—“if you produce an operational definition then you can be shown to have spoken truthfully, (given witness) even if the truth content of your theory cannot be determined to be true – ever. Moreover, that if you do not produce an operational definition of your argument, then we cannot tell you are speaking truthfully or whether you are engaging in deception, or because of your lack of discipline and diligence you are committing error. “—
Source date (UTC): 2014-07-27 00:48:00 UTC
(probably a little difficult for most but possibly profoundly useful)
—“But we can claim that our theory is true and often do so. In fact, the idea that we cannot do so is itself a theory which, if true, cannot be claimed to be true.”—
[O]f course, I didn’t make that claim. I only claimed that we can test if you speak truthfully, as in honestly and diligently, not whether your theory is true. Any statement reducible to human actions is open to sympathetic testing, and is no longer subject to the errors of meaning. Processes work or do not, there is no error of meaning in them. That which is demonstrated is true. Theories are the opposite. Very little of what is spoken is other than a word game. We can state human actions both as actor and observer.They are the same, merely from a different point of view. But, we must anthropomorphize the “actions” of the physical universe if we state the universe’s position (theoretical definitions) — or we can state the observer position (operational definitions). When we state the observer position we need not add imaginary content. When we state the universe’s position we must always add imaginary content – we must hypothesize.We can not read the mind of the universe (at least yet). This is what mises intuited by imitating the ideas of other thinkers, but he was not able to state it, and fell into pseudoscience instead. In economics we have a constant problem of this nature between Austrians and mainstream macro. Austrians stress the human position as both actor and observer. However, in the mainstream is common if not universal to state that ‘the curve moves this way” in response to some change. when the cause is human activity. (Sometimes I wonder if all this talk of theories is just another type of justification, and recipes are the only truth we can or do know. We can categorize our recipes, but that is all. Everything else, is imaginary.) [T]his is probably more important than is obvious at first blush. Between the problem of (a) anthropomorphizing the physical universe (theoretical definitions), (b) the obscurity provided by functions, (c) the obscurity provided by experiential definitions, (d) the obscurity provided by imaginary definitions (analogies), (e) the obscurity provided by the verb to-be, (f) the variety of cognitive biases that we know of, (g) and pervasive human framing and loading, if not (h) the cosmopolitan techniques of critique as means of overloading (deception), it seems that human beings are desperate to add meaning wherever they can – when the exercise of science is in no small part an effort to remove meaning. We do not need to psychologize the universe. Which is in no small part what is being done. (psychologizing the universe: I have to work on this a bit more but it’s pretty close to the criticism I’m looking for.)
(probably a little difficult for most but possibly profoundly useful)
—“But we can claim that our theory is true and often do so. In fact, the idea that we cannot do so is itself a theory which, if true, cannot be claimed to be true.”—
[O]f course, I didn’t make that claim. I only claimed that we can test if you speak truthfully, as in honestly and diligently, not whether your theory is true. Any statement reducible to human actions is open to sympathetic testing, and is no longer subject to the errors of meaning. Processes work or do not, there is no error of meaning in them. That which is demonstrated is true. Theories are the opposite. Very little of what is spoken is other than a word game. We can state human actions both as actor and observer.They are the same, merely from a different point of view. But, we must anthropomorphize the “actions” of the physical universe if we state the universe’s position (theoretical definitions) — or we can state the observer position (operational definitions). When we state the observer position we need not add imaginary content. When we state the universe’s position we must always add imaginary content – we must hypothesize.We can not read the mind of the universe (at least yet). This is what mises intuited by imitating the ideas of other thinkers, but he was not able to state it, and fell into pseudoscience instead. In economics we have a constant problem of this nature between Austrians and mainstream macro. Austrians stress the human position as both actor and observer. However, in the mainstream is common if not universal to state that ‘the curve moves this way” in response to some change. when the cause is human activity. (Sometimes I wonder if all this talk of theories is just another type of justification, and recipes are the only truth we can or do know. We can categorize our recipes, but that is all. Everything else, is imaginary.) [T]his is probably more important than is obvious at first blush. Between the problem of (a) anthropomorphizing the physical universe (theoretical definitions), (b) the obscurity provided by functions, (c) the obscurity provided by experiential definitions, (d) the obscurity provided by imaginary definitions (analogies), (e) the obscurity provided by the verb to-be, (f) the variety of cognitive biases that we know of, (g) and pervasive human framing and loading, if not (h) the cosmopolitan techniques of critique as means of overloading (deception), it seems that human beings are desperate to add meaning wherever they can – when the exercise of science is in no small part an effort to remove meaning. We do not need to psychologize the universe. Which is in no small part what is being done. (psychologizing the universe: I have to work on this a bit more but it’s pretty close to the criticism I’m looking for.)
Link: The Copenhagen Interpretation [A] profoundly good example of the problem philosophers face in reducing that which we cannot sense and perceive without instruments to analogies to experience which we can. As I struggle with the cultural conflation of truth with strategic good, assumed as metaphysical property of reality, and reconciling this with the requirement for ethical testimony, which can only be claimed by observation and measurement, I realize the problems facing those in quantum mechanics and those of ethics and politics of heterogeneous polities, are both products of vast increases in scale and complexity that our minds neither evolved for, nor have our language and epistemological traditions evolved to accommodate. We are still mystics at describing reality at scale, not because we are conservative or unwilling, as we were with religion in reaction to science, but because despite our willingness we do not yet know how. There are two solutions to this problem: to state scale concepts in perceivable terms as best we can, or to restate all concepts in new terms. Under both models language will eventually evolve, and with it the populace. I suppose the former is more pragmatic but less truthful, and the latter more truthful but less likely to succeed. In ethics I face this same problem. And its painful.we must use extant language despite that it is wrong, clarify its meaning by cleansing it of error, and restate relations formed in homogenous polities with the properties of heterogeneous polities. Universalism is an error in scale, measurement, and logic. Its yeoman’s labor.
