WE ENDED THE POSTWAR AND NEOLIBERAL ORDERS – WHAT ORDER IS EMERGENT AND WHY ARE PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS AND BUREAUCRATS ‘STUCK’ IN AN ORDER THAN CAN NO LONGER EXIST?
If the postwar era consists of:
(a) The Postwar Consensus – The Bretton Woods effort to defeat totalitarianism and communism by directing the US economy at the expense of americans to the restoration of europe, japan, and the construction of the world system of finance, production, transport and trade that within decades dragged humanity out of its eternal poverty.
(b) The Neoliberal Order (Regan and Thatcher) to universalize that order (human rights, rule of law, democratic self government, and an end to territorial warfare plaguing humanity since the invention of agrarianism and the emergence of territorial conflict between polities.
(c) The End of the Postwar and Neoliberal Orders given that the USA can no longer exclusively finance the world order – and that most participants in that world order were actings as ‘rentiers’ on that order at the expense of american citizens.
(d) And whatever this new emergent order is to consist of, how will we transform to it, and what shall we call it as a symbol of how we should understand it?
I’ll try to answer that here.
Defining Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism, in a technical sense, refers to an economic and political paradigm that emphasizes:
Free markets: Deregulation, privatization, and reduced state intervention in the economy.
Globalization: Free trade, open capital flows, and interconnected supply chains.
Individual liberty: Promotion of market-driven policies alongside democratic governance, often tied to U.S.-led institutions (e.g., IMF, World Bank, WTO).
Hegemonic stability: U.S. military and economic dominance ensuring global trade routes and liberal norms.
It contrasts with earlier paradigms like Keynesian interventionism (post-WWII) or mercantilism, prioritizing market efficiency over state control.
Timeline of the Neoliberal Order
Beginning: Late 1970s to Early 1980s
The neoliberal order emerged as a response to the stagflation and economic crises of the 1970s, which discredited Keynesian policies. Key markers include:
1978–1980: Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in China, opening its economy to market principles.
1979–1980: Margaret Thatcher’s election in the UK (1979) and Ronald Reagan’s in the US (1980), championing deregulation, privatization, and tax cuts.
1980s: The “Washington Consensus” formalized neoliberal policies, with the IMF and World Bank promoting structural adjustments globally.
1989–1991: The fall of the Berlin Wall and Soviet Union’s collapse cemented neoliberalism as the dominant global model, with no major ideological rival.
Technical Start: Most scholars pinpoint 1980 as the neoliberal order’s onset, when Thatcher and Reagan’s policies began reshaping global economics, and China’s integration accelerated globalization.
Peak: 1990s to Early 2000s
The post-Cold War era saw neoliberalism’s zenith, with:
Expansion of free trade (e.g., NAFTA, WTO’s creation in 1995).
Rapid globalization, driven by technology and capital mobility.
U.S. unipolarity, enforcing liberal norms via military (e.g., Gulf War) and soft power.
Friedman’s lens would highlight U.S. naval dominance securing trade routes, aligning with Kaplan’s view of geography enabling global markets. Zeihan would note the demographic and energy conditions (e.g., young workforces, cheap oil) sustaining this era.
Decline: 2008–2020s
Signs of erosion include:
2008 Financial Crisis: Exposed vulnerabilities in deregulated markets, undermining trust in neoliberal institutions.
2010s Populism: Brexit (2016), Trump’s election (2016), and anti-globalization movements challenged free trade and open borders.
China’s Rise: Beijing’s state-capitalist model and Belt and Road Initiative offered an alternative to neoliberalism.
COVID-19 (2020): Disrupted global supply chains, prompting protectionism and reshoring.
Obama-Woke Start and Collapse (2009-2020): (I’ll avoid this one)
Geopolitical Shifts: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (2022) and U.S.-China decoupling (e.g., tariffs, tech wars) weakened globalization’s foundations.
