Curt Doolittle

Theme: Civilization

  • Daniel Gurpide 1. We should be aware that we are living in an interregnum (postm

    Daniel Gurpide

    1. We should be aware that we are living in an interregnum (postmodernity), a period of waiting during which destiny hangs between two options: either to complete the triumph of the egalitarian conception of the world (the end of history), or to promote a historical regeneration.

    (CD: Agreed)

    2. Is European civilization going to expand or contract? No doubt the free capital to adapt is still there – for how long is another question.

    But where is the plan, the idea (the myth) that can ignite consciousness? The Propertarian Institute should have the ambition of designing this map, able to take us to port while avoiding the most obvious pitfalls.

    (CD: I think that I see that as our purpose, yes)

    3. If we take a look at some of the most recent ‘sovereignty and freedom’ campaigns among Europeans:

    A. Catalonian parody: a bunch of flea-ridden commies who proclaimed the independent republic of Catalonia and among other things wanted to outsource the defense of the territory to another European state?!?

    B. Brexit fiasco: Nigel Farage, an Englishman with a French name and a German wife, collaborated with Boris Johnson, an Englishman of Turkish descent married to a woman of Indian descent, and Michael Gove, a Scotsman married to a Jewish woman of, probably German descent, to take Britain out of Europe. Also on their team were Priti Patel who was born in London to a Uganda Asian family, and Gisela Stuart who was born in Germany. This dedicated band of ‘Britons’ persuaded the British people to “take back their borders” and keep out the foreigners. If it wasn’t so serious it would be funny. Commonwealth immigrants were entitled to vote in the referéndum, but Europeans settled in the UK were not entitled. Also barred from voting were Britons living elsewhere in Europe . Most likely in a near future: Labour comes back to 10th Downing Street with James Corbyn (an admirer of Hugo Chaves) as PM.

    C. Ukrainian tragedy (among the different intra-european nationalist projects, I have the warmest feelings for Ukrainians): Ukraine should have played the role of connecting bridge between Russia and the EU. After a series of catastrophic decisions (I don’t want to start apportioning blame now), the relations with Russia will remain fouled for a long, long time, and economic integration with the EU will not be a possibility for at least 40 years (I think that is the ultimate goal ofthe Russian military campaign in the East).

    Old formulas, disconnected from historical and geopolitical reality, do not work.

    (CD: I have too much knowledge of ukrainian circumstances and I see the Intermarium as necessary, not the preservation of ukraine as a torn state.)

    4. Europe, despite current appearances, continues to be the only reality with potential historically to mobilise the European population. This is much more than so in respect of either the tangible and concrete nation-states—devoid today of any vis politica—or of those regional tendencies that will never come to represent even vestigial resistance to the formation of already moribund nation-states. In this sense—and contrary to anti-European propaganda—struggle for the construction of Europe is the most ‘realistic’ political position currently available.

    (CD: I see a europe with a weak judicial federation in the ancient model, rather than a peer of the USA. So I see the opposite. The restoration of the european model with a weak federal judiciary (the role played by a church).

    5. An extension of patriotism is needed—a higher patriotism which proclaims: ‘I am a European and therefore the heir of an ancient culture which has civilised the whole world.’ Only then will Magna Europe dominate the world, as is its birthright.

    (CD: well, people pay the cost of patriotism when it is in their interest, either to seize an opportunity or to prevent a harm.)

    6. Imperium and Empire must not be confused with each other. In fact, the notion of Imperium has found its truth and perfect realisation more in efforts that led to the establishment of the Roman Republic than in the maintenance of the post-Julian Empire. The notion of Imperium reflects a will to cosmic order, and it is this order that organises hierarchically the various ‘gentes’ living under the protection of Rome. In theory and in practice, Imperium is at the antipodes of any sort of ‘universalism.’ It does not seek to reduce humankind to one and the same; rather, it seeks to preserve diversity in a world heading towards unification.

    (CD: I think I can express that less emphemistically but yes. the problem is, what is the incentive. Or rather *the incentive is intuitied by some. But in this interregnum, the market for various incentives has caused a bifurcation.*)

    7. I also see speciation as an opportunity. But this time, speciation will take place due to a self-conscious decision, and the whole planet will be its stage. In that sense, I’m a Nietzschean, as you know. He was the first thinker who, in view of a world-history emerging for the first time, asked the decisive question and thought through its metaphysical implications. The question is: Is man, as man in his nature till now, prepared to assume dominion over the whole earth? If not, what must happen to man as he is, so that he may be able to ‘subject’ the earth and thereby reclaim an old legacy? Must man as he is then not be brought beyond himself if he is to fulfill this task? This thinking concerns us, concerns Europe, concerns the whole earth not just today but tomorrow even more.

