Curt Doolittle

Theme: Governance

  • The academic process consists much more of indoctrination than it does empirical

    The academic process consists much more of indoctrination than it does empirical resolution of differences independent of doctrine – otherwise there would be no controversy over what was said or what was investigated.

    At present
    a) no use of research to fund activists, political activism, whether in the academy, in the non-commercial sector, or in the commercial sector as a means of funding activism.

    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-14 19:45:22 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2032905948898144605

  • REFORMING THE “CANCELLED” GRANT SYSTEM Restructure the grant request to be free

    REFORMING THE “CANCELLED” GRANT SYSTEM
    Restructure the grant request to be free of DEI dogma. Re-apply. They have a mission. They are pursuing their mission. It’s not that complicated. They’re irradicating DEI from the government, and eradicating funding of leftist causes through the grant system.

    Deal with it. It’s not rocket science. If your science doesn’t pass those hurdles then it’s not science it’s use of public funds for political purposes, propaganda and ideology parading as science.

    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-14 18:35:26 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2032888351435665413

  • THE REAL DAMAGE THE LEFT ACHIEVED THROUGH EMPATHY RATHER THAN TRUTH We used to b

    THE REAL DAMAGE THE LEFT ACHIEVED THROUGH EMPATHY RATHER THAN TRUTH
    We used to be humble. The left intentionally trained generations to assert false confidence in justification of their intuitions rather than skepticism of them, and testimony under that skepticism, in order to undermine our ancient traditions of self regulation, self skepticism, and humility in order to weaponize the arrogance and ignorance of the inexperienced against the polity to generate demand for the left’s authority, and the gradual erasure of our traditions values institutions morals and norms.

    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-14 16:51:42 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2032862245903028691

  • THE SCOPE OF TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ATTEMPT TO CONTROL WORLD OIL PRICES AND SUPPLY

    THE SCOPE OF TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ATTEMPT TO CONTROL WORLD OIL PRICES AND SUPPLY
    The United States employs a multifaceted strategy to exert control over global oil supplies, often framed within broader geopolitical competition, particularly to limit adversaries like China’s access to affordable energy. This includes direct interventions, sanctions, military posture, alliances, and domestic policies. Below is a breakdown of key actions beyond those directly involving Venezuela and Iran (such as recent military interventions and sanctions that have disrupted Chinese imports from these sources).

    Sanctions and Enforcement on Other Oil Producers

    Russia: The US has maintained extensive sanctions on Russian oil exports since the Ukraine conflict, aiming to reduce Moscow’s revenues and limit discounted supplies to China (which has become a major buyer). However, in early 2026, the US temporarily lifted some sanctions on Russian oil to stabilize global markets amid price spikes from the Iran conflict. This selective easing demonstrates US leverage in modulating supply. Additionally, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed new sanctions on major Russian firms like Rosneft and Lukoil in late 2025, further tightening control.
    Pressure on Buyers: The US has demanded that China cease imports of Russian and Iranian oil, using diplomatic and secondary sanctions to enforce compliance. This extends to using newly controlled Venezuelan oil to pressure countries like India to halt purchases of discounted Russian crude and to cut off supplies to Cuba.

    Military and Geopolitical Leverage in Key Regions

    Middle East Dominance: Through US Central Command (CENTCOM), the US maintains a significant military presence (over 30,000 troops, bases in allied countries) in the region, which holds nearly half of global oil reserves. In a conflict scenario, this allows the US to block oil shipments to China via chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz (handling ~20% of global oil flows and most of China’s Middle East imports), Suez Canal, or Bab al-Mandab. This posture preserves options to disrupt ~50% of China’s seaborne oil imports, enhancing US leverage in great-power competition.
    Engagement in Resource-Rich Areas: The US is expanding diplomatic and economic ties in Latin America (e.g., lithium in Chile/Argentina), Africa (to counter Chinese dominance in cobalt/rare earths), and Central Asia (oil/gas infrastructure investments) to diversify supply chains away from China and secure alliances. This indirectly influences oil flows by reducing China’s embedded presence in these regions.

