Theme: Measurement

  • THE IMMORALITY AND UN-NECESSITY OF MATHEMATICAL PLATONISM (I’m getting closer. F

    THE IMMORALITY AND UN-NECESSITY OF MATHEMATICAL PLATONISM

    (I’m getting closer. From a post elsewhere. And, yes. ‘unnecessity’ is a word. Really. I checked.) 🙂

    My argument, is that of mathematics can be stated operationally, and non-platonically, without negative externality, and that mathematicians have tragically produced the new mysticism in postmodernism for purely utilitarian and self interested reasons.

    Can we create a “standard of truth”? In other words, can two or more of the theories of truth be organized such that one is more narrowly constrained and more parsimonious than the other? I think that correspondence theory of truth is pretty much the accepted practice, while deflationary and formal theories are adaptations to the needs of particular problems. That And that pluralistic theory attempts to compensate for these differences.

    We can measure truth on two axis. The first is completeness of correspondence: it’s parsimony and explanatory power. And the second is the presence and severity of negative externalities. That means that a utilitarian standard of truth is a convenience and a necessary standard of truth is not. And it means that a necessary standard of truth that produces negative externalities is unavoidable and moral and a pragmatic standard of truth is both avoidable and immoral. Morality being a higher standard than disciplinary utility.

    If you read the background on intuitionist mathematics, then that’s enough. And I don’t have to repeat it here. I think that ‘defining truth’ independent of correspondence is a non sequitur, and is conveniently circular use of the term ‘truth’. Internal consistency is not equal to external correspondence. Nor is it immune from criticism. I think if you read, even just the wiki article on the different forms of truth, including the difference between Formal (linguistic) and Substantive (correspondence) theories of truth, then that’s enough, and I don’t need to repeat it here. I think it’s not difficult to grasp that the different theories of truth have different standards – certainly intuitionist has a higher standard than classical. I think it’s not difficult to grasp that math has a lower standard than science. I think that it’s not difficult to grasp that the standards in classical mathematics are utilitarian. And I think it’s not difficult to grasp that utilitarian actions, if they produce externalities, allow us to criticize that utility. And to demand change if necessary. For example: free speech is one thing, but shouting fire in a theater is another. And while justifying and spreading postmodernism, is less immediate, it is more consequential.

    I have not taken it on myself to play Wittgenstein’s game. I am not sure I am up to it. But I believe I can attack the mathematician’s justification of the logic of sets well enough to put the blame for postmodernism on the people within the discipline. And I can denounce their motives. I may be wrong. But I think I can do it. At least. I can do it well enough.

    MARGINAL INDIFFERENCE is the only criteria for performative truth that I know of that is universally applicable in all circumstances.

    This set of criteria satisfies the requirements of even the PLURALIST theory of truth. It allows us to use correspondence, marginal indifference, and externalities as the criteria of truth, without the need to resort to the ‘religion’ and ‘theology’ of platonism, and the external consequences of teaching generations of students a new theology that is dependent upon magic.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-08-29 15:14:00 UTC

  • VERY CLOSE TO PUTTING ANOTHER STAKE IN POSTMODERNISM: MATHEMATICAL PLATONISM AS

    VERY CLOSE TO PUTTING ANOTHER STAKE IN POSTMODERNISM: MATHEMATICAL PLATONISM AS ‘FRAUD’.

    (Excerpt From A Very Very Very long thread)

    Hopefully some people will begin to gasp the difference between morality and property in Propertarianism as I’ve defined them, versus the way Rothbard defined morality and property in libertarianism.

    I think that I should probably write 2500 words on how Rothbard’s argument was sufficient for socialism, but insufficient for Postmodernism. That way I don’t have to attack rothbard as hard as I do now.

    The necessity of operational language is something that I understood was necessary in politics and law. But it was only over the past year or two that I understood that it is necessary for avoiding fraud.

    I still cannot solve the point of demarcation between literature and it’s appeals for empathy, or Heidegger’s confusing mixture of literature and reason, at the expense of causality. I think I know where it is. But I’ll have to work on it.

    -Curt

    ——–

    From: William

    @Curt Doolittle says: “So I would argue, why not just admit that these are utilities and contrivances, not operational truths, and just go on your merry way?”

    I don’t have the vocabulary to express what I think in response to the above. But, I will try to give a stab to convey my thoughts.

    First, it appears to me that you are using “utilities”, ” contrivances”, etc in a derogatory meaning, but “operational” in a favorable meaning. This is similar to attaching a derogatory meaning to “liberal”. I will leave it at this without going into it any further.

    Second, I have a book “A Course In Constructive Algebra” by Ray Mines, Fred Richman and Wim Ruitenburg. The authors don’t accept the principle of excluded middle and they require elements of sets to be constructable. I have no problem reading it and following the proofs. I realize that I am working in a different context. It is just as good as if I worked in the context of ZFC with allowing excluded middle. In other words, I am not converted over to their method and give up standard ZFC. I do both.

    Third, I have no qualms about working out a problem in Newtonian physics (like calculating the moment of inertia of a spinning top). I don’t know if you would say I am doing “operational truths” because the operations are constructive, or if you would say I an not doing “operational truths” because the result is not true because Newtonian physics is not true.

    Fourth, I suspect that in the 21th century there are still philosophers who support the framework of mathematicians who do standard ZFC theorem proving. That is, those mathematicians have not been abandoned by philosophers who try to justify, explain, etc what the mathematicians are doing. And there are other philosophers who support other different views, who have mathematicians following them to provide their ground to stand on. If these philosophers can’t agree among themselves, why do you want the mathematicians to choose just one of them. Are mathematicians a better judge of the various philosophical views than the philosophers themselves?

    Fifth, I believe mathematicians would not have any qualms switching among the various mathematical foundations. Would a “utilitarian” philosopher be ok with writing a paper in the “platonic” viewpoint, and vice versa?

    ————–

    From: Curt Doolittle

    @William Hale

    RE “Second”, “Fourth”, “Fifth”

    I think we are still talking past each other. I’m fully appreciative of using multiple methodologies to solve problems. I’m fully appreciative of the fact that mathematicians, like a general staff, run theories – and that surprisingly often, some particular formula describes a useful natural process. The question is, do you understand that point of demarcation, or not. And do you claim that the standard of truth in deduction is equal to the standard of truth in construction. That the two standards are marginally indifferent is different from the two standards being identical. They aren’t. So then, there are statements that are necessarily true. And statements that are deductively true. IF we can claim there are many types of infinities but some are larger or smaller. Then perhaps we can claim their are many truths, but that some are more authoritative than others. if you claim that .999… is operationally equal to one, that is different from whether .999.. is deductively equal to one, or equal by fiat. But in a conflict over which statement is a more authoritative truth, the operational must be. Because it can be nothing else. And even this is not important to me. What is important is that the Russell/Cantor debate led to platonism. And platonism was adopted by postmodernists. Yet the more parsimonious answer was readily available.

    RE: “Third”

    I would say that newtonian physics is sufficiently precise for the calculations where it is sufficiently precise. This is all that needs to be said. Just like all scientific theories are open to revision, so are all formulae. Why mathematicians feel that they need to create Platonistic standards of truth when the matter is one of precision is … as far as I can tell… an artifact of the language of the Greeks, Bacon and Newton – religious language. Appeals to divine authority.

    RE: “First”

    I am raising a moral objection. Correct? Is then moral context not relevant? 🙂 But that said, I think that when one makes a truth claim about something that is in fact, utilitarian, it is… either immoral, ignorant, or dishonest.

    In other words, do we get to act selfishly when it suits us?

    WHY

    What if all political language (law, regulation) was stated operationally, so that it was not open to interpretation? How would that change civic discourse?

    Utterances are actions and all actions have consequences. Or, are we not responsible for our actions?

    The basic argument is that, when making truth claims, scientific statements, stated operationally, are moral, and non scientific statements are immoral. It is very hard to commit fraud by operational argument. It is very easy to commit fraud by platonic argument. In fact – that is the entire purpose of it.

    For example, money laundering. Money laundering is the process of removing causation. If mathematicians remove causality from their language, it is laundering as well (information loss). If I cannot launder money because it causes externalities, why can I launder causality in mathematics if it causes externalities?

