Theme: Institution

  • The only possible counter proposition is that a given group is of such failure i

    The only possible counter proposition is that a given group is of such failure in genetics, ability, habits, culture, religion, and institutions, that it cannot engage in productive, voluntary cooperation with others.


    Source date (UTC): 2019-08-19 13:18:14 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1163440032205737984

    Reply addressees: @SignHexa @NoahRevoy @StefanMolyneux

    Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1163439679758372864


    IN REPLY TO:

    Unknown author

    @SignHexa @NoahRevoy @StefanMolyneux Political power that is Egalitarian (open to all of merit and observance of the law) not Equalitarian (independent of merit and observancy of the law).

    Original post: https://x.com/i/web/status/1163439679758372864


    IN REPLY TO:

    @curtdoolittle

    @SignHexa @NoahRevoy @StefanMolyneux Political power that is Egalitarian (open to all of merit and observance of the law) not Equalitarian (independent of merit and observancy of the law).

    Original post: https://x.com/i/web/status/1163439679758372864

  • Policing One’s Own.

    Bryan Nova Brey August 15 at 8:14 PM · Let’s see if I get banned. I copied this from one of my Good Jew friends, Rosenbörg Predmetsky. I really appreciate them, because they police their own, like we all need to do.

    The “HoIocaust”: -The actual number of Js who died at the hands of N@zis is anywhere between 250,000 (close to Red Cross and East German government estimation) to 600,000. -Many of them died of typhus and starvation due to overcrowding and collapsing of German supply lines late in the war caused most of the deaths. -Hitler probably knew that some would die in the process of deportation, and in this sense, I suppose he can be said to have killed them, but it was not the end game. -A lot of them were just Soviet soldiers who predictably died in combat with N@zis. -Concerning eyewitness reports: some may be reliable to some degree, some are mistaken, some are outright lying, some are sincere, some may be highly reliable — but reliance on anecdotal accounts to establish 6 miIIion is ridiculous, especially when it so flatly contradicts rigorous demographic data. -The Fin@l Solution of the Nazis was to deport Js outside of Germany. -What makes the impossibility of the 6 miIIion obvious is that there weren’t even close to 6 miIIion under sphere of German influence in Europe. -Walter Sanning published his Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry in 1983; a detailed investigation of census records and immigration statistics. In 1930s, there were about 6 million Js **altogether** who lived in the areas of Europe that would eventually come under Nazi influence -By 1939 this number had dropped to 5 million and over the next two years, massive emigration (mostly out of Poland) dropped this number to below 3 million. -At around the alleged beginning of the HoIocaust, there were only 2.7 million in the German sphere of influence, of which 1 million would be designated survivors by Jewish census groups. -This leaves about 1 .3 million missing — possibly dead (possibly not), and some of these may have died of non-homicidal causes. -some fifty years after the war, the so-called Spanic Report stated that there were between 834,000 and 960,000 living survivors; a range largely confirmed in 2000 in the Ukeles Report.

  • Policing One’s Own.

    Bryan Nova Brey August 15 at 8:14 PM · Let’s see if I get banned. I copied this from one of my Good Jew friends, Rosenbörg Predmetsky. I really appreciate them, because they police their own, like we all need to do.

    The “HoIocaust”: -The actual number of Js who died at the hands of N@zis is anywhere between 250,000 (close to Red Cross and East German government estimation) to 600,000. -Many of them died of typhus and starvation due to overcrowding and collapsing of German supply lines late in the war caused most of the deaths. -Hitler probably knew that some would die in the process of deportation, and in this sense, I suppose he can be said to have killed them, but it was not the end game. -A lot of them were just Soviet soldiers who predictably died in combat with N@zis. -Concerning eyewitness reports: some may be reliable to some degree, some are mistaken, some are outright lying, some are sincere, some may be highly reliable — but reliance on anecdotal accounts to establish 6 miIIion is ridiculous, especially when it so flatly contradicts rigorous demographic data. -The Fin@l Solution of the Nazis was to deport Js outside of Germany. -What makes the impossibility of the 6 miIIion obvious is that there weren’t even close to 6 miIIion under sphere of German influence in Europe. -Walter Sanning published his Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry in 1983; a detailed investigation of census records and immigration statistics. In 1930s, there were about 6 million Js **altogether** who lived in the areas of Europe that would eventually come under Nazi influence -By 1939 this number had dropped to 5 million and over the next two years, massive emigration (mostly out of Poland) dropped this number to below 3 million. -At around the alleged beginning of the HoIocaust, there were only 2.7 million in the German sphere of influence, of which 1 million would be designated survivors by Jewish census groups. -This leaves about 1 .3 million missing — possibly dead (possibly not), and some of these may have died of non-homicidal causes. -some fifty years after the war, the so-called Spanic Report stated that there were between 834,000 and 960,000 living survivors; a range largely confirmed in 2000 in the Ukeles Report.