    Domestic and Export Policies

    Boosting US Production and Exports: Under the “energy dominance” agenda in the 2025 National Security Strategy, the US has prioritized saturating global markets with American hydrocarbons (oil and LNG) to deepen alliances, provide energy security to Europe and Asia, and undercut adversaries’ revenues. US crude output averaged ~13.8 million barrels per day in 2025, with 2026 projections holding steady at ~13.5 million b/d, positioning the US as a “swing exporter.” New LNG facilities (e.g., Plaquemines, Golden Pass) are expanding capacity to ~16.3 billion cubic feet per day by 2026, further enhancing export leverage.
    Strategic Petroleum Reserve Management: The US uses its SPR (world’s largest at 714 million barrels capacity) to influence prices, with rebuilds since 2023 providing a buffer for releases during disruptions. President Trump has considered restricting US oil exports to manage domestic supply and curb inflation, prioritizing strategic stockpiling.

    Trade and Regulatory Tools

    Tariffs and Export Controls: Broad tariffs on imports (including energy-related tech) and restrictions on Chinese firms in clean energy/critical materials aim to slow China’s ascent and limit its access to advanced equipment, indirectly affecting global energy dynamics. Ongoing negotiations could adjust tariffs on oil/gas-related goods under sections like 232.
    Supply Chain Reshoring: Massive subsidies and incentives (e.g., via the Inflation Reduction Act remnants) rebuild US manufacturing for batteries, solar, and strategic tech, creating resilient chains outside China and treating industrial capacity as national defense.

    These efforts collectively aim to sustain US influence over ~20% of global oil production (including indirect control via Canada, Guyana, and Venezuela) while countering de-dollarization trends in energy trade. Analysts view this as seeking leverage against China, akin to China’s control over rare earths, by dominating energy supply chains. However, global oversupply projections for 2026 (e.g., 4 million b/d surplus) could temper prices, potentially deferring investments and setting up future shortages.

    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-14 02:58:03 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2032652448813428836

  • Catholics as Better Supreme Court Judges and Protestants as Better Presidents I

    Catholics as Better Supreme Court Judges and Protestants as Better Presidents

    I do not mean this as a sectarian claim, nor as a claim of individual superiority, nor as a claim that theology mechanically determines office performance. I mean something narrower and more operational: different religious formations tend to cultivate different habits of mind, different relations between person and office, different modes of legitimacy, and different tolerances for authority, continuity, discretion, conscience, and mission. Those differences map unevenly onto the distinct demands of judicial office and executive office.
    The intuition, then, is not: Catholics are better people, or Protestants are better leaders. The intuition is: Catholic formation tends to produce one kind of civilizational psychology, Protestant formation another, and those psychologies fit the role-demands of judge and president differently.
    The argument begins with the offices themselves.
    A Supreme Court justice and a president do not merely exercise power in different branches. They perform different civilizational functions.
    The justice is charged with preserving continuity, constraining novelty, interpreting under inherited rules, preserving legitimacy by restraint, and subordinating will to office, text, doctrine, procedure, and precedent. The office is custodial. It is not primarily creative. It is not supposed to be prophetic. It is not supposed to be a theater of self-expression. Its legitimacy depends upon the minimization of arbitrariness and the preservation of a continuous adjudicative order across time.
    The president is charged with deciding under uncertainty, personifying political unity, acting in public time rather than merely interpreting it, imposing direction on conflict, absorbing responsibility for consequence, and converting legitimacy into motion. The office is executive. It is not primarily interpretive. It does not have the luxury of waiting upon full certainty. It does not exist merely to preserve continuity. Its legitimacy depends in part upon agency, decisiveness, representation, and the visible bearing of responsibility.
    So the first distinction is simple:
    The judge is a custodian of continuity.
    The president is an agent of directed action.
    Once that distinction is clear, the rest follows.
    The contrast at issue is not only doctrinal. It is civilizational and psychological. It concerns the kind of person each tradition tends to habituate.
    Catholic formation tends to cultivate:
    • comfort with hierarchy,
    • loyalty to institution,
    • reasoning within a transgenerational canon,
    • mediation through office and tradition,
    • willingness to distinguish principle from prudential application,
    • willingness to operate within layered authority,
    • tolerance for inherited grammar,
    • and often, a disciplined separation between person and office.
    A person formed this way tends to think: I am not the source of the order. I am a participant within an inherited order. My task is to preserve, interpret, and apply that order without dissolving it into myself.
    That is extraordinarily judge-like.
    Protestant formation tends to cultivate:
    • conscience-centered agency,
    • direct accountability,
    • moral seriousness,
    • direct relation to text,
    • reformist impulse,
    • initiative,
    • self-command,
    • willingness to act without waiting for sacramental or institutional mediation,
    • and often, a stronger tendency to internalize responsibility personally rather than institutionally.
    A person formed this way tends to think: I stand before truth more directly, bear responsibility more personally, and must act when institutions are insufficient, inert, compromised, or silent.
    That is far more president-like.
    So the contrast can be stated very plainly:
    Catholic formation tends to train fidelity within order.
    Protestant formation tends to train agency under judgment.
    The former fits judicial office more naturally.
    The latter fits executive office more naturally.
    What I am calling “Catholic” and “Protestant” here can be reduced to a difference in moral-political grammar.
    Catholic grammar tends toward mediation, hierarchy, office, continuity, canon, inheritance, commentary, and discipline under institution.
    Protestant grammar tends toward conscience, direct textual encounter, reform, mission, responsibility, initiative, and action under judgment.
    Neither grammar is universally superior. Each has virtues and liabilities. But they are not equally useful for every role.
    A high judge needs legitimacy through constraint.
    A president needs legitimacy through agency.
    The judge must preserve the authority of an order larger than himself.
    The president must bear responsibility for acting through an order that cannot move without him.
    This is why the intuition has force. It is tracking role-fit.
    A Supreme Court justice is not primarily valuable for personality, inspiration, or moral charisma. He is valuable insofar as he can subordinate appetite, faction, and improvisation to a durable interpretive order.
    He must be able to live inside inherited rules. He must distinguish text from mood, doctrine from preference, institution from self, legitimacy from applause. He must often manage difficult edge cases without abandoning the coherence of the whole. He must tolerate ambiguity without collapsing into personal will. He must preserve continuity while still adjudicating particulars.
    Catholic intellectual and institutional culture has spent centuries refining exactly this problem. Canon law, scholastic method, layered authority, doctrinal continuity, the distinction between principle and application, the habit of reasoning within an inherited structure rather than beginning from self-authorized conscience: all of this maps well onto high judicial office.
    Put simply: Catholic culture often trains for ordered interpretation under authority.
    That is why Catholic formation often looks native to appellate and especially high-court judging.
    The virtue of the Catholic judge
    The virtue is institutional self-restraint. At his best, the Catholic judge preserves order without dissolving law into personality. He knows the office is larger than the self.
    The liability of the Catholic judge
    The liability is excessive deference to institution as such. He may become too protective of continuity, procedure, or elite consensus. He may preserve the institution after justice has already begun leaking out of it. He may prefer equilibrium to clarity, stewardship to correction, prestige to confrontation.
    But this liability is still recognizably judicial. It is a distortion of the correct virtue. It is the vice nearest the judicial good.
    The presidency demands something different. The president cannot merely interpret. He must decide. He must often act before consensus, before certainty, before full information, and under conditions of conflict. He must name the conflict, bear the responsibility, unify or mobilize a public, and convert office into motion.
    Protestant culture tends to produce personalities more comfortable with precisely these burdens. The direct relation to conscience, the moral seriousness of standing personally accountable, the textual and rhetorical tendency toward proclamation rather than commentary, the reformist and mission-bearing temperament, the willingness to act without mediation: these are executive traits.
    Put simply: Protestant culture often trains for personal responsibility under judgment.
    That is why Protestant formation often looks native to presidential office, especially in the American setting where the presidency is not merely administrative but symbolic, narrative-bearing, and public-moral.
    The virtue of the Protestant president
    The virtue is responsible agency. At his best, the Protestant president bears the burden of decision openly and acts. He is willing to stand in exposed relation to consequence. He can personify national purpose and absorb blame.
    The liability of the Protestant president
    The liability is voluntarist overreach. Conviction can become crusade. Personal rectitude can be mistaken for public legitimacy. Mission can outgrow law, prudence, or institutional limit. The office can become a theater of self-righteousness, improvisation, or moral exhibition.
    But again, this liability is recognizably executive. It is the vice nearest the executive good.
    This is perhaps the clearest compression of the distinction without loss of substance.
    A great judge says: I must reduce myself so that the law can appear.
    A great president says: I must bear this office through conflict, uncertainty, and decision.
    The judicial office requires depersonalization.
    The executive office requires personification.
    Catholic formation, broadly speaking, is better at the former.
    Protestant formation, broadly speaking, is better at the latter.
    Or stated another way:
    The justice must obey the office more than himself.
    The president must often impose himself through the office.
    Catholic formation better trains the first disposition.
    Protestant formation better trains the second.
    The American regime intensifies this pattern because its legal and political institutions pull in different moral directions.
    American mass political culture is structurally Protestant even when citizens are not personally devout. It favors conscience, self-authorship, reform, mission, directness, rhetoric, individual accountability, and leadership by declaration. It expects the president not merely to administer but to signify. The president is expected to mean the nation.
    At the same time, the Supreme Court has increasingly taken on a quasi-sacerdotal character: textual, procedural, interpretive, cloistered, continuity-bearing, legitimized by restraint and inherited form. That role is congenial to Catholic formation because Catholicism has long refined the arts of institutional continuity across time.
    So America is mixed in a revealing way:
    • its political psychology is Protestant,
    • its highest judicial function is quasi-Catholic.
    That is why the intuition feels plausible even before one formalizes it.
    The clearest way to state the whole structure is by crossing religious formation with political office.
    1. Catholic × Judge
    This is the strongest fit.
    The Catholic judge tends toward institutional discipline, comfort with layered authority, continuity-preserving reasoning, and disciplined interpretation under inherited forms. He is well suited to a role whose legitimacy depends upon restraint, continuity, and the separation of person from office.
    At his best, he is a disciplined custodian of continuity.
    At his worst, he becomes an institutional apologist, preserving form after substance has decayed.
    2. Catholic × President
    This is a mixed fit.
    The Catholic president may bring seriousness, long time-horizon thinking, stewardship, and awareness of institutional consequence. Those are real virtues. But the presidency also requires decision, symbolic command, public-moral direction, and willingness to impose action under uncertainty.
    The Catholic failure mode here is managerial caution: administration where command is needed, stewardship where direction is needed, consultation where decision is needed.
    At his best, he is a prudent steward of continuity.
    At his worst, he governs as a chamberlain rather than a ruler.
    3. Protestant × Judge
    This is also a mixed, and often more dangerous, fit.
    The Protestant judge may bring moral seriousness, textual directness, honesty, and resistance to ornamental sophistry. Those are assets. But he also carries a temptation toward conscience overriding office, moral seriousness displacing legal discipline, and reformist impulse becoming jurisprudence.
    At his best, he is a grave and serious textualist.
    At his worst, he is a preacher in judicial form.
    4. Protestant × President
    This is the strongest executive fit.
    The Protestant president tends toward direct responsibility, mission-bearing rhetoric, initiative, comfort with conflict, and public agency. Those are central executive virtues. He can more easily bear the loneliness of command and act under uncertainty.
    At his best, he is a decisive national agent.
    At his worst, he becomes a crusader, mistaking private rectitude for public legitimacy and mission for limit.
    This typology is not a theorem, but it can be tested against American examples.
    Catholic justices who fit the pattern
    John Roberts
