Curt Doolittle

Theme: Measurement

  • Interesting: "Know", "Knowing" and "Knowledge" As Terms Of Obscurantism

    [P]ossession of knowledge is not a binary condition, but a spectrum from awareness or intuition, through hypothesis, theory and law, through parsimonious theoretical completeness, through axiomatic declaration, through tautological identity. The context for use of such knowledge in pursuit of some action determines necessary sufficiency. Despite our habits, one cannot say that one knows something without stating the sufficiency of knowledge required, and still have a decidable proposition – there just isn’t enough information there. Now, we can assume the question of utility from the context, and therefore the standard of knowledge required. But knowledge cannot be divorced from action, even if that action is merely identity or perception. But like many empty verbalisms that are not problems, but merely inarticulate language masquerading as complexity. The common fallacy of using the language of experience rather than action. One cannot sever the qualitative expression “knowledge” either from the context of an act, from choice, nor from the cost of action. We can discount these values for arbitrary purposes, but to discount cost and context in pursuit of a general rule is very different from saying that in application of any general rule the action, choice and cost determine the sufficiency of knowledge. I have been making this general argument regarding the use of the scientific method for either (a) production, (b) technological or (c) purely scientific purposes. The method we use is the same in each circumstance, but we merely apply discounts or premiums to different outputs of the scientific method. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • Interesting: “Know”, “Knowing” and “Knowledge” As Terms Of Obscurantism

    [P]ossession of knowledge is not a binary condition, but a spectrum from awareness or intuition, through hypothesis, theory and law, through parsimonious theoretical completeness, through axiomatic declaration, through tautological identity. The context for use of such knowledge in pursuit of some action determines necessary sufficiency. Despite our habits, one cannot say that one knows something without stating the sufficiency of knowledge required, and still have a decidable proposition – there just isn’t enough information there. Now, we can assume the question of utility from the context, and therefore the standard of knowledge required. But knowledge cannot be divorced from action, even if that action is merely identity or perception. But like many empty verbalisms that are not problems, but merely inarticulate language masquerading as complexity. The common fallacy of using the language of experience rather than action. One cannot sever the qualitative expression “knowledge” either from the context of an act, from choice, nor from the cost of action. We can discount these values for arbitrary purposes, but to discount cost and context in pursuit of a general rule is very different from saying that in application of any general rule the action, choice and cost determine the sufficiency of knowledge. I have been making this general argument regarding the use of the scientific method for either (a) production, (b) technological or (c) purely scientific purposes. The method we use is the same in each circumstance, but we merely apply discounts or premiums to different outputs of the scientific method. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • Interesting: "Know", "Knowing" and "Knowledge" As Terms Of Obscurantism

    [P]ossession of knowledge is not a binary condition, but a spectrum from awareness or intuition, through hypothesis, theory and law, through parsimonious theoretical completeness, through axiomatic declaration, through tautological identity. The context for use of such knowledge in pursuit of some action determines necessary sufficiency. Despite our habits, one cannot say that one knows something without stating the sufficiency of knowledge required, and still have a decidable proposition – there just isn’t enough information there. Now, we can assume the question of utility from the context, and therefore the standard of knowledge required. But knowledge cannot be divorced from action, even if that action is merely identity or perception. But like many empty verbalisms that are not problems, but merely inarticulate language masquerading as complexity. The common fallacy of using the language of experience rather than action. One cannot sever the qualitative expression “knowledge” either from the context of an act, from choice, nor from the cost of action. We can discount these values for arbitrary purposes, but to discount cost and context in pursuit of a general rule is very different from saying that in application of any general rule the action, choice and cost determine the sufficiency of knowledge. I have been making this general argument regarding the use of the scientific method for either (a) production, (b) technological or (c) purely scientific purposes. The method we use is the same in each circumstance, but we merely apply discounts or premiums to different outputs of the scientific method. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • Interesting: “Know”, “Knowing” and “Knowledge” As Terms Of Obscurantism

    [P]ossession of knowledge is not a binary condition, but a spectrum from awareness or intuition, through hypothesis, theory and law, through parsimonious theoretical completeness, through axiomatic declaration, through tautological identity. The context for use of such knowledge in pursuit of some action determines necessary sufficiency. Despite our habits, one cannot say that one knows something without stating the sufficiency of knowledge required, and still have a decidable proposition – there just isn’t enough information there. Now, we can assume the question of utility from the context, and therefore the standard of knowledge required. But knowledge cannot be divorced from action, even if that action is merely identity or perception. But like many empty verbalisms that are not problems, but merely inarticulate language masquerading as complexity. The common fallacy of using the language of experience rather than action. One cannot sever the qualitative expression “knowledge” either from the context of an act, from choice, nor from the cost of action. We can discount these values for arbitrary purposes, but to discount cost and context in pursuit of a general rule is very different from saying that in application of any general rule the action, choice and cost determine the sufficiency of knowledge. I have been making this general argument regarding the use of the scientific method for either (a) production, (b) technological or (c) purely scientific purposes. The method we use is the same in each circumstance, but we merely apply discounts or premiums to different outputs of the scientific method. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • WORTH REPEATING : ARBITRARY PRECISION AND INFORMATION LOSS In mathematics, (intu

    WORTH REPEATING : ARBITRARY PRECISION AND INFORMATION LOSS

    In mathematics, (intuitionist mathematics), the requirement that we demonstrate all operations eliminates the possibility of the excluded middle – which is an unnecessary constraint upon mathematics. (This constraint is equivalent somewhat to computability in computer science.)

    However, in order to create mathematical statements in the form of general rules independent of scale, we divorce the statements from scale, maintaining only the relations themselves (ratios).

    By doing so – loss of context – we lose the information necessary to determine contextual precision. In other words, we no longer know that 1/64 of an inch is the maximum precision necessary for the given calculation. But in any application of the general statement to a given context we then regain the information necessary to make decisions.

    As such general mathematical statements are constructed with arbitrary precision that requires choice independent of context, or contextual application to supply the missing information.

    This problem of creating general statements independent of context is why it was necessary to transition number theory from geometry (infinite precision) to sets (binary precision). Thus reducing all mathematics to truth tables. And binary precision (set membership) is the reason why binary mathematics is so crucial to computation: we are always in a true or false state: a truth table that is universally decidable regardless of contextual precision.

    These discussions evolved in math as a war against mathematical platonism. And by applying the same principle to ethics the problem changes significantly since we never encounter the problem of arbitrary precision.

    In ethics, we do not have the luxury that physics does, in that information cannot be lost and all relations are constant. We are stuck with bounded but relatively inconstant relations.

    But we always can test the rationality of any economic statement that is reduced to a sequence of actions. ***And so we never encounter the problem of arbitrary scale and the insufficiency of information.***

    So when I speak of empiricism ( observation), operationalism (actions in time), and instrumentalism (reducing the imperceptible to the perceptible) it is in the context of ethics not mathematics and as such is not subject to the failure if operationalism and intuitionism to satisfy the needs of mathematicians.

    This is a revolutionary idea.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-06-12 02:55:00 UTC

  • DRAFT – IMPROVING LESTER – OPERATIONALISM (I have to do more work on this but I’

    DRAFT – IMPROVING LESTER – OPERATIONALISM

    (I have to do more work on this but I’m running out of gas today. You probably can see what I’m doing.

    From Lester’s Leviathan:

    —“1. Interpersonal liberty exists to the extent that people do not impose costs on each other.”—JCLester

    (Note: Before we get going, note that I use the terms “Free Riding” and “Involuntary Transfer” as if to say “One free rides upon the actions of others when he causes an involuntary transfer of the other’s property. I prefer my terms as anyone would, but for all intents and purposes, the act of causing another a loss of property that he has accumulated is the same description regardless of whether we use the terms “imposed cost, involuntary transfer, theft, or free-riding” all of which semantically differ only in the point of view of the observer expressing the term and the historical loading associated with the terms.)

    -Interactions-

    Let us distinguish between the different possible forms of group interaction: (direct->)(Gv1)Genocide, (Gv2)Conquest, (Gv2)Conflict, (Gc)Competition, (Gp)Cooperation, (Ge) Exchange (production), (Gr1) Charity, (Gr2)Parasitism, (Gr3)Predation (<-indirect) because cooperation and conflict an be conducted by multiple means of severity and method.

    (show graph 1)

    -Conflict-

    Let us define conflict as the imposition of costs upon others; and let us define cooperation as the avoidance of the imposition of costs upon others.

    -Relations-

    Let us further distinguish between cooperation upon (Ck)Kin, (Ce) Ends, (Cm) Means, and (Ca) Avoidance/Boycott. (Because all relations are not equally important to us, and our kin are more important to us than those with whom cooperation is of little use.)

    (show graph 2)

    Let us define costs. Costs must be imposed against something? What is the definition of those things that we impose costs against? What is the positive assertion of the negative prohibition? We call that “Property” such that the negative prohibition on free riding (imposed costs) can be stated as positive examples that are possible to enumerate.

    -Property-

    Let us define property as (i) (Pa) that which I have homesteaded, (Pb) that which I have received in exchange, and (Pc) that which I have transformed from that which I have homesteaded or exchanged; and (ii) where under (Pa),(Pb), and (Pc), I acted with the presumption of a monopoly of control over private property, or in the construction of a commons (shareholder asset) that I may use but not ‘consume’, or in payment for a commons, that I constantly consume and must keep replenished (property rights are such a norm that is a constant unending cost).

    -Costs-

    So, costs are those actions which cause a decrease in property. Furthermore, let us define that which is not property, as that which it is impossible to impose costs upon.

    -Terms-

    Let us convert the spectrum of impositions into common language so that we can discuss legal, moral, and ethical violations in familiar terms..

    (1-Interpersonal-)

    Criminal

    Unethical

    (2-Impersonal-)

    Immoral

    (3-Organized-)

    Conspiratorial

    (4-External-)

    Invasion

    Conquest

    (Show graph 3)

    -Liberty- Let us define liberty as a successful implementation (habituation in a body of people) of a normative contact that forbids the involuntary imposition of costs upon others, and under which we can somehow logically resolve disputes by rational and non-subjective, means.

    If we have succeeded in constructing a normative contract, whether expressly stated, or merely habituated and intuited, for non predatory, non-parasitic and therefore productive, voluntary cooperation, and by consequence, for the voluntary organization of production, then we can claim to have constructed a condition of liberty, by constructing a contract for the condition of liberty. For a condition of liberty to exist, individuals must succeed in constructing a normative contract, and the means of resolving disputes under the terms of that contract.

    (Show liberty on the graph 4)

    That seems to be fairly settled reasoning. I guess, I’d have to ask, why such a thing was so unnatural that we would have to define it with such care and effort.

    ROTHBARDIAN LIBERTINISM

    The problem with the NAP/IVP is that it only addresses category #1-Criminal- property violations. And since humans universally demonstrate extraordinary willingness to apply even costly violence to punish violators of the entire spectrum, and that the state is necessary either to suppress such violations, or to suppress punishment of violators, the NAP/IVP is an insufficient definition of property for the rational formation of a voluntary polity. In other words, it doesn’t make sense to join a voluntary polity – the transaction costs are too high compared to a statist or high trust polity. Furthermore, the evidence is that (in the case of gypsies and jews) that periodic extermination is the punishment for relying upon rothbardian ethics. Or, as is the case in Muslim countries and Asia, high demand for both corruption and the state to suppress violence because of the permissibility of violations of property.

    More later

    Source date (UTC): 2014-06-09 12:07:00 UTC

  • We Require Exchange and 'Calculability', Not Yet Another Arbitrary Moral Argument

    Regarding: New Libertarians: New Promoters of a Welfare State johnmccaskey.com John. [G]ood piece. Although, I’m critical of philosophical pretense in social justice as much as I am in the market. If any judgment is beyond our perception, and any concept of social justice is, then we must, as in all other matters where complexity exceeds our perception, develop some kind of instrumentation and means of calculation such that we can reduce that which we cannot perceive, to some analogy to experience that we can perceive. Moral rules are not sufficient for achieving that kind of instrumentation, or performing that kind of calculation. The problems (of instrumentation and calculation) require formal institutions as a means of calculation. For example, we have the market for cooperating on means even if we disagree on ends. We have the government for forcing cooperation on means and ends by majority rule. We have accounting to assist us in the perception of that which we cannot possibly grasp without it. And we have economics to attempt to measure our success. But we have no such instrumentation and means of calculating “social justice” – or even defining such a thing as social justice. (Which current psychologists and economists suspect is reducible to status seeking, and insurance against risk, and nothing more.) Hayek addresses this thoroughly in TCoL. While we might continue to try to rely upon the methods of the past (philosophy), and attempt to concoct yet another empty incalculable moralism for the purported common good, these results are value judgements and nothing more. They are incalculable. Non Empirical. Unascertainable. [M]ost of the post-enlightenment philosophical effort has considered society a monopoly, in contrast to the pre-enlightenment condition of most urban cities, as federations of minorities denied access to political power, and forced to compete outside of politics, in the market. So the idea of social justice is an artifact of monopoly democracy rather than a federation of disparate interests. This is a fallacy. We have no common goals, only common means of cooperating to achieve disparate goals. However, libertarians rightly argue that the only moral test is that of voluntary exchange free of violent coercion. I argue that this ‘test’ is incorrect, since no in-group human organizations demonstrate that low a level of trust, And instead all groups demonstrate and require higher standards of trust, tah also forbid free riding, deception, cheating, as well as burdening other group members indirectly. However, whether we accept a low trust society and high demand for external authority that low trust societies demonstrate, or a high trust society and the low demand for external authority that high trust societies demonstrate, the underlying argument that the only test of moral action is voluntary exchange. So the effort that political philosophers left, libertarian and right have expended under the universalist assumption of the enlightenment has been to find some justification for moral decision making even if the knowledge to make such decisions is impossible both in the market, and afterward, using the profits created from the market. The question instead, is how to construct institutions with which groups can conduct voluntary exchanges, which are by definition moral. Majority rule does not allow this. Majority rule is sufficient for the selection of priorities in homogenous polities with homogenous interests. The market is the means by which heterogeneous polities cooperate on means despite different interests on ends. But how can we construct an institutional system that allows the construction of commons, and other exchanges between groups and classes, but is not dependent upon a monopoly bureaucracy, majority rule, or representatives open to influence, special interest, and corruption? Because a government of contracts, not laws, would allow the exchange of say, adherence to traditions and norms, or requirements for married families in order to obtain redistribution. This would make government a means of cooperation rather than the source and facilitator of conflict. Cheers Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

  • We Require Exchange and ‘Calculability’, Not Yet Another Arbitrary Moral Argument

    Regarding: New Libertarians: New Promoters of a Welfare State johnmccaskey.com John. [G]ood piece. Although, I’m critical of philosophical pretense in social justice as much as I am in the market. If any judgment is beyond our perception, and any concept of social justice is, then we must, as in all other matters where complexity exceeds our perception, develop some kind of instrumentation and means of calculation such that we can reduce that which we cannot perceive, to some analogy to experience that we can perceive. Moral rules are not sufficient for achieving that kind of instrumentation, or performing that kind of calculation. The problems (of instrumentation and calculation) require formal institutions as a means of calculation. For example, we have the market for cooperating on means even if we disagree on ends. We have the government for forcing cooperation on means and ends by majority rule. We have accounting to assist us in the perception of that which we cannot possibly grasp without it. And we have economics to attempt to measure our success. But we have no such instrumentation and means of calculating “social justice” – or even defining such a thing as social justice. (Which current psychologists and economists suspect is reducible to status seeking, and insurance against risk, and nothing more.) Hayek addresses this thoroughly in TCoL. While we might continue to try to rely upon the methods of the past (philosophy), and attempt to concoct yet another empty incalculable moralism for the purported common good, these results are value judgements and nothing more. They are incalculable. Non Empirical. Unascertainable. [M]ost of the post-enlightenment philosophical effort has considered society a monopoly, in contrast to the pre-enlightenment condition of most urban cities, as federations of minorities denied access to political power, and forced to compete outside of politics, in the market. So the idea of social justice is an artifact of monopoly democracy rather than a federation of disparate interests. This is a fallacy. We have no common goals, only common means of cooperating to achieve disparate goals. However, libertarians rightly argue that the only moral test is that of voluntary exchange free of violent coercion. I argue that this ‘test’ is incorrect, since no in-group human organizations demonstrate that low a level of trust, And instead all groups demonstrate and require higher standards of trust, tah also forbid free riding, deception, cheating, as well as burdening other group members indirectly. However, whether we accept a low trust society and high demand for external authority that low trust societies demonstrate, or a high trust society and the low demand for external authority that high trust societies demonstrate, the underlying argument that the only test of moral action is voluntary exchange. So the effort that political philosophers left, libertarian and right have expended under the universalist assumption of the enlightenment has been to find some justification for moral decision making even if the knowledge to make such decisions is impossible both in the market, and afterward, using the profits created from the market. The question instead, is how to construct institutions with which groups can conduct voluntary exchanges, which are by definition moral. Majority rule does not allow this. Majority rule is sufficient for the selection of priorities in homogenous polities with homogenous interests. The market is the means by which heterogeneous polities cooperate on means despite different interests on ends. But how can we construct an institutional system that allows the construction of commons, and other exchanges between groups and classes, but is not dependent upon a monopoly bureaucracy, majority rule, or representatives open to influence, special interest, and corruption? Because a government of contracts, not laws, would allow the exchange of say, adherence to traditions and norms, or requirements for married families in order to obtain redistribution. This would make government a means of cooperation rather than the source and facilitator of conflict. Cheers Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

  • We Require Exchange and 'Calculability', Not Yet Another Arbitrary Moral Argument

    Regarding: New Libertarians: New Promoters of a Welfare State johnmccaskey.com John. [G]ood piece. Although, I’m critical of philosophical pretense in social justice as much as I am in the market. If any judgment is beyond our perception, and any concept of social justice is, then we must, as in all other matters where complexity exceeds our perception, develop some kind of instrumentation and means of calculation such that we can reduce that which we cannot perceive, to some analogy to experience that we can perceive. Moral rules are not sufficient for achieving that kind of instrumentation, or performing that kind of calculation. The problems (of instrumentation and calculation) require formal institutions as a means of calculation. For example, we have the market for cooperating on means even if we disagree on ends. We have the government for forcing cooperation on means and ends by majority rule. We have accounting to assist us in the perception of that which we cannot possibly grasp without it. And we have economics to attempt to measure our success. But we have no such instrumentation and means of calculating “social justice” – or even defining such a thing as social justice. (Which current psychologists and economists suspect is reducible to status seeking, and insurance against risk, and nothing more.) Hayek addresses this thoroughly in TCoL. While we might continue to try to rely upon the methods of the past (philosophy), and attempt to concoct yet another empty incalculable moralism for the purported common good, these results are value judgements and nothing more. They are incalculable. Non Empirical. Unascertainable. [M]ost of the post-enlightenment philosophical effort has considered society a monopoly, in contrast to the pre-enlightenment condition of most urban cities, as federations of minorities denied access to political power, and forced to compete outside of politics, in the market. So the idea of social justice is an artifact of monopoly democracy rather than a federation of disparate interests. This is a fallacy. We have no common goals, only common means of cooperating to achieve disparate goals. However, libertarians rightly argue that the only moral test is that of voluntary exchange free of violent coercion. I argue that this ‘test’ is incorrect, since no in-group human organizations demonstrate that low a level of trust, And instead all groups demonstrate and require higher standards of trust, tah also forbid free riding, deception, cheating, as well as burdening other group members indirectly. However, whether we accept a low trust society and high demand for external authority that low trust societies demonstrate, or a high trust society and the low demand for external authority that high trust societies demonstrate, the underlying argument that the only test of moral action is voluntary exchange. So the effort that political philosophers left, libertarian and right have expended under the universalist assumption of the enlightenment has been to find some justification for moral decision making even if the knowledge to make such decisions is impossible both in the market, and afterward, using the profits created from the market. The question instead, is how to construct institutions with which groups can conduct voluntary exchanges, which are by definition moral. Majority rule does not allow this. Majority rule is sufficient for the selection of priorities in homogenous polities with homogenous interests. The market is the means by which heterogeneous polities cooperate on means despite different interests on ends. But how can we construct an institutional system that allows the construction of commons, and other exchanges between groups and classes, but is not dependent upon a monopoly bureaucracy, majority rule, or representatives open to influence, special interest, and corruption? Because a government of contracts, not laws, would allow the exchange of say, adherence to traditions and norms, or requirements for married families in order to obtain redistribution. This would make government a means of cooperation rather than the source and facilitator of conflict. Cheers Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

  • We Require Exchange and ‘Calculability’, Not Yet Another Arbitrary Moral Argument

    Regarding: New Libertarians: New Promoters of a Welfare State johnmccaskey.com John. [G]ood piece. Although, I’m critical of philosophical pretense in social justice as much as I am in the market. If any judgment is beyond our perception, and any concept of social justice is, then we must, as in all other matters where complexity exceeds our perception, develop some kind of instrumentation and means of calculation such that we can reduce that which we cannot perceive, to some analogy to experience that we can perceive. Moral rules are not sufficient for achieving that kind of instrumentation, or performing that kind of calculation. The problems (of instrumentation and calculation) require formal institutions as a means of calculation. For example, we have the market for cooperating on means even if we disagree on ends. We have the government for forcing cooperation on means and ends by majority rule. We have accounting to assist us in the perception of that which we cannot possibly grasp without it. And we have economics to attempt to measure our success. But we have no such instrumentation and means of calculating “social justice” – or even defining such a thing as social justice. (Which current psychologists and economists suspect is reducible to status seeking, and insurance against risk, and nothing more.) Hayek addresses this thoroughly in TCoL. While we might continue to try to rely upon the methods of the past (philosophy), and attempt to concoct yet another empty incalculable moralism for the purported common good, these results are value judgements and nothing more. They are incalculable. Non Empirical. Unascertainable. [M]ost of the post-enlightenment philosophical effort has considered society a monopoly, in contrast to the pre-enlightenment condition of most urban cities, as federations of minorities denied access to political power, and forced to compete outside of politics, in the market. So the idea of social justice is an artifact of monopoly democracy rather than a federation of disparate interests. This is a fallacy. We have no common goals, only common means of cooperating to achieve disparate goals. However, libertarians rightly argue that the only moral test is that of voluntary exchange free of violent coercion. I argue that this ‘test’ is incorrect, since no in-group human organizations demonstrate that low a level of trust, And instead all groups demonstrate and require higher standards of trust, tah also forbid free riding, deception, cheating, as well as burdening other group members indirectly. However, whether we accept a low trust society and high demand for external authority that low trust societies demonstrate, or a high trust society and the low demand for external authority that high trust societies demonstrate, the underlying argument that the only test of moral action is voluntary exchange. So the effort that political philosophers left, libertarian and right have expended under the universalist assumption of the enlightenment has been to find some justification for moral decision making even if the knowledge to make such decisions is impossible both in the market, and afterward, using the profits created from the market. The question instead, is how to construct institutions with which groups can conduct voluntary exchanges, which are by definition moral. Majority rule does not allow this. Majority rule is sufficient for the selection of priorities in homogenous polities with homogenous interests. The market is the means by which heterogeneous polities cooperate on means despite different interests on ends. But how can we construct an institutional system that allows the construction of commons, and other exchanges between groups and classes, but is not dependent upon a monopoly bureaucracy, majority rule, or representatives open to influence, special interest, and corruption? Because a government of contracts, not laws, would allow the exchange of say, adherence to traditions and norms, or requirements for married families in order to obtain redistribution. This would make government a means of cooperation rather than the source and facilitator of conflict. Cheers Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev