Curt Doolittle

Theme: Decidability

  • Sorry But Science Solved Morality – Morality Is Closed.

    —“so yes, science can tell us what is but not what we ought to do.”—

    [T]his is a justificationary position (sophism). |Decidability| = That which is not irreciprocal or false (negatively consequential) -> Value (personal strategy -> Positively Consequential) -> Preference (Inconsequential) [S]cience (law) tells us what we may not do (irreciprocity) – that which is unethical, and immoral. Anything that is not unethical and immoral is merely a PREFERENCE to be settled in the market competition for means and ends. What we ‘ought’ to do is anything we CAN organize voluntarily TO DO that which is not false or irreciprocal. Even so, we can just as equally test positive moral claims by the investments that you make, the externalities caused, and desired outcomes produced. All truth propositions are falsificationary. All moral claims are merely claims that one acts not immorally. All moral propositions, means, and outcomes are testable by reciprocity. All moral propositions are open to triangulation of the returns on investments (compare by ordinality if not cardinality). All moral propositions are decidable by adversarial competition in markets for voluntary production of moral outcomes, given scarcity and competition for means and outcomes. All markets produce empirical results, and as such are scientific. All epistemological questions are the result of falsification by adversarial competition. All moral questions are epistemological questions. All not-evil-immoral-unethical propositions are amoral, ethical, or good, depending upon the means of organizing their production, the structure of their production, and the returns on that production. We can make a claim to means, externalities, or ends, or all three. We can measure the claim, the means, the ends – all three, and do so scientifically. There is nothing in metaphysics, language, psychology, or sociology that cannot be expressed scientifically in these terms. That is a purely scientific statement. Conversely you cannot deny or falsify this statement. Period. If you don’t use these terms one can claim ignorance, on can claim expediency(cost), but one cannot claim anything else. As far as I know, the question of Morality is closed. You can try to create test after test but you will find no test that fails this test.

  • Russell’s Paradox Isn’t

    Russell’s Paradox Isn’t. https://propertarianism.com/2020/02/17/russells-paradox-isnt/

    Source date (UTC): 2020-02-17 22:11:54 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1229528929360392195

  • Russell’s Paradox Isn’t.

    [R]ussell’s Paradox (a version of the liar’s paradox), is not a paradox, it’s an ill formed statement (Grammatical error) because it failed the test of continuously recursive ambiguity – which is what ‘grammar’ means: rules of continuous recursive disambiguation. Nearly all seemingly challenging philosophical questions play on some variation of the verb to be. In the case of the liar’s paradox in all its forms, it’s not a paradox it’s constructed ambiguity. Words don’t mean things. People mean things. They use language well or not well to state their meaning – or their deceit. A number is the name of a position, and beyond the base (glyphs) we use ‘Positional Naming’. We can name anything we choose with a position in an order just like we can name anything else. All that matters is that we all rely on the same names in the same order. Numbers exist as names. That’s it. Nothing else. Mathematics is ill-grounded (vulnerable to grammatical errors) because of sets (platonic, ideal, verbal) rather than operations (gears and geometry). If you explain all mathematics using positional names, gears, and geometry (as it was invented) you do not expose yourself to grammatical errors. The same is true of philosophical (verbal) statements. If you state all statements as promises, in operational prose, in complete sentences, without the ‘cheat’ (or lie) of the verb to be, you will have a very difficult time make grammatical errors. So the entire analytic program (sets) was a failure. So was the attempt to discover a via-positiva scientific method. This is because all epistemology is falsificationary and adversarial, with surviving truth propositions competing in networks of paradigms themselves in falsificationary and adversarial competition. Most of philosophy is little more than sophistry. (really) Everything that isn’t sophistry is in the domain of science including that science we call ‘grammar’.   === COMMENTS ===

    —“Not quite, as Godel presented a mathematical model of this phenomenon. You cannot reduce this to mere positivistic linguistics. On which point, are you not assuming Chomsky’s universal grammar with your definition of grammar? If so, this has been shown to be unempirical.”—Rik Storey

    I didn’t say anything like that. I’m saying that he’s correct. I haven’t met anyone other than the author of the best book on the subject that understands the limit of Godel’s argument: (a) we identify new constant relations (experiences) (b) we invent new references (c) we invent new paradigms (d) we require grammars to talk about them (e) we can make ungrammatical statements. Godel said it. Turing said it. Kripke said it. So there is no closure to logic without appeal to the operational, empirical, limits and completeness, and even then there is only closure on falsification not justification. There is nothing positivistic in P. It’s purely falsificationary. Either it survives adverstarial competition by the terms stated in testimonialism or it doesn’t. If more than one does, then we just don’t know and nothing else can be said.

    —“Oh very well. In that case, we must still follow Godel’s Platonism because of the assumptions we make in a purely sceptical and empirical worldview. That or nihilism are our two consistent options.”—Rik Storey

    I can’t translate that into operational language. I don’t know what you mean. “…we must still follow Godel’s Platonism…” (Godel’s argument was operational, by applying the technique of pairing off (the foundation of mathematics in positional names) producing unique names for operations. Not all statements available in all grammar and vocabulary will be decidable within that grammar and vocabulary. And he did this for the special case of addition as an example, under the presumption the model would hold. But all he is saying is that no language is closed (other than first order logics maybe. Same is true even for math. We can write formulae that are descriptive but not deducible (we can’t write a proof)). and how does that relate to: “purely skeptical and empirical” (Permanently contingent, uncertain, cannot abandon continuous learning and adaptation?) and what do you mean by: “worldview” (means of understanding, predicting, decision making? paradigm?)

    —“I made a similar argument on a Philosophy page. Russell’s paradox is just a domain error. A barber in a set of barbers or a tree in a forest. In the objective empirical world, it’s just a grammatical error. In the abstract world of numbers, a set of all sets must contain itself. “All” being transcendent can break the normal rules.”—Andrew M Gilmour

    yep

  • Russell’s Paradox Isn’t.

    [R]ussell’s Paradox (a version of the liar’s paradox), is not a paradox, it’s an ill formed statement (Grammatical error) because it failed the test of continuously recursive ambiguity – which is what ‘grammar’ means: rules of continuous recursive disambiguation. Nearly all seemingly challenging philosophical questions play on some variation of the verb to be. In the case of the liar’s paradox in all its forms, it’s not a paradox it’s constructed ambiguity. Words don’t mean things. People mean things. They use language well or not well to state their meaning – or their deceit. A number is the name of a position, and beyond the base (glyphs) we use ‘Positional Naming’. We can name anything we choose with a position in an order just like we can name anything else. All that matters is that we all rely on the same names in the same order. Numbers exist as names. That’s it. Nothing else. Mathematics is ill-grounded (vulnerable to grammatical errors) because of sets (platonic, ideal, verbal) rather than operations (gears and geometry). If you explain all mathematics using positional names, gears, and geometry (as it was invented) you do not expose yourself to grammatical errors. The same is true of philosophical (verbal) statements. If you state all statements as promises, in operational prose, in complete sentences, without the ‘cheat’ (or lie) of the verb to be, you will have a very difficult time make grammatical errors. So the entire analytic program (sets) was a failure. So was the attempt to discover a via-positiva scientific method. This is because all epistemology is falsificationary and adversarial, with surviving truth propositions competing in networks of paradigms themselves in falsificationary and adversarial competition. Most of philosophy is little more than sophistry. (really) Everything that isn’t sophistry is in the domain of science including that science we call ‘grammar’.   === COMMENTS ===

    —“Not quite, as Godel presented a mathematical model of this phenomenon. You cannot reduce this to mere positivistic linguistics. On which point, are you not assuming Chomsky’s universal grammar with your definition of grammar? If so, this has been shown to be unempirical.”—Rik Storey

    I didn’t say anything like that. I’m saying that he’s correct. I haven’t met anyone other than the author of the best book on the subject that understands the limit of Godel’s argument: (a) we identify new constant relations (experiences) (b) we invent new references (c) we invent new paradigms (d) we require grammars to talk about them (e) we can make ungrammatical statements. Godel said it. Turing said it. Kripke said it. So there is no closure to logic without appeal to the operational, empirical, limits and completeness, and even then there is only closure on falsification not justification. There is nothing positivistic in P. It’s purely falsificationary. Either it survives adverstarial competition by the terms stated in testimonialism or it doesn’t. If more than one does, then we just don’t know and nothing else can be said.

    —“Oh very well. In that case, we must still follow Godel’s Platonism because of the assumptions we make in a purely sceptical and empirical worldview. That or nihilism are our two consistent options.”—Rik Storey

    I can’t translate that into operational language. I don’t know what you mean. “…we must still follow Godel’s Platonism…” (Godel’s argument was operational, by applying the technique of pairing off (the foundation of mathematics in positional names) producing unique names for operations. Not all statements available in all grammar and vocabulary will be decidable within that grammar and vocabulary. And he did this for the special case of addition as an example, under the presumption the model would hold. But all he is saying is that no language is closed (other than first order logics maybe. Same is true even for math. We can write formulae that are descriptive but not deducible (we can’t write a proof)). and how does that relate to: “purely skeptical and empirical” (Permanently contingent, uncertain, cannot abandon continuous learning and adaptation?) and what do you mean by: “worldview” (means of understanding, predicting, decision making? paradigm?)

    —“I made a similar argument on a Philosophy page. Russell’s paradox is just a domain error. A barber in a set of barbers or a tree in a forest. In the objective empirical world, it’s just a grammatical error. In the abstract world of numbers, a set of all sets must contain itself. “All” being transcendent can break the normal rules.”—Andrew M Gilmour

    yep

  • GOOD EXAMPLE (GODEL, CHOMSKY) —“Not quite, as Godel presented a mathematical m

    GOOD EXAMPLE (GODEL, CHOMSKY)

    —“Not quite, as Godel presented a mathematical model of this phenomenon. You cannot reduce this to mere positivistic linguistics. On which point, are you not assuming Chomsky’s universal grammar with your definition of grammar? If so, this has been shown to be unempirical.”—

    I didn’t say anything like that. I’m saying that he’s correct.

    I haven’t met anyone other than the author of the best book on the subject that understands the limit of Godel’s argument:

    (a) we identify new constant relations (experiences)

    (b) we invent new references

    (c) we invent new paradigms

    (d) we require grammars to talk about them

    (e) we can make ungrammatical statements.

    Godel said it. Turing said it. Kripke said it.

    So there is no closure to logic without appeal to the operational, empirical, limits and completeness, and even then there is only closure on falsification not justification.

    THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM FOR PEOPLE IN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY:

    There is nothing positivistic in P. It’s purely falsificationary. Either it survives adversarial competition by the terms stated in testimonialism or it doesn’t. If more than one does, then we just don’t know and nothing else can be said.

    In general, i have found that the first and most significant hurdle that people have trouble with – at least those not educated in the sciences – is that all propositions are contingent and all truth propositions are achieved by falsification. And P articulates the METHOD for universal falsification.

    ====

    Afterward: Chomsky was trying to bring Turing to language. His original paper is simply pulling Turing into language. Chomsky’s contribution – from my understanding – is correctly stating that:

    (a) the brain produces experience by continuous recursive disambiguation.

    (b) linguistic thought consists of rules of continuous recursive disambiguation.

    (c) grammar regardless of language consists of rules of continuous recursive disambiguation.

    (d) language serves as a system of measurement for thought – albeit we use many different paradigms (metaphysics) within each human language, and these paradigms vary according to the correspondent vs the three non-correspondent (fictionalisms).

    (e) there appear to be higher demands on cognition for higher levels of thought. And we should expect aliens if there are any to use simpler or more complex grammatical structures given their abilities.

    Source date (UTC): 2020-02-17 14:17:00 UTC

  • RUSSELL’ S PARADOX ISNT. Russell’s Paradox (a version of the liar’s paradox), is

    RUSSELL’ S PARADOX ISNT.

    Russell’s Paradox (a version of the liar’s paradox), is not a paradox, it’s an ill formed statement (Grammatical error) because it failed the test of continuously recursive ambiguity – which is what ‘grammar’ means: rules of continuous recursive disambiguation. Nearly all seemingly challenging philosophical questions play on some variation of the verb to be. In the case of the liar’s paradox in all its forms, it’s not a paradox it’s constructed ambiguity. Words don’t mean things. People mean things. They use language well or not well to state their meaning – or their deceit.

