Theme: Incentives

  • 2) individual home ownership in the Anglo model vs large urban apartments in the

    2) individual home ownership in the Anglo model vs large urban apartments in the German model increase debt, loneliness.


    Source date (UTC): 2016-09-30 08:06:43 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/781767217746735104

    Reply addressees: @JoshZumbrun

    Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/781157309145686016


    IN REPLY TO:

    @JoshZumbrun

    This is one of the most horrifying graphics I’ve ever seen:
    https://t.co/wM0VJZn0Wg https://t.co/qaUaNFtRPl

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/781157309145686016

  • (read it and weep) ***Pareto Distributions are a Consequence of Nash Equilibrium

    (read it and weep)

    ***Pareto Distributions are a Consequence of Nash Equilibriums***

    You cannot create Nash equilibriums and Pareto distributions if you attempt to create Pareto distributions (involuntary redistributions) at the expense of Nash equilibriums.

    Nash equilibriums (pairing off = voluntary exchanges = sovereignty.)

    Pareto Distributions (80/20,80/20,80/20….) result from sovereignty, voluntary exchanges, desirability(oppy), ability(utility), and knowledge(advantage).

    Pareto distributions without sovereignty and pairing off, can only be constructed by authority (violence). And these are…. not constructed by voluntary exchange, desirability, ability, and knowledge, but by corruption, nepotism, and favoritism.

    We can produce Pareto distributions by creating nash equilibriums if we charge fees for market transactions (taxes).

    But the question then becomes why should that revenue from the production of Pareto distributions using nash equilibriums made necessary by sovereignty and its institutions: natural, judge discovered, common, law, be allocated by monopoly rather than market decisions?

    This is the question. Why must we, in a mixed economy, rely upon the monopoly provision of commons under majoritarian democracy, rather than the market provision of commons under a multi-house market for commons limited by juridical dissent?


    Source date (UTC): 2016-09-28 06:56:00 UTC

  • THE VARIOUS EXECUTIVE ROLES First. Let’s get our terminology straight so that we

    THE VARIOUS EXECUTIVE ROLES

    First. Let’s get our terminology straight so that we’re not talking apples and oranges. Executive Roles are Fungible, but in general:

    – CEO: BALANCE SHEET AND MANAGEMENT TEAM

    – CSO / VP SALES: SALES AND SALES AND MARKETING TEAM

    – …..CMO: MARKETING (if a separate responsibility for demand generation)

    – COO: P&L AND PRODUCTION TEAM (IN HOUSE OPERATIONS)

    – CFO: CASH AND CREDIT, AND ACCOUNTING TEAM

    The term President is a legal fiction preserved for archaic reasons. And it refers to those organizations still small enough that the various executive roles are held by an individual. For the uninitiated, in American parlance, the Legal Entity (corporation) must have a president (registered responsible person), and sometimes one or more other responsible persons (All are for tax accountability, and for legal accountability in matters of conflict). The ORGANIZATION can be run by registered agents (president), or the CEO and Management team, or by the Board, and the CEO and the Management Team. It’s a matter of scale.

    Some companies are separating the balance sheet (CEO) from the sales measurement by assigning the ‘president’ role to the CSO, and some are still using the strange archaic fiction of “VP Sales” in large companies. Sometimes because the CEO retains the SALES function as his primary focus.

    This is also a possible strategy if the company is small enough. A CEO should generally focus 1/3 on sales and marketing (outside), 1/3 on talent management,(inside) and 1/3 on resources and allocation of resources to strategic ends.

    As a general rule, if a CEO is spending too much time outside, his sales and marketing are too weak, or he is pursuing phis own interests, not the company’s. The most productive CEO’s handle exceptions in all functions, and spend half of their time internally with staff. (Although I have been criticized for making companies too dependent upon me by doing that.) In most companies I have acquired that are unsuccessful the CEO does not spend enough time or budget in sales (‘Craftsman Effect’), or the CEO spends too much time in sales without (paying for) an adequate internal CEO (COO), (“underinvestment effect”). In both these cases I am fairly confident that the company has failed to transition from small to mid-sized, usually because not enough profit to pay for transition to the next scale, or too much extraction of profits to afford to pay for transition to the next scale; or (as I have encountered) the CEO is not able to transition to an executive role and/or is incapable of hiring talent sufficiently strong to allow him to do so. (This inability to hire good enough talent to work for you is a more common problem than we usually intuit.)

    The Chief Revenue Officer (CRO) title is floating around referring to the sales function, but this is incorrect, since sales (what you book as potential revenue from the operation of the business ) and revenue (what you recognize as ‘earned’ revenue from the business plus any other activities such as investments) are two different things. In organizations where sales are immediately booked as revenue because of simple transactions where the production cycle does not have to be ‘earned’ or where the sale is not recognized until the good is delivered, this error is the understandable result of confusion. (Does it matter. Maybe not. But it can make your company look a little ‘dim’ if you have sophisticated customers, and there is a lag between sale and recognition of revenue.)


    Source date (UTC): 2016-09-28 02:52:00 UTC

  • Sympathetic testing of other’s incentives, particularly by a jury is objective.

    Sympathetic testing of other’s incentives, particularly by a jury is objective. That’s praxeology.


    Source date (UTC): 2016-09-20 04:56:58 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/778095585438081024

    Reply addressees: @ne0colonial

    Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/778078448388546560


    IN REPLY TO:

    Original post on X

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    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/778078448388546560

  • WRONG WITH DEMOCRACY (AND HOW TO FIX IT)

    https://propertarianforum.wordpress.com/2016/09/19/propertarian-podcast-006-malincentives-of-democracy/WHAT’S WRONG WITH DEMOCRACY (AND HOW TO FIX IT)


    Source date (UTC): 2016-09-20 01:09:00 UTC

  • Q&A: What’s Wrong With Capitalism?

    —“What is wrong with capitalism? Can it be solved by economic theories alone, or is it a leadership problem as well?”— Well, let’s take a ‘meaningful’ name: “capitalism”, and restated it operationally, using a ‘true’ name: What problems arise from the voluntary organization of production distribution and trade(capitalism) with individual distribution of property rights providing individual discretion using information provided by the pricing system, compared to the involuntary organization of production, distribution, and trade (socialism) with the discretionary distribution of property rights, in the absence of a pricing system, and compared to a mixed economy, where we use the voluntary organization of production, distribution, and trade, with the individual allocation of property rights, and with individual discretion provided by the pricing system, yet representative decision over the amount and use of the proceeds from the voluntary organization of production? And why has no one really succeded at producing a mixed property economy (other than the fascists), whereby the majority of consumption goods are produced by the voluntary market, and the commons are produced by the involuntary organization of production? In other words, we use armies for building defense, why don’t we use the industrial equivalent of armies to build and maintain infrastructure, and maintain the beauty, and civility of the commons. That’s a very long way of describing the problem, but it still obscures the next layer of complexity: discretion (decidability). The market provides superior decidability for those things that will benefit from competition. In many cases, competition for ideas(architecture and engineering) is beneficial but competition for labor is not (construction and maintenance). The answer is that we cannot choose pure capitalism because too many people are of too little value in many markets, because of immigration, asymmetric class reproduction, or simply overpopulation in relation to the trustworthiness of the people and their institutions. Likewise we cannot choose pure socialism, because there are too few incentives for people to engage in value-creating production, and too many incentives for people to engage in corruption. When we try a mixed appropriation economy (what we call a mixed economy today), we seem to produce rapidly decreasing birth rates in our productive people, and extraordinary rents in the public sector. We considered trying a mixed production economy, but the problem is the statists and rent seekers in the productive sector compete using the government to deprive the private sector. So the problem is not capitalism or socialism. The problem is demographic mix, the mixture of voluntary and involuntary organiztaion of production to suit the demographics and institutions available, and the elimination of discretion from the people in what we call government so that even if they exist they cannot (easily) engage in corruption. The problem is: 1) That we lack rule of law rather rule of legislation. Majority rule, representative democracy, is perhaps the worst government everyone ever produced. If we could vote to oust the entire government every 90 days, and rescind all acts of that government upon successful ouster, then that might be helpful. If we could sue government participants if they tried to construct or did construct immoral contracts, then that would be an a solutoin. And if we were still required to pay a progressive income tax, but we chould choose how it was allocated, right down to the paperclip, I think that would solve the problem. 2) But then we get to the answer: That we lack a market for the production of commons (like we had under english houses of parliament). We rely on assent (majority rule) creating opportunity for corruption, instead of relying on dissent (violation of natural, judge discovered, common law) to prevent immoral and illegal contracts for the production of commons. We could allocate funds evenly and let areas negotiate exchanges. And that would produce a moral and naturally legal market for the production of commons. 3) We rely on fiat money (which is an advantage) but we distribute liquidity and dividends through the financial system rather than directly to consumers. In other words, we cause consumers and businesses to fight for credit, rather than businesses and finance to fight for consumer spending. So as humans we tend to like to break ideas down into too simple a set of comparisons, becuase really, it’s hard to work with anything other than ideal types. Humans… well, we just aren’t that smart. (Try algebraic geometry, which in principle should’nt be too complicated, but our minds are just not often made for it.) Instead we must often thing in supply demand curves, becuase whether the thing we are discussing is persona, social, international, or physical concept, we deal with equilibrial forces. In this case we have a series of problems we must deal with: 1) demographic distributions: the differnce between races is largely one of sexual maturity and asymmetric sexual dimorphism producing differences in abilities. This is magnified by geography that cuases various selection pressures. As such poor places just were worse at killing off the lower classes and suppressing their reproduction, and the wealthier places better at upward redistribution of resources and constant culling of the underclasses through sanction (killing), war, starvation, and the difficulty of surviving in cold climates. 2) Information and incentives: the pricing system provides opportunity to FORM both information and incentives. 3) Discretion versus rule of law: Discretion and corruption versus rule of law and non-corruption. 4) The distribution of the organizaiton of production from authoritarian (originating in the fertile crescent and other flood plains) raider ethics (originating in steppe and desert), and libertarian (originating in the forest and sea peoples), and equalitarian, (preserved among hunter-gatherers). The solution is to solve all these problems with (a) rule of law (non discretion) (b) market production of commons limited by legal dissent. (c) extension of involuntary production for the construction and maintenance of commons, and reduction of the voluntary organization of production to those capable of surviving within it. (d) the restoration of the family as the central object of policy (e) the restoration of the process of intergenrational lending to preserve knowldge and calculability. (f) the direct and equal distribution of liquidity under fiat money (shares in the commons) to consumers in the case of the necessity to reorder the sustainable patterns of specialization and trade (the market) when it incurrs shocks or exhaustions (of opportunities). I could go on but I think you get the general idea. We got it wrong when we tried to steal the commons from the aristocracy by imposing majoritarianism, rather than constructing additional houses and continuing the tradition of using government as a market for the production of commons by negotiation between the classes. The middle class was nowhere near as good at governing as the aristocracy. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • Q&A: What’s Wrong With Capitalism?

    —“What is wrong with capitalism? Can it be solved by economic theories alone, or is it a leadership problem as well?”— Well, let’s take a ‘meaningful’ name: “capitalism”, and restated it operationally, using a ‘true’ name: What problems arise from the voluntary organization of production distribution and trade(capitalism) with individual distribution of property rights providing individual discretion using information provided by the pricing system, compared to the involuntary organization of production, distribution, and trade (socialism) with the discretionary distribution of property rights, in the absence of a pricing system, and compared to a mixed economy, where we use the voluntary organization of production, distribution, and trade, with the individual allocation of property rights, and with individual discretion provided by the pricing system, yet representative decision over the amount and use of the proceeds from the voluntary organization of production? And why has no one really succeded at producing a mixed property economy (other than the fascists), whereby the majority of consumption goods are produced by the voluntary market, and the commons are produced by the involuntary organization of production? In other words, we use armies for building defense, why don’t we use the industrial equivalent of armies to build and maintain infrastructure, and maintain the beauty, and civility of the commons. That’s a very long way of describing the problem, but it still obscures the next layer of complexity: discretion (decidability). The market provides superior decidability for those things that will benefit from competition. In many cases, competition for ideas(architecture and engineering) is beneficial but competition for labor is not (construction and maintenance). The answer is that we cannot choose pure capitalism because too many people are of too little value in many markets, because of immigration, asymmetric class reproduction, or simply overpopulation in relation to the trustworthiness of the people and their institutions. Likewise we cannot choose pure socialism, because there are too few incentives for people to engage in value-creating production, and too many incentives for people to engage in corruption. When we try a mixed appropriation economy (what we call a mixed economy today), we seem to produce rapidly decreasing birth rates in our productive people, and extraordinary rents in the public sector. We considered trying a mixed production economy, but the problem is the statists and rent seekers in the productive sector compete using the government to deprive the private sector. So the problem is not capitalism or socialism. The problem is demographic mix, the mixture of voluntary and involuntary organiztaion of production to suit the demographics and institutions available, and the elimination of discretion from the people in what we call government so that even if they exist they cannot (easily) engage in corruption. The problem is: 1) That we lack rule of law rather rule of legislation. Majority rule, representative democracy, is perhaps the worst government everyone ever produced. If we could vote to oust the entire government every 90 days, and rescind all acts of that government upon successful ouster, then that might be helpful. If we could sue government participants if they tried to construct or did construct immoral contracts, then that would be an a solutoin. And if we were still required to pay a progressive income tax, but we chould choose how it was allocated, right down to the paperclip, I think that would solve the problem. 2) But then we get to the answer: That we lack a market for the production of commons (like we had under english houses of parliament). We rely on assent (majority rule) creating opportunity for corruption, instead of relying on dissent (violation of natural, judge discovered, common law) to prevent immoral and illegal contracts for the production of commons. We could allocate funds evenly and let areas negotiate exchanges. And that would produce a moral and naturally legal market for the production of commons. 3) We rely on fiat money (which is an advantage) but we distribute liquidity and dividends through the financial system rather than directly to consumers. In other words, we cause consumers and businesses to fight for credit, rather than businesses and finance to fight for consumer spending. So as humans we tend to like to break ideas down into too simple a set of comparisons, becuase really, it’s hard to work with anything other than ideal types. Humans… well, we just aren’t that smart. (Try algebraic geometry, which in principle should’nt be too complicated, but our minds are just not often made for it.) Instead we must often thing in supply demand curves, becuase whether the thing we are discussing is persona, social, international, or physical concept, we deal with equilibrial forces. In this case we have a series of problems we must deal with: 1) demographic distributions: the differnce between races is largely one of sexual maturity and asymmetric sexual dimorphism producing differences in abilities. This is magnified by geography that cuases various selection pressures. As such poor places just were worse at killing off the lower classes and suppressing their reproduction, and the wealthier places better at upward redistribution of resources and constant culling of the underclasses through sanction (killing), war, starvation, and the difficulty of surviving in cold climates. 2) Information and incentives: the pricing system provides opportunity to FORM both information and incentives. 3) Discretion versus rule of law: Discretion and corruption versus rule of law and non-corruption. 4) The distribution of the organizaiton of production from authoritarian (originating in the fertile crescent and other flood plains) raider ethics (originating in steppe and desert), and libertarian (originating in the forest and sea peoples), and equalitarian, (preserved among hunter-gatherers). The solution is to solve all these problems with (a) rule of law (non discretion) (b) market production of commons limited by legal dissent. (c) extension of involuntary production for the construction and maintenance of commons, and reduction of the voluntary organization of production to those capable of surviving within it. (d) the restoration of the family as the central object of policy (e) the restoration of the process of intergenrational lending to preserve knowldge and calculability. (f) the direct and equal distribution of liquidity under fiat money (shares in the commons) to consumers in the case of the necessity to reorder the sustainable patterns of specialization and trade (the market) when it incurrs shocks or exhaustions (of opportunities). I could go on but I think you get the general idea. We got it wrong when we tried to steal the commons from the aristocracy by imposing majoritarianism, rather than constructing additional houses and continuing the tradition of using government as a market for the production of commons by negotiation between the classes. The middle class was nowhere near as good at governing as the aristocracy. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • Q&a: A Gentle Eugenics?

    –What is the gentlest way to restrain underclass reproduction?– The gentlest way to restrain underclass reproduction is to be honest about it, transfer from services to direct redistribution, and to make redistribution contingent on single child reproduction, and offer free sterilization after the fist birth, and require sterilization of those with severe histories in the family (we have studies on this it’s pretty obvious stuff). And secondly to limit immigration to those with IQ’s 125 and above.

  • Q&a: A Gentle Eugenics?

    –What is the gentlest way to restrain underclass reproduction?– The gentlest way to restrain underclass reproduction is to be honest about it, transfer from services to direct redistribution, and to make redistribution contingent on single child reproduction, and offer free sterilization after the fist birth, and require sterilization of those with severe histories in the family (we have studies on this it’s pretty obvious stuff). And secondly to limit immigration to those with IQ’s 125 and above.

  • Q&a: Curt: Can We Shape Capitalism Or Is It Just Demographics?

    —Do you think that national culture can shape capitalism to be an effective force without the downward shift of consumer choice tending toward mass culture, and government corruption? Or does it all come down to demographics?—It’s just demographics and redistribution. Better demographics, more homogenous demographics greater redistribution lower personal consumption for the purpose of signaling.