    (CD: This last bit takes some work to get thru. But I see the choice of monopoly world order of increasing parasitism and dysgenia, and market world order of increasing eugenia as a fairly obvious one. )

    Source date (UTC): 2017-11-13 09:07:00 UTC

  • Daniel Gurpide 1. We should be aware that we are living in an interregnum (postm

    Daniel Gurpide 1. We should be aware that we are living in an interregnum (postmodernity), a period of waiting during which destiny hangs between two options: either to complete the triumph of the egalitarian conception of the world (the end of history), or to promote a historical regeneration. (CD: Agreed) 2. Is European civilization going to expand or contract? No doubt the free capital to adapt is still there – for how long is another question. But where is the plan, the idea (the myth) that can ignite consciousness? The Propertarian Institute should have the ambition of designing this map, able to take us to port while avoiding the most obvious pitfalls. (CD: I think that I see that as our purpose, yes) 3. If we take a look at some of the most recent ‘sovereignty and freedom’ campaigns among Europeans: A. Catalonian parody: a bunch of flea-ridden commies who proclaimed the independent republic of Catalonia and among other things wanted to outsource the defense of the territory to another European state?!? B. Brexit fiasco: Nigel Farage, an Englishman with a French name and a German wife, collaborated with Boris Johnson, an Englishman of Turkish descent married to a woman of Indian descent, and Michael Gove, a Scotsman married to a Jewish woman of, probably German descent, to take Britain out of Europe. Also on their team were Priti Patel who was born in London to a Uganda Asian family, and Gisela Stuart who was born in Germany. This dedicated band of ‘Britons’ persuaded the British people to “take back their borders” and keep out the foreigners. If it wasn’t so serious it would be funny. Commonwealth immigrants were entitled to vote in the referéndum, but Europeans settled in the UK were not entitled. Also barred from voting were Britons living elsewhere in Europe . Most likely in a near future: Labour comes back to 10th Downing Street with James Corbyn (an admirer of Hugo Chaves) as PM. C. Ukrainian tragedy (among the different intra-european nationalist projects, I have the warmest feelings for Ukrainians): Ukraine should have played the role of connecting bridge between Russia and the EU. After a series of catastrophic decisions (I don’t want to start apportioning blame now), the relations with Russia will remain fouled for a long, long time, and economic integration with the EU will not be a possibility for at least 40 years (I think that is the ultimate goal ofthe Russian military campaign in the East). Old formulas, disconnected from historical and geopolitical reality, do not work. (CD: I have too much knowledge of ukrainian circumstances and I see the Intermarium as necessary, not the preservation of ukraine as a torn state.) 4. Europe, despite current appearances, continues to be the only reality with potential historically to mobilise the European population. This is much more than so in respect of either the tangible and concrete nation-states—devoid today of any vis politica—or of those regional tendencies that will never come to represent even vestigial resistance to the formation of already moribund nation-states. In this sense—and contrary to anti-European propaganda—struggle for the construction of Europe is the most ‘realistic’ political position currently available. (CD: I see a europe with a weak judicial federation in the ancient model, rather than a peer of the USA. So I see the opposite. The restoration of the european model with a weak federal judiciary (the role played by a church). 5. An extension of patriotism is needed—a higher patriotism which proclaims: ‘I am a European and therefore the heir of an ancient culture which has civilised the whole world.’ Only then will Magna Europe dominate the world, as is its birthright. (CD: well, people pay the cost of patriotism when it is in their interest, either to seize an opportunity or to prevent a harm.) 6. Imperium and Empire must not be confused with each other. In fact, the notion of Imperium has found its truth and perfect realisation more in efforts that led to the establishment of the Roman Republic than in the maintenance of the post-Julian Empire. The notion of Imperium reflects a will to cosmic order, and it is this order that organises hierarchically the various ‘gentes’ living under the protection of Rome. In theory and in practice, Imperium is at the antipodes of any sort of ‘universalism.’ It does not seek to reduce humankind to one and the same; rather, it seeks to preserve diversity in a world heading towards unification. (CD: I think I can express that less emphemistically but yes. the problem is, what is the incentive. Or rather *the incentive is intuitied by some. But in this interregnum, the market for various incentives has caused a bifurcation.*) 7. I also see speciation as an opportunity. But this time, speciation will take place due to a self-conscious decision, and the whole planet will be its stage. In that sense, I’m a Nietzschean, as you know. He was the first thinker who, in view of a world-history emerging for the first time, asked the decisive question and thought through its metaphysical implications. The question is: Is man, as man in his nature till now, prepared to assume dominion over the whole earth? If not, what must happen to man as he is, so that he may be able to ‘subject’ the earth and thereby reclaim an old legacy? Must man as he is then not be brought beyond himself if he is to fulfill this task? This thinking concerns us, concerns Europe, concerns the whole earth not just today but tomorrow even more. (CD: This last bit takes some work to get thru. But I see the choice of monopoly world order of increasing parasitism and dysgenia, and market world order of increasing eugenia as a fairly obvious one. )