    A number is the name of a position, and beyond the base (glyphs) we use ‘Positional Naming’. We can name anything we choose with a position in an order just like we can name anything else. All that matters is that we all rely on the same names in the same order. Numbers exist as names. That’s it. Nothing else.

    Mathematics is ill-grounded (vulnerable to grammatical errors) because of sets (platonic, ideal, verbal) rather than operations (gears and geometry). If you explain all mathematics using positional names, gears, and geometry (as it was invented) you do not expose yourself to grammatical errors.

    The same is true of philosophical (verbal) statements. If you state all statements as promises, in operational prose, in complete sentences, without the ‘cheat’ (or lie) of the verb to be, you will have a very difficult time make grammatical errors.

    So the entire analytic program (sets) was a failure. So was the attempt to discover a via-positiva scientific method. This is because all epistemology is falsificationary and adversarial, with surviving truth propositions competing in networks of paradigms themselves in falsificationary and adversarial competition.

    Most of philosophy is little more than sophistry. (really)

    Everything that isn’t sophistry is in the domain of science including that science we call ‘grammar’.

    Source date (UTC): 2020-02-17 13:39:00 UTC

  • SORRY BUT SCIENCE SOLVED MORALITY – MORALITY IS CLOSED,. —“so yes, science can

    SORRY BUT SCIENCE SOLVED MORALITY – MORALITY IS CLOSED,.

    —“so yes, science can tell us what is but not what we ought to do.”—

    This is a justificationary position (sophism).

    |Decidability| = That which is not irreciprocal or false (negatively consequential) -> Value (personal strategy -> Positively Consequential) -> Preference (Inconsequential)

    Science (law) tells us what we may not do (irreciprocity) – that which is unethical, and immoral. Anything that is not unethical and immoral is merely a PREFERENCE to be settled in the market competition for means and ends.

    What we ‘ought’ to do is anything we CAN organize voluntarily TO DO that which is not false or irreciprocal.

    Even so, we can just as equally test positive moral claims by the investments that you make, the externalities caused, and desired outcomes produced.

    All truth propositions are falsificationary.

    All moral claims are merely claims that one acts not immorally.

    All moral propositions, means, and outcomes are testable by reciprocity.

    All moral propositions are open to triangulation of the returns on investments (compare by ordinality if not cardinality).

    All moral propositions are decidable by adversarial competition in markets for voluntary production of moral outcomes, given scarcity and competition for means and outcomes.

    All markets produce empirical results, and as such are scientific. All epistemological questions are the result of falsification by adversarial competition. All moral questions are epistemological questions.

    All not-evil-immoral-unethical propositions are amoral, ethical, or good, depending upon the means of organizing their production, the structure of their production, and the returns on that production.

    We can make a claim to means, externalities, or ends, or all three. We can measure the claim, the means, the ends – all three, and do so scientifically.

    There is nothing in metaphysics, language, psychology, or sociology that cannot be expressed scientifically in these terms.

    That is a purely scientific statement. Conversely you cannot deny or falsify this statement.

    Period.

    If you don’t use these terms one can claim ignorance, on can claim expediency(cost), but one cannot claim anything else.

    As far as I know, The question of Morality is closed.

    You can try to create test after test but you will find no test that fails this test.

    Source date (UTC): 2020-02-17 12:36:00 UTC

  • The Presumptions in Discourse and Argument in The Positiva and Negativa Traditions

    (CORE) Feb 12, 2020, 9:16 PM [I] would rather let this conversation go forward without my interjection to let the team demonstrate their skills but to save time 0) I use falsification. Falsification in science evolved from falsification by contest (competition, adversarial) in European law. And falsification by adversarial competition in law is our oldest continuous political tradition after sovereignty. 1) I do not presume people have agency, or that they have other than the minimum consciousness and self-reflection and self-regulation to engage in negotiation deception, parasitism, and predation to minimize the costs of obtaining wants and needs by productive voluntary exchange (people only demonstrate the minimum morality necessary to act in their interests.) 2) I do not presume that people seek truth but that people seek to justify priors, to lie, or sow social constructions for manipulation in pursuit of a discount, to engage in fraud, or to engage, or to conspire. 3) I do not presume when I don’t know the answer – I say something from the spectrum “We don’t know, I don’t know yet”, or “as far as I know”, or “we only know x so far”, or” we only know x so far and these possibilities are consistent with what we know so far”, or “as far as I know that’s false”, or “that can’t be true” – as that is the only truthful testimony I can give. 4) The history of all thought consists of the history of falsification of all causal claims other than realism naturalism under operationalism 5) All alternatives, all knowledge claims that are consistent with failure of all alternatives to realism, naturalism, under operationalism, must depend on some incentive other than “we don’t know yet, but all causality will depend upon realism, naturalization under operationalism”. 6) While we can testify to causes of realism naturalism operationalism and empiricism including subjective testing of incentives (rational choice), we cannot possibly testify to any claim that is not dependent upon realism, naturalism, under operationalism, because we cannot claim to have that knowledge, 7) If we can identify incentive, meaning, means motive and opportunity, for giving false testimony, by claiming the untestifiable then there is nothing else to determine – the person is lying. 8) In other words, theology and philosophy, negotiation and chit chat (exchange of signals of safety) seek opportunity for agreement or consent by means motive and opportunity, while, mathematics, logic, science, and law seek opportunity for falsification or decidability in dispute resolution by means motive and opportunity. In other words, if you can’t testify to a claim you’re starting out informing, negotiating, persuading, threatening by lying. Now, in a public forum at distance without direct physical contact I can’t engage in physical punishment for lying. But as a European man, defending the informational commons, I do the best I can in prose.

  • The Presumptions in Discourse and Argument in The Positiva and Negativa Traditions

    (CORE) Feb 12, 2020, 9:16 PM [I] would rather let this conversation go forward without my interjection to let the team demonstrate their skills but to save time 0) I use falsification. Falsification in science evolved from falsification by contest (competition, adversarial) in European law. And falsification by adversarial competition in law is our oldest continuous political tradition after sovereignty. 1) I do not presume people have agency, or that they have other than the minimum consciousness and self-reflection and self-regulation to engage in negotiation deception, parasitism, and predation to minimize the costs of obtaining wants and needs by productive voluntary exchange (people only demonstrate the minimum morality necessary to act in their interests.) 2) I do not presume that people seek truth but that people seek to justify priors, to lie, or sow social constructions for manipulation in pursuit of a discount, to engage in fraud, or to engage, or to conspire. 3) I do not presume when I don’t know the answer – I say something from the spectrum “We don’t know, I don’t know yet”, or “as far as I know”, or “we only know x so far”, or” we only know x so far and these possibilities are consistent with what we know so far”, or “as far as I know that’s false”, or “that can’t be true” – as that is the only truthful testimony I can give. 4) The history of all thought consists of the history of falsification of all causal claims other than realism naturalism under operationalism 5) All alternatives, all knowledge claims that are consistent with failure of all alternatives to realism, naturalism, under operationalism, must depend on some incentive other than “we don’t know yet, but all causality will depend upon realism, naturalization under operationalism”. 6) While we can testify to causes of realism naturalism operationalism and empiricism including subjective testing of incentives (rational choice), we cannot possibly testify to any claim that is not dependent upon realism, naturalism, under operationalism, because we cannot claim to have that knowledge, 7) If we can identify incentive, meaning, means motive and opportunity, for giving false testimony, by claiming the untestifiable then there is nothing else to determine – the person is lying. 8) In other words, theology and philosophy, negotiation and chit chat (exchange of signals of safety) seek opportunity for agreement or consent by means motive and opportunity, while, mathematics, logic, science, and law seek opportunity for falsification or decidability in dispute resolution by means motive and opportunity. In other words, if you can’t testify to a claim you’re starting out informing, negotiating, persuading, threatening by lying. Now, in a public forum at distance without direct physical contact I can’t engage in physical punishment for lying. But as a European man, defending the informational commons, I do the best I can in prose.

  • Why the Threes?

    Feb 13, 2020, 10:00 AM

    —“The Propertarians are the only group that takes trinities seriously.”— (Humor)

    [I]t takes three points to prove a line. Or conversely, it takes at least three points to falsify any other point. Or said differently, it takes at least three markets to produce and equilibrium. It’s not a random thing – our emphasis on trifunctionalism, tripartism, and markets in everything. It’s the optimum order possible for maximizing all opportunities on one end while falsifying the maximum error, bias, irreciprocity and deceit on the other end.