    Everything isn’t relative. 🙂 Truth is accurate description of causal relations. Everything else is ‘contrivance’. And the only reason for developing alternative forms is to say ‘we can get away with it’ and to raise it to the same level of legitimacy as truth. The same way that politicians use the word ‘law’ to give legitimacy to ‘command’. There is but one LAW of human cooperation. The rest is commands and punishments. And non-operational language, platonic language, meant to provide legitimacy, is in fact, a violation of that single law: theft. It is fraud by omission. Obtaining convenience and legitimacy by use of language that avoids causal relations. Mathematical platonism if argued as a truth claim, where that truth claim is also stated as equivalent to operational truth, is in fact, fraud.

    This is, in fact, the source of the argument for postmodern thought: mathematics.

    We may not HOLD each other accountable for our actions. But our actions have consequences that we are RESPONSIBLE for, whether we hold our selves accountable, or others hold us accountable for them. I am holding (or anticipating holding) mathematicians responsible for the consequences of their actions. (this is the theory I am testing via argument to make sure that I understand it.)

    And operational language is the only truth. Everything else is an allegory to it. We can speak truthfully to the best of our knowledge. We can write theories that are testable. But we can make no truth claim that is not operationally stated. Because platonism is the laundry of causal relations.

    Mathematics has reinvented mysticism – appeals to platonism to justify arguments. I don’t care about math as a discipline. It’s not terribly important. I care about society. i care about the fact that in democracy, debates have consequences. And the moral commons is an asset we must protect like any other asset from the privatization of wins and the socialization of losses.

    So when I say, operationally .999… cannot exist, and even if it could could not equal 1, because it never CAN equal one. That is a true statement. Or, given that the the correct term is ‘substitution’, that .999.. in any context we can imagine, can be substituted for 1. Or if you were to say that … is a a notation for that which we cannot operationally state because of the limits of our number system. Or if you were to say that because in all real world applications, precision is contextually dependent, and infinity allows us to represent contextual precision. Or if you say you say deductively, they are equivalent, if not equal. Or if you say that in practice, the fields of irrational numbers tell us what geometric calculations will be problematic or easy. Or if you say that in practice, fields of (rings of) complex numbers, actually do represent combinations of charges we observe at the subatomic level. (there are still more I can think of). Then all of those are valid statements. They are true statements. But under no conditions are platonic arguments ‘true’. That is a terribly deceptive game that is the source of moral ‘relevance’ in our society.

    Mathematical ‘truth’, not stated operationally, is a contrivance, which we use to give status and legitimacy to pragmatic utilitarian actions just as governments give legitimacy to commands by calling them laws. In practice this does not affect our calculations due to the marginal indifference of contextual precision. Symbolic substitution, at marginally indifferent precision does not affect our calculations as well.

    There is absolutely no reason that mathematical language must be stated platonically other than status seeking, and legitimacy seeking.

    If questioned, it is quite alright to say, ‘we do these things because, in our craft it is easier’ that is different from saying, ‘we do these things because they are true’. The first is a pleading for understanding given the high cost of operational language. The second is an act of fraud.

    – cheers. 🙂

    (PS: I suspect that I may have given you the vocabulary to express your thoughts.) 🙂


    Source date (UTC): 2013-08-29 02:14:00 UTC

  • What Are The Biggest Unsolved Intellectual Problems In The World Today?

    1) If we are to supply money to the economy, how do we know how much? When are we causing more distortion than good?
    2) There is something wrong with the standard model.  What is the theory of the universe? The theory of ‘everything’?
    3) What is the human population load bearing capacity of the planet? What is the next malthusian limit?
    4) Is our progress since the industrial revolution little more than capturing hydrocarbons?  And if so, what happens when they’re gone?
    5) Our anti-bacterial technology is losing effectiveness, and we still have not found an anti-viral solution.
    6) Is Modern Monetary Theory possible, or will it produce perpetual, and destabilizing inflation?
    7) We still have not solved the mind-body problem to everyone’s satisfaction. What is the answer?
    8) What’s ‘after democracy’?  Because democracy apparently has very hard limits to where it will function, and seems to be of limited use outside of a small number of countries.
    9) Is diversity really a good?  It doesn’t look like it.  And how do we solve that?
    10) The problem of transhumanism: what does this mean for us?
    11) The problem of the technological singularity.
    12) What will happen if we have fully taken advantage of industrialization and we have half of the world’s population permanently poor and living in slums?

    https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-biggest-unsolved-intellectual-problems-in-the-world-today

  • What Are The Biggest Unsolved Intellectual Problems In The World Today?