  • Nationalism

    by Daniel Gurpide 1. I think that ‘nationalism’ has to be clarified and put into historical perspective so as to become a really empowering technology. (CD: ok) 2. My priors so that you understand where I come from: I have relatives in Spain, France, Norway and the UK; I studied in Madrid, Paris, Cambridge, and Dresden; I lived in Tanzania, Bolivia, New York, Switzerland, and Germany. I consider myself a ‘good European’. (CD: ok) 3. Nationalism only has meaning for me if understood as a doctrine capable of expressing in political terms the philosophy and vital needs of European man in 2017 (I am thinking not in geographical, but in anthropological terms—the white man—and including both the peoples of the continental homeland as well as ‘Europe overseas.’ Their plight is common and, even if they are unaware of it, they are experiencing a similar fate—they all suffer from the same disease). (CD: agreed) 4. European nations are condemned either to exit from history and be melted down into a shapeless and faceless global mass, or to turn into the substance of a future nation and people. (CD: agreed) 5. It is convenient to distinguish between two different ways of posing the ‘national question.’ One, developed in France, sees a nation essentially as a construction operated by a state, and bound ab initio to a restricted horizon, a closure: historically, the closure and separation from Empire. This attitude cannot but immediately give rise to the problem of fixing national borders: in this case first for the natio francorum without; then, for the political and cultural identities within those borders, on which ‘reduction’ is operated. This policy of self-exclusion without (from the Imperium), and homologation and repression of internal identities and differences within, was pursued by French absolutism—and to its ultimate consequences with the French Revolution. Subsequently it was emulated by all the democratic revolutions in Europe, to the point when all nationalisms based on ‘the masses’ and exclusion of ‘the other’ arrived, necessarily, at contemporary one world universalism. (CD: agreed) Contrary to appearances, the one world ideology—which today impregnates the dominant culture and the political praxis of international institutions—is only superficially in contradiction to the presuppositions of the form of nationalism described above. Withdrawal into oneself implies, intrinsically, recognition, sooner or later, of equality among nations. The dream of political universalism is but the reproposal, on a global scale, of the very process that led to the formation of the nation-state. (CD: agreed) 6. Where the memory of the Roman imperial model persisted, and where the project of a Holy Roman Empire as restoration of the classical order remained politically active through the Middle Ages the process of ‘national’ unification did not take place (except partially and on a small scale) until the Romantic Age: during the nineteenth century. It assumed a deeply diverse aspect. (CD: agreed) In this case, it is not the state that builds a nation and stimulates a national consciousness, but rather a national consciousness which, in its maturity, seeks to express itself politically through one state. Belonging, for example, to the German or the Italian nation was not, initially, a fact on which to build national consciousness, but rather an idea (in its political sense): a spiritual attachment to a project that needed to be defined and was linked to an old imperial vision of a hierarchically organised cosmos. (CD: agreed) 7. Today, the situation of European nationalism is analogous. Europe – Magna Europa – does not enjoy a real existence. Europe is only the destiny of those who recognise themselves as part of it. Furthermore, it is precisely to this ‘ghost,’ to this choice of culture, values, civilisation (i.e., the regeneration of history)—to this myth—that the faith of the good European is addressed. Ultimately, it is also contrasted with the jumble of states and petty-states inhabiting our continent, together with their squalid supranational bureaucracies. (CD: agreed) 8. There is another reason why European nationalism should associate itself with the second model described above: the very same idea of Europe amounts to a transfigured re-emergence of the imperial vision. The unification of Europe on the model of the Jacobin nation-state—and in direct opposition to regionalist tendencies (even perhaps forcing linguistic, cultural, and administrative homogenisation)—is unthinkable. There is a further reason: the non-existence of the matter of Europe’s borders. Europe is not a territory, but rather a destiny offered to all who can trace an ethnic and spiritual relationship to it. (CD: agreed) This consideration helps clarify how un-European, in this sense, are institutions like the Council of Europe, an institution of which Turkey is a member today—and perhaps Israel tomorrow. (CD: agreed) 9. With the Industrial Revolution, humankind entered into a phase of planetisation. None may avoid such planetary perspective or dream of impossible isolation. Planetary order is unavoidable. It is fated to come about, sooner or later. Tomorrow’s Great Politics cannot be conceived or pursued without a ‘world order’. (CD: Um. Either I dont understand what you’re getting at, or I don’t agree. i’m not sure which. What I see is vacillation between opening and closing, expanding and contracting, civilizations in response to circumstances, and some having the free capital to adapt and some not.) 10. Institutionally, we should study carefully three models: Switzerland, the USA Constitution (Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, and Adams) and Ancient Rome. My contribution today regarding Rome: (CD: agreed 100% that those are the three ‘scales’. Swiss > American > Roman. 11. The planetisation that is taking place demands a ‘cosmic order.’ Will such order be ‘imperial’ or ‘egalitarian’? In that the future is open, this must remain unknown: we can merely commit ourselves to one or to the other. (CD: Ok so this is where we are not seeing the same thing and that’s why I asked the question.) The egalitarian solution implies the reduction of humankind ad unum, the emergence of the ‘universal type’ and of global standardisation. The imperial solution is hierarchical. If freedom in egalitarian dialectics is one absolute opposed to another (the denial of freedom), in imperial dialectics, freedom is merely a relative proposition directly linked to the notion of social responsibility. Within the Imperium, only the right of the best is absolute, measured according to the virtue manifested by humankind at a particular moment. However, Imperium is also, from a planetary perspective, the only means of preserving differences, thanks to the principle of unicuique suum, which implicitly recognises the fundamental inequality of values and identities. Imperium may be seen as the alternative to globalisation: strength and cohesion in diversity as a model of planetary organisation. (CD: I see speciation as an opportunity.)

