Theme: Property

ANOTHER USEFUL ROTHBARDIAN IDIOT

—“> asserts that there can never be a social order based on private property norms

> engages in argumentation, thereby demonstrating a preference for and participation in a libertarian social order based on private property norms

You wrote 10 paragraphs of performative contradiction, but at least you felt cool doing it.”—-Jared Howe

Interesting how you’d even imagine that such a statement wasn’t anything but profoundly stupid.

(Not sure I can provide a complete analysis of the fraud of marxist argumentation ethics without writing a whole book but lets at least lay down the outline and show how ridiculous you are – and how useful, educated but unintelligent, idiots are in the cause against possible liberty: Aristocratic Sovereignty)

1) All humans argue (produce a series of statements for the purpose of persuasion: changing state of another’s behavior.) They argue with ignorance, error, bias, and deciet. They argue with contradictions. They argue with fallacies. They outright lie.

2) No humans exist in a rothbardian political, social, familial, and personal order wherein the definition and scope of property is limited to physical, intersubjectively verifiable property.

3) An insignificant portion of populations STATES a preference for a rothbardian order. NO portion of ANY polity DEMONSTRATES a preference for a rothbardian order.

Why? It is impossible to praxeologically (operationally) argue for the rational construction of a rothbardian order. It does not appear to be able to praxeologically (operationally) argue for the migration of such an order. It appears only possible that a tribal and migratory polity parasitically living off the territorial defenses and juridciald efenses of some other order, might employ this strategy as an ethical basis. Or for separate states to rely upon this form of non-normative, separatist ethics. And, this is what we find. That Rothbardianism is rhetorically similar to international law limited by violence, rather than national law, limited by cooperation.

Ergo:

3) engaging in argumentation (Rationalism) cannot demonstrate a preference for, or possibility of, a rothbardian (purely private property) social order. In fact, argumentation then demonstrates a preference for non-rothbardian social orders. In fact, as I argue, rationalism was invented as an extension of pilpul > theological interpretation > legal interpretation, specifically as a method of avoiding empirical evidence – ie: for lying. (ie: Kant/Marx/Rothbart/hoppe). Argumentation ethics then, by extension of this method, and refusal to use the operational and empeirical methods, demonstrates how easy it is to use rationalism to lie.

4) The reason being that people engage in ignorance, error, bias, wishful thinking, suggestion, obscurantism, propagandism, and deceit – and they must, because argumentation is itself a process of trades consisting of names (categories), properties, relations, values: a negotiation on meaning, and value. Argument, unlike mathematics, does not consists of axioms, but of theories, and hypotheses.

5) In fact, by the addition of full accounting, and productivity, warranty, and operational definitions to argument (categorical consistency, internal consistency, external consistency and reciprocity: voluntary exchange) we can dramatically improve the truth content of negotiations, producing something much closer to a discourse using laws (not axioms), even if it increases the cost of negotiating, heavily, such that truthful negotiation (argument) is closer to “possible”.

You see, people do not engage in axiomatic argument, (truth) they engage in hypothetical negotiation (persuasion). Because the rarely if ever possess the information, intellectual agency, and rhetorical technology (or time for that matter) to engage in anything else.

Argumentation is evidentially self-refuting, if we ourselves argue that argument consists of axiomatic and truthful propositions, rather than a negotiation on meaning and value.

The means by which we force negotiations (ignorance, error bias and deceit) into something close to argumentation, is by the organized application of violence to demand truthful negotiations and attempt to improve argument from fraud into truth telling; and by doing so create a high trust, and therefore competitively profitable polity (market). The means by which we force negotiations (trades) closer to argument (truths), is through the organized threat of and application of violence prior to the negotiation (denial of violence, theft, and falsehood), during the negotiation (demand for truthfulness), and after the negotiation (violence by dispute resolution).

People engage in ignorance, error, bias and lie.

If it isn’t clear, I”m not negotiating, I’m threatening violence so that non-parasitic negotiation with long term returns can be brought into existence, by denying you the opportunity for parasitism that you seek. Otherwise I prefer violence, theft, or fraud, to parasitically exploit you. Because it is only under full reciprocity that you are worth not preying upon.