Theme: Measurement

  • 2000 Years Of Economic History In A Chart? What Would That Chart Tell Us?

    I don’t know what we’re supposed to learn from this chart from The Atlantic, but as others have already stated with passion, it’s pretty bad information design. And even without that criticism, almost every conclusion that one would draw from it certainly appears to be simply meaningless or false – at least without some sort of prevarication.

    It reminds me of the biggest statistical sin in current economics: using ‘families’ rather than individuals. If someone uses that measure, then everything that follows is false. Families have changed too much. More so than the economy itself. The economy is noise by comparison. Likewise, for such gross categorization as this chart seeks to make use of, economic activity is meaningless without the sizes of the geography and the population. Boundaries are meaningless unless what happens within them is substantially different per person per square mile/km. Perhaps even, limited to per person per acre of arable land. Otherwise all the chart tells you is that big arbitrary geographic areas produce more income than small arbitrary geographic areas. Which tells us precisely nothing that isn’t absurdly obvious. WHAT SHOULD A CHART OF ECONOMIC HISTORY SHOW US? What any such chart would allow us to draw the conclusion that:

      Economic history is not complicated. People need:

        They need institutional technologies which do not so much require the state as require the state not abuse:

          And, they need those institutions that *are* complicated: social aspects we too often ignore, and which appear to require intervention on the part of the state:

            A chart that is useful, will be the chart that illustrates that the only value of a state is in creating these institutions (a) thru (h).

          • 2000 Years Of Economic History In A Chart? What Would That Chart Tell Us?

            I don’t know what we’re supposed to learn from this chart from The Atlantic, but as others have already stated with passion, it’s pretty bad information design. And even without that criticism, almost every conclusion that one would draw from it certainly appears to be simply meaningless or false – at least without some sort of prevarication.

            It reminds me of the biggest statistical sin in current economics: using ‘families’ rather than individuals. If someone uses that measure, then everything that follows is false. Families have changed too much. More so than the economy itself. The economy is noise by comparison. Likewise, for such gross categorization as this chart seeks to make use of, economic activity is meaningless without the sizes of the geography and the population. Boundaries are meaningless unless what happens within them is substantially different per person per square mile/km. Perhaps even, limited to per person per acre of arable land. Otherwise all the chart tells you is that big arbitrary geographic areas produce more income than small arbitrary geographic areas. Which tells us precisely nothing that isn’t absurdly obvious. WHAT SHOULD A CHART OF ECONOMIC HISTORY SHOW US? What any such chart would allow us to draw the conclusion that:

              Economic history is not complicated. People need:

                They need institutional technologies which do not so much require the state as require the state not abuse:

                  And, they need those institutions that *are* complicated: social aspects we too often ignore, and which appear to require intervention on the part of the state:

                    A chart that is useful, will be the chart that illustrates that the only value of a state is in creating these institutions (a) thru (h).

                  • KNEW THAT DATA WAS WRONG. I KNEW IT

                    http://blog.american.com/2012/04/obamas-inequality-argument-just-utterly-collapsed/I KNEW THAT DATA WAS WRONG. I KNEW IT.


                    Source date (UTC): 2012-04-17 04:39:00 UTC

                  • WORD BUDGETS: Writing vs Speaking, and the Male vs Female myth.

