Theme: Governance

  • Adding Depth To Taleb’s Insight That Minority Rule Is Superior To Majority.

    (Shhh. Its all in the incentives.) Nassim, (edited for clarity) I’ll fortify your thought experiment a bit. To the best of my knowledge the general argument that reflects the evidence is this: 1) The slower the rotation of elites, the more consistent the policies, the least ‘virtue signaling expenditure’, the least waste, and the least fragility. Consistent policy allows long-term low-cost investment in commons. Preserves knowledge in the administrators. 2) The longer term the incentives the more capital will be accumulated in all its forms. So, Monarchies have the best intertemporal incentives, houses of ‘lords’ so to speak the next best, Westminster/German model parliaments the next, and democratically elected representatives in the American model the worst incentives. Germans seem to produce consistent policies, yet can still be removed from office. 3) Minorities face higher consequences if deposed from power than members of a majority, and they are easier to depose, so they have both incentive to rule well (reduce cost of defense), and to maintain rule(preserve their investments). (The HAN, RUSSIANS/Muscovites), and the TEUTONS/Germanics understood this. The Europeans no longer do. They lost this sentiment in the world wars. Aside from Jefferson’s attempt to codify natural law in an extant document and order, America has been a very bad influence on the world since its revolution.) 4) The more thorough the rule of law, the higher the trust, the faster the economic velocity. So, Rule of law (common, judge-discovered, natural law) is more important in producing good policy than the form of government if the aristocracy (martial class) is large enough. If a professional bureaucracy can form prior to the expansion of the franchise, then Continental Law can function as well as Common Law with a smaller aristocracy (martial class). 5) So, most civilizations fail to defeat i) Malthus, ii) Rent Seekers(corruption), iii) Familism(corruption) for any one of these reasons: (a) inability to form a military/martial/nobility class capable of enforcing rule of law and profiting from its enforcement (Nobility). (b) inability to concentrate wealth without ever-expanding corruption (Homogeneity), (c) inability to direct proceeds to the production of commons(universalism), (d) inability to create a class capable of sustained policy development (minority control) So it’s not so much that it’s minority rule, but that it’s CONSISTENT rule, with intertemporal incentives, while still able to ‘throw the bums out’, with rule of law limiting their actions, and suppressing corruption. And minority rule tends to be more consistent. (And monarchies were more tolerant.) Net: incentives of representative governments constantly trying to hold to their positions produce the worst policy because they have the worst of all incentives: urgency and unaccountability. Reversal: If you are in a heterogeneous, tribal, familial, civilization, lacking a militia (universal military), and a large enough middle class to demand and require rule of law, and if you have its opposite (universal theocracy), and if you do not have harsh winters to reduce the size of the underclasses without invoking moral hazard, you will have a very difficult time creating prosperity compared to a homogenous, outbred, militial civilization, with harsh winters, and putative rule of law. Nobility makes an administrative class, makes a middle class makes a working class, makes an over-reproductive underclass, and rents expand by all classes until the civilization is fragile or stagnant and cannot respond to shocks or competitors. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
    Nassim Nicholas Taleb
    WHY THE MINORITY RULE DICTATES MORALS IN SOCIETIES, A PROBABILITISTIC ARGUMENT (addition) A probabilistic argument in favor of the minority rule dictating societal values is as follows. Wherever you look across societies and histories, you tend to find the same general moral laws prevailing, with some, but not significant, variations: do not steal (at least not from within the tribe); do not hunt orphans for pleasure; do not gratuitously beat up passers by for training, use instead a boxing bags (unless you are Spartan and even then you can only kill a limited number of helots for training purposes), and similar interdicts. And we can see these rules evolving over time to become more universal, expanding to a broader set, to progressively include slaves, other tribes, other species (animals, economists), etc. And one property of these laws: they are black-and-white, binary, discrete, and allow no shadow. You cannot steal “a little bit” or murder “moderately”. You cannot keep Kosher and eat “just a little bit” of pork on Sunday barbecues. Now it would be vastly more likely that these values emerged from a minority that the majority. Why? Take the following two theses: – Outcomes are paradoxically more stable under the minority rule — the variance of the results is lower and the rule is more likely to be emerge independently across populations. – What emerges from the minority rule is more likely to be be black-and-white. An example. Consider that an evil person wants to poison the collective by putting some product into soda cans. He has two options. The first is cyanide, which obeys a minority rule: a drop of poison (higher than a small threshold) makes the entire liquid poisonous. The second is a “majority”-style poison; it requires more than half the liquid to be poisonous in order to kill. Now look at the inverse problem, a collection of dead people after a dinner party, and you need to investigate the cause. The local Sherlock Holmes would assert that conditional on the outcome that all people drinking the soda having been killed, the evil man opted for the first not the second option. Simply, the majority rule leads to fluctuations around the average, with a high rate of survival. The black-and-white character of these societal laws can be explained with the following. Assume that under a certain regime, when you mix white and dark blue in various combinations, you don’t get variations of light blue, but dark blue. Such a regime is vastly more likely to produce dark blue than another rule that allows more shades of blue. https://medium.com/…/the-most-intolerant-wins-the-dictators…
  • Adding Depth To Taleb’s Insight That Minority Rule Is Superior To Majority.