    Roberts strongly exemplifies Catholic × Judge. He is institutional, cautious, continuity-oriented, and deeply concerned with the legitimacy of the Court as such. His strength is disciplined stewardship of the institution. His liability is precisely the Catholic judicial liability: protecting equilibrium or prestige where clarity or confrontation may be warranted.
    Antonin Scalia
    Scalia is more vivid and combative, but still substantially fits the type. He operated inside a legal grammar larger than himself, argued from interpretive method rather than free-floating moral intuition, and treated law as a structured adversarial practice bounded by office. His rhetorical force gave him some Protestant energy, but his method remained deeply judicial and tradition-conscious.
    Samuel Alito
    Alito likewise fits the Catholic judicial pattern. He is disciplined, serious, and less susceptible to public applause as a governing criterion. He reads as office-conscious and tradition-conscious rather than morally performative.
    Protestant justices who illustrate the opposite risk
    Earl Warren
    Warren is a powerful example of executive moral temperament inside judicial office. He displayed moral seriousness, reforming impulse, and a willingness to use the Court as an instrument of national correction. One may praise or criticize the outcomes, but the office-psychology is clear: he often felt less like a custodian of adjudicative continuity than like a reformer seated on the Court.
    William O. Douglas
    Douglas also illustrates the liability. Personal temperament, expansive moralism, and less disciplined submission to inherited legal form made him feel more self-active inside the office than the judicial role ideally allows.
    Harry Blackmun
    Blackmun increasingly came to exemplify conscience pressing forward through office. Again, the point is not agreement or disagreement with his conclusions, but the underlying structure: moral judgment carried through role, rather than role constraining moral judgment.
    Catholic presidents who fit the mixed pattern
    John F. Kennedy
    Kennedy complicates the model. He had charisma, decisiveness, and executive bearing, but he was not psychologically a “clerical Catholic.” His elite formation, war experience, class style, and modernity partially overrode confessional pattern. So he is mixed evidence: neither a refutation nor a clean confirmation.
    Joe Biden
    Biden fits the Catholic-president pattern more clearly. He reads as a steward, a restorer, a maintainer of continuity, a broker, and a manager of coalition and process. That is not necessarily incompetent, but it is archetypally managerial rather than presidential in the strongest executive sense. He appears more comfortable preserving regime continuity than embodying and directing the polity through decisive public command.
    Protestant presidents who strongly fit the executive pattern
    Abraham Lincoln
    Lincoln is perhaps the clearest example of Protestant × President. He fused moral gravity, textual seriousness, direct responsibility, willingness to decide under radical uncertainty, and the capacity to personify the nation in crisis. He is almost the executive archetype of conscience-bearing agency.
    Woodrow Wilson
    Wilson shows both the virtue and vice of the type. He was mission-bearing, rhetorically powerful, morally purposive, and direction-setting. But he also showed the vice: moral abstraction, self-righteousness, and missionary overreach.
    Ronald Reagan
    Reagan strongly fits the Protestant executive grammar: directness, moral framing, comfort with mission, symbolic leadership, and the ability to animate public direction rather than merely manage institutions.
    George W. Bush
    Bush likewise exhibited responsibility-bearing executive language, willingness to decide, and clarity under conflict, along with the liability of simplification and moralized overreach.
    Donald Trump
    Trump is not Protestant in the conscience-burdened, morally grave sense. But he does fit a broader Protestant political anthropology: direct relation to the public, anti-mediating agency, self-authorization, combative personification of power. He is evidence that the executive side of the pattern may survive even when its moral discipline has decayed.
    So the strongest defensible version of the thesis is not theological triumphalism. It is this:
    Different religious-civilizational formations train different virtues of office.
    Some offices reward those virtues.
    Some offices punish them.
    Catholic formation tends to produce office-centered, continuity-preserving, institutionally mediated reasoning, which is advantageous in judicial roles where legitimacy depends upon restraint and inherited form.
    Protestant formation tends to produce conscience-centered, mission-bearing, directly accountable agency, which is advantageous in executive roles where legitimacy depends upon decision and public action.
    That is the real claim.
    This can also be stated in terms of reciprocal duty.
    A judge’s reciprocal duty is to all parties under a common rule. He must preserve a stable adjudicative order that minimizes arbitrariness. That requires impersonality. The intrusion of self is a threat to legitimacy.
    A president’s reciprocal duty is different. He must preserve the polity through action. He must coordinate, decide, deter, symbolize, and bear consequence under uncertainty. That requires accountable agency. The absence of self is a threat to effectiveness.
    So:
    • judicial reciprocity favors impersonality,
    • executive reciprocity favors accountable agency.
    Catholic formation better habituates the first.
    Protestant formation better habituates the second.
    The cleanest statement I can produce is this:
    Catholic formation tends to produce persons more comfortable subordinating themselves to inherited office, doctrine, hierarchy, and institutional continuity, which better fits the judicial role. Protestant formation tends to produce persons more comfortable bearing direct responsibility through conscience, conviction, and action, which better fits the executive role. The justice must minimize the self so that the law may rule. The president must use the self so that the polity may act.
    Or, in the shortest acceptable formulation:
    Catholics tend to make better custodians.
    Protestants tend to make better agents.
    Judges are custodians.
    Presidents are agents.

    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-12 18:48:02 UTC

    Original post: https://x.com/i/articles/2032166746887766093

  • My argument may be beyond you. The cost-reciprocity model for expulsions, using

    My argument may be beyond you. The cost-reciprocity model for expulsions, using examples like European colonization of America and bacterial competition, to highlight how power, not “neutral science”, decides “hosts” versus “non-hosts.” And yes host populations demonstrably by the overwhelming evidence possess the power of expulsion throughout history and exercise it whenever costs suggest its utility. I am not sure how you conceive that power is neutral and can be used to restore non imposition of costs or impose costs. Thats science. I merely explain the science.

    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-10 20:33:55 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2031468616277962763

  • All that said, the geostrategic argument he is laying out is in fact what the tr

    All that said, the geostrategic argument he is laying out is in fact what the trump administration is advancing: we can control the resource that constrains china, we can use our navy to prevent its receipt of that resource, or we can fight over the results of it maintaining access to that resource.
    At present the administration is driving chinese expansion out of our hemisphere as well as the middle east.
    This is effectively ‘denying your opponent the field’.
    Whether one agrees with it or not and how it is done or not is something very different from the strategy itself.

    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-08 19:22:49 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2030725947746594830

  • @havivrettiggur Stunned by the extraordinary quality of your interview on the Wi

    @havivrettiggur

    Stunned by the extraordinary quality of your interview on the Winston Marshall Show released today March 7th.
    In one hour you provided the audience with more explanatory power constructed from rational incentives driving the shifts in the world, free of ideology or bias than I have seen worldwide on the matter.
    And your advice, particularly to Europeans was worth repeating and with emphasis.
    My training as a critic demands I provide some contribution rather than just fawning accolades. 😉
    So, I had only one minor comment: you are correct in your assessment of international law, however I might position it slightly different as a set of conventions that prevent conflict and assist in cooperation among first world polities during the postwar order. In this sense they are documentation of norms rather than laws – which was the point you elegantly made.
    Thanks again.
    Extraordinary.

    Curt Doolittle
    The Natural Law Institute

    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-08 03:43:08 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2030489469120581659

  • You are relying on hindsight bias. At the time the USA was taking over from the

    You are relying on hindsight bias. At the time the USA was taking over from the UK as the world financial sector. The problem you are correctly obsessing over is a postwar one in the states, and a pre-war one in europe.

    You can’t blame people in the past for now knowing what we didn’t know until much – or for looking at the evidence of the moment (vast increase in state power in both europe and the USA because of the industrial revolution) and assuming the risk that you see was something of the past.

    Their folly was permissiveness which was endemic in both conservative and progressive circles at the time. The industrial revolution had make a west full of foolish optimism.

    We are in the opposite end of that cycle. We can see what the permissiveness and state power have led to.

    It’s not our job to blame them in the past but to solve the problem now that it’s visible and we can solve it.

    I work on the laws so that what you despise can’t happen again. The rest requires physical expulsion of people from the country for certain and possibly the revocation of the vote from women, or at least women without three or more children (who are the only women that vote rationally).

    Cheers

    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-04 19:22:58 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2029276433185685778

  • Why would you think I was speaking in reference to individuals rather than state

    Why would you think I was speaking in reference to individuals rather than states? How did you make that leap?

    The US is visibly sovereign by every measure, but if you mean are citizens sovereign, they are more so in the USA than elsewhere, but are they sovereign in the pure and complete sense – then no.

    I know these subjects are emotionally loaded and conservatives are right to be emotionally activated, but I’m not (and Martin is not) a trivial thinker. It is better to ask questions when you object than to exhort accusations, because while I might lack sufficient clarity at times due to practical brevity, I’m not wrong very often – it’s more likely that your interpretation is.

    My difference from martin is caused by my frequent conflation of multiple issues that I often falsely assume are obvious: the natural law, the natural law reforms necessary for the anglosphere, and the natural law reforms that would be helpful for any and all of mankind. In my mind I think this is obvious but it’s not.

    So, as martin and I frequently state (and which I find extraordinary value) is that I”m cleary from an anglo naval background and hold that optimism (higher risk tolerance) because of it, while Martin is from a small continental background that holds pessimism (lower risk tolerance). In effect the natural law is the same, but each polity still needs to develop a strategy that suits its circumstances.

    To some degree this applies to you. I’m at the latter end of a long life of relative success and prosperity despite treating occupations as a means of funding my avocation. You are perhaps not to fortunate in your life as I have been in mind. As such my risk tolerance is higher than yours. This means you are acting correctly ust as martin is acting correctly, and I am acting correctly because of my and my country’s risk tolerance.

    Cheers

    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-03 23:21:21 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2028974034864750931