                    I can’t quite tell if there is any data to support the commonly quoted difference between men and women’s speaking budgets. It’s one of those things that’s so commonly bandied about that you’d think you could easily find data on it. But you can’t. And what you can, is pretty specious. In fact, it looks pretty much ‘just plain wrong’ when I read it. But there is another explanation; it certainly does appear that men and women speak more in different **contexts**. One thing we know that helps us understand those contexts, is that men have more friends than women, but women have closer relationships than do men. Men tolerate greater diversity of value judgements in their friends. Women tolerate less diversity of value judgments in their friends. Or perhaps better stated, men and women view the source of loyalty that defines friendship as coming from different behaviors: cooperation in pursuit of opportunities for shared gain, versus care-taking which requires bearing costs on behalf of the other. For this reason fear of ostracization is lower in men, and higher in women. Add onto that the men not only feel more comfortable taking risks, but enjoy and seek taking them — albiet the level of risk varies substantially. But conversational risk is very low among men. We think it’s better to hear a bad idea than fail to hear all the ideas. Women are more cautious because they are more sensitive to variation in opinion. In my anecdotal experience, in business meetings and debates, men speak far more words than women. In social settings, and in personal conversations, women speak more words than men. Men seem to enjoy participating in competitive conversations. They even artificially create nonsense-conflicts just to have something to debate: they talk about sports teams, companies, politics, technologies, cars and tools etc. Each as a vehicle for debate. They prefer the abstract to the experiential, and a limited number of contextual changes. Women seem to prefer gradual subtle conversations across multiple contexts where they can build consensus and thoroughly understand one another’s viewpoints in the process. The result of these different preferences is more of a difference in velocity than anything else. Women tend to ‘get there’ using their conversational style just like men do, but more slowly. Like everything else, men are built for speed. The extraneous is removed by evolution. It certainly seems like most woman I’ve been in a relationship with has greater capacity for speech than I do — and I’m pretty talkative. But I suspect that it’s a difference in the content and circumstance not the number of words. I”m not the only man who thinks it’s odd that his mate must revisit her dreams in the morning, and her daily conversations at night. It’s common knowledge among men that we must learn that skill. But it’s good for a relationship when men learn how to feign interest in these things that we lack the emotional bandwidth to appreciate and comprehend. Listening is an exercise in providing what the other person needs, and what she needs is not comprehension and problem solving – it’s to ensure we’re committed to one another, and for her to organize her emotions by way of speaking them in the same way that men organize our ideas by visualizing them. Chatter after all, is negatively correlated with successful hunting. Communication during hunts and war is visual, not verbal. Besides, that female revisitation of emotions is why women help us with our emotional problems when we have them: they’re more experienced at dealing with them. Our compensation for lacking those tools, is that mechanical devices, consumer electronics, and politics are not opaque to our comprehension. But I’m not sure which gender gets the better deal. We forget that we all start out female, and that the template for human beings is female, and that males are highly specialized versions of females. Testosterone shuts all that ‘unnecessary’ emotional processing off for males in the womb so that we can worry about doing dangerous things and making tools, and inventing pretty much everything, without worrying about the needs of children or the danger that other women might ostracize us in a time of weakness, when we and our children need communal support to survive. Applying that word budget to writing: I”m writing about 8K words a day on average now, with an average low of 5K, an average high of 10K, and a max of 25K on rare occasions. I’m not sure what that means. I know that if I dont talk to people all day, I write more, and vice versa. I also know that if I am writing for a competitive argument I write more than if I write in the explanatory neutral voice. But I also need to chat more than does my spouse. We are the product of our genes. The universe is fascinating. Life is a miraculous luxury. And every breath of it is worth savoring.

                  • WORD BUDGETS: Writing vs Speaking, and the Male vs Female myth. I can’t quite te

                    WORD BUDGETS: Writing vs Speaking, and the Male vs Female myth.

                    I can’t quite tell if there is any data to support the commonly quoted difference between men and women’s speaking budgets. It’s one of those things that’s so commonly bandied about that you’d think you could easily find data on it. But you can’t. And what you can, is pretty specious. In fact, it looks pretty much ‘just plain wrong’ when I read it.

                    But there is another explanation; it certainly does appear that men and women speak more in different **contexts**.

                    One thing we know that helps us understand those contexts, is that men have more friends than women, but women have closer relationships than do men. Men tolerate greater diversity of value judgements in their friends. Women tolerate less diversity of value judgments in their friends. Or perhaps better stated, men and women view the source of loyalty that defines friendship as coming from different behaviors: cooperation in pursuit of opportunities for shared gain, versus care-taking which requires bearing costs on behalf of the other.

                    For this reason fear of ostracization is lower in men, and higher in women. Add onto that the men not only feel more comfortable taking risks, but enjoy and seek taking them — albiet the level of risk varies substantially. But conversational risk is very low among men. We think it’s better to hear a bad idea than fail to hear all the ideas. Women are more cautious because they are more sensitive to variation in opinion.

                    In my anecdotal experience, in business meetings and debates, men speak far more words than women. In social settings, and in personal conversations, women speak more words than men. Men seem to enjoy participating in competitive conversations. They even artificially create nonsense-conflicts just to have something to debate. (sports teams etc). Women seem to prefer gradual subtle conversations where they can build consensus.

