Theme: Decidability

  • Asking A Different Question: How Do We Scale Our Ability To Reason?

    Sep 17, 2016 1:43pm So here is the central issue:

    ++Voluntary exchange++vs–Decidability by law–
    ++Positive epistemology++vs–negative epistemology–

    So rather than reason how we might do something as individual thinkers I ask HOW CAN WE CALCULATE SOMETHING by voluntary exchanges within the constraints of natural law. In other words, how do we scale the ability to reason?

  • Belief is Quantifiable, But Justification Isn’t

    IS BELIEF QUANTIFIABLE? YES BUT JUSTIFICATION ISN”T. Belief is already quantifiable by the degree of risk you are willing to take to demonstrate it. It’s not justifiable, but it’s measurable. In most cases, belief is indistinguishable from self-signaling, and other-signalling, and signal vs risk explains the difference between reported belief, and demonstrated belief. In other words, any use of the word ‘belief’ epistemically is either suspect or outright false, unless (like many conveniences) it’s short for “as far as I know”, and not “I am justified in my claim”. THE GRAMMAR OF HEDGING (DETACHMENT)
    • I think I understand / I believe I understand / but it’s nt something I’d risk with my current understanding.
    • I can understand it but I don’t know if it’s possible. / I believe I understand but don’t know if it’s possible / and we shouldn’t do it if it’s costly.
    • As far as I know, it’s possible. / I believe its possible / hard to know if it’s possible/ we can try it if it’s not costly.
    • As far as I know, it’s likely or probable / I believe it’s likely / we might be able to do it / we can try to do it if it’s not too costly.
    • As far as I know, it’s pretty common. / I believe it’s pretty common / we probably can do this / we probably should do this.
    • As far as I know it’s hard to imagine otherwise. / I believe it’s pretty certain./ We should do this / we must do this.
    There is no possible justification for belief. There is possible justification for moral action according to norms. There is possible justification for legal action according to laws. But to conflate justification(knowable norms, laws, and axioms), with Truth (unknowns constantly open to revision) is to conflate excuse making, with warranty, the same way we conflate probability and guessing in the ludic fallacy. Our language arose from local, in-group use. In-group members use moral language, and we use legal language as if it’s moral language. But we live now in a SCALE of human organization far beyond the local, and we have not quite adapted our language, concepts, and institutions to correspond to the SCALE of human organization we live in. Very little of what we discuss is between people with common interests, kinship, knowledge, understanding, experience that was not artificially constructed through media propaganda. (ASIDE: Just as an illustration, when you’re talking to people and they hesitate or stutter, or rephrase, listen for how often they’re trying to take a declarative martial language (Germanic) and rephrase it probabilistically with hedges, the same way we took and hedged martial language with deferential language as economic equality spread through society and hierarchy disappeared. It will shock you to see that not only does pronunciation migrate but so concepts as they work through our language.) So to speak truthfully requires we no longer use the CONSTRUCTIVIST DECEIT: that we speak morally (with ingroup preference) and instead speak either in terms of justificationary axioms, morals, and laws, or we speak in critical (theoretical) epistemology of truths, and we leave behind the philosophical tradition of deception that circumvents costs when we discuss ingroup norms and policy, and include costs when we discuss external/outgroup policy, because we are now all members of outgroups thanks to the scale of our polities – especially in empire America. If it sounds like I just cast most of philosophical discourse into a category along with theological discourse as a great deception….. I did. Hence why I struggle daily to unite philosophy, science, and law into a single discipline with a single language, without room to engage in fraud. 😉 Cheers. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine
  • Belief is Quantifiable, But Justification Isn’t