    1) If we are to supply money to the economy, how do we know how much? When are we causing more distortion than good?
    2) There is something wrong with the standard model.  What is the theory of the universe? The theory of ‘everything’?
    3) What is the human population load bearing capacity of the planet? What is the next malthusian limit?
    4) Is our progress since the industrial revolution little more than capturing hydrocarbons?  And if so, what happens when they’re gone?
    5) Our anti-bacterial technology is losing effectiveness, and we still have not found an anti-viral solution.
    6) Is Modern Monetary Theory possible, or will it produce perpetual, and destabilizing inflation?
    7) We still have not solved the mind-body problem to everyone’s satisfaction. What is the answer?
    8) What’s ‘after democracy’?  Because democracy apparently has very hard limits to where it will function, and seems to be of limited use outside of a small number of countries.
    9) Is diversity really a good?  It doesn’t look like it.  And how do we solve that?
    10) The problem of transhumanism: what does this mean for us?
    11) The problem of the technological singularity.
    12) What will happen if we have fully taken advantage of industrialization and we have half of the world’s population permanently poor and living in slums?

    https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-biggest-unsolved-intellectual-problems-in-the-world-today

  • INFINITY Out of the three possible definitions of infinity that i can understand

    INFINITY

    Out of the three possible definitions of infinity that i can understand today, I am going to choose to define infinity as the point at which the last marginally different value is followed by a marginally indifferent different value. Ie the first marginally indifferent value. More simply as the smallest unit which would affect change in state. Or as stated traditionally as a “limit.”

    This definition does not require we stipulate any platonic infinity. It simply states that the value is unknown, and for our purposes indifferent to the calculation.

    In practice, this is the operational definition as applied in practice in scientific experiment and argument.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-08-08 09:06:00 UTC

  • SETS AND NONSENSE : THE PERCEPTION OF INFINITE SEMANTICALLY MEANINGFUL SETS IS A

    SETS AND NONSENSE : THE PERCEPTION OF INFINITE SEMANTICALLY MEANINGFUL SETS IS A COGNITIVE BIAS

    I have been working with computers for a long time.

    Computers are very good with sets of things and teaching you how to work with them. Relational databases are even better at teaching you the algebra of sets than programming languages. Compilers are very good at teaching you about semantics.

    And trying to write games that have some semblance of intelligence not immediately deducible as trivial dumb patterns. Or writing software that can produce reasonably articulate legal arguments from limited data. Or trying to represent semantic clouds of related terms teaches you something very basic about language:

    That there are actually very few sentences that are not nonsense compared to the number of sentences that are sensible.

    If one accumulates knowledge from many different disciplines, it becomes rapidly apparent that the number of concepts shared by these domains is limited and that the perception of vast knowledge is an illusory artifact of disciplinary methodological loading – most of which is erroneous and caused by ignorance of these greater patterns, or various forms of social and normative loading, or the natural brevity that emerges in any population over time. Worse, no small part of current language consists of loading meant to signal social position or create priestly mysticism to preserve status cues.

    One of our cognitive biases is to assume when we discover something new,

    Mystical statements were not false if they achieved the purpose of getting non-kin to treat each other as kin.

    They may have been allegorical but they were not false. They produced the desired outcome of uniting disunited people by getting them to extend kin-trust to non-kin.

    The externality produced by that allegory was pretty dangerous it turned out. But until trade became pervasive, the need to extend trust in order to trade and operate a division of labor was insufficient to produce the level of trust that religion did.

