Reminder: Humans have very little agency. Those of us who are at the extreme end of the spectrum have much more agency than most. So we cannot necessarily blame people for their genetics – we can only blame each other for not creating rule of law that limits the damage done by their genetics.
Source: Original Site Post
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Repeat after me: “I don’t know yet”
Repeat after me: “I don’t know yet” https://t.co/9sKr5xU7Wt
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Repeat after me: “I don’t know yet”
Every time some conservative asserts something in confidence despite his relative ignorance, he is no different from his consumptive (liberal) counterpart. The only ‘truthful’ empirical, and therefore ‘conservative’ answer is: “i don’t know yet” But ‘i know…’ is merely a statement of being lazy or incompetent.
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Repeat after me: “I don’t know yet”
Every time some conservative asserts something in confidence despite his relative ignorance, he is no different from his consumptive (liberal) counterpart. The only ‘truthful’ empirical, and therefore ‘conservative’ answer is: “i don’t know yet” But ‘i know…’ is merely a statement of being lazy or incompetent.
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The Stack
The Stack https://t.co/keyN3VccOR
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The Stack
Nov 17, 2019, 7:55 PM by Luke Weinhagen SOVEREIGNTIST NOMOCRATIC MONARCHY Free men of agency and autonomy participating in reciprocal, voluntary interaction via markets and bound in value by a culture whose aesthetic and function are preserved by those demonstrating greatest merit and protected by a judge of last resort in a system specifically imbued at every level with the power to deny power.
KINSHIP CAPITALISM
Full-accounting preventing individual profit subsidized by the transfer of inter-generational value to out-groups.FAMILIAL POLITIC
The autonomous family (non-dependent), representing reproductive viability and therefore inter-generational transfer, is the smallest political unit with direct voting power, with non-familied citizens represented by dedicated houses (underclass, unmarried, etc…).CRAFTSMEN ARISTOCRACY
Leadership meritoriously demonstrating the blending of aesthetics with functionality, with the later never sacrificed for the former and the former never detached from the later.MARKET MONARCH
Judge of last resort. Rules where limits are otherwise undecidable. Insures decisions via exposure to market risk.
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The Stack
Nov 17, 2019, 7:55 PM by Luke Weinhagen SOVEREIGNTIST NOMOCRATIC MONARCHY Free men of agency and autonomy participating in reciprocal, voluntary interaction via markets and bound in value by a culture whose aesthetic and function are preserved by those demonstrating greatest merit and protected by a judge of last resort in a system specifically imbued at every level with the power to deny power.
KINSHIP CAPITALISM
Full-accounting preventing individual profit subsidized by the transfer of inter-generational value to out-groups.FAMILIAL POLITIC
The autonomous family (non-dependent), representing reproductive viability and therefore inter-generational transfer, is the smallest political unit with direct voting power, with non-familied citizens represented by dedicated houses (underclass, unmarried, etc…).CRAFTSMEN ARISTOCRACY
Leadership meritoriously demonstrating the blending of aesthetics with functionality, with the later never sacrificed for the former and the former never detached from the later.MARKET MONARCH
Judge of last resort. Rules where limits are otherwise undecidable. Insures decisions via exposure to market risk.
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Is the Rate of Scientific Progress Slowing Down?
Is the Rate of Scientific Progress Slowing Down? https://t.co/8i4mCkmJ2E
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Is the Rate of Scientific Progress Slowing Down?
by Tyler Cowen November 18, 2019 at 1:09 am in Data Source Economics History That is the title of my new paper with Ben Southwood, here is one segment from the introduction:
Our task is simple: we will consider whether the rate of scientific progress has slowed down, and more generally what we know about the rate of scientific progress, based on these literatures and other metrics we have been investigating. This investigation will take the form of a conceptual survey of the available data. We will consider which measures are out there, what they show, and how we should best interpret them, to attempt to create the most comprehensive and wide-ranging survey of metrics for the progress of science. In particular, we integrate a number of strands in the productivity growth literature, the “science of science” literature, and various historical literatures on the nature of human progress. In our view, however, a mere reporting of different metrics does not suffice to answer the cluster of questions surrounding scientific progress. It is also necessary to ask some difficult questions about what science means, what progress means, and how the literatures on economic productivity and “science on its own terms” might connect with each other. Mostly we think scientific progress is indeed slowing down, and this is supported by a wide variety of metrics, surveyed in the paper. The gleam of optimism comes from this: And to the extent that progress in science has not been slowing down, which is indeed the case under some of our metrics, that may give us new insight into where the strengths of modern and contemporary science truly lie. For instance, our analysis stresses the distinction between per capita progress and progress in the aggregate. As we will see later, a wide variety of “per capita” measures do indeed suggest that various metrics for growth, progress and productivity are slowing down. On the other side of that coin, a no less strong variety of metrics show that measures of total, aggregate progress are usually doing quite well. So the final answer to the progress question likely depends on how we weight per capita rates of progress vs. measures of total progress in the aggregate. What do the data on productivity not tell us about scientific progress? By how much is the contribution of the internet undervalued? What can we learn from data on crop yields, life expectancy, and Moore’s Law? Might the social sciences count as an example of progress in the sciences not slowing down? Is the Solow model distinction between “once and for all changes” and “ongoing increases in the rate of innovation” sound? And much more. Your comments on this paper would be very much welcome, either on MR or through email. I will be blogging some particular ideas from the paper over the next week or two.
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Is the Rate of Scientific Progress Slowing Down?
by Tyler Cowen November 18, 2019 at 1:09 am in Data Source Economics History That is the title of my new paper with Ben Southwood, here is one segment from the introduction:
Our task is simple: we will consider whether the rate of scientific progress has slowed down, and more generally what we know about the rate of scientific progress, based on these literatures and other metrics we have been investigating. This investigation will take the form of a conceptual survey of the available data. We will consider which measures are out there, what they show, and how we should best interpret them, to attempt to create the most comprehensive and wide-ranging survey of metrics for the progress of science. In particular, we integrate a number of strands in the productivity growth literature, the “science of science” literature, and various historical literatures on the nature of human progress. In our view, however, a mere reporting of different metrics does not suffice to answer the cluster of questions surrounding scientific progress. It is also necessary to ask some difficult questions about what science means, what progress means, and how the literatures on economic productivity and “science on its own terms” might connect with each other. Mostly we think scientific progress is indeed slowing down, and this is supported by a wide variety of metrics, surveyed in the paper. The gleam of optimism comes from this: And to the extent that progress in science has not been slowing down, which is indeed the case under some of our metrics, that may give us new insight into where the strengths of modern and contemporary science truly lie. For instance, our analysis stresses the distinction between per capita progress and progress in the aggregate. As we will see later, a wide variety of “per capita” measures do indeed suggest that various metrics for growth, progress and productivity are slowing down. On the other side of that coin, a no less strong variety of metrics show that measures of total, aggregate progress are usually doing quite well. So the final answer to the progress question likely depends on how we weight per capita rates of progress vs. measures of total progress in the aggregate. What do the data on productivity not tell us about scientific progress? By how much is the contribution of the internet undervalued? What can we learn from data on crop yields, life expectancy, and Moore’s Law? Might the social sciences count as an example of progress in the sciences not slowing down? Is the Solow model distinction between “once and for all changes” and “ongoing increases in the rate of innovation” sound? And much more. Your comments on this paper would be very much welcome, either on MR or through email. I will be blogging some particular ideas from the paper over the next week or two.