  • NATIONALISM by Daniel Gurpide 1. I think that ‘nationalism’ has to be clarified

    NATIONALISM

    by Daniel Gurpide

    1. I think that ‘nationalism’ has to be clarified and put into historical perspective so as to become a really empowering technology.

    (CD: ok)

    2. My priors so that you understand where I come from: I have relatives in Spain, France, Norway and the UK; I studied in Madrid, Paris, Cambridge, and Dresden; I lived in Tanzania, Bolivia, New York, Switzerland, and Germany. I consider myself a ‘good European’.

    (CD: ok)

    3. Nationalism only has meaning for me if understood as a doctrine capable of expressing in political terms the philosophy and vital needs of European man in 2017 (I am thinking not in geographical, but in anthropological terms—the white man—and including both the peoples of the continental homeland as well as ‘Europe overseas.’ Their plight is common and, even if they are unaware of it, they are experiencing a similar fate—they all suffer from the same disease).

    (CD: agreed)

    4. European nations are condemned either to exit from history and be melted down into a shapeless and faceless global mass, or to turn into the substance of a future nation and people.

    (CD: agreed)

    5. It is convenient to distinguish between two different ways of posing the ‘national question.’ One, developed in France, sees a nation essentially as a construction operated by a state, and bound ab initio to a restricted horizon, a closure: historically, the closure and separation from Empire. This attitude cannot but immediately give rise to the problem of fixing national borders: in this case first for the natio francorum without; then, for the political and cultural identities within those borders, on which ‘reduction’ is operated. This policy of self-exclusion without (from the Imperium), and homologation and repression of internal identities and differences within, was pursued by French absolutism—and to its ultimate consequences with the French Revolution. Subsequently it was emulated by all the democratic revolutions in Europe, to the point when all nationalisms based on ‘the masses’ and exclusion of ‘the other’ arrived, necessarily, at contemporary one world universalism.

    (CD: agreed)

    Contrary to appearances, the one world ideology—which today impregnates the dominant culture and the political praxis of international institutions—is only superficially in contradiction to the presuppositions of the form of nationalism described above. Withdrawal into oneself implies, intrinsically, recognition, sooner or later, of equality among nations. The dream of political universalism is but the reproposal, on a global scale, of the very process that led to the formation of the nation-state.

    (CD: agreed)

    6. Where the memory of the Roman imperial model persisted, and where the project of a Holy Roman Empire as restoration of the classical order remained politically active through the Middle Ages the process of ‘national’ unification did not take place (except partially and on a small scale) until the Romantic Age: during the nineteenth century. It assumed a deeply diverse aspect.

    (CD: agreed)

    In this case, it is not the state that builds a nation and stimulates a national consciousness, but rather a national consciousness which, in its maturity, seeks to express itself politically through one state. Belonging, for example, to the German or the Italian nation was not, initially, a fact on which to build national consciousness, but rather an idea (in its political sense): a spiritual attachment to a project that needed to be defined and was linked to an old imperial vision of a hierarchically organised cosmos.

    (CD: agreed)

    7. Today, the situation of European nationalism is analogous. Europe – Magna Europa – does not enjoy a real existence. Europe is only the destiny of those who recognise themselves as part of it. Furthermore, it is precisely to this ‘ghost,’ to this choice of culture, values, civilisation (i.e., the regeneration of history)—to this myth—that the faith of the good European is addressed. Ultimately, it is also contrasted with the jumble of states and petty-states inhabiting our continent, together with their squalid supranational bureaucracies.

    (CD: agreed)

    8. There is another reason why European nationalism should associate itself with the second model described above: the very same idea of Europe amounts to a transfigured re-emergence of the imperial vision. The unification of Europe on the model of the Jacobin nation-state—and in direct opposition to regionalist tendencies (even perhaps forcing linguistic, cultural, and administrative homogenisation)—is unthinkable. There is a further reason: the non-existence of the matter of Europe’s borders. Europe is not a territory, but rather a destiny offered to all who can trace an ethnic and spiritual relationship to it.

    (CD: agreed)

    This consideration helps clarify how un-European, in this sense, are institutions like the Council of Europe, an institution of which Turkey is a member today—and perhaps Israel tomorrow.

    (CD: agreed)

    9. With the Industrial Revolution, humankind entered into a phase of planetisation. None may avoid such planetary perspective or dream of impossible isolation. Planetary order is unavoidable. It is fated to come about, sooner or later.

    Tomorrow’s Great Politics cannot be conceived or pursued without a ‘world order’.

    (CD: Um. Either I dont understand what you’re getting at, or I don’t agree. i’m not sure which. What I see is vacillation between opening and closing, expanding and contracting, civilizations in response to circumstances, and some having the free capital to adapt and some not.)

    10. Institutionally, we should study carefully three models: Switzerland, the USA Constitution (Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, and Adams) and Ancient Rome. My contribution today regarding Rome:

    (CD: agreed 100% that those are the three ‘scales’. Swiss > American > Roman.

    11. The planetisation that is taking place demands a ‘cosmic order.’ Will such order be ‘imperial’ or ‘egalitarian’? In that the future is open, this must remain unknown: we can merely commit ourselves to one or to the other.

    (CD: Ok so this is where we are not seeing the same thing and that’s why I asked the question.)

    The egalitarian solution implies the reduction of humankind ad unum, the emergence of the ‘universal type’ and of global standardisation. The imperial solution is hierarchical. If freedom in egalitarian dialectics is one absolute opposed to another (the denial of freedom), in imperial dialectics, freedom is merely a relative proposition directly linked to the notion of social responsibility. Within the Imperium, only the right of the best is absolute, measured according to the virtue manifested by humankind at a particular moment. However, Imperium is also, from a planetary perspective, the only means of preserving differences, thanks to the principle of unicuique suum, which implicitly recognises the fundamental inequality of values and identities.

    Imperium may be seen as the alternative to globalisation: strength and cohesion in diversity as a model of planetary organisation.

    (CD: I see speciation as an opportunity.)