Link: The Copenhagen Interpretation [A] profoundly good example of the problem philosophers face in reducing that which we cannot sense and perceive without instruments to analogies to experience which we can. As I struggle with the cultural conflation of truth with strategic good, assumed as metaphysical property of reality, and reconciling this with the requirement for ethical testimony, which can only be claimed by observation and measurement, I realize the problems facing those in quantum mechanics and those of ethics and politics of heterogeneous polities, are both products of vast increases in scale and complexity that our minds neither evolved for, nor have our language and epistemological traditions evolved to accommodate. We are still mystics at describing reality at scale, not because we are conservative or unwilling, as we were with religion in reaction to science, but because despite our willingness we do not yet know how. There are two solutions to this problem: to state scale concepts in perceivable terms as best we can, or to restate all concepts in new terms. Under both models language will eventually evolve, and with it the populace. I suppose the former is more pragmatic but less truthful, and the latter more truthful but less likely to succeed. In ethics I face this same problem. And its painful.we must use extant language despite that it is wrong, clarify its meaning by cleansing it of error, and restate relations formed in homogenous polities with the properties of heterogeneous polities. Universalism is an error in scale, measurement, and logic. Its yeoman’s labor.
[K]nowing is an experience. Constructing an existence, logical, or mathematical, proof is an action. We can demonstrate them. That is not to say that they are true, it is to say that they are proofs. If we have constructed proofs, we may err, but it is very hard to lie. And even if one does, err, we need not hold him accountable for his error. Speaking truthfully, constructing a proof, and possessing the ultimate truth are very different things. I can however speak truthfully, and I can construct an existence proof, and that is the most that I can do. I can know those things even if I cannot know if I possess the truth. So what does that do for me? I doesn’t tell me anything about whether I possess the ultimate truth, but it does allow me to speak truthfully to the best of my ability – and that is all that we can ask of anyone. Because it is all that is possible for anyone. Conversely, we must ask it of anyone who seeks to place an argument into the commons the result of which would subject others to harm.
[K]nowing is an experience. Constructing an existence, logical, or mathematical, proof is an action. We can demonstrate them. That is not to say that they are true, it is to say that they are proofs. If we have constructed proofs, we may err, but it is very hard to lie. And even if one does, err, we need not hold him accountable for his error. Speaking truthfully, constructing a proof, and possessing the ultimate truth are very different things. I can however speak truthfully, and I can construct an existence proof, and that is the most that I can do. I can know those things even if I cannot know if I possess the truth. So what does that do for me? I doesn’t tell me anything about whether I possess the ultimate truth, but it does allow me to speak truthfully to the best of my ability – and that is all that we can ask of anyone. Because it is all that is possible for anyone. Conversely, we must ask it of anyone who seeks to place an argument into the commons the result of which would subject others to harm.
(possibly the latter bit is profound) [F]rom my notes…. –“An operational definition is produced by defining a process of operationalization and recording the results of operating that process; in order to define a variable, term, or object in terms of a set of tests needed to determine its existence, duration, and quantity or quality. Operational definitions define changes in state as those operations necessary to change state; define unobservable entities concretely in terms of the physical and mental operations used to measure them; and ensures that the definition of each observable and unobservable entity has been uniquely identified with the instrumentation used to define it. Just as the operational naming of numbers via positional numbering gives a unique name to every number, this process of operationalization gives a unique name to an extant entity consisting of the definition for that step, rather than consisting of an analogy that approximates it in some form or other. Operationalism is a process of granting unique names.”– This ensures that we are discussing names of extant entities rather than allegories, functions, experiences, or imaginary projections. Operationalism is not a truth test, it is a test of truth telling.
(possibly the latter bit is profound) [F]rom my notes…. –“An operational definition is produced by defining a process of operationalization and recording the results of operating that process; in order to define a variable, term, or object in terms of a set of tests needed to determine its existence, duration, and quantity or quality. Operational definitions define changes in state as those operations necessary to change state; define unobservable entities concretely in terms of the physical and mental operations used to measure them; and ensures that the definition of each observable and unobservable entity has been uniquely identified with the instrumentation used to define it. Just as the operational naming of numbers via positional numbering gives a unique name to every number, this process of operationalization gives a unique name to an extant entity consisting of the definition for that step, rather than consisting of an analogy that approximates it in some form or other. Operationalism is a process of granting unique names.”– This ensures that we are discussing names of extant entities rather than allegories, functions, experiences, or imaginary projections. Operationalism is not a truth test, it is a test of truth telling.
[O]perationalism asks us to demonstrate that we are conducting observations of extant entities not projecting imagination and subjectivity. As a general rule: *** We shall define all phenomenon which we choose to observe, in terms of the sequence of physical operations (actions) used, the instruments used, and the measurements taken with those instruments (whether cardinal or ordinal), rather than either the use of analogies of any form, interpretations of those observations, or subjective experiences of those observations, so that we guarantee to any audience that all entities that we refer to exist, and that no information is added to the observation but that which can be observed when reproduced by the repetition of those actions, instruments and measurements by others.***