  • Do you understand economics at all? Find a city that is not (a) on the verge of

    Do you understand economics at all?
    Find a city that is not (a) on the verge of bankruptcy, (b) burning through physical and institutional capital (c) turning into a favela.

    You don’t get it. You are moving to plantations where people don’t breed.


    Source date (UTC): 2019-08-18 20:58:03 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1163193364164042752

    Reply addressees: @SignHexa @NoahRevoy @StefanMolyneux

    Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1163172723595653126


    IN REPLY TO:

    Original post on X

    Original tweet unavailable — we could not load the text of the post this reply is addressing on X. That usually means the tweet was deleted, the account is protected, or X does not expose it to the account used for archiving. The Original post link below may still open if you view it in X while signed in.

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1163172723595653126

  • OMG do you know how cheap it is to use FB to advertise a post from the institute

    OMG do you know how cheap it is to use FB to advertise a post from the institute to the english speaking countries? It’s like $60 every ten days? Hmmm…..


    Source date (UTC): 2019-08-17 17:38:20 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1162780715924238336

  • OMG do you know how cheap it is to use FB to advertise a post from the institute

    OMG do you know how cheap it is to use FB to advertise a post from the institute to the english speaking countries? It’s like $60 every ten days? Hmmm…..


    Source date (UTC): 2019-08-17 13:38:00 UTC

  • @I_Do_Not_Give_A_Damn @a Well, here is how things work. But maybe Gab isn’t a co

    @I_Do_Not_Give_A_Damn@a

    Well, here is how things work. But maybe Gab isn’t a community site like FB or Quora and just a news stream. All I know is I hae a community of thousands of followers and I can only bring a few of them here.

    Notices (tweets)
    Words 40-50
    … Twitter ‘thought’ threads can consist of around – 8-12, but not more.
    … Rough average, 10*(40 to 50) = 400-500 words

    Awareness (Fluff, Marketing )
    Words 250
    Characters with spaces 1500

    Opinions or Ideas
    Words 500
    Characters with spaces 3000

    Persuasive opinions
    Words 750
    Characters with spaces 4500

    Persuasive Arguments
    Words 1500
    Characters with spaces 9000
    (Most of the time this is the limit of digital publication: 10K)

    — paper —

    Words 2000 (print, papers, articles)
    Scholarly Opinion and Commentary

    Words 3000-5000 (print, journals, papers, books)
    Subject Matter Treatments


    Source date (UTC): 2019-08-16 21:15:07 UTC

    Original post: https://gab.com/curtd/posts/102628727621423058

  • **ARNOLD KLING’S EULOGY: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND THE ASH HEAP OF HISTORY** April

    **ARNOLD KLING’S EULOGY: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND THE ASH HEAP OF HISTORY**

    April 6th, 2009

    From Arnold Kling’s recent post on an Outline for a Talk on Financial Regulation:

    “…. dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, and most of what macroeconomists have done since World War II will find its way to the ash heap of history.”

    Finally. Unfortunately, those of us who have been fighting this battle for years cannot take any comfort from the fact that this falsification has been so painful, and that the pain will likely continue for some time.

    Maybe I can describe the phoenix that, at least hopefully, may rise from the ashes:

    1) All economic activity is described by fractal, not equilibrial mathematics. (Human existence is evolutionary, not equilibrial.)

    2) The underlying geometry consists of a set of properties determined by the properties of memory: in particular, forgetting-curves (events, severity and frequency), the information available to people, and the time to production of resources (property).

    3) The purpose of policy will be (if we learn from the past) to exploit all possible opportunities at the lowest cost, rather than to achieve an equilibrium efficiently.

    I would recommend as well that, in order to make possible the transformation of society from rural to urban worldwide, we need to change our idea of the very nature and purpose of government. Because it is not only general equilibrium that failed us. Most of the primary levers by which we govern have failed us, or are also failing.

    1) Policy: Since we are permanently committed to fiat money and credit money, then the state (the people) are the insurance policy for losses, and therefore the state (the people) should be the recipients of rewards from the issue of credit. We need to convert from the law-and-tax state to the credit-and-interest state.