    (Shhh. Its all in the incentives.) Nassim, (edited for clarity) I’ll fortify your thought experiment a bit. To the best of my knowledge the general argument that reflects the evidence is this: 1) The slower the rotation of elites, the more consistent the policies, the least ‘virtue signaling expenditure’, the least waste, and the least fragility. Consistent policy allows long-term low-cost investment in commons. Preserves knowledge in the administrators. 2) The longer term the incentives the more capital will be accumulated in all its forms. So, Monarchies have the best intertemporal incentives, houses of ‘lords’ so to speak the next best, Westminster/German model parliaments the next, and democratically elected representatives in the American model the worst incentives. Germans seem to produce consistent policies, yet can still be removed from office. 3) Minorities face higher consequences if deposed from power than members of a majority, and they are easier to depose, so they have both incentive to rule well (reduce cost of defense), and to maintain rule(preserve their investments). (The HAN, RUSSIANS/Muscovites), and the TEUTONS/Germanics understood this. The Europeans no longer do. They lost this sentiment in the world wars. Aside from Jefferson’s attempt to codify natural law in an extant document and order, America has been a very bad influence on the world since its revolution.) 4) The more thorough the rule of law, the higher the trust, the faster the economic velocity. So, Rule of law (common, judge-discovered, natural law) is more important in producing good policy than the form of government if the aristocracy (martial class) is large enough. If a professional bureaucracy can form prior to the expansion of the franchise, then Continental Law can function as well as Common Law with a smaller aristocracy (martial class). 5) So, most civilizations fail to defeat i) Malthus, ii) Rent Seekers(corruption), iii) Familism(corruption) for any one of these reasons: (a) inability to form a military/martial/nobility class capable of enforcing rule of law and profiting from its enforcement (Nobility). (b) inability to concentrate wealth without ever-expanding corruption (Homogeneity), (c) inability to direct proceeds to the production of commons(universalism), (d) inability to create a class capable of sustained policy development (minority control) So it’s not so much that it’s minority rule, but that it’s CONSISTENT rule, with intertemporal incentives, while still able to ‘throw the bums out’, with rule of law limiting their actions, and suppressing corruption. And minority rule tends to be more consistent. (And monarchies were more tolerant.) Net: incentives of representative governments constantly trying to hold to their positions produce the worst policy because they have the worst of all incentives: urgency and unaccountability. Reversal: If you are in a heterogeneous, tribal, familial, civilization, lacking a militia (universal military), and a large enough middle class to demand and require rule of law, and if you have its opposite (universal theocracy), and if you do not have harsh winters to reduce the size of the underclasses without invoking moral hazard, you will have a very difficult time creating prosperity compared to a homogenous, outbred, militial civilization, with harsh winters, and putative rule of law. Nobility makes an administrative class, makes a middle class makes a working class, makes an over-reproductive underclass, and rents expand by all classes until the civilization is fragile or stagnant and cannot respond to shocks or competitors. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
    Nassim Nicholas Taleb
    WHY THE MINORITY RULE DICTATES MORALS IN SOCIETIES, A PROBABILITISTIC ARGUMENT (addition) A probabilistic argument in favor of the minority rule dictating societal values is as follows. Wherever you look across societies and histories, you tend to find the same general moral laws prevailing, with some, but not significant, variations: do not steal (at least not from within the tribe); do not hunt orphans for pleasure; do not gratuitously beat up passers by for training, use instead a boxing bags (unless you are Spartan and even then you can only kill a limited number of helots for training purposes), and similar interdicts. And we can see these rules evolving over time to become more universal, expanding to a broader set, to progressively include slaves, other tribes, other species (animals, economists), etc. And one property of these laws: they are black-and-white, binary, discrete, and allow no shadow. You cannot steal “a little bit” or murder “moderately”. You cannot keep Kosher and eat “just a little bit” of pork on Sunday barbecues. Now it would be vastly more likely that these values emerged from a minority that the majority. Why? Take the following two theses: – Outcomes are paradoxically more stable under the minority rule — the variance of the results is lower and the rule is more likely to be emerge independently across populations. – What emerges from the minority rule is more likely to be be black-and-white. An example. Consider that an evil person wants to poison the collective by putting some product into soda cans. He has two options. The first is cyanide, which obeys a minority rule: a drop of poison (higher than a small threshold) makes the entire liquid poisonous. The second is a “majority”-style poison; it requires more than half the liquid to be poisonous in order to kill. Now look at the inverse problem, a collection of dead people after a dinner party, and you need to investigate the cause. The local Sherlock Holmes would assert that conditional on the outcome that all people drinking the soda having been killed, the evil man opted for the first not the second option. Simply, the majority rule leads to fluctuations around the average, with a high rate of survival. The black-and-white character of these societal laws can be explained with the following. Assume that under a certain regime, when you mix white and dark blue in various combinations, you don’t get variations of light blue, but dark blue. Such a regime is vastly more likely to produce dark blue than another rule that allows more shades of blue. https://medium.com/…/the-most-intolerant-wins-the-dictators…
  • You’re White And You’re The Bad Guy? Rule or Be Ruled. It’s Not Complicated.

