Theme: Institution

  • by Bill Joslin Replace the notion of transcendental ideals as a motive force for

    by Bill Joslin

    Replace the notion of transcendental ideals as a motive force for group cohesion with the notion of a grounded ideal whereby the ideal remains under the authority of natural consequences and thus meets the criteria of truthful explanation (operational explanation)


    Source date (UTC): 2017-11-14 09:18:00 UTC

  • by Bill Joslin Replace the notion of transcendental ideals as a motive force for

    by Bill Joslin Replace the notion of transcendental ideals as a motive force for group cohesion with the notion of a grounded ideal whereby the ideal remains under the authority of natural consequences and thus meets the criteria of truthful explanation (operational explanation)
  • Western aristocracy requires an enemy. We have one: our own secular priesthood

    Western aristocracy requires an enemy. We have one: our own secular priesthood.
  • “Some people are satisfied with having “truth” bestowed upon them by another ind

    —“Some people are satisfied with having “truth” bestowed upon them by another individual, institution, or superstition. Other people, themselves concerned with truth are not satisfied when it is bestowed upon them. They will try to falsify everything until only what is true remains.”— Adam Walker
  • “Some people are satisfied with having “truth” bestowed upon them by another ind

    —“Some people are satisfied with having “truth” bestowed upon them by another individual, institution, or superstition. Other people, themselves concerned with truth are not satisfied when it is bestowed upon them. They will try to falsify everything until only what is true remains.”— Adam Walker


    Source date (UTC): 2017-11-13 20:58:00 UTC

  • “Some people are satisfied with having “truth” bestowed upon them by another ind

    —“Some people are satisfied with having “truth” bestowed upon them by another individual, institution, or superstition. Other people, themselves concerned with truth are not satisfied when it is bestowed upon them. They will try to falsify everything until only what is true remains.”— Adam Walker
  • Nationalism