    Source date (UTC): 2017-11-12 22:37:00 UTC

  • Nationalism

    by Daniel Gurpide 1. I think that ‘nationalism’ has to be clarified and put into historical perspective so as to become a really empowering technology. (CD: ok) 2. My priors so that you understand where I come from: I have relatives in Spain, France, Norway and the UK; I studied in Madrid, Paris, Cambridge, and Dresden; I lived in Tanzania, Bolivia, New York, Switzerland, and Germany. I consider myself a ‘good European’. (CD: ok) 3. Nationalism only has meaning for me if understood as a doctrine capable of expressing in political terms the philosophy and vital needs of European man in 2017 (I am thinking not in geographical, but in anthropological terms—the white man—and including both the peoples of the continental homeland as well as ‘Europe overseas.’ Their plight is common and, even if they are unaware of it, they are experiencing a similar fate—they all suffer from the same disease). (CD: agreed) 4. European nations are condemned either to exit from history and be melted down into a shapeless and faceless global mass, or to turn into the substance of a future nation and people. (CD: agreed) 5. It is convenient to distinguish between two different ways of posing the ‘national question.’ One, developed in France, sees a nation essentially as a construction operated by a state, and bound ab initio to a restricted horizon, a closure: historically, the closure and separation from Empire. This attitude cannot but immediately give rise to the problem of fixing national borders: in this case first for the natio francorum without; then, for the political and cultural identities within those borders, on which ‘reduction’ is operated. This policy of self-exclusion without (from the Imperium), and homologation and repression of internal identities and differences within, was pursued by French absolutism—and to its ultimate consequences with the French Revolution. Subsequently it was emulated by all the democratic revolutions in Europe, to the point when all nationalisms based on ‘the masses’ and exclusion of ‘the other’ arrived, necessarily, at contemporary one world universalism. (CD: agreed) Contrary to appearances, the one world ideology—which today impregnates the dominant culture and the political praxis of international institutions—is only superficially in contradiction to the presuppositions of the form of nationalism described above. Withdrawal into oneself implies, intrinsically, recognition, sooner or later, of equality among nations. The dream of political universalism is but the reproposal, on a global scale, of the very process that led to the formation of the nation-state. (CD: agreed) 6. Where the memory of the Roman imperial model persisted, and where the project of a Holy Roman Empire as restoration of the classical order remained politically active through the Middle Ages the process of ‘national’ unification did not take place (except partially and on a small scale) until the Romantic Age: during the nineteenth century. It assumed a deeply diverse aspect. (CD: agreed) In this case, it is not the state that builds a nation and stimulates a national consciousness, but rather a national consciousness which, in its maturity, seeks to express itself politically through one state. Belonging, for example, to the German or the Italian nation was not, initially, a fact on which to build national consciousness, but rather an idea (in its political sense): a spiritual attachment to a project that needed to be defined and was linked to an old imperial vision of a hierarchically organised cosmos. (CD: agreed) 7. Today, the situation of European nationalism is analogous. Europe – Magna Europa – does not enjoy a real existence. Europe is only the destiny of those who recognise themselves as part of it. Furthermore, it is precisely to this ‘ghost,’ to this choice of culture, values, civilisation (i.e., the regeneration of history)—to this myth—that the faith of the good European is addressed. Ultimately, it is also contrasted with the jumble of states and petty-states inhabiting our continent, together with their squalid supranational bureaucracies. (CD: agreed) 8. There is another reason why European nationalism should associate itself with the second model described above: the very same idea of Europe amounts to a transfigured re-emergence of the imperial vision. The unification of Europe on the model of the Jacobin nation-state—and in direct opposition to regionalist tendencies (even perhaps forcing linguistic, cultural, and administrative homogenisation)—is unthinkable. There is a further reason: the non-existence of the matter of Europe’s borders. Europe is not a territory, but rather a destiny offered to all who can trace an ethnic and spiritual relationship to it. (CD: agreed) This consideration helps clarify how un-European, in this sense, are institutions like the Council of Europe, an institution of which Turkey is a member today—and perhaps Israel tomorrow. (CD: agreed) 9. With the Industrial Revolution, humankind entered into a phase of planetisation. None may avoid such planetary perspective or dream of impossible isolation. Planetary order is unavoidable. It is fated to come about, sooner or later. Tomorrow’s Great Politics cannot be conceived or pursued without a ‘world order’. (CD: Um. Either I dont understand what you’re getting at, or I don’t agree. i’m not sure which. What I see is vacillation between opening and closing, expanding and contracting, civilizations in response to circumstances, and some having the free capital to adapt and some not.) 10. Institutionally, we should study carefully three models: Switzerland, the USA Constitution (Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, and Adams) and Ancient Rome. My contribution today regarding Rome: (CD: agreed 100% that those are the three ‘scales’. Swiss > American > Roman. 11. The planetisation that is taking place demands a ‘cosmic order.’ Will such order be ‘imperial’ or ‘egalitarian’? In that the future is open, this must remain unknown: we can merely commit ourselves to one or to the other. (CD: Ok so this is where we are not seeing the same thing and that’s why I asked the question.) The egalitarian solution implies the reduction of humankind ad unum, the emergence of the ‘universal type’ and of global standardisation. The imperial solution is hierarchical. If freedom in egalitarian dialectics is one absolute opposed to another (the denial of freedom), in imperial dialectics, freedom is merely a relative proposition directly linked to the notion of social responsibility. Within the Imperium, only the right of the best is absolute, measured according to the virtue manifested by humankind at a particular moment. However, Imperium is also, from a planetary perspective, the only means of preserving differences, thanks to the principle of unicuique suum, which implicitly recognises the fundamental inequality of values and identities. Imperium may be seen as the alternative to globalisation: strength and cohesion in diversity as a model of planetary organisation. (CD: I see speciation as an opportunity.)