    (by Eli Harman) If you’re a f__king white male, you are the bad guy, the cause of all the world’s problems, the personification of historic evil. That’s the role that has been prepared for you and assigned to you. You don’t get to decline the role. The standard of evil has been updated to including denying you are evil. The harder you deny it, the more evil you are. The dialectical traps have been woven and laid to ensure there is no escape.

    The only choice you get to make is how you play the role. The expectation is typically that you will play it badly; that you will apologize for who your ancestors were and what they did, and live your life bowing and scraping and trying vainly to make amends for crimes which can never be forgiven or expunged; that you will take everyone’s side against yourself and give everything away in exchange for nothing. But why do that? That’s stupid. There is nothing in it for us. You could also play it well. Though somewhat degenerated from our heyday, we’re still the baddest motherfuckers who have ever lived, and if we put our heads together and use a little team work we can fuck up everyone else’s shit, take what we want, do what we want, lord over inferior people and not put up with any of their bullshit. They don’t have to like it. They don’t have to like us. They don’t have to understand what we do or why. The only thing they need to understand is that if they fuck with us, they’re going to have a bad time. You couldn’t possibly get any less respect by going off script than you would by playing the role as written.
  • You’re White And You’re The Bad Guy? Rule or Be Ruled. It’s Not Complicated.

    (by Eli Harman) If you’re a f__king white male, you are the bad guy, the cause of all the world’s problems, the personification of historic evil. That’s the role that has been prepared for you and assigned to you. You don’t get to decline the role. The standard of evil has been updated to including denying you are evil. The harder you deny it, the more evil you are. The dialectical traps have been woven and laid to ensure there is no escape.