    by Daniel Gurpide 1. I think that ‘nationalism’ has to be clarified and put into historical perspective so as to become a really empowering technology. (CD: ok) 2. My priors so that you understand where I come from: I have relatives in Spain, France, Norway and the UK; I studied in Madrid, Paris, Cambridge, and Dresden; I lived in Tanzania, Bolivia, New York, Switzerland, and Germany. I consider myself a ‘good European’. (CD: ok) 3. Nationalism only has meaning for me if understood as a doctrine capable of expressing in political terms the philosophy and vital needs of European man in 2017 (I am thinking not in geographical, but in anthropological terms—the white man—and including both the peoples of the continental homeland as well as ‘Europe overseas.’ Their plight is common and, even if they are unaware of it, they are experiencing a similar fate—they all suffer from the same disease). (CD: agreed) 4. European nations are condemned either to exit from history and be melted down into a shapeless and faceless global mass, or to turn into the substance of a future nation and people. (CD: agreed) 5. It is convenient to distinguish between two different ways of posing the ‘national question.’ One, developed in France, sees a nation essentially as a construction operated by a state, and bound ab initio to a restricted horizon, a closure: historically, the closure and separation from Empire. This attitude cannot but immediately give rise to the problem of fixing national borders: in this case first for the natio francorum without; then, for the political and cultural identities within those borders, on which ‘reduction’ is operated. This policy of self-exclusion without (from the Imperium), and homologation and repression of internal identities and differences within, was pursued by French absolutism—and to its ultimate consequences with the French Revolution. Subsequently it was emulated by all the democratic revolutions in Europe, to the point when all nationalisms based on ‘the masses’ and exclusion of ‘the other’ arrived, necessarily, at contemporary one world universalism. (CD: agreed) Contrary to appearances, the one world ideology—which today impregnates the dominant culture and the political praxis of international institutions—is only superficially in contradiction to the presuppositions of the form of nationalism described above. Withdrawal into oneself implies, intrinsically, recognition, sooner or later, of equality among nations. The dream of political universalism is but the reproposal, on a global scale, of the very process that led to the formation of the nation-state. (CD: agreed) 6. Where the memory of the Roman imperial model persisted, and where the project of a Holy Roman Empire as restoration of the classical order remained politically active through the Middle Ages the process of ‘national’ unification did not take place (except partially and on a small scale) until the Romantic Age: during the nineteenth century. It assumed a deeply diverse aspect. (CD: agreed) In this case, it is not the state that builds a nation and stimulates a national consciousness, but rather a national consciousness which, in its maturity, seeks to express itself politically through one state. Belonging, for example, to the German or the Italian nation was not, initially, a fact on which to build national consciousness, but rather an idea (in its political sense): a spiritual attachment to a project that needed to be defined and was linked to an old imperial vision of a hierarchically organised cosmos. (CD: agreed) 7. Today, the situation of European nationalism is analogous. Europe – Magna Europa – does not enjoy a real existence. Europe is only the destiny of those who recognise themselves as part of it. Furthermore, it is precisely to this ‘ghost,’ to this choice of culture, values, civilisation (i.e., the regeneration of history)—to this myth—that the faith of the good European is addressed. Ultimately, it is also contrasted with the jumble of states and petty-states inhabiting our continent, together with their squalid supranational bureaucracies. (CD: agreed) 8. There is another reason why European nationalism should associate itself with the second model described above: the very same idea of Europe amounts to a transfigured re-emergence of the imperial vision. The unification of Europe on the model of the Jacobin nation-state—and in direct opposition to regionalist tendencies (even perhaps forcing linguistic, cultural, and administrative homogenisation)—is unthinkable. There is a further reason: the non-existence of the matter of Europe’s borders. Europe is not a territory, but rather a destiny offered to all who can trace an ethnic and spiritual relationship to it. (CD: agreed) This consideration helps clarify how un-European, in this sense, are institutions like the Council of Europe, an institution of which Turkey is a member today—and perhaps Israel tomorrow. (CD: agreed) 9. With the Industrial Revolution, humankind entered into a phase of planetisation. None may avoid such planetary perspective or dream of impossible isolation. Planetary order is unavoidable. It is fated to come about, sooner or later. Tomorrow’s Great Politics cannot be conceived or pursued without a ‘world order’. (CD: Um. Either I dont understand what you’re getting at, or I don’t agree. i’m not sure which. What I see is vacillation between opening and closing, expanding and contracting, civilizations in response to circumstances, and some having the free capital to adapt and some not.) 10. Institutionally, we should study carefully three models: Switzerland, the USA Constitution (Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, and Adams) and Ancient Rome. My contribution today regarding Rome: (CD: agreed 100% that those are the three ‘scales’. Swiss > American > Roman. 11. The planetisation that is taking place demands a ‘cosmic order.’ Will such order be ‘imperial’ or ‘egalitarian’? In that the future is open, this must remain unknown: we can merely commit ourselves to one or to the other. (CD: Ok so this is where we are not seeing the same thing and that’s why I asked the question.) The egalitarian solution implies the reduction of humankind ad unum, the emergence of the ‘universal type’ and of global standardisation. The imperial solution is hierarchical. If freedom in egalitarian dialectics is one absolute opposed to another (the denial of freedom), in imperial dialectics, freedom is merely a relative proposition directly linked to the notion of social responsibility. Within the Imperium, only the right of the best is absolute, measured according to the virtue manifested by humankind at a particular moment. However, Imperium is also, from a planetary perspective, the only means of preserving differences, thanks to the principle of unicuique suum, which implicitly recognises the fundamental inequality of values and identities. Imperium may be seen as the alternative to globalisation: strength and cohesion in diversity as a model of planetary organisation. (CD: I see speciation as an opportunity.)
  • NATIONALISM by Daniel Gurpide 1. I think that ‘nationalism’ has to be clarified

    NATIONALISM

    by Daniel Gurpide

    1. I think that ‘nationalism’ has to be clarified and put into historical perspective so as to become a really empowering technology.

    (CD: ok)

    2. My priors so that you understand where I come from: I have relatives in Spain, France, Norway and the UK; I studied in Madrid, Paris, Cambridge, and Dresden; I lived in Tanzania, Bolivia, New York, Switzerland, and Germany. I consider myself a ‘good European’.

    (CD: ok)

    3. Nationalism only has meaning for me if understood as a doctrine capable of expressing in political terms the philosophy and vital needs of European man in 2017 (I am thinking not in geographical, but in anthropological terms—the white man—and including both the peoples of the continental homeland as well as ‘Europe overseas.’ Their plight is common and, even if they are unaware of it, they are experiencing a similar fate—they all suffer from the same disease).

    (CD: agreed)

    4. European nations are condemned either to exit from history and be melted down into a shapeless and faceless global mass, or to turn into the substance of a future nation and people.