  • Western Man Does Not Ask The Capitalism Vs Socialism Question: It”s A Cosmopolitan Dichotomy.

    WESTERN MAN DOES NOT ASK THE CAPITALISM VS SOCIALISM QUESTION: IT”S A COSMOPOLITAN DICHOTOMY. The question of capitalism vs socialism is not a western question – It’s a Cosmopolitan Question. Westerners have always been homogenous and therefore could afford to be communitarian but we have done so by tripartism: classes. The agrarian and industrial revolutions made it possible to shift vast numbers between the economic classes even if we maintained our genetic and social classes. The automation and information revolution is to some degree, reversing this trend. And the wealth made possible by that shift created the illusion of difference between the classes in ability, rather than in consumption. The western question is not capitalism vs communism. The western question is the limits of discretion. We have all preferred the results of aristocratic production of commons, as long as aristocracy limited itself to rule of law by natural law. We had only tradition, not science, to explain it to us. And we lacked the economics to measure it. We don’t any longer. So quite the opposite from what we intuit, we are in an even better position today to restore the optimum political order: a large number of monarchies competing for status and revenue produced by creating optimum markets to attract different distributions of classes of citizens. It is extremely difficult to produce a single poly economic order. It is very simple to produce a market for economic orders. The reason being that peoples with different abilities require different political orders. Hence my concern with what I call ‘nationalism’ or ‘homogeneity’. Meaning: people with common kin class and economic interests.

  • WESTERN MAN DOES NOT ASK THE CAPITALISM VS SOCIALISM QUESTION: IT”S A COSMOPOLIT

    WESTERN MAN DOES NOT ASK THE CAPITALISM VS SOCIALISM QUESTION: IT”S A COSMOPOLITAN DICHOTOMY.

    The question of capitalism vs socialism is not a western question – It’s a Cosmopolitan Question. Westerners have always been homogenous and therefore could afford to be communitarian but we have done so by tripartism: classes.

    The agrarian and industrial revolutions made it possible to shift vast numbers between the economic classes even if we maintained our genetic and social classes. The automation and information revolution is to some degree, reversing this trend.

    And the wealth made possible by that shift created the illusion of difference between the classes in ability, rather than in consumption.

    The western question is not capitalism vs communism.

    The western question is the limits of discretion. We have all preferred the results of aristocratic production of commons, as long as aristocracy limited itself to rule of law by natural law.

    We had only tradition, not science, to explain it to us. And we lacked the economics to measure it.

    We don’t any longer.

    So quite the opposite from what we intuit, we are in an even better position today to restore the optimum political order: a large number of monarchies competing for status and revenue produced by creating optimum markets to attract different distributions of classes of citizens.

    It is extremely difficult to produce a single poly economic order. It is very simple to produce a market for economic orders.

    The reason being that peoples with different abilities require different political orders.

    Hence my concern with what I call ‘nationalism’ or ‘homogeneity’. Meaning: people with common kin class and economic interests.

    Source date (UTC): 2017-11-12 21:20:00 UTC

  • Western Man Does Not Ask The Capitalism Vs Socialism Question: It”s A Cosmopolitan Dichotomy.