    The only choice you get to make is how you play the role. The expectation is typically that you will play it badly; that you will apologize for who your ancestors were and what they did, and live your life bowing and scraping and trying vainly to make amends for crimes which can never be forgiven or expunged; that you will take everyone’s side against yourself and give everything away in exchange for nothing. But why do that? That’s stupid. There is nothing in it for us. You could also play it well. Though somewhat degenerated from our heyday, we’re still the baddest motherfuckers who have ever lived, and if we put our heads together and use a little team work we can fuck up everyone else’s shit, take what we want, do what we want, lord over inferior people and not put up with any of their bullshit. They don’t have to like it. They don’t have to like us. They don’t have to understand what we do or why. The only thing they need to understand is that if they fuck with us, they’re going to have a bad time. You couldn’t possibly get any less respect by going off script than you would by playing the role as written.
  • SIMPLE: ARISTOCRACY +COMMONS, OLIGARCHY -COMMONS An Aristocracy increases the ca

    SIMPLE: ARISTOCRACY +COMMONS, OLIGARCHY -COMMONS

    An Aristocracy increases the capital in the commons and an Oligarchy exploits it. That’s the difference.


    Source date (UTC): 2016-10-02 04:05:00 UTC

  • ADDING DEPTH TO TALEB’S INSIGHT THAT MINORITY RULE IS SUPERIOR TO MAJORITY. (Shh

    ADDING DEPTH TO TALEB’S INSIGHT THAT MINORITY RULE IS SUPERIOR TO MAJORITY. (Shhh. Its all in the incentives.)

    Nassim,

    (edited for clarity)

    I’ll fortify your thought experiment a bit. To the best of my knowledge the general argument that reflects the evidence is this:

    1) The slower the rotation of elites, the more consistent the policies, the least ‘virtue signaling expenditure’, the least waste, and the least fragility. Consistent policy allows long-term low-cost investment in commons. Preserves knowledge in the administrators.

    2) The longer term the incentives the more capital will be accumulated in all its forms. So, Monarchies have the best intertemporal incentives, houses of ‘lords’ so to speak the next best, Westminster/German model parliaments the next, and democratically elected representatives in the American model the worst incentives. Germans seem to produce consistent policies, yet can still be removed from office.

    3) Minorities face higher consequences if deposed from power than members of a majority, and they are easier to depose, so they have both incentive to rule well (reduce cost of defense), and to maintain rule(preserve their investments). (The HAN, RUSSIANS/Muscovites), and the TEUTONS/Germanics understood this. The Europeans no longer do. They lost this sentiment in the world wars. Aside from Jefferson’s attempt to codify natural law in an extant document and order, America has been a very bad influence on the world since its revolution.)

    4) The more thorough the rule of law, the higher the trust, the faster the economic velocity. So, Rule of law (common, judge-discovered, natural law) is more important in producing good policy than the form of government if the aristocracy (martial class) is large enough. If a professional bureaucracy can form prior to the expansion of the franchise, then Continental Law can function as well as Common Law with a smaller aristocracy (martial class).

    5) So, most civilizations fail to defeat i) Malthus, ii) Rent Seekers(corruption), iii) Familism(corruption) for any one of these reasons: (a) inability to form a military/martial/nobility class capable of enforcing rule of law and profiting from its enforcement (Nobility). (b) inability to concentrate wealth without ever-expanding corruption (Homogeneity), (c) inability to direct proceeds to the production of commons(universalism), (d) inability to create a class capable of sustained policy development (minority control)

    So it’s not so much that it’s minority rule, but that it’s CONSISTENT rule, with intertemporal incentives, while still able to ‘throw the bums out’, with rule of law limiting their actions, and suppressing corruption. And minority rule tends to be more consistent. (And monarchies were more tolerant.)

    Net: incentives of representative governments constantly trying to hold to their positions produce the worst policy because they have the worst of all incentives: urgency and unaccountability.

    Reversal: If you are in a heterogeneous, tribal, familial, civilization, lacking a militia (universal military), and a large enough middle class to demand and require rule of law, and if you have its opposite (universal theocracy), and if you do not have harsh winters to reduce the size of the underclasses without invoking moral hazard, you will have a very difficult time creating prosperity compared to a homogenous, outbred, militial civilization, with harsh winters, and putative rule of law. Nobility makes an administrative class, makes a middle class makes a working class, makes an over-reproductive underclass, and rents expand by all classes until the civilization is fragile or stagnant and cannot respond to shocks or competitors.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine


    Source date (UTC): 2016-10-02 02:35:00 UTC

  • The Virtue of Disorder

    Disorder is merely an opportunity to obtain a discount on the high cost of constructing an alternative order. Great strategists accumulate resources with which to create and exploit opportunities. Fools rush headlong into battles.