    (CD: agreed)

    5. It is convenient to distinguish between two different ways of posing the ‘national question.’ One, developed in France, sees a nation essentially as a construction operated by a state, and bound ab initio to a restricted horizon, a closure: historically, the closure and separation from Empire. This attitude cannot but immediately give rise to the problem of fixing national borders: in this case first for the natio francorum without; then, for the political and cultural identities within those borders, on which ‘reduction’ is operated. This policy of self-exclusion without (from the Imperium), and homologation and repression of internal identities and differences within, was pursued by French absolutism—and to its ultimate consequences with the French Revolution. Subsequently it was emulated by all the democratic revolutions in Europe, to the point when all nationalisms based on ‘the masses’ and exclusion of ‘the other’ arrived, necessarily, at contemporary one world universalism.

    (CD: agreed)

    Contrary to appearances, the one world ideology—which today impregnates the dominant culture and the political praxis of international institutions—is only superficially in contradiction to the presuppositions of the form of nationalism described above. Withdrawal into oneself implies, intrinsically, recognition, sooner or later, of equality among nations. The dream of political universalism is but the reproposal, on a global scale, of the very process that led to the formation of the nation-state.

    (CD: agreed)

    6. Where the memory of the Roman imperial model persisted, and where the project of a Holy Roman Empire as restoration of the classical order remained politically active through the Middle Ages the process of ‘national’ unification did not take place (except partially and on a small scale) until the Romantic Age: during the nineteenth century. It assumed a deeply diverse aspect.

    (CD: agreed)

    In this case, it is not the state that builds a nation and stimulates a national consciousness, but rather a national consciousness which, in its maturity, seeks to express itself politically through one state. Belonging, for example, to the German or the Italian nation was not, initially, a fact on which to build national consciousness, but rather an idea (in its political sense): a spiritual attachment to a project that needed to be defined and was linked to an old imperial vision of a hierarchically organised cosmos.

    (CD: agreed)

    7. Today, the situation of European nationalism is analogous. Europe – Magna Europa – does not enjoy a real existence. Europe is only the destiny of those who recognise themselves as part of it. Furthermore, it is precisely to this ‘ghost,’ to this choice of culture, values, civilisation (i.e., the regeneration of history)—to this myth—that the faith of the good European is addressed. Ultimately, it is also contrasted with the jumble of states and petty-states inhabiting our continent, together with their squalid supranational bureaucracies.

    (CD: agreed)

    8. There is another reason why European nationalism should associate itself with the second model described above: the very same idea of Europe amounts to a transfigured re-emergence of the imperial vision. The unification of Europe on the model of the Jacobin nation-state—and in direct opposition to regionalist tendencies (even perhaps forcing linguistic, cultural, and administrative homogenisation)—is unthinkable. There is a further reason: the non-existence of the matter of Europe’s borders. Europe is not a territory, but rather a destiny offered to all who can trace an ethnic and spiritual relationship to it.

    (CD: agreed)

    This consideration helps clarify how un-European, in this sense, are institutions like the Council of Europe, an institution of which Turkey is a member today—and perhaps Israel tomorrow.

    (CD: agreed)

    9. With the Industrial Revolution, humankind entered into a phase of planetisation. None may avoid such planetary perspective or dream of impossible isolation. Planetary order is unavoidable. It is fated to come about, sooner or later.

    Tomorrow’s Great Politics cannot be conceived or pursued without a ‘world order’.

    (CD: Um. Either I dont understand what you’re getting at, or I don’t agree. i’m not sure which. What I see is vacillation between opening and closing, expanding and contracting, civilizations in response to circumstances, and some having the free capital to adapt and some not.)

    10. Institutionally, we should study carefully three models: Switzerland, the USA Constitution (Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, and Adams) and Ancient Rome. My contribution today regarding Rome:

    (CD: agreed 100% that those are the three ‘scales’. Swiss > American > Roman.

    11. The planetisation that is taking place demands a ‘cosmic order.’ Will such order be ‘imperial’ or ‘egalitarian’? In that the future is open, this must remain unknown: we can merely commit ourselves to one or to the other.

    (CD: Ok so this is where we are not seeing the same thing and that’s why I asked the question.)