    IS BELIEF QUANTIFIABLE? YES BUT JUSTIFICATION ISN”T. Belief is already quantifiable by the degree of risk you are willing to take to demonstrate it. It’s not justifiable, but it’s measurable. In most cases, belief is indistinguishable from self-signaling, and other-signalling, and signal vs risk explains the difference between reported belief, and demonstrated belief. In other words, any use of the word ‘belief’ epistemically is either suspect or outright false, unless (like many conveniences) it’s short for “as far as I know”, and not “I am justified in my claim”. THE GRAMMAR OF HEDGING (DETACHMENT)
    • I think I understand / I believe I understand / but it’s nt something I’d risk with my current understanding.
    • I can understand it but I don’t know if it’s possible. / I believe I understand but don’t know if it’s possible / and we shouldn’t do it if it’s costly.
    • As far as I know, it’s possible. / I believe its possible / hard to know if it’s possible/ we can try it if it’s not costly.
    • As far as I know, it’s likely or probable / I believe it’s likely / we might be able to do it / we can try to do it if it’s not too costly.
    • As far as I know, it’s pretty common. / I believe it’s pretty common / we probably can do this / we probably should do this.
    • As far as I know it’s hard to imagine otherwise. / I believe it’s pretty certain./ We should do this / we must do this.
    There is no possible justification for belief. There is possible justification for moral action according to norms. There is possible justification for legal action according to laws. But to conflate justification(knowable norms, laws, and axioms), with Truth (unknowns constantly open to revision) is to conflate excuse making, with warranty, the same way we conflate probability and guessing in the ludic fallacy. Our language arose from local, in-group use. In-group members use moral language, and we use legal language as if it’s moral language. But we live now in a SCALE of human organization far beyond the local, and we have not quite adapted our language, concepts, and institutions to correspond to the SCALE of human organization we live in. Very little of what we discuss is between people with common interests, kinship, knowledge, understanding, experience that was not artificially constructed through media propaganda. (ASIDE: Just as an illustration, when you’re talking to people and they hesitate or stutter, or rephrase, listen for how often they’re trying to take a declarative martial language (Germanic) and rephrase it probabilistically with hedges, the same way we took and hedged martial language with deferential language as economic equality spread through society and hierarchy disappeared. It will shock you to see that not only does pronunciation migrate but so concepts as they work through our language.) So to speak truthfully requires we no longer use the CONSTRUCTIVIST DECEIT: that we speak morally (with ingroup preference) and instead speak either in terms of justificationary axioms, morals, and laws, or we speak in critical (theoretical) epistemology of truths, and we leave behind the philosophical tradition of deception that circumvents costs when we discuss ingroup norms and policy, and include costs when we discuss external/outgroup policy, because we are now all members of outgroups thanks to the scale of our polities – especially in empire America. If it sounds like I just cast most of philosophical discourse into a category along with theological discourse as a great deception….. I did. Hence why I struggle daily to unite philosophy, science, and law into a single discipline with a single language, without room to engage in fraud. 😉 Cheers. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine
  • Informational Content in Operationalism vs Empiricism

    Aug 25, 2016 8:02am There is as great a difference in informational content and therefore truth (decidability), between Operationalism and Empiricism, as there was between empiricism and reason, and between reason, and storytelling. This is why, in the future, people will rely on Propertarianism and Testimonialism over ‘mere’ empiricism, the same way we empiricists rely on empiricism over rationalism. And this in turn, is why Propertarianism and Testimonialism and Operationalism will produce as great a leap forward in the ‘average’ human mind, as scientific thinking using general rules has produced an advance over rational thinking using particularist recipes.

  • Informational Content in Operationalism vs Empiricism

    Aug 25, 2016 8:02am There is as great a difference in informational content and therefore truth (decidability), between Operationalism and Empiricism, as there was between empiricism and reason, and between reason, and storytelling. This is why, in the future, people will rely on Propertarianism and Testimonialism over ‘mere’ empiricism, the same way we empiricists rely on empiricism over rationalism. And this in turn, is why Propertarianism and Testimonialism and Operationalism will produce as great a leap forward in the ‘average’ human mind, as scientific thinking using general rules has produced an advance over rational thinking using particularist recipes.

  • So here is the central issue: ++Voluntary exchange++ vs –Decidability by law–

    So here is the central issue:

    ++Voluntary exchange++ vs –Decidability by law–

    ++Positive epistemology++ vs –negative epistemology–

    So rather than reason how we might do something as individual thinkers I ask HOW CAN WE CALCULATE SOMETHING by voluntary exchanges within the constraints of natural law.

    In other words, how do we scale the ability to reason?


    Source date (UTC): 2016-09-17 06:43:00 UTC

  • The difference is that you won’t spend an entire year on one topic and cover the

    The difference is that you won’t spend an entire year on one topic and cover the entire corpus searching for a method of decidability rather than meaning or utility. That’s the difference. We evolved to search for meaning so that we can discover opportunities. I don’t. I search for decidability in matters of conflict. So most people look for more haystacks to search, and I look for the single needle in each one.


