convinced you so. You see, popper’s warning is merely moral, not necessary. And I submit, like the ethics of the ghetto peoples whose verbal methodology, and whose ritualistic literature, was purely pragmatic, that there are vast consequences to platonic truth just as there are vast consequences to platonic (false) anything. As far as I know I am correct. I cant get away from it. because we are currently the victims of a century and a half of pseudoscience the immorality of which has not been achieved since the forcible conversion to christianity or the muslim conversion to scriptural perfection. If we look at just the one’s that I see as catastrophic; kant, freud, marx, cantor, russell/frege, keynes, mises, rothbard, then all of these fallacies were preventable by a requirement for operational definitions – proof of internal consistency: proof of existence. Analogy and meaning are properties of myths. Action and measurement are properties of reality. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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The Propertarian Criticism of Platonic Truth
(important piece)
–“We can speak about truth even without a warranty, and we don’t mean truthlike or agreed to be true, just plain true.”—Bruce
[Y]es, but how do we know you are speaking truthfully? How do we prevent pseudoscience? Or are you, like free speech advocates, saying that the damage that is done by error is less than the good that is achieved by tolerating it? Which is terribly pragmatic. It’s also demonstrably false. Propagating false arguments turns out to be much more effective than true ones. Or do you claim that scientists should be able to engage in untruthful speech? Or are you saying that because truth is unknown and never knowable, that I can never speak the truth? ***What is the material difference between a theory stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent), and a theory not stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent) yet excused as not being possible to be true, and therefore not subject to requirement that it is spoken truthfully?*** This isn’t an immaterial question. It is perhaps THE ethical question facing scientific investigation in ANY field. Evidence is that in hard science this rule is respected. Evidence is that outside of hard science it is not. Then difference is that hard science is a luxury good without opportunity cost, and everything else is — particularly politics and law, where laws do not perish like falsified theories. The communist manifesto, the labor theory of value, the possibility of a universally DESIRABLE moral code vs a universally moral set of laws. These are all false statements, because they are false in construction, not in prediction. You see, science is pretty much ‘irrelevant’ because it is a luxury good, but truth must apply universally no? or it is not truthful definition of truth? ***While it may be true that the ultimate truth (the most parsimonious statement possible) is the optimum definition of true, does that obviate us from pursuing it with truthful statements? Furthermore why not simply state the truth: that all truthfully constructed arguments and theories are true but incomplete, and constantly open to revision, rather than no theories are true except the one most parsimonious statement that we can never make?*** You see, you might think it’s clear and simple – but it’s not. It’s just experience that has convinced you so. You see, popper’s warning is merely moral, not necessary. And I submit, like the ethics of the ghetto peoples whose verbal methodology, and whose ritualistic literature, was purely pragmatic, that there are vast consequences to platonic truth just as there are vast consequences to platonic (false) anything. As far as I know I am correct. I cant get away from it. because we are currently the victims of a century and a half of pseudoscience the immorality of which has not been achieved since the forcible conversion to christianity or the muslim conversion to scriptural perfection. If we look at just the one’s that I see as catastrophic; kant, freud, marx, cantor, russell/frege, keynes, mises, rothbard, then all of these fallacies were preventable by a requirement for operational definitions – proof of internal consistency: proof of existence. Analogy and meaning are properties of myths. Action and measurement are properties of reality. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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We Can Prevent Lies Easily If The Normative Commons Is Common (Shareholder) Property
[S]o, under freedom of speech, libel, slander, defamation, are acceptable to you? So are Keynesian economics, Marxism upon which it is based, Freudian Psychology, Cantor’s sets, Mises’ Praxeology, Rothbard’s Ethics, The Frankfurt School, Feminism (feminist socialism), Boasian Pseudo-Anthropology, Postmodernism (the attack on truth), the marxist attack on education, the marxist attack on art? All of which were constructed of pseudoscientific arguments and all of which were permissible under free speech, but none of which would have been possible if individuals possessed the right of standing to require truth in free speech. It is ok I suspect to pollute the physical commons but not the normative commons? Do you have some evidence that such constraints place such limits on progress rather than improve progress? Or even a rational argument to demonstrate why (because you can’t, which is Bridgman’s position). Calling a woman a whore under anglo saxon law was equivalent to attempted murder that exposed the skull. Words have consequences. Why would some people prefer that words NOT have consequences unless they feared being held accountable for their consequences? THE PEOPLE WHO TAUGHT US TO LIE
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We Can Prevent Lies Easily If The Normative Commons Is Common (Shareholder) Property
[S]o, under freedom of speech, libel, slander, defamation, are acceptable to you? So are Keynesian economics, Marxism upon which it is based, Freudian Psychology, Cantor’s sets, Mises’ Praxeology, Rothbard’s Ethics, The Frankfurt School, Feminism (feminist socialism), Boasian Pseudo-Anthropology, Postmodernism (the attack on truth), the marxist attack on education, the marxist attack on art? All of which were constructed of pseudoscientific arguments and all of which were permissible under free speech, but none of which would have been possible if individuals possessed the right of standing to require truth in free speech. It is ok I suspect to pollute the physical commons but not the normative commons? Do you have some evidence that such constraints place such limits on progress rather than improve progress? Or even a rational argument to demonstrate why (because you can’t, which is Bridgman’s position). Calling a woman a whore under anglo saxon law was equivalent to attempted murder that exposed the skull. Words have consequences. Why would some people prefer that words NOT have consequences unless they feared being held accountable for their consequences? THE PEOPLE WHO TAUGHT US TO LIE
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WE CAN PREVENT LIES PRETTY EASILY IF THE NORMATIVE COMMONS IS COMMON PROPERTY. S
WE CAN PREVENT LIES PRETTY EASILY IF THE NORMATIVE COMMONS IS COMMON PROPERTY.