    We did not become enlightened because we wanted to, but because trade required that we did. And morality could be enforced by trade and credit rather than religion which threatens ostracization and death, and law which threatens punishment. Instead the ability to consume, compete for status and mates or feel the pressure of degrading status made very granular control of moral behavior possible – for nearly everyone, at very low cost, and producing a virtuous cycle of declining prices.

    While we might create very vast and highly loaded languages, the fact of the matter, is that all language is allegory to experience. There is little or nothing that cannot be expressed with a thousand words. The primary challenge is that complexity using that limited vocabulary overwhelms short term memory. So loading using complex words. Like symbols or measurements, allows us to stuff ideas into short term memory and create faster “meaning” in each other’s minds, in the three second window of our processing cycle for those who are already familiar with the topic.

    In this sense, while we use complex words with heavy loading for brevity and status signaling, the concepts that we can convey require analogy to experience, and analogy to experience requires few words.

    Where am I going with this?

    The number if meaningful sentences is fairly small. The number if meaningful narratives has been known to be small for some time.

    The need to restate narratives in the current context is high.

    But the number of theories active at any time is quite small. With the illusion of large numbers a cognitive bias, and most theories merely justifications for preferences masquerading as theories.

    There just aren’t that many theories. And thats in no small part because we are very good at killing theories.

    We are super predators after all.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-08-04 11:02:00 UTC

  • FUN COINCIDENCE Coursera has a course, starting monday, in Mathematical Philosop

    FUN COINCIDENCE

    Coursera has a course, starting monday, in Mathematical Philosophy addressing precisely the questions I’m asking – Although, from what I gather, it is an example of everything that is I believe is wrong with the discipline of logic. 🙂 “Know thy enemy” and all that sort of thing. Anyway. I thought that it would be fun to take. And to have whole bunch of people and some young professors to bounce ideas off of. I’m pretty sure I understand the domain now. It only took me two weeks I think. But I’m pretty sure that the infinite set problem is a trivial statement about constructing statements, not a meaningful statement about reality.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-07-29 07:28:00 UTC

  • PROPERTARIANISM Status First daft of epistemology has been done for months. Fini

    PROPERTARIANISM

    Status

    First daft of epistemology has been done for months.

    Finished first sketch of metaphysics today.

    Still having trouble with the necessity of Calculation in the broader sense.

    Ready to put this section to paper soon. Get rid of axiom of action language and handle it as necessary for operational language.

    In Propertarian context this material is just back matter but it takes trivial criticism off the table if its included. I don’t have to handle silly objections.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-07-26 16:13:00 UTC

  • What Are Some Problems People Will Be Surprised Mathematics Can’t Solve?

    I am not sure that there are problems mathematics cannot illustrate.  That seems unlikely.  I think there are LOGICAL problems with number theory that cannot necessarily be solved with certainty.  Math is  a pretty good way of describing the physical world.  It is a pretty good way of describing complex relations.  But that is different from saying that math can express everything about itself.  And that is probably the fundamental question that we would like to solve, but may not be able to.

    Jack Thompson below, asks the metaphysical question whether real numbers exist, and the answer is one of definitions not of existence.  No, real numbers are platonic entities. Natural numbers exist in nature.  All else is a product of mind. And even natural numbers are names for the act of counting. Everything else an act of calculating ratios.  🙂

    https://www.quora.com/What-are-some-problems-people-will-be-surprised-mathematics-cant-solve

  • What Are Some Problems People Will Be Surprised Mathematics Can’t Solve?

    I am not sure that there are problems mathematics cannot illustrate.  That seems unlikely.  I think there are LOGICAL problems with number theory that cannot necessarily be solved with certainty.  Math is  a pretty good way of describing the physical world.  It is a pretty good way of describing complex relations.  But that is different from saying that math can express everything about itself.  And that is probably the fundamental question that we would like to solve, but may not be able to.

    Jack Thompson below, asks the metaphysical question whether real numbers exist, and the answer is one of definitions not of existence.  No, real numbers are platonic entities. Natural numbers exist in nature.  All else is a product of mind. And even natural numbers are names for the act of counting. Everything else an act of calculating ratios.  🙂

    https://www.quora.com/What-are-some-problems-people-will-be-surprised-mathematics-cant-solve