    2) Government: While this is unlikely to be possible in the US without a revolution, we should promote the Federal Reserve to the third House of Congress and force all “appropriations” to come from interest collected by the Fed. The House of Commons then should dispense social services, and the Senate return to its role of regulating commerce. I would prefer we also return to a hereditary monarchy with veto power, assumed assent, and the ability to dissolve government and call for elections. I say this not because I believe it will occur here, only because I would recommend that any new state adopt this policy. The age of taxation is dead. It should have been dead two thousand years ago. I will have to work on it longer, but it’s entirely possible that the credit state may have resulted in a very different period after the failure of imperial Rome.

    3) Religion: Weber was actually wrong. We may need myths for pedagogical reasons, simply to teach children to visualize ideals in time and space and history. We may need myths to teach them the relationship between processes and the invariant nature of the human animal, where the narrative can accomplish what disciplined, symbolic systems cannot. Religions are not, however, terribly important. Credit is granular enough that we do not have to have a state built on punishments (laws) or a cheap imitation of punishments in the form of threats (hell and damnation). We need the myths, and the rituals that perpetuate the myths, and they need to be resistant to fashion, but this can be accomplished by requiring that teachers simply be grandparents.

    It is not only our concept of equilibrium that needs to be discarded on the ash heap of history, but the concepts of general equality, law, and taxation, which should have been discarded along with slavery. They are tools we invented to organize people into slavery, and pseudo-slavery when we developed farming.

    It is the credit-and-interest state that we have fitfully been trying to bring to birth for the past few hundred years. Without that birth I am fairly sure that the urban state will be still born, if only for epistemic reasons (because there is no means of governance that can function in the urban state).

    Unfortunately, we may have to violently kill off the tax-and-law state to do it. Lawyers are not bankers, and public service that is paid for by interest earned, rather than taxes stolen, requires a person of knowledge and talent rather than a person of popularity and conviction.


    Source date (UTC): 2019-08-16 09:29:00 UTC

  • **A CATALOGUE OF ERRORS, AND AN AVALANCHE IN BANKING** From April 18th, 2009 1 –

    **A CATALOGUE OF ERRORS, AND AN AVALANCHE IN BANKING**

    From April 18th, 2009

    1 – PHILOSOPHICAL ERRORS

    Knowledge of property and its use does NOT SCALE. The reason we have property is so that we can break the world into comprehensible and known components that we can use to cooperate with each other by exchange and therefore specialize and increase production. This is the most important principle: Knowledge of property cannot scale and the stability of any price, including any collateral, is an illusion. There is no numeric or formulative substitute for personal human knowledge of economic activity. None. Period, end of story.

    2 – FINANCIAL ERRORS

    Risk is not measurable AT SCALE, because we cannot measure the unknown, nor can we predict large corrections. In other words, risks cannot be summed if they make use of prices.

    Priced collateral is not meaningful in a world of credit money, which at every moment invalidates any price.

    We should seek to maximize opportunities at lowest cost, not maximize interest at minimum risk.

    Banking is a knowledge problem, not a mathematical problem. Personal knowledge of property is required for forecasting its future value. This is because the categories that determine cause and effect change constantly.

    We need to “definancialize”1 savings and retirement, because there are no means of forecasting such things over time, and any assumption of perpetual growth is a fantasy.

    3 – EDUCATIONAL ERRORS

    Our education system seeks to treat finance, economics, and sociology as disciplines open to quantitative analysis in order to establish rules, rather than the virtue of collected history and wisdom, and a record of the quantitative analysis and expressed rules as a history that is constantly open to interpretation.

    Our education system seeks to teach people formulae which are invalid so that they can avoid collecting accumulated wisdom, rather than seeking to endow them with accumulated wisdom and the analytical tools to interpret currently collected data for comparison to accumulated wisdom. Educators make this mistake in order to simplify the job of TESTING students, who, if subjected to tests of accumulated wisdom rather than technical expression, would fare far worse, and consume much more of the educator’s time.

    Our education system seeks to confer on social science the same argumentative weight as physical science, confusing the fact that in physical science we discover something that exists already. In social science we manufacture the future, and there is nothing to be discovered, only created.

    4 – POLITICAL ERRORS

    Our political system seeks to replace governance by means of religious conformity with governance by economic efficiency so as to justif the accumulation of power in order to advance the interests of groups, and to do so when economic efficiency is impossible to determine and risk is impossible to measure. It does this instead of increasing the rate of production and a seizing and exploiting every possible opportunity for every individual independent of his class or group membership, which would allow all groups to benefit by the success of other groups by the use of credit, rather than for some groups to profit at the expense of others by privatizing wins and socializing losses.

    Our political system seeks to pit groups against each other by the use of laws, and allows politicians to hold themselves unaccountable for production by the use of taxes (which are a penalty for productivity), and to tax people according to income so that they can keep them servants of the state, rather than facilitating group cooperation by the use of credit, holding themselves accountable by funding the state by the collection of interest, and taxing citizens by their balance sheets so that they can become independent of the state.

    Some classes in society use banking, credit, and interest to socialize losses and privatize wins, using fiat and credit money that is paid for by all, but rewards that are collected by few. This does decrease prices for all. But it also creates class warfare.


    Source date (UTC): 2019-08-16 09:26:00 UTC

  • **GALBRAITH AND REGULATION: HE’S GOT IT WRONG AGAIN** May 6th, 2009 On Angry Bea

    **GALBRAITH AND REGULATION: HE’S GOT IT WRONG AGAIN**

    May 6th, 2009

    On Angry Bear, there is a posting referring to a statement by Galbraith by the Texas Observer. It’s entitled “James Galbraith remarks“.

    Texas Observer carries commentary that is revealing.

    Editor’s note: These remarks were delivered to a meeting of the Texas Lyceum in Austin on April 3, at a debate between University of Texas professor James Galbraith, an Observer contributing writer, and former Majority Leader Richard Armey, chief instigator of the recent Astroturf “tea party” protests. Armey had begun his remarks by noting that his rule in life was “never trust anyone from Austin or Boston,” and proceeded to declare his allegiance to the “Austrian School” of economics, a libertarian view that regards public intervention in private markets as socialism.

    It is of course a pleasure to be with you today. I was born in Boston, and I am proud of it. And I have lived 24 years in Austin—and I’m proud of that.

    Leader Armey spoke to you of his admiration for Austrian economics. I can’t resist telling you that when the Vienna Economics Institute celebrated its centennial, many years ago, they invited, as their keynote speaker, my father [John Kenneth Galbraith]. The leading economists of the Austrian school—including von Hayek and von Haberler—returned for the occasion. And so my father took a moment to reflect on the economic triumphs of the Austrian Republic since the war, which, he said, “would not have been possible without the contribution of these men.” They nodded—briefly—until it dawned on them what he meant. They’d all left the country in the 1930s.

    My own economics is American: genus Institutionalist; species: Galbraithian.

    This is a panel on the crisis. Mr. Moderator, you ask what is the root cause? My reply is in three parts. (below the fold)

    First, an idea. The idea that capitalism, for all its considerable virtues, is inherently self-stabilizing, that government and private business are adversaries rather than partners; the idea that freedom without responsibility is a viable business principle; the idea that regulation, in financial matters especially, can be dispensed with. We tried it, and we see the result.

    Second, a person. It would not be right to blame any single person for these events, but if I had to choose one to name it would be a Texan, our own distinguished former Senator Phil Gramm. I’d cite specifically the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act—the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act—in 1999, after which it took less than a decade to reproduce all the pathologies that Glass-Steagall had been enacted to deal with in 1933. I’d also cite the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, slipped into an 11,000-page appropriations bill in December 2000 as Congress was adjourning following Bush v. Gore. This measure deregulated energy futures trading, enabling Enron and legitimating credit-default swaps, and creating a massive vector for the transmission of financial risk throughout the global system. When the Washington Post caught up with me at an airport in Parkersburg, West Virginia, a year ago to ask for a comment on Gramm’s role, I said very quickly that he was “the sorcerer’s apprentice of financial instability and disaster.” They put that on the front page. I do have to give Gramm some credit: When the Post called him up and read that to him, he said, “I deny it.”

    Third, a policy. This was the abandonment of state responsibility for financial regulation: the regulation of mortgage originations, of underwriting, and of securitization. This abandonment was not subtle: The first head of the Office of Thrift Supervision in the George W. Bush administration came to a press conference on one occasion with a stack of copies of the Federal Register and a chainsaw. A chainsaw. The message was clear. And it led to the explosion of liars’ loans, neutron loans (which destroy people but leave buildings intact), and toxic waste. That these were terms of art in finance tells you what you need to know.

    This is another case in which I wish economists were better philosophers and philosophers were better economists.

    It was the Austrians who said this quantitative nonsense wouldn’t work. So I don’t understand his arguments against Austrians. Secondly, none of us are against regulation so much as against the idea that regulators possess wisdom. If we simply forced originators to hold 20% of each of their loans (and to separate on the balance sheet public and private investment, and to take losses accordingly), then most of this regulatory problem would go away. Libertarianism is not a vehicle for promoting wild west theft by deception. It’s just that we acknowledge that regulators are an expensive, ignorant, and often political problem because they cannot possess the knowledge required to do the assigned job. Property in itself is regulation. So Austrians are not against regulation. They’re against a system of policing that requires a man to possess knowledge that he cannot have, and against empowering the state.

    We just learned a lot about banking and the fact that collateral isn’t collateral any longer. That reliance on collateral is not a very useful means of risk measurement in a credit-money society. We just learned that a lot of actuarial information isn’t really what we thought it was. We just learned a lot about the mathematics of subsets and how they do not scale. We just learned a lot about the “dynamic stochastic equilibrium model,” in that the world is not equilibrial or efficient, but disequilibrial and innovatively equilibrating, as it consumes new opportunities, not as it efficiently produces desired effects. We learned that none of these devices is a substitute for individual human knowledge.

    There is little difference between “complex financial instruments” and “herbal remedies.” The consumer, and most of the time the manufacturer, think that these things actually work. There were volumes of literature saying that financial instruments would, and much less volume produced by Austrians saying that they not only wouldn’t, but couldn’t. So, this isn’t an issue of fraudulent behavior. Restitution is not possible for complex financial transactions. There is nothing left to repossess. This isn’t an Austrian problem, it’s a Knightian-Keynesian problem. Deregulation isn’t an Austrian problem. Knowledge is an Austrian problem. Property implies knowledge, and value expressed as numbers cannot represent that knowledge equally to different people, only experience tagged by reference numbers can.

    So if you want to say that in the constant political warfare between the socialist-statists and the capitalist-libertarians, each who uses the policy of, and conflict between, the quantitative school (mainstream) and the psychological school (Austrian), and that by virtue of that conflict we created a perfect storm, which allowed deregulation while implementing formulae and financial instruments, then that is true. But it’s true because we did not replace regulation with responsibility by requiring retention of risk when using public-financed credit money. In other words, we violated the principle of property, because property requires knowledge. If you don’t know what it is, then it can’t be property. If it isn’t property, then it’s snake oil. If it’s snake oil, it’s not libertarian, it’s just THEFT AND DECEPTION.

    Each of these systems of thought is an interdependent system. You cannot have it both ways. I suppose it is better that we argue over economic productivity and redistribution than that we argue over religion, or of what’s “just,” so perhaps that’s an advancement in human development. But in terms of regulation, it’s simply ridiculous to create a complex web of financial regulation and law to attempt to compensate for the fact that we want to absolve bankers from holding loans that they originate. In other words, the Austrian view is that the state created the problem and makes it worse with regulation.

    Property is a form of REGULATION. So Austrians CAN’T say that are against regulation. Regulation isn’t the problem. It is the kind of regulation that we do. We have created a catastrophe by not regulating violations of property. That violation is that property requires individual knowledge, or it’s NOT property, because it CAN’T be property. We only NEED property because we need to break the world up into little, perceptible bits that can be used to exchange with each other. If we could perceive everything, we wouldn’t NEED property. We can’t perceive everything, so we DO need property. And to have property you have to perceive it. If you exchange something with someone else, something that you don’t understand, you’re selling magic. Magic isn’t property, it’s deception. It’s deception even if it’s self-deception. It’s self deception because you cannot pass the test of personal knowledge.

    Fundamentally, when all is said and done, and when we solve what we loosely call the problem of induction and produce the next version of capitalism, the Austrians will have been the “most right.” Almost nothing we have done in Macro is of merit, except to prove Austrian insights and to fix Austrian errors (”stickiness”). Even the anarchic research program, which is not something we could ever practically implement, has taught us valuable lessons, and it has taught us how easily replaced are state functions. Just as the Marxian program has taught us valuable lessons. Mostly bad ones. But while we continue to evolve our knowledge of cooperating in larger and larger numbers, we need to keep in mind that there is no end of history. Only the practical policy of the moment. Management of an economy may “thrill the intellectual’s mind,” as Hayek said. Because it gives his fantasy a chance at reality. However it’s a fantasy. It always will be.


    Source date (UTC): 2019-08-16 09:03:00 UTC