    Source date (UTC): 2016-09-17 06:25:00 UTC

  • No. Morality Is Objective. It’s Just Proscriptive(negative) Not Prescriptive(positive).

    [W]e make the mistake that norms are in fact moral when they may in fact not be. We call norms moral just like we call legislation law. But norms may or may not be decidably moral and legislation and regulation may or may not be decidably law. So positive normative moral pretenses, and negative objective moral prohibitions are very different things. We may not be able to say what is best but we can say what is worst. This is the purpose of all natural law: prohibition. We spend most of our energies trying to rally numbers to different causes, so that we obtain the discounts of may hands making light work for large numbers. But we may rally to any cause one or another. At every given time there is a market for causes to rally in favor of. However, when we say something is moral or immoral, it is not because of the positive ends it achieves, but because it is not a violation of moral limitations. When you say “my portfolio of reproductive interests consists of set X, and your productive portfolio consists of set Y”, that means only that we cannot impose a POSITIVE demand on either person. We can only impose a NEGATIVE limit on both, so that they must trade to obtain what it is that they wish. Evolutionary strategies are not equal but that does not mean that they are not compatible. They are compatible through compromise, not perfection. We seem to evolve toward nash equilibrium in everything we do. This serves evolution as well, since it shuts out the bottom. So it’s true that morality is objective and universal. the problem is that objective and universal morality simply LIMITS what we can demand from each other while preserving cooperation. It does not tell us what is good and we should do, only what is bad and we should not do. That leaves exchange open to choose what is good for all as long as it is bad for none. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute

  • No. Morality Is Objective. It’s Just Proscriptive(negative) Not Prescriptive(positive).

    [W]e make the mistake that norms are in fact moral when they may in fact not be. We call norms moral just like we call legislation law. But norms may or may not be decidably moral and legislation and regulation may or may not be decidably law. So positive normative moral pretenses, and negative objective moral prohibitions are very different things. We may not be able to say what is best but we can say what is worst. This is the purpose of all natural law: prohibition. We spend most of our energies trying to rally numbers to different causes, so that we obtain the discounts of may hands making light work for large numbers. But we may rally to any cause one or another. At every given time there is a market for causes to rally in favor of. However, when we say something is moral or immoral, it is not because of the positive ends it achieves, but because it is not a violation of moral limitations. When you say “my portfolio of reproductive interests consists of set X, and your productive portfolio consists of set Y”, that means only that we cannot impose a POSITIVE demand on either person. We can only impose a NEGATIVE limit on both, so that they must trade to obtain what it is that they wish. Evolutionary strategies are not equal but that does not mean that they are not compatible. They are compatible through compromise, not perfection. We seem to evolve toward nash equilibrium in everything we do. This serves evolution as well, since it shuts out the bottom. So it’s true that morality is objective and universal. the problem is that objective and universal morality simply LIMITS what we can demand from each other while preserving cooperation. It does not tell us what is good and we should do, only what is bad and we should not do. That leaves exchange open to choose what is good for all as long as it is bad for none. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute

  • NOTES ON DANIEL DENNETT’S TALK SELF 1 – Ability To Choose Action. (necessity) 2

    NOTES ON DANIEL DENNETT’S TALK

    SELF

    1 – Ability To Choose Action. (necessity)

    2 – Maximum energy-economic value. (evolutionary utility)

    3 – Center of gravity=”preferential decidability” (seems not only common but universal)

    4 – Competitive centers of gravity (common, but one observer?)

    5 – Undecidable centers of gravity (uncommon but … solipsism to autism?)

    The common Error of mechanistic and material (cells), rather than persistent information within the limits of human actions that the cells make possible. Information can persist across cell lifetimes if only by revisiting memories.

    We evolve from ‘mostly personality’ to ‘mostly memories’.

    As someone who has had many episodes of unconsciousness it is very clear to me that as we ‘wake’ the ‘self’ exists prior to memory, and is identifiable to the increasing layers of introspection.

    It has made me extremely conscious of the change in my ‘self’ how it relies upon my personality’s biases, and then as memory increasingly becomes available, how we adjust perception as we retain consciousness.


    Source date (UTC): 2016-09-07 03:23:00 UTC