                    The result of these different preferences is more of a difference in velocity than anything else. Women tend to ‘get there’ using their conversational style just like men do, but more slowly. Like everything else, men are built for speed. The extraneous is removed by evolution.

                    It certainly seems like most woman I’ve been in a relationship with has greater capacity for speech than I do — and I’m pretty talkative. But I suspect that it’s a difference in the content and circumstance not the number of words. I”m not the only man who thinks it’s odd that his mate must revisit her dreams in the morning, and her daily conversations at night.

                    But it’s good for a relationship when men learn how to feign interest in these things that we lack the emotional bandwidth to appreciate and comprehend. Listening is an exercise in providing what the other person needs, and what she needs is not comprehension and problem solving – it’s to ensure we’re committed to one another, and for her to organize her emotions by way of speaking them the way men organize our ideas by visualizing them. Chatter after all, is negatively correlated with successful hunting. Communication during hunts and war is visual, not verbal. Besides, that female revisitation of emotions is why women help us with our emotional problems when we have them. They’re more experienced at dealing with them. Our compensation is that mechanical devices and politics are not opaque to our comprehension. But I”m not sure which gender gets the better deal.

                    We forget that we all start out female, and that the template for human beings is female, and that males are highly specialized versions of females. Testosterone shuts all that ‘unnecessary’ emotional processing off for males in the womb so that we can worry about doing dangerous things and making tools, and inventing pretty much everything, without about the needs of children or the danger that other women might ostracize us in a time of weakness, when we and our children need communal support to survive.

                    Applying that word budget to writing: I”m writing about 8K words a day on average now, with an average low of 5K, an average high of 10K, and a max of 25K on rare occasions.

                    I’m not sure what that means. I know that if I dont talk to people all day, I write more, and vice versa. I also know that if I am writing for a competitive argument I write more than if I write in the explanatory neutral voice.

                    We are the product of our genes. The universe is fascinating. Life is a miraculous luxury. And every breath of it is worth savoring.


                    Source date (UTC): 2012-04-16 09:44:00 UTC

                  • Caplan and Boettke On Wikipedia And The Economic Calculation Debate

                    I haven’t read the wiki article on economic calculation before. But this subject is one on which I have spent ten years of work, and Caplan’s quote in the wiki as it’s written bothers me because it’s too easy to misinterpret. 1) Caplan’s argument is reducible to this statement: “between price signals for planning and incentives for coordination, the greater problem is the one of incentives.” The problem of incentives without prices manifests itself in a multitude of behaviors. That multitude of manifested behaviors renders a planned economy impossible. He has stated repeatedly that his criticism is one of subtle priority between incentives and prices. 2) The dispute between the priority of prices and incentives is an artificial distinction. Just as one cannot have a principle of voluntary transfer without the institution of property, one cannot have the institution of prices without human incentives. And prices have no meaning without incentives. The two concepts are inseparable. Incentives require choice, and prices are required to choose between multiple alternatives. Just as voluntary transfer has no meaning without property. While incentives can exist without prices — fear, want, belonging, security, barter and the like — they are limited to simple goods that we can use or consume ourselves. In and industrial economy those goods are abstractions that we cannot grasp the use of with our senses (specialty metals, chemicals, tools). They require special knowledge that one must have an incentive to acquire. So without prices, planning in an industrial economy consisting of factors of production that can be put to multiple purposes in real time, cannot be organized into any rational plan by the multitude of people required to produce any single good. (See I Pencil/I Hamburger). ergo: while the human mind can conceive of an artificially constant organization of individuals, resources and means of production once it is already known, and once individuals possess the appropriate knowledge — an industrial economy is impossible to FIGURE OUT and it is impossible to SUSTAIN without prices and the impact of those prices on incentives. Companies organize to create production all the time. They then have to reorganize in order to suit changes in the market that are signalled by prices of the factors of production AND their outputs. This last bit is important, because producers find a market price for their goods and services then alter their production processes (their cost structure) to satisfy market prices. Humans lack the information to make decisions, but decision making is only important given that they need to have incentives in order to perform the work. Mises doesn’t so much overstate his case, as he is simply more concerned about the problem of money and calculation given the events of his time. 3) The problem for any economy functioning in an equilibrium (competing with other economies) is that competition forces constant recalculation of the use of factors of production, and the organizations that such factors of production are used by. The problem for any economy dependent upon natural resources (food) as a means of production (feeding people), and where production requires time (seasons), is that nature does not adhere to plans and is subject to black swan effects (natural disasters). And it may be impossible to ‘re-plan’ in real time without irreparable effects (starvation) because of the lack of prices and incentives. 4) We might also put Caplan’s statement in context: GMU’s Austrian Economists are in an identity clash with the Rothbardians from the Mises institute. The rothbardians have appropriated the terms ‘libertarian’ and ‘austrian economics’ by adopting Alinsky’s marxist model of propagandizing. Because the Rothbardians have been so successful in doing so, this has caused the only university department in the USA that actively promotes Austrian theory, to defend its theory from ideological if not intellectual abuse, for market reasons. (I am not criticizing the rothbardians, just pointing out the motivations involved. All publicity is good publicity.) In effect Caplan is not commenting about Mises and his economics, he’s commenting about the Rothbardians and their political movement. 5) A paper by Boettke supposedly refutes Caplan. Accusing Caplan of not understanding the arguments Mises was making about Socialism. This is somewhat of a comedy of errors, because in his attempted refutation, Boettke makes that mistake, and Caplan does not. Caplan is not arguing against Misesian era socialism, and the stipulation by socialists that the problem of scarcity would be solved by state ownership of property. But he’s from a younger generation. He is arguing against his generation’s problems of social democracy (private ownership of property, public ownership of profits, which we call redistributive or progressive social democracy.) In this new context he’s saying that incentives matter more than prices, and that there is too much being made of the price issue, rather than the behavioral issue. He’s addressing current issues. In particular the Rothbardian over-emphasis on prices in relation to current socialistic arguments over maximum taxation, and the impact that such taxation would have on the economy. So Caplan’s critique stands to date. And if we were to ask Block, Herbner and Solerno, who wrote most of the papers on the subject, and all of which I have read repeatedly, they would say that the debate has closed. (I know. They’ve told me in person.) There is no meaningful difference between the price and incentive arguments. The importance of each has more to do with the emphasis needed to address each generation’s attempts to protect private property, because the two instantiations of socialistic behavior (socialism and democratic socialism) attempt to appropriate different aspects of property: the means of production by socialists, and the results of production by democratic socialists. Socialism failed because of the inability to both plan and provide incentives. Democratic socialism to some degree continues to survive because it allows (rental?) ownership of property which allows economic calculation and does not appropriate so much of the proceeds that we fail to have the incentive to work. (in most cases.) In fact, in the literature to date (and there is a great deal of it) economists on the left attempt to figure out how much more can be taxed without negative aggregate effects on the economy. They estimate it is much higher. 6) In Why I Am Not An Austrian Economist, Caplan makes the following material errors: a) That probability and uncertainty are the same thing. This is the [glossary:ludic fallacy]. (wiki Ludic Fallacy) And b) that we can predict highly disequlibrating events (black swans.) Or that models can accomodate for black swan effects. 7) Caplan is fundamentally wrong in his understanding of Mises, Rothbard and Hoppe, and Section 2, which attempts to articulate why the neoclassical economists are correct and why models are viable, is a confused set of prevarications I am surprised that has not been better refuted. I do not propose to do full justice here. But while I agreed with Caplan years ago, I have come to understand that he’s simply making excuses for using mathematical models where Mises, Rothbard and Hoppe were trying to discover human nature, so that a better system of government, if any, could be resolved. I don’t think Caplan’s critique is valuable any longer. I think the world has moved on. But at this point in my life I’m pretty sure I can dismantle his arguments as presented in WIANAAE, by demonstrating that Boettke’s argument that Caplan does not understand is actually true. 🙂 And I think Caplan’s later waffling only prove it. But I’m in the middle of a dozen other ideas that are more valuable. Hopefully it’ll be a nice bit of work for some grad student someday. So I’ll stick with my assertion that his arguments have political not material motives. That his single observation about the relationship between incentives and prices is true. That Boettke’s criticism is wrong. And that Caplan’s broader understanding of mises, rothbard, and hoppe are wrong. Everyone is conducting a research program. We’re just scratching the surface.

                  • Yes, We Need To Define ‘Structural’

                    Yes, We Need To Define ‘Structural’ http://www.capitalismv3.com/2012/03/26/the-definition-of-structural-unemployment/


                    Source date (UTC): 2012-03-27 13:56:20 UTC

                    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/184639996811165698

                  • economics, what does STRUCTURAL mean? I’ll provide the Austrian answer. It makes

                    http://www.capitalismv3.com/2012/03/26/the-definition-of-structural-unemployment/In economics, what does STRUCTURAL mean? I’ll provide the Austrian answer. It makes sense. Will someone else try to provide one that makes sense for keynesianism?


                    Source date (UTC): 2012-03-27 09:56:00 UTC

                  • Yes, We Need To Define ‘Structural’

                    One growing point of tension that I that has both semantic and substantive difficulties is whether or not we regard the situation in the mortgage markets as “structural.”

                    via Two-Track Intermediation « Modeled Behavior.

                    Karl, I would love it if you would solve this semantic problem. Because it’s material to the public debate. The technical definition is artificially narrow and as such leads to either dishonest (Krugmanian) or semantic rather than material debate. To Austrians, “Structural” means that we have misallocated financial capital and thereby caused a misallocation of human and fixed capital such that the cost of reallocating that capital is so high that the fixed capital may be ‘wasted’ and the human capital (human beings) cannot be put to productive ends because the learning curve and lifetime commitments of individuals cannot be altered by the market at ANY possible cost. This circumstance results in a permanent loss of competitiveness in relation to other societies what can allocate capital against the remaining productive workers. We see this as a permanent loss with human consequences. For example, the misallocation of human capital during both the tech boom and the housing boom mean that certain people obtained higher incomes in a short period of time but by doing so lost the opportunity to gain competitive skills (in relation to their ages) that had ongoing value to them. Furthermore, by implication, it means that those prior skills were of lower marketability than the skills that they might have possessed. The counter-arguments are that a) people are infinitely fungible (that’s not supportable) or b) we can keep misallocating capital from boom to boom as a means of redistribution, or c) this process is cumulative and causes permanent shifts toward financialization at the top and unproductive labor at the bottom, and production of inferior goods in the middle. I think you err on the side of (b). I think Austrians err on the side of (c). In more abstract terms I think this is a debate over the welfare of the bottom of society or the middle, with your side favoring the former and the austrians the latter. I also think your side considers this problem immaterial and Austrians (and conservatives) consider it cumulatively destructive. And of course, I disagree with your ‘belief’ that we can fix problems in the future. If that were true we would not have the polarization we do today – a polarization which is being solved, not by reason or argument but by differences in breeding rates and immigration.

                  • Yes, We Need To Define ‘Structural’

                    One growing point of tension that I that has both semantic and substantive difficulties is whether or not we regard the situation in the mortgage markets as “structural.”

                    via Two-Track Intermediation « Modeled Behavior.

                    Karl, I would love it if you would solve this semantic problem. Because it’s material to the public debate. The technical definition is artificially narrow and as such leads to either dishonest (Krugmanian) or semantic rather than material debate. To Austrians, “Structural” means that we have misallocated financial capital and thereby caused a misallocation of human and fixed capital such that the cost of reallocating that capital is so high that the fixed capital may be ‘wasted’ and the human capital (human beings) cannot be put to productive ends because the learning curve and lifetime commitments of individuals cannot be altered by the market at ANY possible cost. This circumstance results in a permanent loss of competitiveness in relation to other societies what can allocate capital against the remaining productive workers. We see this as a permanent loss with human consequences. For example, the misallocation of human capital during both the tech boom and the housing boom mean that certain people obtained higher incomes in a short period of time but by doing so lost the opportunity to gain competitive skills (in relation to their ages) that had ongoing value to them. Furthermore, by implication, it means that those prior skills were of lower marketability than the skills that they might have possessed. The counter-arguments are that a) people are infinitely fungible (that’s not supportable) or b) we can keep misallocating capital from boom to boom as a means of redistribution, or c) this process is cumulative and causes permanent shifts toward financialization at the top and unproductive labor at the bottom, and production of inferior goods in the middle. I think you err on the side of (b). I think Austrians err on the side of (c). In more abstract terms I think this is a debate over the welfare of the bottom of society or the middle, with your side favoring the former and the austrians the latter. I also think your side considers this problem immaterial and Austrians (and conservatives) consider it cumulatively destructive. And of course, I disagree with your ‘belief’ that we can fix problems in the future. If that were true we would not have the polarization we do today – a polarization which is being solved, not by reason or argument but by differences in breeding rates and immigration.