Communes are a durable fantasy of feminine thinking.
But there are no survivable female societies, and the one we have left is evidence of what happened in the past: when men are decimated by war, women can, for a time, form female centric orders – until other men want their bodies, their livestock, or their territory.
So, the fantasy of Non-Paternal societies presumes that men as a group would allow you those freedoms. Because they could easily reduce you to slavery. After all, the europeans are the product of the steppe invasion who killed 90% of men, older women, and kept the young as sex and labor slaves. :).
Men only need dormitories (the precursors of christian monasteries) to take care of one another. They could instead, and generally do, form barracks instead – since together than can easily force others to do their will. Without a fence of men, women cannot even protect one another.
The truth is this: our experiment with intergenerational redistribution has failed because women will not bear enough children to pay for their retirement. And women consume 70% of government resources, when men over 30 provide 65% of government resources.
So what I think we mean is that the family is no longer a viable institution. And female employability will be replaced almost entirely by automation – far more so than male labor. This intersexual conflict is suicide.
Yes women are social creatures. But men are political creatures. The social order is dependent upon the political order, and the political order is dependent upon the military order – and this will never, ever, cease.
No. Groups use different strategies, those strategies reflect their degree of neoteny, degree of development, and their group evolutionary strategy. Semitic group srategy whether jewish or muslim is hostile to western group strategy. Deal with it. Jews are integrating out outbreeding rapidly in the USA, despite their fondness for industries that profit from ‘baiting into hazard’ (asymmetric risk). And their group strategy is separatist and hostile. Muslims show no sign of integation and their group strategy is conquest by demographic and cultural means. Hence the destruction of six civilizations of teh ancient world, and theh lost of their arts, letters, traditions and rates of development.
Third-World Leftism is a form of leftist ideology that attributes the poverty and underdevelopment of nations in Latin America, Africa, the Caribbean, and parts of Eurasia primarily to historical and ongoing exploitation by Western powers. It interprets underdevelopment as a consequence of colonialism, imperialism, and unequal global exchange, and prescribes anti-imperialist, nationalist, and state-centered policies—such as protectionism, nationalization, and autarky—to achieve economic independence and social justice.
Our NLI Assessment
This criticism consists largely of status signaling, and is only possible because of the unfication of the world by the postwar order and the development of technology that exposes less developed countries, the regions, and peoples within them to their relative position. Prior to the industrial revolution, and certainly into it’s first decades, agrarian and population expansion was the only means of increasing wealth. As such most of history consisted of attempts to capture territory, labor, and resources as the only means of increasing wealth. After the industrial revolution industrialization and modernization were more impactful than acquisition of more territory. The only value of colonies then, were the natural resources. The net effect is that colonies were more costly than valuable which is one of the reasons for postwar decolonization.
There are two factors that determine the consequences of colonization:
a) which european country performed the colonization, and the stage of that country’s cultural and institutional development. The anglo-Dutch invented the trade system and the anglos invented the modern rule of law state. This is because these were the two most developed countries with the greatest seafaring demand for trade. The french and Spanish were less developed. The french retained both the authoritarianism of the cathoic chuch and of the monarchy – even after the revolution, and more so after napoleon. The Spanish, less developed than the french retained the feudal biases that they brought to south america as neo feudalism. The Russians brought their eurasian authoritarianism of the mongols to bear and not through trade but through conquest and resources. So whether you were an anglo or duct colony, a french, spanish, or russian, determined the standards of government that were brought to the colony. You were lucky if an anglo colony. Not so much anyone else’s.
b) The state of development both culturally and institutionally of the colonized country, territory, or people. The less developed the more forcible the organization necessary to reform tribal or chieftain or kingdom or empire into sufficient economic and political organization that trade was possible in that region. The more backward, the greater shock, the more advanced teh colonizers, the more beneficial the colonization despite the shocks = over the long term.
The problem remains is that the more tribal and politically immature the region (islam, africa) the more challenging the adjustment. At present Islam is still going through it’s adaptive crisis with great turmoil, south america is finally maturing out of feudalism, and it’s failed experiments with cetnralized socialism, and southeast asia appears to be doing just fine given they are more neotenic civilizations with greater homogeneity to start with.
Third-World Leftism = a diagnosis and a prescription.
Diagnosis (causal claim): Underdevelopment in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and parts of Southern Eurasia is primarily the consequence of external predation: slavery, colonial extraction, unequal exchange, imperial wars/coups, corporate exploitation, sanctions, debt regimes.
Prescription (policy claim): Therefore the path to development is anti-imperial mobilization—nationalization, import-substitution, strategic autarky, single-party discipline, and redistribution—until external dependence is neutralized.
Everything hangs on the word primarily. If external causes explain most variance, TWL is directionally right; if they explain a minority once we control for internal constraints, TWL misallocates agency and selects counter-productive strategies.
Development = f( constraints, capital formation, governance )
Constraints: geography (market access, navigable waterways, arable land), disease burden, climate volatility, distance to frontier, initial human capital, population age structure.
Capital formation: physical (roads, ports, power), human (education, health), institutional (property/contract enforcement, fiscal capacity), social (trust outside kin/clan), technological (adoption, export sophistication).
TWL emphasizes external shocks in constraints and governance (colonial rules, foreign interference) and terms of trade in capital formation. A complete model must allocate weights across exogenous and endogenous drivers and test the counterfactual trajectory under feasible policy choices.
Exogenous (external) channels
Enslavement & extraction: demographic collapse, capital drain, predatory institutions.
Demography: high fertility → capital dilution; urbanization without industrialization.
Education & health lags: slow accumulation of skills and labor productivity.
Inference: External causes raised the starting difficulty and distorted institutional paths; but persistent underperformance is typically multiplicative—external shocks interacting with domestic institutional choices. The decisive margin for takeoff is governance quality under constraint.
TWL underestimates: (a) the scarcity of state capacity, (b) the time-limited nature of protection, (c) the necessity of export discipline to discover productivity, and (d) the importance of predictable reciprocity with capital (domestic + foreign). It correctly identifies: (e) predatory histories; (f) unequal bargaining power; (g) the moral hazard in some external programs.
Border test: Countries with similar colonial trauma but different governance quality should diverge. (e.g., Botswana vs. neighbors; Mauritius vs. peers.)
Commodity cycle test: During price booms, do TWL regimes convert rents into non-resource exports/productivity? If not, the binding constraint is domestic capability, not external oppression.
Openness with reciprocity test: Where rule-of-law + openness rise together, does growth accelerate despite past exploitation? If yes, primary causality shifts inward.
Policy reversal test: When TWL policies are relaxed toward export discipline and macro realism, do outcomes improve? (Chile post-1990, Vietnam post-Doi Moi.)
If TWL were primarily right, autarkic or high-protection regimes would systematically outperform open but rules-based regimes among otherwise similar countries. The cross-country record shows the opposite.
Narrative: From 1970s oil bonanza to 1980s debt crisis; 1999 Bolivarian revolution; 2000s–2010s nationalizations, price controls, exchange controls; sanctions in late 2010s.
External factors: Commodity volatility; some sanction effects (later stage); historical oil concessions shaped a rentier state.
Internal dynamics (binding): Oil-rent substitution for taxation → weak fiscal consent; chronic overvaluation → non-oil tradables collapse; expropriation without capability transfer; price/exchange controls → shortages, capital flight; politicized PDVSA de-skilling.
Counterfactual: With a Norway-style fund + realistic FX + competitive non-oil policy, vulnerability remains but collapse is avoidable. External antagonism is insufficient to explain the scale of failure.
External: Embargo and lost Soviet subsidies were large shocks.
Internal: Central planning’s productivity ceiling; dual currency distortions; repression of private enterprise; skill formation high but absent incentives for innovation/export.
Outcome: Good basic human development for income level; poor productivity and growth. External pressure mattered, but system design caps prosperity.
External: US interventions, civil wars, coffee/banana price swings, gangs shaped by US deportations; terms-of-trade shocks; hurricanes.
Internal: Highly concentrated land/property rights; weak courts/policing; fiscal incapacity; criminal governance in corridors; political polarization. Costa Rica avoided militarization, invested in education/tourism/eco-exports → better outcomes.
Inference: History of intervention raised violence; yet domestic elite bargains and state capacity determine divergence (Costa Rica vs. Northern Triangle).
Internal:
Botswana: early property clarity over diamonds, conservative macro, rule-bound bureaucracy → compounding gains despite landlocked geography. Zimbabwe: expropriation without capacity, monetary collapse. Zambia: copper dependence; SOE inefficiency; gradual reform improved but vulnerable to cycles. South Africa: world-class firms/infrastructure but apartheid’s human-capital scar + governance decay (state capture) limit TFP.
Inference: Same region, similar external winds; rule quality and rent management dominate long-run variance.
Strengths (what it gets right)
Moral accounting: It keeps the historical bill of damages visible (slavery, conquest, coups, sanctions).
Bargaining realism: Highlights power asymmetries in trade, finance, and IP.
Elite discipline: Points out that foreign alignment can entrench domestic compradors.
Social cohesion: Emphasizes distributional legitimacy as a development input.
Weaknesses (what breaks in practice)
Primary-cause error: Over-weights exogenous causes in contemporary underperformance, under-weights state capacity + policy quality.
Capability neglect: Treats nationalization as transfer of ownership rather than transfer of know-how (which rarely transfers without reciprocity incentives).
Protection without clocks: Uses tariffs/controls as permanent shelter, not time-boxed scaffolding to force export discipline.
Reciprocity failure: Unpredictable treatment of capital (domestic/foreign) raises risk premia, starving precisely the investment needed to escape dependency.
Information poverty: Isolation reduces learning-by-export and technology diffusion—the very engines of catch-up.
Pragmatic correction
Replace “break dependency first” with “earn bargaining power first” through export competitiveness, institutional credibility, and human-capital compounding. Interdependence under reciprocal, rules-based constraints beats autarky.
Decidability tests (without discretion): Did policy raise non-resource tradable exports per capita within 10–15 years?
Did TFP and electricity generation per worker trend up persistently?
Did the tax base (non-resource) deepen?
Did schooling-adjusted learning outcomes and infant mortality converge toward frontier?
Truth tests (scope-limited claims): “Sanctions reduced output” → quantify pre/post differentials vs. unaffected neighbors controlling for commodity cycles.
“Nationalization improved capability” → track O&M performance, downtime, and cost curves vs. private comparators.
Judgment (residual discretion): When evidence is mixed, choose remedies that minimize irreciprocity: time-boxed protection, transparent rent-to-results contracts, sovereign wealth funds with rule locks, predictably compensable expropriation.
Macrostability first: credible, boring monetary/fiscal rules; FX realism; independent statistics.
Capacity before control: professionalize revenue, courts, and procurement before ambitious industrial policy.
Open regionalism: scale markets via regional power/standards pools; trade corridors and ports.
Human capital flywheel: teacher quality, basic health, and firm-linked vocational pipelines.
Rent-to-capability contracts: in resources and utilities, convert rents into local supplier development under auditable milestones.
Sovereign wealth & rule locks: insulation from commodity cycles; fiscal councils; transparent dividend rules.
Diaspora & FDI reciprocity: attract know-how with predictable rights, fast dispute resolution, and local-partner protections.
Third-World Leftism is morally intelligible and historically grounded but strategically unsound when it treats external antagonism as the primary cause of present underdevelopment and autarky/statism as the primary cure. The binding constraint in most cases is capability—administrative, productive, and legal. Where states built those capabilities and coupled them to export discipline under reciprocal rules, catch-up occurred despite predatory histories. Where they didn’t, no amount of anti-imperial rhetoric compensated.
Aristotle alone is the greatest contributor to human history. And yes that’s an empirical judgement. Unfortunately the equally influential characters (jesus and mohammed) were producing a counter-revolution against greco-roman-persian aristocratic thought which required a higher level of trust than middle easterners could possibly practice. The persians, despite their advantage, lost it because of Islam. The romans lost it because of christianity and invasion. But Europe pulled out of its dark age. The rest of the world, which islam is hostile to (and perhaps judaism as well), is attempting to either constrain islam from further damage, or in europe’s case, cause it to reform as europeans reformed christianity in to secular natural law.
Huntington’s Culture Matters supplies the behavioral–normative bridge:
– Neural: innate temperament and cognitive bias. – Cultural: codified and transmitted preferences for truth, reciprocity, responsibility. – Institutional: formalization of those preferences into law and governance. – Civilizational: accumulation of accomplishments (Murray) under sustained epistemic norms (Mokyr).
It explains how the demand for truth and reciprocity becomes moral habit — the necessary precondition for decidable cooperation.
Comparative Insights
This schema allows direct operationalization of cultural variables into our measurement grammar.
Summary Culture Matters adds the moral-psychological substrate missing from both Murray and Mokyr. It demonstrates empirically that belief in causality, personal responsibility, and reciprocity precedes institutional and civilizational success.
That triad produces the full causal chain of cooperation—from value to institution to output—capturing both the internal (moral) and external (institutional) prerequisites of civilizational excellence.
It’s testimonial truth, reason, empiricism, the sciences, the unification of the world through sail, the agrarian and industrial revolutions, medicine, technology, computation, bayesian computation, cognitive science, behavioral, micro, political, and macro economics, rule of law, human rights …
THE WORLD the boomers, Jones and gen-x grew up in no longer exists. It has nothing to do with them. It has everything to do with the rest of the world ‘catching up’ to six hundred years of european advantage: rationalism, empiricism, science, technology, republican government, rule of law, education and a vibrant capitalist economy.
The question is, why are Gens Milennial and Z so uneducated, indoctrinated, unfit, and dependent? Well? It’s women in education and the media…. Really.
The people of the Ukrainian forest–steppe are old — deeply archaic in population continuity — but their language and ethnonym (“Slav”) are relatively recent cultural overlays.
Let’s make that causal chain explicit.
I. Population vs. Language: Two Different Clocks
So, when we call early medieval groups “Slavs,” we’re referring to a linguistic and cultural unification of populations that had already been there for thousands of years.
II. Archaic Continuity of the Ukrainian Population Refugial Descent – The population of the Dnieper basin and surrounding forest-steppe descends directly from Late Paleolithic foragers of the East-Central European refugium (Epigravettian and post-Glacial groups). → This makes them among the oldest continuous populations in Europe in a geographic sense.
Cultural Layers Over Time The same biological stock evolves through a sequence of archaeological cultures: Epigravettian → Mesolithic (Kukrek) → Neolithic (Dnieper-Donets) → Eneolithic (Trypillia contact zone) → Bronze Age (Corded Ware / Trzciniec) → Iron Age (Zarubintsy) → Proto-Slavic (Korchak, Pen’kovka). Each represents incremental technological or linguistic accretions, not population replacement.
Minimal Discontinuity Despite Invasions Steppe nomads (Cimmerians, Scythians, Sarmatians, Goths, Huns) introduced elite layers or limited admixture but never replaced the dense, forest-based agrarian population. → The open steppe changes hands; the riverine forest zone remains continuous.
Thus, the “Slavs of Ukraine” in physical anthropology are the direct descendants of archaic local peoples, not migrants from elsewhere.
III. Late Emergence of the Slavic Language
Proto-Indo-European Stage (~3500 BC) The Yamnaya horizon on the Pontic steppe (including modern Ukraine) disseminates the Indo-European linguistic structure. But the forest-steppe farmers to the northwest (ancestors of the Slavs) are likely bilingual: local substrate + Indo-European superstrate.
Balto-Slavic Differentiation (~2000 BC) The languages north of the steppe (modern Belarus–Ukraine–Poland zone) form the Balto-Slavic continuum, distinct from Indo-Iranian and Germanic. Genetic continuity supports a shared northeastern forest origin.
Slavic Divergence (~1500–500 BC) Gradual phonological and grammatical drift isolates Proto-Slavic from Baltic; this language becomes common across a broad but still small region.
Demographic Expansion (~500–800 AD) The fall of Rome, depopulation of Central Europe, and collapse of steppe powers allow these long-stable forest populations to expand explosively, spreading the Slavic language and identity. → Linguistic expansion over old genetic substrate.
Hence, the Slavic language horizon is young, but its speakers are ancient.
IV. Operational Model: Archaic Body, Modern Tongue Layer
So: the people of early medieval Ukraine are linguistically recent Slavs but biologically ancient Eurasians — one of the most continuous populations north of the Mediterranean world.
V. Analytic Summary
Yes: The populations of the Ukrainian region are archaic, in that they descend from Paleolithic/Mesolithic survivors of the East-European refugium. Yes: The Slavic language and cultural identity are comparatively late overlays that expanded across these long-stable populations. No: There was not a wholesale migration of “Slavic peoples” into Ukraine; rather, the language spread through existing populations already there, producing an illusion of sudden appearance.
In evolutionary terms: the Slavs are old bodies, young words — an ancient gene pool that only later acquired a linguistic and cultural label.
RACES I share this kind of thing with regularity. But why is it necessary?
The feminine cognitive attempt to rewrite history in teh same manner the semitic civilizations promoted mythicism instead of history: loading, framing, and deceiving.
There are three primary actors in the pseudoscientific attack on human differences. 1) Boaz and boazian anthropology all of which is, as stated above, mythicism – there is no science behind it. 2) The frankfurt school of social science, which, as stated above, produced mythicism – again, they literally ‘made it up’ – there is no science behind it. 3) Perhaps most importantly, Lewontin, and lewontin’s fallacy of the non-existence of race because of statistical fictionalisms (mythicism) he invented and which have no logical or scientific foundation. All of these people were jewish, meaning, of semitic genetic and cultural extraction. Jewish culture is the most advance culture using the feminine strategy, just as europeans are the most using the masculine strategy.
I shouldn’t perhaps have to illustrate the female tendency to storytell (semitic mythicism) vs the male tendency to testify (european history). Nor point out that the intellectual elites in the middle east copied what they could of european thought, but used it to advance their feminine strategy (authoritarian falsehood) over the extant and obviously more successful masculine strategy (rational and empirical truth).