    The egalitarian solution implies the reduction of humankind ad unum, the emergence of the ‘universal type’ and of global standardisation. The imperial solution is hierarchical. If freedom in egalitarian dialectics is one absolute opposed to another (the denial of freedom), in imperial dialectics, freedom is merely a relative proposition directly linked to the notion of social responsibility. Within the Imperium, only the right of the best is absolute, measured according to the virtue manifested by humankind at a particular moment. However, Imperium is also, from a planetary perspective, the only means of preserving differences, thanks to the principle of unicuique suum, which implicitly recognises the fundamental inequality of values and identities.

    Imperium may be seen as the alternative to globalisation: strength and cohesion in diversity as a model of planetary organisation.

    (CD: I see speciation as an opportunity.)


    Source date (UTC): 2017-11-12 22:37:00 UTC

  • Nationalism

    by Daniel Gurpide 1. I think that ‘nationalism’ has to be clarified and put into historical perspective so as to become a really empowering technology. (CD: ok) 2. My priors so that you understand where I come from: I have relatives in Spain, France, Norway and the UK; I studied in Madrid, Paris, Cambridge, and Dresden; I lived in Tanzania, Bolivia, New York, Switzerland, and Germany. I consider myself a ‘good European’. (CD: ok) 3. Nationalism only has meaning for me if understood as a doctrine capable of expressing in political terms the philosophy and vital needs of European man in 2017 (I am thinking not in geographical, but in anthropological terms—the white man—and including both the peoples of the continental homeland as well as ‘Europe overseas.’ Their plight is common and, even if they are unaware of it, they are experiencing a similar fate—they all suffer from the same disease). (CD: agreed) 4. European nations are condemned either to exit from history and be melted down into a shapeless and faceless global mass, or to turn into the substance of a future nation and people. (CD: agreed) 5. It is convenient to distinguish between two different ways of posing the ‘national question.’ One, developed in France, sees a nation essentially as a construction operated by a state, and bound ab initio to a restricted horizon, a closure: historically, the closure and separation from Empire. This attitude cannot but immediately give rise to the problem of fixing national borders: in this case first for the natio francorum without; then, for the political and cultural identities within those borders, on which ‘reduction’ is operated. This policy of self-exclusion without (from the Imperium), and homologation and repression of internal identities and differences within, was pursued by French absolutism—and to its ultimate consequences with the French Revolution. Subsequently it was emulated by all the democratic revolutions in Europe, to the point when all nationalisms based on ‘the masses’ and exclusion of ‘the other’ arrived, necessarily, at contemporary one world universalism. (CD: agreed) Contrary to appearances, the one world ideology—which today impregnates the dominant culture and the political praxis of international institutions—is only superficially in contradiction to the presuppositions of the form of nationalism described above. Withdrawal into oneself implies, intrinsically, recognition, sooner or later, of equality among nations. The dream of political universalism is but the reproposal, on a global scale, of the very process that led to the formation of the nation-state. (CD: agreed) 6. Where the memory of the Roman imperial model persisted, and where the project of a Holy Roman Empire as restoration of the classical order remained politically active through the Middle Ages the process of ‘national’ unification did not take place (except partially and on a small scale) until the Romantic Age: during the nineteenth century. It assumed a deeply diverse aspect. (CD: agreed) In this case, it is not the state that builds a nation and stimulates a national consciousness, but rather a national consciousness which, in its maturity, seeks to express itself politically through one state. Belonging, for example, to the German or the Italian nation was not, initially, a fact on which to build national consciousness, but rather an idea (in its political sense): a spiritual attachment to a project that needed to be defined and was linked to an old imperial vision of a hierarchically organised cosmos. (CD: agreed) 7. Today, the situation of European nationalism is analogous. Europe – Magna Europa – does not enjoy a real existence. Europe is only the destiny of those who recognise themselves as part of it. Furthermore, it is precisely to this ‘ghost,’ to this choice of culture, values, civilisation (i.e., the regeneration of history)—to this myth—that the faith of the good European is addressed. Ultimately, it is also contrasted with the jumble of states and petty-states inhabiting our continent, together with their squalid supranational bureaucracies. (CD: agreed) 8. There is another reason why European nationalism should associate itself with the second model described above: the very same idea of Europe amounts to a transfigured re-emergence of the imperial vision. The unification of Europe on the model of the Jacobin nation-state—and in direct opposition to regionalist tendencies (even perhaps forcing linguistic, cultural, and administrative homogenisation)—is unthinkable. There is a further reason: the non-existence of the matter of Europe’s borders. Europe is not a territory, but rather a destiny offered to all who can trace an ethnic and spiritual relationship to it. (CD: agreed) This consideration helps clarify how un-European, in this sense, are institutions like the Council of Europe, an institution of which Turkey is a member today—and perhaps Israel tomorrow. (CD: agreed) 9. With the Industrial Revolution, humankind entered into a phase of planetisation. None may avoid such planetary perspective or dream of impossible isolation. Planetary order is unavoidable. It is fated to come about, sooner or later. Tomorrow’s Great Politics cannot be conceived or pursued without a ‘world order’. (CD: Um. Either I dont understand what you’re getting at, or I don’t agree. i’m not sure which. What I see is vacillation between opening and closing, expanding and contracting, civilizations in response to circumstances, and some having the free capital to adapt and some not.) 10. Institutionally, we should study carefully three models: Switzerland, the USA Constitution (Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, and Adams) and Ancient Rome. My contribution today regarding Rome: (CD: agreed 100% that those are the three ‘scales’. Swiss > American > Roman. 11. The planetisation that is taking place demands a ‘cosmic order.’ Will such order be ‘imperial’ or ‘egalitarian’? In that the future is open, this must remain unknown: we can merely commit ourselves to one or to the other. (CD: Ok so this is where we are not seeing the same thing and that’s why I asked the question.) The egalitarian solution implies the reduction of humankind ad unum, the emergence of the ‘universal type’ and of global standardisation. The imperial solution is hierarchical. If freedom in egalitarian dialectics is one absolute opposed to another (the denial of freedom), in imperial dialectics, freedom is merely a relative proposition directly linked to the notion of social responsibility. Within the Imperium, only the right of the best is absolute, measured according to the virtue manifested by humankind at a particular moment. However, Imperium is also, from a planetary perspective, the only means of preserving differences, thanks to the principle of unicuique suum, which implicitly recognises the fundamental inequality of values and identities. Imperium may be seen as the alternative to globalisation: strength and cohesion in diversity as a model of planetary organisation. (CD: I see speciation as an opportunity.)
  • Pilpul: The Institutionalization Of The Feminine – The Invention Of Lying

    What Is Pilpul , And Why On Earth Should I Care About It? By David Shasha For those who have any concern with the Middle East conflict or with Judaism, what you know — or do not know — about pilpul is something upon which your well-being could depend. Ignorance of pilpul is a very dangerous thing, something that would allow your interlocutor to have the upper hand in ways that you could not begin to even imagine. Pilpul is the Talmudic term used to describe a rhetorical process that the Sages used to formulate their legal decisions. The word is used as a verb: one engages in the process of pilpul in order to formulate a legal point. It marks the process of understanding legal ideas, texts, and interpretations. It is a catch-all term that in English is translated as “Casuistry.” In order to better understand the term pilpul as it functions today, we must define the way in which that term has been understood in the classical Sephardic tradition and how that understanding has been transformed by the Ashkenazi tradition. As I was taught by my Rabbi Jose Faur, the Sephardic tradition, emerging out of the Babylonian academies and finding its definitive form in the many legal works of Moses Maimonides, held the Talmudic texts to be oral literature. Using mnemonics, technical terms, and other rhetorical devices to aid memorization and transmission, Sephardim understood the Talmud to be a colloquy of discussions that were drawn from the proceedings of the great rabbinical Academies of Babylonia. The Babylonian Talmud became the basis upon which the Jewish law would be constructed. This was a process grounded, as it was in the Muslim Hadith and Shari’a, in tradition and the chain of transmission. Laws were transmitted in the name of rabbinical authorities. It was this chain of tradition, known to Muslims by the Arabic term Isnad, that drew clear lines between the formal authority of what has been passed down to us and the process of codifying these laws. The ultimate purpose of the legal process was to elevate the Law above personal and political concerns so that members of the community would be completely equal and not live at the whim of arbitrary judges. In order to maintain the distinction between the Written Torah — the Hebrew Bible — and the Oral Law, the Talmudic Sages conceived of the idea of pilpul as a means to join each Law to its Biblical prooftext. Rabbis would debate what in legal terms would be the formal “title” of each law. Differences would arise regarding these legal titles that a court must use in a criminal charge. The Talmudic formalism of Maimonides in his encyclopedic legal compendium, the Mishneh Torah, was strongly contested by the Ashkenazi rabbis of France and Germany. In the Mishneh Torah Maimonides famously eliminated the rhetorical discussions of the Talmud and simply presented the final ruling — a process that replicated the methodology of Rabbi Isaac Alfasi, Maimonides’ precursor in Lucena. The Ashkenazi rabbis saw pilpul as a substantive debate over the content of the Law rather than as a simple rhetorical matter. Their understanding of Talmudic pilpul took the form of a radical reinterpretation of the Law. The scholar Haym Soloveitchik discusses this matter in his 1987 article “Religious Change: The Medieval Ashkenazic Example”: Many have inferred, and reasonably so, that the Tosafists were not only scholars but communal leaders … like all true leaders they molded the law to fit the needs of their people … What legitimized, in the eyes of the Tosafists, this radical reinterpretation? “Reinterpretation” is actually a misleading term. More accurately one should ask what led them to read the Talmud, to perceive the Talmud, in a fashion which could be construed as a justification of the status quo. In this discussion we have the key that will unlock much of the content of contemporary Jewish discourse. As Soloveitchik states, the Ashkenazi rabbis were less concerned with promulgating the Law transmitted in the Talmud than they were with molding it to suit their own needs. Pilpul was a means to justify practices already fixed in the behaviors of the community by re-reading the Talmud to justify those practices. There were two ways in which the Ashkenazi rabbis effected this radical reinterpretation of the Talmud: In Rashi’s Talmud commentary — a required text in every Jewish school in the world — he uses the Aramaic term Hakhi Garsinan, meaning, “This is how the text is to be read.” Whenever this term is used, it indicates that Rashi has amended the text. His emendations were necessitated by the need to bring actual practice in line with the text. Rashi’s emendations are not a theoretical proposition; the actual editions of the Talmud that we use today reflect the changes. The text of the Talmud was forever remade according to the dictates of Rashi and his school. As if this was not enough, the Tosafists instituted one more pilpul principle into Talmudic discourse. This was called the Lav Davqa method. In English we might call it the “Not Quite” way of reading a text. When a text appeared to be saying one thing, the Tosafot — in order to conform to the already-existing custom — would re-interpret it by saying that what it seemed to mean is not what it really meant! In absolute contrast to the Ashkenazi method, the Sephardic tradition, grounded in textual reality and scientific principles, carefully parsed every term in the Talmud; a concern that often led the most prominent scholars to look for the most accurate version of the Talmudic text. Rashi’s method of emendation and the Tosafist reading based on the Lav Davqa method completely transformed Judaism; the Ashkenazi tradition was the one that ultimately triumphed. What this means for contemporary Jewish discourse is critical: Even though many contemporary Jews are not observant, pilpul continues to be deployed. Pilpul occurs any time the speaker is committed to “prove” his point regardless of the evidence in front of him. The casuistic aspect of this hair-splitting leads to a labyrinthine form of argument where the speaker blows enough rhetorical smoke to make his interlocutor submit. Reason is not an issue when pilpul takes over: what counts is the establishment of a fixed, immutable point that can never truly be disputed. In this context, the Law is not primary; it is the status of the jurist. Justice is extra-legal, thus denying social equality under the rubric of a horizontal system. Law is in the hands of the privileged rather than the mass. What is thought to be the Jewish “genius” is often a mark of how pilpul is deployed. The rhetorical tricks of pilpul make true rational discussion impossible; any “discussion” is about trying to “prove” a point that has already been established. There is little use trying to argue in this context, because any points being made will be twisted and turned to validate the already-fixed position. Pilpul is the rhetorical means to mark as “true” that which cannot ever be disputed by rational means. The contentiousness of the Middle East conflict is intimately informed by pilpul. Whether it is Alan Dershowitz or Noam Chomsky, both of them Ashkenazim who had traditional Jewish educations, the terms of the debate are consistently framed by pilpul. What is most unfortunate about pilpul — and this is something that will be familiar to anyone who has followed the controversies involving Israel and Palestine — is that, since the rational has been removed from the process, all that is left is yelling, irrational emotionalism, and, ultimately, the threat of violence. It is this agitation that continues to mar a political process that has long abandoned the rational understanding of the issues involved in its construction. David Shasha Director, Center for Sephardic Heritage