So libel, slander, defamation, are acceptable to you, I ‘m sure. So are Keynesian economics, Marxism upon which it is based, Freudian Psychology, Cantor’s sets, Mises’ Praxeology, Rothbard’s Ethics, The Frankfurt School, Feminism (feminist socialism), Boasian Pseudo-Anthropology, Postmodernism (the attack on truth), the marxist attack on education, the marxist attack on art, all of which were constructed of pseudoscientific arguments and all of which were permissible under free speech, but none of which would have been possible if individuals possessed the right of standing to require truth in politics law and commerce.
It is ok I suspect to pollute the physical commons but not the normative commons?
Do you have some evidence that such constraints place such limits on progress rather than improve progress? Or even a rational argument to demonstrate why (because you can’t, which is Bridgman’s position).
Calling a woman a whore under anglo saxon law was equivalent to attempted murder that exposed the skull.
Words have consequences. Why would some people prefer that words NOT have consequences unless they feared being held accountable for their consequences?
THE PEOPLE WHO TAUGHT US TO LIE
Source date (UTC): 2014-07-25 10:32:00 UTC
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The Propertarian Criticism Of Platonic Truth
(important piece)
–“We can speak about truth even without a warranty, and we don’t mean truthlike or agreed to be true, just plain true.”—Bruce
[Y]es, but how do we know you are speaking truthfully? How do we prevent pseudoscience? Or are you, like free speech advocates, saying that the damage that is done by error is less than the good that is achieved by tolerating it? Which is terribly pragmatic. It’s also demonstrably false. Propagating false arguments turns out to be much more effective than true ones. Or do you claim that scientists should be able to engage in untruthful speech? Or are you saying that because truth is unknown and never knowable, that I can never speak the truth? ***What is the material difference between a theory stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent), and a theory not stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent) yet excused as not being possible to be true, and therefore not subject to requirement that it is spoken truthfully?*** This isn’t an immaterial question. It is perhaps THE ethical question facing scientific investigation in ANY field. Evidence is that in hard science this rule is respected. Evidence is that outside of hard science it is not. Then difference is that hard science is a luxury good without opportunity cost, and everything else is — particularly politics and law, where laws do not perish like falsified theories. The communist manifesto, the labor theory of value, the possibility of a universally DESIRABLE moral code vs a universally moral set of laws. These are all false statements, because they are false in construction, not in prediction. You see, science is pretty much ‘irrelevant’ because it is a luxury good, but truth must apply universally no? or it is not truthful definition of truth? ***While it may be true that the ultimate truth (the most parsimonious statement possible) is the optimum definition of true, does that obviate us from pursuing it with truthful statements? Furthermore why not simply state the truth: that all truthfully constructed arguments and theories are true but incomplete, and constantly open to revision, rather than no theories are true except the one most parsimonious statement that we can never make?*** You see, you might think it’s clear and simple – but it’s not. It’s just experience that has convinced you so. You see, popper’s warning is merely moral, not necessary. And I submit, like the ethics of the ghetto peoples whose verbal methodology, and whose ritualistic literature, was purely pragmatic, that there are vast consequences to platonic truth just as there are vast consequences to platonic (false) anything. As far as I know I am correct. I cant get away from it. because we are currently the victims of a century and a half of pseudoscience the immorality of which has not been achieved since the forcible conversion to christianity or the muslim conversion to scriptural perfection. If we look at just the one’s that I see as catastrophic; kant, freud, marx, cantor, russell/frege, keynes, mises, rothbard, then all of these fallacies were preventable by a requirement for operational definitions – proof of internal consistency: proof of existence. Analogy and meaning are properties of myths. Action and measurement are properties of reality. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine