Theme: Incentives

  • Like I Said … Declining Marriage Incentives and Male Withdrawal from The Labor Force

    Oct 31, 2019, 9:21 PM e9b0558e-7a7d-4b8e-a3c1-ed599eb209e5.filesusr.com

    —“Why have so many young men withdrawn from the U.S. labor force since 1965? This paper presents a model in which men invest time in employment to enhance their value as marriage partners. When the marriage market return on this investment declines, young men’s employment declines as well, in preparation for a less favorable marriage market. Taking this prediction to data, I show that fewer young men sought employment after TWO interventions that reduced the value of gender-role-specialization within marriage: i) the adoption of unilateral divorce legislation, and ii) demand-driven improvements in women’s employment opportunities. I then show, using a structural estimation, that half of the employment effect of a labor market shock to men’s wages is determined by endogenous adjustment of the marriage market to the shock. These findings establish the changing marriage market as an important driver of decline in young men’s labor market involvement.”—

    That is from the job market paper of Ariel J. Binder, job market candidate from the University of Michigan.

  • Incentives at The Bottom

    Incentives at The Bottom https://propertarianism.com/2020/06/01/incentives-at-the-bottom/


    Source date (UTC): 2020-06-01 00:09:06 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1267246759081885696

  • Incentives at The Bottom

    Incentives at The Bottom https://t.co/SGsz9Chi3T

  • Incentives at The Bottom

    Nov 3, 2019, 9:39 AM (Michael Churchill ) There is no incentive for the people on the sub-optimal side of the curve to voluntarily go along with the extinction of their own DNA line. There is declining incentive for the people at the top to enforce laws to prevent reproduction of those who are on the sub-optimal side of the curve. And there are strong IN-centives for both capital and fifth-columnists to encourage reproduction on the sub-optimal side of the curve. Overall human DNA is weakening in western societies, and the effect is cumulative over generations. (Curt Doolittle) The Incentive for people on the sub-optimal side of the curve is compensation NOT to reproduce, as well as prosecution IF they reproduce. (Martin Štěpán) I do see that. We’ve let it go too far. But if we isolate from the left though, I’m pretty sure there won’t be that many on the sub-optimal side of the spectrum. And ones that are, what can you really do with them besides paying them to obey the law and not reproduce, at least not more than one kid? If that’s not okay and they still commit crime, they need to be disposed of. And if we keep doing that, we’ll slowly keep improving. I advocated for the same thing in healthcare as welfare, actually. You either pay your own or you use the tax-subsidized healthcare but in the latter case, you submit to one-child policy too, at least unless you manage to pay the money back. (Curt Doolittle) Yes. That’s the correct Incentive and policy.

  • Incentives at The Bottom

    Nov 3, 2019, 9:39 AM (Michael Churchill ) There is no incentive for the people on the sub-optimal side of the curve to voluntarily go along with the extinction of their own DNA line. There is declining incentive for the people at the top to enforce laws to prevent reproduction of those who are on the sub-optimal side of the curve. And there are strong IN-centives for both capital and fifth-columnists to encourage reproduction on the sub-optimal side of the curve. Overall human DNA is weakening in western societies, and the effect is cumulative over generations. (Curt Doolittle) The Incentive for people on the sub-optimal side of the curve is compensation NOT to reproduce, as well as prosecution IF they reproduce. (Martin Štěpán) I do see that. We’ve let it go too far. But if we isolate from the left though, I’m pretty sure there won’t be that many on the sub-optimal side of the spectrum. And ones that are, what can you really do with them besides paying them to obey the law and not reproduce, at least not more than one kid? If that’s not okay and they still commit crime, they need to be disposed of. And if we keep doing that, we’ll slowly keep improving. I advocated for the same thing in healthcare as welfare, actually. You either pay your own or you use the tax-subsidized healthcare but in the latter case, you submit to one-child policy too, at least unless you manage to pay the money back. (Curt Doolittle) Yes. That’s the correct Incentive and policy.

  • Definitions: Regulatory Capture and Rent-Seeking and Corruption

    Definitions: Regulatory Capture and Rent-Seeking and Corruption https://propertarianism.com/2020/05/31/definitions-regulatory-capture-and-rent-seeking-and-corruption/


    Source date (UTC): 2020-05-31 23:57:43 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1267243893063639040

  • Definitions: Regulatory Capture and Rent-Seeking and Corruption

    Definitions: Regulatory Capture and Rent-Seeking and Corruption https://t.co/jkoPPlOvLJ

  • Definitions: Regulatory Capture and Rent-Seeking and Corruption

    REGULATORY CAPTURE (THE RESULT) Regulatory capture is a corruption of authority that occurs when a political entity, policymaker, or regulatory agency is co-opted to serve the commercial, ideological, or political interests of a minor constituency, such as a particular geographic area, industry, profession, or ideological group. When regulatory capture occurs, a special interest is prioritized over the general interests of the public, leading to a net loss for society. Government agencies suffering regulatory capture are called “captured agencies.” Regulatory capture is the result of “rent-seeking” and political failure; client politics “occurs when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, reasonably small interest (e.g., industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers).” RENT SEEKING (THE PRIVATE SECTOR) Rent-seeking in public choice theory, as well as in economics, involves seeking to increase one’s share of existing wealth without creating new wealth. Rent-seeking results in reduced economic efficiency through misallocation of resources, reduced wealth-creation, lost government revenue, heightened income inequality, and potential national decline. Attempts at capture of regulatory agencies to gain a coercive monopoly can result in advantages for the rent seeker in a market while imposing disadvantages on their incorrupt competitors. This is one of many possible forms of rent-seeking behavior. CORRUPTION (THE POLITICAL SECTOR) Corruption is dishonesty or criminal activity undertaken by a person or organization entrusted with a position of authority, often to acquire illicit benefit, or, abuse of entrusted power for one’s private gain. Corruption may include many activities including bribery and embezzlement, though it may also involve practices that are legal in many countries. Political corruption occurs when an office-holder or other governmental employee acts in an official capacity for personal gain. Corruption is most commonplace in kleptocracies, oligarchies, narco-states and mafia states. Corruption can occur on different scales. Corruption ranges from small favors between a small number of people (petty corruption), to corruption that affects the government on a large scale (grand corruption), and corruption that is so prevalent that it is part of the everyday structure of society, including corruption as one of the symptoms of organized crime. Corruption and crime are endemic sociological occurrences which appear with regular frequency in virtually all countries on a global scale in varying degree and proportion. Individual nations each allocate domestic resources for the control and regulation of corruption and crime. Strategies to counter corruption are often summarized under the umbrella term anti-corruption.

  • Definitions: Regulatory Capture and Rent-Seeking and Corruption

    REGULATORY CAPTURE (THE RESULT) Regulatory capture is a corruption of authority that occurs when a political entity, policymaker, or regulatory agency is co-opted to serve the commercial, ideological, or political interests of a minor constituency, such as a particular geographic area, industry, profession, or ideological group. When regulatory capture occurs, a special interest is prioritized over the general interests of the public, leading to a net loss for society. Government agencies suffering regulatory capture are called “captured agencies.” Regulatory capture is the result of “rent-seeking” and political failure; client politics “occurs when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, reasonably small interest (e.g., industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers).” RENT SEEKING (THE PRIVATE SECTOR) Rent-seeking in public choice theory, as well as in economics, involves seeking to increase one’s share of existing wealth without creating new wealth. Rent-seeking results in reduced economic efficiency through misallocation of resources, reduced wealth-creation, lost government revenue, heightened income inequality, and potential national decline. Attempts at capture of regulatory agencies to gain a coercive monopoly can result in advantages for the rent seeker in a market while imposing disadvantages on their incorrupt competitors. This is one of many possible forms of rent-seeking behavior. CORRUPTION (THE POLITICAL SECTOR) Corruption is dishonesty or criminal activity undertaken by a person or organization entrusted with a position of authority, often to acquire illicit benefit, or, abuse of entrusted power for one’s private gain. Corruption may include many activities including bribery and embezzlement, though it may also involve practices that are legal in many countries. Political corruption occurs when an office-holder or other governmental employee acts in an official capacity for personal gain. Corruption is most commonplace in kleptocracies, oligarchies, narco-states and mafia states. Corruption can occur on different scales. Corruption ranges from small favors between a small number of people (petty corruption), to corruption that affects the government on a large scale (grand corruption), and corruption that is so prevalent that it is part of the everyday structure of society, including corruption as one of the symptoms of organized crime. Corruption and crime are endemic sociological occurrences which appear with regular frequency in virtually all countries on a global scale in varying degree and proportion. Individual nations each allocate domestic resources for the control and regulation of corruption and crime. Strategies to counter corruption are often summarized under the umbrella term anti-corruption.

  • This is why proximity creates hostility. Ergo, the only solution is separation,

    This is why proximity creates hostility. Ergo, the only solution is separation, which would provide the incentives destroyed by the great society (socialist relocation) movement, for communitites to produce norms, institutions, and elites suitable for those distributions.


    Source date (UTC): 2020-05-31 19:40:18 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1267179114013884420

    Reply addressees: @evrythingstays @Steve_Sailer

    Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1267178822698520576


    IN REPLY TO:

    Unknown author

    @evrythingstays @Steve_Sailer Given universal kin selection and ingroup bias, and given predictable hierarchy of sexual, social, economic, and political market values, determined by those traits, we are socially(normatively), economically(competitively), and politically (demands for commons), incompatible.

    Original post: https://x.com/i/web/status/1267178822698520576