    WESTERN MAN DOES NOT ASK THE CAPITALISM VS SOCIALISM QUESTION: IT”S A COSMOPOLITAN DICHOTOMY. The question of capitalism vs socialism is not a western question – It’s a Cosmopolitan Question. Westerners have always been homogenous and therefore could afford to be communitarian but we have done so by tripartism: classes. The agrarian and industrial revolutions made it possible to shift vast numbers between the economic classes even if we maintained our genetic and social classes. The automation and information revolution is to some degree, reversing this trend. And the wealth made possible by that shift created the illusion of difference between the classes in ability, rather than in consumption. The western question is not capitalism vs communism. The western question is the limits of discretion. We have all preferred the results of aristocratic production of commons, as long as aristocracy limited itself to rule of law by natural law. We had only tradition, not science, to explain it to us. And we lacked the economics to measure it. We don’t any longer. So quite the opposite from what we intuit, we are in an even better position today to restore the optimum political order: a large number of monarchies competing for status and revenue produced by creating optimum markets to attract different distributions of classes of citizens. It is extremely difficult to produce a single poly economic order. It is very simple to produce a market for economic orders. The reason being that peoples with different abilities require different political orders. Hence my concern with what I call ‘nationalism’ or ‘homogeneity’. Meaning: people with common kin class and economic interests.

  • The Oath Of Transcendent Man A Pagan, A Christian, An Aryan, A Warrior, A Man Transcendent

    I am a pagan if 1) I accept the laws of nature as binding on all of existence; and 2) if I treat nature as sacred and to be contemplated, protected and improved; and 3) I treat the world as something to transform closer to an Eden in whatever ways I can before I die; and 4) if I deny the existence of a supreme being with dominion over the physical laws, and treat all gods, demigods, heroes, saints, figures of history, and ancestors as characters with whom I may speak to in private contemplation in the hope of gaining wisdom and synchronicity from having done so. And 5) if I participate with others of my society in repetition of oaths, repetition of myths, repetition of festivals, repetition of holidays, and the perpetuation of all of the above to my offspring. And 6) if I leave open that synchronicity appears to exist now and then, and that it may be possible that there is a scientific explanation for it, other than just humans subject to similar stimuli producing similar intuitions and therefore similar ends. As far as I know this is all that is required of me to be a Pagan. I am a christian if I have adopted the teaching of christianity: 1) the eradication of hatred from the human heart. 2) the extension of kinship love to non-kin. 3) the extension of exhaustive forgiveness before punishment, enserfment, enslavement, death, or war. As far as I know, this is all that is required of me to be a Christian. I am an Aryan if 1) I proudly display my excellences so that others seek to achieve or exceed them; 2) I seek competition to constantly test and improve myself so I do not weaken; 3) I swear to speak no insult and demand it; 4) I speak the truth and demand it; 5) I take nothing not paid for and demand it; 6) I grant sovereignty to my kin and demand it; 7) I insure my people regardless of condition, and demand it; and in doing so leave nothing but voluntary markets of cooperation between sovereign men; and to discipline, enserf, enslave, ostracize or kill those who do otherwise; 8) to not show fear or cowardice, abandon my brothers, or retreat, and 9) to die a good death in the service of my kin, my clan, my tribe and my people. As far as I know, this is all that is required of me to be an Aryan. I am a warrior in that 1) we will prepare for war so perfectly that none dare enter it against us. 2) Once we go to war, we do so with *joy*, with eagerness, and with passion, and without mercy, without constraint, and without remorse; And 3) before ending war, we shall defeat an enemy completely such that no other dares a condition of our enemy, and the memory of the slaughter lives a hundred generations. As far as I know, this is all that is required of me to be a Warrior. As far as I know, if I succeed as a Pagan, as a Christian, as an Aryan, as a Warrior, then I have transcended the animal man, and earned my place among the saints, heroes, demigods, gods, in the memories, histories, and legends of man. And that is the objective of heroes. We leave the rest for ordinary men. Curt Doolittle The Cult of Sovereignty The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Natural Law of Reciprocity The Propertarian Institute, Kiev, Ukraine

  • Occult, Myth, Fairy Tale, Literature, History, Economics, Law, Science, Mathemat

    || Occult, Myth, Fairy Tale, Literature, History, Economics, Law, Science, Mathematics.