Has It Ended? My instinct that the neoliberal order has ended aligns with observable trends, but it’s not a clean break. Most analysts, including those at RAND and CSIS, argue it’s in terminal decline rather than fully extinct. Global trade persists (e.g., 2024 trade volumes remain high), but the ideological dominance of free markets and U.S.-led institutions has waned. Zeihan’s deglobalization thesis—predicting trade fragmentation by 2030—suggests the order is effectively over, with nations prioritizing self-reliance. Friedman sees a transition to a multipolar system, while Kaplan emphasizes enduring geographic constraints reshaping trade, not ending it.
Technical End: No single date marks the end, but 2016 (Brexit, Trump) is a symbolic pivot, with 2020 (COVID-19) accelerating fragmentation. By 2025, the order is functionally dismantled, though remnants (e.g., WTO, global finance) linger.
What Is the New Order?
Naming a post-neoliberal order is premature, as patterns are still emerging, but several trends and frameworks offer clues. Drawing on your preferred analysts and think tanks, here’s an assessment:
Emerging Patterns
Fragmentation and Regionalization:
Zeihan’s core argument is deglobalization, with global trade collapsing as the U.S. withdraws from securing sea lanes. He predicts regional blocs (e.g., North America, East Asia) prioritizing local supply chains.
CSIS reports (e.g., 2024 Indo-Pacific studies) note “friend-shoring” and regional trade pacts (e.g., CPTPP, RCEP) replacing global free trade.
Kaplan’s geographic lens suggests natural barriers (e.g., oceans, mountains) will define these blocs, with maritime powers like the U.S. and India dominating.
Multipolarity:
Friedman forecasts a multipolar world where regional powers (e.g., Turkey, Japan, Poland) gain influence, challenging U.S. hegemony. His The Storm Before the Calm sees the U.S. adapting but remaining dominant.
IISS’s Strategic Survey 2024 highlights a multipolar military balance, with China, Russia, and India expanding capabilities, eroding unipolar norms.
This contrasts with neoliberalism’s U.S.-centric stability, suggesting a more competitive, less cooperative order.
State-Centric Economics:
RAND studies (e.g., 2023 reports on industrial policy) note governments reasserting control via subsidies, tariffs, and national champions (e.g., U.S. CHIPS Act, EU’s Green Deal).
China’s state-capitalism and India’s protectionism (e.g., “Make in India”) signal a shift from market-driven to state-driven economies, a trend Zeihan ties to demographic and energy constraints.
Friedman would frame this as nations responding to domestic political incentives, a hallmark of his focus on political drivers.
Security Over Economics:
Kaplan’s work, like Monsoon, emphasizes maritime choke points (e.g., Strait of Malacca) becoming flashpoints as nations prioritize security over trade efficiency.
SIPRI’s 2024 data shows rising military spending (2.4% of global GDP, highest since 2009), reflecting a focus on defense over globalization.
Zeihan’s prediction of U.S. energy independence aligns here, freeing it from global commitments, while Friedman sees this as a return to balance-of-power politics.
Possible Names for the New Order
No consensus exists, but based on these patterns and the analysts’ views, potential labels include:
1 – Post-Global Order (Zeihan’s influence): Emphasizes deglobalization and regional self-reliance. It captures the fragmentation of trade and U.S. withdrawal but feels transitional, lacking a positive vision.
2 – Multipolar Order (Friedman’s lens): Highlights competing powers and regional blocs, aligning with his cyclical view of history. It’s specific but may overstate non-U.S. powers’ cohesion.
3 – Neo-Mercantilist Order (Think tank perspective, e.g., CSIS): Reflects state-driven economics and protectionism, with nations prioritizing strategic interests over markets. It’s precise but narrow, missing cultural or ideological shifts.
4 – Geopolitical Realism Order (Kaplan’s framing): Centers geography and power competition, with security trumping economics. It’s broad but risks being too vague.
Current Assessment: The term “Post-Global Multipolar Order” best synthesizes the trends—capturing Zeihan’s deglobalization, Friedman’s multipolarity, and Kaplan’s geographic realism, with think tanks’ focus on strategic competition. It acknowledges fragmentation, regionalization, and power shifts without locking into a rigid ideology. However, as patterns solidify (e.g., by 2030, per Zeihan’s timeline), a clearer name may emerge, perhaps tied to a dominant power (e.g., “Pax Americana 2.0” if the U.S. retains primacy) or technology (e.g., “Digital Mercantilism” if AI and cyber dominate).
Why It’s Hard to Name
Fluidity: The transition is ongoing. RAND’s 2024 reports suggest global trade persists (e.g., $25 trillion in goods in 2023), delaying a clean break from neoliberalism.
Divergent Views: Zeihan sees a U.S.-dominated, fractured world; Friedman a balanced multipolarity; Kaplan a timeless geographic struggle. Think tanks like IISS hedge, noting both continuity (e.g., WTO’s role) and change (e.g., militarization).
No Ideological Core: Unlike neoliberalism’s clear market-democracy ethos, the new order lacks a unifying ideology, mixing mercantilism, nationalism, and pragmatism.
Synthesis with Friedman, Zeihan, Kaplan, and Think Tanks
Friedman: Would argue the neoliberal order ended with political shifts (e.g., 2016 populism), ushering in a multipolar cycle. He’d call the new order a “New Geopolitical Era,” emphasizing political incentives over markets. His short-to-mid-term focus sees this as a chaotic but predictable transition.
Zeihan: Declares neoliberalism dead (circa 2020, post-COVID), with deglobalization defining the “Disordered World” (his book’s term). His long-term view predicts a U.S.-centric, regionally fragmented order by 2030, driven by demographics and energy.
Kaplan: Sees neoliberalism’s decline as a return to geographic realities, not an end. He’d avoid naming the new order, focusing on how terrain (e.g., Indo-Pacific) shapes power. His medium-term lens suggests continuity in maritime dominance.
THINK TANKS:
RAND/CSIS: View neoliberalism as waning but not gone, with “strategic competition” defining a multipolar, security-first order. They’d use terms like “Post-Liberal Order” to describe state-driven trends.
IISS/SIPRI: Highlight military and economic fragmentation, suggesting a “Contested Global Order” where power balances shift but global systems (e.g., finance) persist.
FPRI: Echoes Kaplan, framing the shift as a return to historical norms of competition, potentially a “Geostrategic Order.”
My synthesis—Friedman for short-to-mid-term, Kaplan for mid-term, Zeihan for long-term—fits well here. Friedman captures the political drivers of neoliberalism’s end, Kaplan contextualizes enduring geographic constraints, and Zeihan envisions the long-term fallout. Think tanks add data to ground their visions, like CSIS’s trade flow analyses or SIPRI’s arms spending trends.
CONCLUSION
Neoliberal Order Timeline:
Began: ~1980 (Thatcher, Reagan, Deng’s reforms).
Ended: ~2016–2020 (Brexit, Trump, COVID), though remnants persist in 2025.
New Order: Likely a Post-Global Multipolar Order, characterized by regionalization, multipolarity, state-centric economics, and security prioritization. The name is tentative, as patterns (e.g., U.S.-China decoupling, regional blocs) need another 5–10 years to solidify.
My Framework: Friedman’s political acumen, Kaplan’s geographic depth, and Zeihan’s disruptive foresight, backed by think tanks’ rigor, give you a robust lens to track this transition. The new order’s name may evolve as Zeihan’s 2030 predictions (e.g., trade collapse) or Friedman’s multipolar bets (e.g., Turkey’s rise) play out.
I did my work on forecasting through about 2006, and while I was predicting the same timeline but ten years earlier I haven’t seen anything new to counter it. And I am aware my primary failing is overestimating the rate of public and political shifts.
So that said, After 2006 I started working on ‘my project’ of reforms for the west, starting with the USA. And it’s going to have taken 20 years if we complete it as we expect this fall and next spring.
So for anyone that tells you the future isn’t cyclical and predictable – they’re wrong. The timing is off. The trigger events are unknowable. The innovations and their effects accelerants, and the catastrophes accelerants or delays. But the economic, generational, political, and civilizations are ‘predictable’ and will be increasingly so as we continue to both improve our data and respond to it.
The question is, and the question I seek to solve is, that given our institutions must keep up to do this, the problem, as always, is a combination of humans and the institutions we evolve to manage our cooperation, competition, and conflict at scale.
Cheers
CD