  • The Virtue of Disorder

    Disorder is merely an opportunity to obtain a discount on the high cost of constructing an alternative order. Great strategists accumulate resources with which to create and exploit opportunities. Fools rush headlong into battles.

  • The Non-obvious Benefits Of Market Government

    (important topic) William Butchman just indirectly reminded me that when I say ‘market government’ is the most likely candidate for creating a beneficial form of ‘post majoritarian rule’ while retaining the benefit of creating non-monopolistic commons:
    a) that groups are not prevented from creating what we call anarchic (private contractual) commons, simply by setting conditions of use for the semi-private property. In other words, the Hoppeian contractual model of commons still exists. b) however, by creating a market for the EXCHANGE of commons, we can conduct trades between classes for the construction of commons, thereby obtaining through the exchange of commons what we cannot obtain through either the market, or by the private production of commons. c) the importance of this insight is that we are all compelled to think of what commons we can offer to others just as we are compelled to think of what private goods and services we can offer to others. The most common exchange will be behavior and norms for material goods, services, access and various forms of insurance. d) and that we can create competing commons (monorail vs trains) where before – only monopoly existed. If you can create a commons by wholly private construction, public non-prohibition of private construction, public competition with other common projects, or shared consent via exchange, or shared consent by mutual interest, then you are able to construct commons in every possible means rather than by the one means of majority rule – and that the most effective method of constructing commons is to trade with other classes what you have to supply: labor and good normative public behavior, for knowledge, organization, and wealth. While at the same time, no one can create parasitic commons because no such contract can survive the test of natural law that all contracts must survive. Furthermore, without monopoly production of commons there is no reason for politicals to pass legislation or regulation, only facilitate the market for the production of commons – which is in all our interests, and requires very little that we ask of man’s character to work other than by natural incentives. Again, a legal system that takes its decidability from the natural law and evolves by empirical experimentation via the common law, with universal standing and universal applicability, combined with a market for reproduction (family), a market for production of goods and services (the economy), and a market for the production of commons (government in the loosest sense), is the most empirical and truthful non-parasitic order that we can construct. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
  • The Non-obvious Benefits Of Market Government

    (important topic) William Butchman just indirectly reminded me that when I say ‘market government’ is the most likely candidate for creating a beneficial form of ‘post majoritarian rule’ while retaining the benefit of creating non-monopolistic commons:
    a) that groups are not prevented from creating what we call anarchic (private contractual) commons, simply by setting conditions of use for the semi-private property. In other words, the Hoppeian contractual model of commons still exists. b) however, by creating a market for the EXCHANGE of commons, we can conduct trades between classes for the construction of commons, thereby obtaining through the exchange of commons what we cannot obtain through either the market, or by the private production of commons. c) the importance of this insight is that we are all compelled to think of what commons we can offer to others just as we are compelled to think of what private goods and services we can offer to others. The most common exchange will be behavior and norms for material goods, services, access and various forms of insurance. d) and that we can create competing commons (monorail vs trains) where before – only monopoly existed. If you can create a commons by wholly private construction, public non-prohibition of private construction, public competition with other common projects, or shared consent via exchange, or shared consent by mutual interest, then you are able to construct commons in every possible means rather than by the one means of majority rule – and that the most effective method of constructing commons is to trade with other classes what you have to supply: labor and good normative public behavior, for knowledge, organization, and wealth. While at the same time, no one can create parasitic commons because no such contract can survive the test of natural law that all contracts must survive. Furthermore, without monopoly production of commons there is no reason for politicals to pass legislation or regulation, only facilitate the market for the production of commons – which is in all our interests, and requires very little that we ask of man’s character to work other than by natural incentives. Again, a legal system that takes its decidability from the natural law and evolves by empirical experimentation via the common law, with universal standing and universal applicability, combined with a market for reproduction (family), a market for production of goods and services (the economy), and a market for the production of commons (government in the loosest sense), is the most empirical and truthful non-parasitic order that we can construct. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine