Depending upon your concept of the world: universalist democratic socialist, or hierarchical tribalist, or utilitarian economist, you might see US policy toward Iran in a different light. One thing is for sure: we are accomplishing for militant islam, on behalf of Iran, precisely what the Persians and the radicals have always desired — a restoration of the empire from the mediterranean to the Sino-Hindu border, and a vehicle for concentrating wealth via oil revenues that will surpass both the classical era’s means of concentrating wealth via agriculture, the renaissance era’s means of concentrating wealth through shipping, or the industrial era’s means of concentrating wealth through institutional capitalism and industrial production. We will have an expansionist, anti-rational, totalitarian civilization, operating on non-market principles, with which much of the developed world cannot compete. We will lose the dollar as a reserve currency, and as a Petro-currency, and finish the cycle of credit expansion, finish the Keyenesian economic era, and eradicate the ability of the west to pursue debt-dependent social programs. We will see europe need to remilitarize just when it cannot afford to. We will see the USA split between a hostile and patient china and a hostile and impatient islam, just when the USA is itself split by political, regional and racial discord. One cannot ‘spread democracy’. One can only spread capitalism and consumerism. Democracy is a unique property of the west, because the west is the only civilization to have broken familial and tribal bonds — having forbidden intermarriage for centuries. Democracy will never succeed except among families, tribes, villages and small cities. It is antithetical to human nature. Even capitalism is ‘democratic’. Nations adopt democratic republicanism when the middle class requires access to politics, and when the antiquarian political systems can no longer accomodate the increased number of people with economic interests. Republican democracy is not ideological, it is simply a necessity born of increases in the numbers of economic interests. For these reasons I did, and do, favor war in the middle east on an entirely humanistic, as well as economic, as well as cultural basis: We have spent five hundred years raising humanity out of agrarian ignorance and poverty, through the spread of rationalism, science, technology and the capitalist institutions that make industrial production possible. We must treat Islam as we did the Soviets and the Chinese communists: a militaristic, expansionist form of anti-market regressiveism. A threat to our existing way of life, by a mystical, tribal and familial empire, its culture and religion. Until the last, most primitive civilization has joined the movement, they are a regressive threat to all of humanity. They are the latest luddite movement — yet another variation on Marxism, and nothing more. An attempt by existing power structures, and existing cultural investments, to hold onto antiquity despite the obvious failure of their culture in the contrast to others. And while my libertarian friends do not like battle drums, they too often ignore the fact, that one must defend one’s market from non-market forces. Markets of the peculiar composition in the west, were made by man, by intent, not by accident. The institution of property itself requires defense of not only the property itself, but the institutions of property, and the market itself. Our libertarianism evolved within that set of institutions. And within that set of Institutions it is viable. That does not mean the same principles apply without. Those broader threats pose to high a risk. Ideology is for children living under the convenience of those institutions. Although I would argue that the attempt to contain Germany actually caused the suicide of the west, our attempts to contain the Russians, Chinese and now islam has not been so.
Source: Original Site Post
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CNN Is Anti Christian On Easter. How Nice.
I really don’t care about the content of religious mythology. I don’t think it matters. It might be better for preachers to read from the Iliad and the Odyssey, The Carolingian Epic, La Morte De Arthur, and the Nibelungen than it is to read from the Bible. It might be better to read selections from history and then speak about current events and how they relate. But the idea of a ceremonial leader and a teacher: someone very well educated that the community hires and pays for, and who speaks to the community every week, so that we actually have some sense of membership in something — even if it’s only for festivals and celebrations, births, marriages, foundings, launchings, consolation and deaths, and so we have an excuse to be civil egalitarians in practice by having an occasional meal together and afterward to work on charity together — well, that all seems like a good thing. I love the Monarchy, History, Mythology and Mankind. Nothing more miraculous than that seems necessary. I love the Pope too, just like I love the Monarchy. The only protection from the mob is having someone out there whose entire purpose is the perpetuation of our extended family, and who can, with caution say, ‘I do not know what is good, but I know what is bad, and this is bad, and this other thing might be better’. Moral leadership when it is powerless except for the use of passionate persuasion is a defense against tyranny of the mob, ideologies, groups or individuals. Monarchy, even only as a vehicle for veto or ascent, is good for the same reason – especially if the nations are small. Monarchy is in history, the most common, best understood, and therefore the natural order of man for this reason. Our parliaments are merely a means of getting more work done – not better work done. Religion need not be supernatural for it to have mystery and profundity in the beauty of its complexity. As humans we are capable of all that and more on our own. Gods should be a role model. A model we can aspire to, and perhaps one day achieve. I might prefer Arthur or Alexander. But if you have to pick a particular Nazarene instead, I’m all for it. He was a good man to use as a role model. And the consequences of using him for that purpose are nothing if not magical. 🙂
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CNN Is Anti Christian On Easter. How Nice.
I really don’t care about the content of religious mythology. I don’t think it matters. It might be better for preachers to read from the Iliad and the Odyssey, The Carolingian Epic, La Morte De Arthur, and the Nibelungen than it is to read from the Bible. It might be better to read selections from history and then speak about current events and how they relate. But the idea of a ceremonial leader and a teacher: someone very well educated that the community hires and pays for, and who speaks to the community every week, so that we actually have some sense of membership in something — even if it’s only for festivals and celebrations, births, marriages, foundings, launchings, consolation and deaths, and so we have an excuse to be civil egalitarians in practice by having an occasional meal together and afterward to work on charity together — well, that all seems like a good thing. I love the Monarchy, History, Mythology and Mankind. Nothing more miraculous than that seems necessary. I love the Pope too, just like I love the Monarchy. The only protection from the mob is having someone out there whose entire purpose is the perpetuation of our extended family, and who can, with caution say, ‘I do not know what is good, but I know what is bad, and this is bad, and this other thing might be better’. Moral leadership when it is powerless except for the use of passionate persuasion is a defense against tyranny of the mob, ideologies, groups or individuals. Monarchy, even only as a vehicle for veto or ascent, is good for the same reason – especially if the nations are small. Monarchy is in history, the most common, best understood, and therefore the natural order of man for this reason. Our parliaments are merely a means of getting more work done – not better work done. Religion need not be supernatural for it to have mystery and profundity in the beauty of its complexity. As humans we are capable of all that and more on our own. Gods should be a role model. A model we can aspire to, and perhaps one day achieve. I might prefer Arthur or Alexander. But if you have to pick a particular Nazarene instead, I’m all for it. He was a good man to use as a role model. And the consequences of using him for that purpose are nothing if not magical. 🙂
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Defending John Derbyshire: Dear Brits, Get Ready To Eat Crow On Race
(Updates at end of post.) The Guardian has a nice piece on the flap over John Derbyshire’s recommendation in Takimag that white and asian parents educated their children to avoid african americans on the streets. I found the comments typical of populist high minded British/Canadian public commentary and unrelated to the facts. Dirbyshire is a satirist. The right relies upon satire, the way the left relies upon ridicule. Given the severity and pervasiveness of the racial problem in the states and satire is as good a tool as any to draw attention to it. 1) Derbyshire is playing off the news story in which a hispanic neighborhood watch volunteer with a ‘white’ name in a gated neighborhood shot and killed a black man after calling the police to alert them to his presence, and then being confronted and punched in the face, then beaten by the black man. Without this context, it is impossible to for the UK reader to understand what Derbyshire is saying, and why: avoiding them is a better strategy than confrontation. 2) African americans are FACTUALLY responsible for an absurdly disproportionate percentage of violent crime in the states, and three quarters of their crimes involve white victims. African Americans FACTUALLY demonstrate African American distributions of IQ are FACTUALLY almost a full standard deviation lower than that of their white counterparts, just as asians and ashkenazim five points higher than whites – a problem for the job market in an advanced economy. The research is still out on the cause of these factors, but it is an active area of inquiry. And no, there is no disagreement in the literature over the accuracy or meaning of the tests — that is left to the popular press to spread as a misconception in order to sell advertisements. 3) If we eliminate African American crime from US statistics, the remaining population has approximately the same level of violent crime as do northern European countries. And the USA has even less petty crime than those countries, and Canada. These facts seem to surprise Europeans, and it is almost impossible to convince Canadians of it — until we show them the data from Canadian government sources that proves it. 5) Derbysire’s point, and it is a reasonable one, is that sweeping these facts under the rug and blaming the circumstances on oppression, rather than dealing with the practical reality of the problem, does not help us develop a mutually beneficial society devoid of racial conflict. 5) UK residents have no concept of the severity of racial tensions in the states, nor the degree to which they play into social and arenas. There are two reasons for the difference in tensions between the US and UK: a) institutions that apply pressure for the purpose of achieving conformity, and b) possessing a critical mass of the population, and the distribution or density of those communities within the population – dispersed being irrelevant and concentrated being very relevant. Conformity a) The US does not have a coherent consistent means of applying social pressure in order to achieve conformity to norms that is so ever present in UK society, and absolutely pervasive in France. It is not socially acceptable to treat aberrant behavior among minorities as unacceptable. It must be tolerated under the principle of diversity and freedom of self expression. This is one of the many reasons why religiosity remains so hight in the USA: it is the only means of applying normative pressures. The UK has both a less flexible concept of society, and a pervasive class system, a somewhat elitist identity, and a majority with which to reinforce all of them. In the states the women’s movement allied with the anti-slavery movement, the the rapid immigration movement, then the labor movement, then the civil rights movement and the culmination of these processes has been anti-christian, anti-white-male, and resulted in the complete loss of identity. The problem is not so relevant in the UK yet, because this problem of racial conflict has been theoretical not material. As Charles Murray writes in his recent work Coming Apart, the lower classes in the States are no longer adhering to the middle class norms — or ‘virtues’ — that compensate for differences in impulsivity and intelligence between the social classes. But moreover, by failing to adopt those norms, US society is fragmenting into different castes. The recent massive immigration by hispanics has caused additional tension — not the least of which is caused by the La Raza movement to reconquer the southwest. And the presence of muslims, while small, is exaggerated by their failure to integrate into the economy, society, and its norms — just as we see with muslims in the UK — and their association with harboring and funding terrorism. Density b) British popular hand-wringing and moral outrage to the contrary, racial conflicts happen because of frictions between sets of dense populations; and because of material differences in economic productivity between those groups, as well as differences in the value of status signals between those groups. The USA has numerous areas of density-differences between the races. The black and white populations have never integrated. And there is no evidence that they will, or even desire to. We know that at about 10% diversity, neighborhoods radically flip (create white flight), and become poorer. We know many sets of statistics that demonstrate that people tend to sort geographically by race. We know that intermarriage is up, but it is largely up to about 15% between whites, asians and hispanics, not blacks. And while the USA was 75% white not that long ago, it will approach less than half white fairly shortly. The UK was still approximately 85% white in 2001, and no minority had a 10% presence overall, and so it hasn’t been possible to have significant friction except in certain very small neighborhoods. But in those areas where racial density allows the formation of a cultural identity, that identity is eventually expressed as political power, and when expressed as political power we see racial frictions. Because politics controls access to money and opportunity, law writing and customs. These tensions, since 2001, have expressed themselves in the development of the British National Party, the English Defense League, other groups in the UK. Once a minority population has 10% of the vote, and can motivate higher voter participation because of their minority status, which can be concentrated behind a narrow number of issues, political conflict, and racial conflict will ensue. There is nothing special about the USA. It’s all just demographics, politics and money. The USA is just ahead of the cuve for europe, because we have dealt with the racial problem for 150 years now. The Problem of and Importance Of Norms Without the power to ostracize people for anti-social behavior, and to force adoption of norms, a population must develop frictions, if for no other reason than difference status signaling, and its expression in the pursuit of political power — signals are how we select mates, and gain access to more advantageous social groups, and are therefore inseparable from human nature. A society can rely on religion, education, rigid class nor caste norms, geographic ostracization, and commercial ostracization, in order to achieve that normative equality, from which all other forms of equality are made possible. Ostracization, religion, education are sticks and economic participation and status signals are the carrots by which we encourage adoption of the norms needed to create a cooperative polity. That said, however much races mingle in an economy, people consistently demonstrate a preference for being surrounded by those with morphological, cultural, class, and economic similarities. And despite our best efforts, we will not change that bit of human nature. It is against the interests of those who can more successfully achieve positive status within group than across group. Norms must be homogenous in order for politics to be cooperative. The United States do not have a means of pressuring blacks into norms the way the UK has — mostly we assume, because of differences in density. There are just too many in high concentration that are too culturally unified to break communal bonds. Differences in the distribution of intellectual ability mean that there is a permanent density of underclass blacks that have no possible means of class rotation in the US economy. The hispanic problem is largely one of breeding patterns and language. We should note that american hispanics are largely a mixture of amerindian and spanish genetic pools. Otherwise, if the USA could forcibly change the language, and the breeding patterns, they would be possible to integrate into the society — albiet criminality is still high in that population. Just as it was for the Irish and Jews before them. And despite the negative impact the catholics and jews have had on the US Court system – particularly the Supreme Court, economically and culturally it has been a successful process of integration. Of course, I make these statements of value because I place rule of law higher in value than democratic will. And I do so for the same reason that the founders did, and the greeks did: the fashions and passions of the people are economically dangerous, and bureaucracy eventually leads to tyranny. How The Church Solved The Problem Of Norms The church managed to break european tribalism, which was very similar to racism, by prohibiting intermarriage out to as many as six generations. But intermarriage among europeans is not a visible property once it’s done. You cannot tell a smith from a jones. Races do not carry this same property of anonymity. The church conducted this program of outbreeding in order to capture more inheritance revenue for itself. It was not a socially beneficent policy. It was entirely self serving. And I wold argue that the state is conducting a program of integration and multiculturalism in order to do the same: create power and wealth for members of the state, at the expense of the non-state, coming english people. The problem the UK faces with Pakistanis for example, is their high rate of inbreeding — which is demonstrated by their near monopoly on UK birth defects. Inbreeding is also the same reason for muslim familial tribalism, and the reason for, like american blacks, a standard deviation lower IQ and higher impulsivity, both of which lead to disenfranchisement and criminality. If the UK were to ban intermarriage out to six generations again, it may be possible to integrate Pakistanis and other muslims into society. But as it stands, they are not integrating even after two or three generations, even if they are economically successful. They are forming a permanent subclass, which is maturing into a permanent caste, which will seek political power wherever it has density, in order to alter the privileges of, and persist and improve the status signals for the group. SUMMARY The problems of the USA are occurring in the UK, and for the same reasons: Under any kind of democracy, where it is possible for groups to obtain political power, and where political power enables control of the purse, norms must be homogenous to prevent political divisions. Norms are more difficult to establish between racial groups than they were between tribal and family groups. Our sentimental political values for tolerance arose from an era of religious and tribal rather than racial differences. And religious and tribal differences disappear with intermarriage and the enforcement of norms. Racial differences don’t because they’re visible, and because at the EXTREMES (jews on one end, blacks on the other) it is against the interests of those groups to adopt the norms, as it would impact their status signaling economies, and therefore their real economies. It is important for jews to be racist, so that they can persist their advantages. Whites used to be racist but the wars ended their comfort with self confidence. Blacks are racist at the bottom. And Arabs like blacks will remain racist for a long time to come. Because signaling in-group is beneficial to them, and out-grop it is not. And the dirty secret is that the races are materially different in distributions of talents, and as such these signals have extraordinary value and meaning to the members of each group. Closing With Satire and Ridicule So, like many things we observe over the past two centuries, the USA is just a window into the future for Europe in general, and the UK in particular. I remember the high-minded criticism of the States by UK and continental pundits as the banking system collapsed, and the cheering of the vox populi as they congratulated themselves on their superior wisdom — that was, until a lunch of steaming crow was served in heaping portions when it turned out that the problem was even worse in Europe than in the States. The same is true for the race issue: Do not attribute to wisdom and character, that which is a function of demographics and luck. We here in the states will start saving our crow in large freezers in preparation for your feast. Because UK populists will very soon be eating it. (FYI: Eating crow is a U.S. colloquial idiom, meaning experiencing humiliation for having been proved wrong after taking a strong position.) UPDATE: BANNED FROM THE GUARDIAN FOR THIS POST!!! This is a longer version of a post I put on the Guardian, which was later removed for ‘violating community guidelines’. The fact that facts can be offensive is offensive to me. 🙂 This is quite a good post which will reward the patient reader with new understanding. — CurtUPDATE 2: Dirbyshire was fired from the National Review for writing the article. The primary failing he made, and one I make as well, is to made clear that the race problem is one of distributions: black lower classes are the problem because of where they sit in relation to other groups. I would suppose that most of us think that’s just patently obvious, but then again, that’s because we think in terms of classes. Racism is just plain stupidity. You never know who it is you’re talking to by the color of their skin. But if the color of their skin raises a question, and their signals and behavior make obvious their class, then he’s just right on all counts.UPDATE 3: Again, racism between individuals is simply irrational stupidity. You cannot judge an individual by the properties of his class, only a class by the properties of an individual. However, that requires that you KNOW the individual and that we are talking about individuals, not groups, when groups act as groups because of shared interests. The fact that violent criminality is predominantly a property of the lower classes, the American lower classes are dominated by african americans, and that 40% of african americans are below what we consider ‘cognitively limited’ 10% of whites are. That means that there is a one in ten chance that if you meet a white person entirely at random that you’ll find someone not very bright (a random event which isn’t possible, since people geographically colocate by IQ). And in that group, the dominant majority will use various pressures to control the behavior of those individuals. WHen meeting a black person, there is a four in ten chance that you’ll meet someone who is not very bright. The difference is in the DISTRIBUTION of white and black, ‘dumb’ people. If you’re in africa, and everyone else is black then you don’t think you’re kept down. If you’re black in the states, and 90% of white people are better off than you are, it’s obvious to you that it’s intentional ostracization, rather than a byproduct of the meritocratic sorting of mating and economics. We KNOW that people all rate themselves as above competent until they’re highly competent. We can measure it. But if you’re part of a group that is systemically at a competitive disadvantage, and where you intuitively judge yourself as normal, and therefore everyone else outside your group is conspiring against you, and when everyone on street that you meet treats you as having a 40% chance of being an idiot, and a 80% chance of being a criminal, and when your peers try to find solidarity through signaling that tries to evangelize primitive expressions, so you adopt those expressions of your group for solidarity and perhaps survival, and then walk a street with those signals all about you, simply verifying by signals what outgroup people expect, then it makes sense that you would be frustrated. THe only question asked by conservatives then, is a) why can’t I prohibit those signals if they contribute to an inability to integrate?, b) why can’t I prohibit people from my neighborhood who look and behave a certain way? c) why should I pay for people in that gene pool to have children? This isn’t irrational on anyone’s part. THe only reason conservatives can come up with is to empower the government.
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Gödel’s Theorem Needs Godel’s Law
Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorem came up in a debate the other night. I usually react by hanging my head and groaning in anticipation of the chaos that eventually ensues. But on an impulse made a statement about the narrowness of its applicability in a vain attempt to avoid the conversation. It was futile. Chaos ensued. The conversation really troubled me. Because I couldn’t defend it from memory. I couldn’t reconstruct the argument in my head. I’ve spent time with the problem in computer science. So much so that it’s intuitive. But I could not remember how to reconstruct the salient part of the problem — the arithmetic requirement — so I couldn’t argue it. I had to go look it up again. And in doing so remembered why I can’t remember it: it’s complicated, and difficult if not impossible to reduce it to something more accessible. That’s why no one does it. 🙂 That’s why no one has done it. Gödel’s theory is one of the most abused concepts referred to by people outside of professional mathematics. And when it is used, it’s almost guaranteed that it’s being used incorrectly. I suspect that’s because of the popularization of the idea by way of the liars paradox, which is then inappropriately applied elsewhere by analogy. But mostly it’s abused as an excuse to create arguments to defend mysticism in religion and avoidance in philosophy, and to justify any state of skepticism. Instead, it is in fact, a fairly narrow argument, related to axioms and number theory. ie: questions within axiomatic systems that are testable by the rules of arithmetic. I do no better. I usually express it as “given any fixed axiomatic system, there are statements that are expressible that are contradictory to the claim of completeness.” Which itself is incomplete because the difficulty with Gödel’s theory is in describing its arithmetic requirements — and that description is complicated, which is why it’s never included in any definition, and by that omission leads to its spread by erroneous analogy. This simplified definition is useful within computer science, because computers themselves are bound by Gödel’s arithmetic constraint in the first place — unlike mathematics, wherein he discussion of Gödel’s theorem must specifically address the arithmetic requirement in order for it to be narrow enough to be true. So we have three categories of problems that help us understand Gödel’s theorem in the abstract even if the mathematical concepts are difficult to convey other than by examples that are difficult to construct: 1) the computational problem set which is by definition constrained, 2) the mathematical problem set which must be constrained, and 3) the linguistic problem which cannot be constrained. And philosophical questions are part of set 3 – impossible to constrain to arithmetic limits which are the reason incompleteness is imposed by the theorem. The net result is that Godel’s theorem is, for all intents and purposes, never applicable to non-mathematical, non-computational propositions. Ever. But since, in casual debate, we break Godwin’s law in any conversation by mentioning Nazis about once an hour, then even if we created a new law: “The inclusion of Gödel in any philosophical discourse is sufficient proof that the argument is faulty”, we would still break it once a week. Because in the end, people of philosophical bent, are actually searching to fulfill their un-sated desire for mystical release from our inescapable requirement to reason and adapt to a constantly changing, and entirely kaleidic reality. 🙂 Here is a wonderful little criticism by From Cosma Shalizi, Assistant Professor, Carnegie Mellon University. And as such it is only an appeal to authority – again, because the proof is burdensome and inaccessible.
“There are two very common but fallacious conclusions people make from this, and an immense number of uncommon but equally fallacious errors I shan’t bother with. The first is that Gödel’s theorem imposes some some of profound limitation on knowledge, science, mathematics. Now, as to science, this ignores in the first place that Gödel’s theorem applies to deduction from axioms, a useful and important sort of reasoning, but one so far from being our only source of knowledge it’s not even funny. It’s not even a very common mode of reasoning in the sciences, though there are axiomatic formulations of some parts of physics. Even within this comparatively small circle, we have at most established that there are some propositions about numbers which we can’t prove formally. As Hintikka says, “Gödel’s incompleteness result does not touch directly on the most important sense of completeness and incompleteness, namely, descriptive completeness and incompleteness,” the sense in which an axiom system describes a given field. In particular, the result “casts absolutely no shadow on the notion of truth. All that it says is that the whole set of arithmetical truths cannot be listed, one by one, by a Turing machine.” Equivalently, there is no algorithm which can decide the truth of all arithmetical propositions. And that is all. This brings us to the other, and possibly even more common fallacy, that Gödel’s theorem says artificial intelligence is impossible, or that machines cannot think. The argument, so far as there is one, usually runs as follows. Axiomatic systems are equivalent to abstract computers, to Turing machines, of which our computers are (approximate) realizations. (True.) Since there are true propositions which cannot be deduced by interesting axiomatic systems, there are results which cannot be obtained by computers, either. (True.) But we can obtain those results, so our thinking cannot be adequately represented by a computer, or an axiomatic system. Therefore, we are not computational machines, and none of them could be as intelligent as we are; quod erat demonstrandum. This would actually be a valid demonstration, were only the penultimate sentence true; but no one has ever presented any evidence that it is true, only vigorous hand-waving and the occasional heartfelt assertion.”
WEB
- http://mathworld.wolfram.com/GoedelsIncompletenessTheorem.html
- http://math.mind-crafts.com/godels_incompleteness_theorems.php
- http://math.stanford.edu/~feferman/papers/Godel-IAS.pdf
- http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel/#IncThe
Recommended by Shalizi
- Michael Arbib, Brains, Machines and Mathematics [A good sketch of the proof of the theorem, without vaporizing]
- George S. Boolos and Richard C. Jeffrey, Computability and Logic [Textbook, with a good discussion of incompleteness results, along with many other things. Intended more for those interested in the logical than the computational aspects of the subject — they do more with model theory than with different notions of computation, for instance — but very strong all around.]
- Torkel Franzen, Gödel’s on the net [Gentle debunking of many of the more common fallacies and misunderstandings]
- Jaakko Hintikka, The Principles of Mathematics Revisited [Does a nice job of defusing Gödel’s theorem, independently of some interesting ideas about logical truth and the like, about which I remain agnostic. My quotations above are from p. 95]
- Dale Myers, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem [A very nice web page that builds slowly to the proof]
- Roger Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind [Does a marvelous job of explaining what goes into the proof — his presentation could be understood by a bright high school student, or even an MBA — but then degenerates into an unusually awful specimen of the standard argument against artificial intelligence]
- Willard Van Orman Quine, Mathematical Logic [Proves a result which is actually somewhat stronger than the usual version of Gödel’s theorem in the last chapter, which however adds no philosophical profundity; review]
- Raymond Smullyan, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems [A mathematical textbook, not for the faint at heart, though the first chapter isn’t so bad; one of the few to notice the strength of Quine’s result]
- To read:
- John C. Collins, “On the Compatibility Between Physics and Intelligent Organisms,” physics/0102024 [Claims to have a truly elegant refutation of Penrose]
- Rebecca Goldstein, Incompleteness [Biography of Gödel, which seems to actually understand the math]
- Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, Gödel’s Proof [Thanks to S. T. Smith for the recommendation]
- Mario Rabinowitz, “Do the Laws of Nature and Physics Agree About What is Allowed and Forbidden?” physics/0104001
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Caplan and Boettke On Wikipedia And The Economic Calculation Debate
I haven’t read the wiki article on economic calculation before. But this subject is one on which I have spent ten years of work, and Caplan’s quote in the wiki as it’s written bothers me because it’s too easy to misinterpret. 1) Caplan’s argument is reducible to this statement: “between price signals for planning and incentives for coordination, the greater problem is the one of incentives.” The problem of incentives without prices manifests itself in a multitude of behaviors. That multitude of manifested behaviors renders a planned economy impossible. He has stated repeatedly that his criticism is one of subtle priority between incentives and prices. 2) The dispute between the priority of prices and incentives is an artificial distinction. Just as one cannot have a principle of voluntary transfer without the institution of property, one cannot have the institution of prices without human incentives. And prices have no meaning without incentives. The two concepts are inseparable. Incentives require choice, and prices are required to choose between multiple alternatives. Just as voluntary transfer has no meaning without property. While incentives can exist without prices — fear, want, belonging, security, barter and the like — they are limited to simple goods that we can use or consume ourselves. In and industrial economy those goods are abstractions that we cannot grasp the use of with our senses (specialty metals, chemicals, tools). They require special knowledge that one must have an incentive to acquire. So without prices, planning in an industrial economy consisting of factors of production that can be put to multiple purposes in real time, cannot be organized into any rational plan by the multitude of people required to produce any single good. (See I Pencil/I Hamburger). ergo: while the human mind can conceive of an artificially constant organization of individuals, resources and means of production once it is already known, and once individuals possess the appropriate knowledge — an industrial economy is impossible to FIGURE OUT and it is impossible to SUSTAIN without prices and the impact of those prices on incentives. Companies organize to create production all the time. They then have to reorganize in order to suit changes in the market that are signalled by prices of the factors of production AND their outputs. This last bit is important, because producers find a market price for their goods and services then alter their production processes (their cost structure) to satisfy market prices. Humans lack the information to make decisions, but decision making is only important given that they need to have incentives in order to perform the work. Mises doesn’t so much overstate his case, as he is simply more concerned about the problem of money and calculation given the events of his time. 3) The problem for any economy functioning in an equilibrium (competing with other economies) is that competition forces constant recalculation of the use of factors of production, and the organizations that such factors of production are used by. The problem for any economy dependent upon natural resources (food) as a means of production (feeding people), and where production requires time (seasons), is that nature does not adhere to plans and is subject to black swan effects (natural disasters). And it may be impossible to ‘re-plan’ in real time without irreparable effects (starvation) because of the lack of prices and incentives. 4) We might also put Caplan’s statement in context: GMU’s Austrian Economists are in an identity clash with the Rothbardians from the Mises institute. The rothbardians have appropriated the terms ‘libertarian’ and ‘austrian economics’ by adopting Alinsky’s marxist model of propagandizing. Because the Rothbardians have been so successful in doing so, this has caused the only university department in the USA that actively promotes Austrian theory, to defend its theory from ideological if not intellectual abuse, for market reasons. (I am not criticizing the rothbardians, just pointing out the motivations involved. All publicity is good publicity.) In effect Caplan is not commenting about Mises and his economics, he’s commenting about the Rothbardians and their political movement. 5) A paper by Boettke supposedly refutes Caplan. Accusing Caplan of not understanding the arguments Mises was making about Socialism. This is somewhat of a comedy of errors, because in his attempted refutation, Boettke makes that mistake, and Caplan does not. Caplan is not arguing against Misesian era socialism, and the stipulation by socialists that the problem of scarcity would be solved by state ownership of property. But he’s from a younger generation. He is arguing against his generation’s problems of social democracy (private ownership of property, public ownership of profits, which we call redistributive or progressive social democracy.) In this new context he’s saying that incentives matter more than prices, and that there is too much being made of the price issue, rather than the behavioral issue. He’s addressing current issues. In particular the Rothbardian over-emphasis on prices in relation to current socialistic arguments over maximum taxation, and the impact that such taxation would have on the economy. So Caplan’s critique stands to date. And if we were to ask Block, Herbner and Solerno, who wrote most of the papers on the subject, and all of which I have read repeatedly, they would say that the debate has closed. (I know. They’ve told me in person.) There is no meaningful difference between the price and incentive arguments. The importance of each has more to do with the emphasis needed to address each generation’s attempts to protect private property, because the two instantiations of socialistic behavior (socialism and democratic socialism) attempt to appropriate different aspects of property: the means of production by socialists, and the results of production by democratic socialists. Socialism failed because of the inability to both plan and provide incentives. Democratic socialism to some degree continues to survive because it allows (rental?) ownership of property which allows economic calculation and does not appropriate so much of the proceeds that we fail to have the incentive to work. (in most cases.) In fact, in the literature to date (and there is a great deal of it) economists on the left attempt to figure out how much more can be taxed without negative aggregate effects on the economy. They estimate it is much higher. 6) In Why I Am Not An Austrian Economist, Caplan makes the following material errors: a) That probability and uncertainty are the same thing. This is the [glossary:ludic fallacy]. (wiki Ludic Fallacy) And b) that we can predict highly disequlibrating events (black swans.) Or that models can accomodate for black swan effects. 7) Caplan is fundamentally wrong in his understanding of Mises, Rothbard and Hoppe, and Section 2, which attempts to articulate why the neoclassical economists are correct and why models are viable, is a confused set of prevarications I am surprised that has not been better refuted. I do not propose to do full justice here. But while I agreed with Caplan years ago, I have come to understand that he’s simply making excuses for using mathematical models where Mises, Rothbard and Hoppe were trying to discover human nature, so that a better system of government, if any, could be resolved. I don’t think Caplan’s critique is valuable any longer. I think the world has moved on. But at this point in my life I’m pretty sure I can dismantle his arguments as presented in WIANAAE, by demonstrating that Boettke’s argument that Caplan does not understand is actually true. 🙂 And I think Caplan’s later waffling only prove it. But I’m in the middle of a dozen other ideas that are more valuable. Hopefully it’ll be a nice bit of work for some grad student someday. So I’ll stick with my assertion that his arguments have political not material motives. That his single observation about the relationship between incentives and prices is true. That Boettke’s criticism is wrong. And that Caplan’s broader understanding of mises, rothbard, and hoppe are wrong. Everyone is conducting a research program. We’re just scratching the surface.
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A Libertarian Reformation Is Possible: Restoring Libertarianism from Libertinism.
The Success Of The Rothbardians Using The Strategy Of The Marxists: Community and Ideology
The success of the Rothbardians under the leadership of Lew Rockwell in prosthelytizing anarcho-capitalism through education, community-building and information distribution has affected the American political debate — so successfully that they have caused much of the public to identify libertarianism almost exclusively with Rothbardian anarcho-capitalism, and Anarcho-Capitalism with Austrian Economics. Neither of which is true, and little more than an appropriation of terms, but an appropriation of terms that demonstrates the power of Lew’s vision of promoting ideology by good marketing, making use of new technology early, building inclusive communities and sponsoring education. Rothbard’s Libertine Libertarianism is no longer on the Randian fringe, or limited to economic radicals, but on the cusp of popular viability — something more traditional organizations can only view with envy. So much envy that they pay him the greatest compliment: imitation. And while the reason for his success is often attributed to his emphasis on technology, his strategy of applying the tactics of the Marxists to libertarianism is largely ignored. Despite the fact that it was both visionary and successful.
But that success has been achieved by fostering passionate ideological sentiments in favor of libertinism – an immoral prescription for a levantine polity that westerners almost universally, and rightfully reject – and not by developing a set of institutional recommendations that would provide practical solutions to problems of American political conflict. In fact, unlike Hoppeian private government advocates who want to replace bureaucracies with insurance companies, or classical liberals who want to restore our procedural institutions, or conservatives who want to restore our normative institutions — Rothbardian anarcho-capitalists simply ignore the problem of formal institutions by trying to create what amounts to an immoral libertine personal religion held by conviction, instead of a set of political institutions held in place by communal and intergenerational habit and commercial and operational necessity. So Rothbardians don’t recommend institutional changes. They learned from the marxists: they don’t even try. To implement change requires power. To obtain power one needs an ideology. An ideology must be more motivating than intellectual to gain numbers, and only rigorously intellectual for its leaders, who must then argue against the leaders of competing ideologies.
Past Ideology: The Problem Of Institutions
But institutions are necessary. Everyone: the progressives and conservatives and anarchists, attempts to create homogenous norms through the force of legislation — or in case of the anarchists, the somehow magical prohibition of legislation. Even classical liberal libertarians seem to cling to the belief that they can instill by reason those virtues that lead to a high trust homogenous society into a population despite the contrary evidence that those virtues were an accident of european history due to the church’s prohibition on cousin-marriage, the church’s use of pre-existing roman law thereby creating the rule of law, the natural eugenics and manufacture of the work ethic that were a byproduct by the manorial system. A set of circumstances that will never to be repeated again, and a set of cultural values that are antithetical to most of the world — a good portion of that world and its antithetical cultural value which has migrated to America and which will soon be the majority of the population. Unlike classical liberals, post-rothbard libertarians do not require homogeneity from a population; they only require institutions that allow different factions to conduct voluntary exchanges and to disallow institutions from inhibiting those voluntary transfers.Propertarianism“And political solutions come, not in the desire for homogeneity of belief against instinctual preferences, but in the form of institutions that allow people of different political preferences to cooperate despite their different preferences — and institutions that prohibit the mandate that those preferences be homogenous.”But we should be clear about this fact: among all the libertarians, despite the fact that misesian praxeology does not account for the opportunity costs we pay in order to establish the norm of property, despite Rand’s ability to give form and argument to the heroism of commercial virtues, and despite the fact that Rothbards ethic is inimicable to the lower classes, and as such cannot gain even their least accommodating, tacit consent, despite the fact that to conservatives and progressives alike the very premise of rothbardian individualism is anti-social and morally objectionable, and despite the fact that the enfranchisement of women in particular, and the lower classes more generally, has made liberty a minority proposition in the electorate because of no other reason than instinctual differences in mating behaviors writ large, no other libertarian other than Hoppe has contributed to the solution of the institutional problem of bureaucracy. The first problem of government is bureaucracy. And only the Hoppeians have given us a solution to the problem of government: insurance companies not bureaucracies.
In fact, the classical liberal wing, and the conservatives, have done nothing of note: All libertarian progress, even those policies that were adopted by conservatives as convenient tactics to delay the progressives, in order to protect their social norms were not provided by classical liberals: The argument against socialism by mises. The compromise economic solutions provided by Friedman, The philosophical argument provided by Rothbard, the utilitarian argument provided by Hayek.
Ideology can gain interest. Intellectuals can assist the passionate in gaining power. But once in power, holding power requires solutions. And political solutions come, not in the desire for homogeneity of belief against instinctual preferences, but in the form of institutions that allow people of different political preferences to cooperate despite their different preferences — and institutions that prohibit the mandate that those preferences be homogenous.
So, without a program of institutional changes aren’t we stuck with Classical Liberal institutions? And, if classical liberal institutions have already failed to protect our property rights, even when the population was more homogenous in its mythology, values, mating patterns, genders and races, then why would a return to classical liberalism preserve our rights? Don’t we need to update classical liberalism in order to incorporate what we’ve learned over the past few centuries?
THE LIBERTARIAN REFORMATION
Right now, we libertarians are participating in the Libertarian Reformation. When the Bleeding Heart Libertarians formed, I was sure that the Rothbardian solution had peaked, the Randian era had declined into irrelevance, and the thought leadership was searching for a political program for the maturing generations. But that the movement would remain stuck in an attempt to gain converts by reason, ignoring the value of ideology, rather than gain converts by ideology and education and develop rational solutions that solve material problems which must be solved by institutions.
The Rothbardians, the Hoppeians, the Hayekians, the Bleeding Heart Libertarians, the classical liberal libertarians, and the economic conservatives, are all trying to propagate a system of sentiments that is homogenous enough that we can obtain some sort of political power — enough power with which we might enact some sort of policy more suited to our preferences.
Cato, which seems perpetually behind the trend in the popular movement — largely because they see their audience as policy makers, not the next generation of young voters, and who wants to remain a bridge with conservatives, and retain their access to the republican party — has launched libertarianism.org. Albeit without much attention.
Quietly I believe, everyone is catching up to the use of technology, and if the attraction of intellectuals to different alliances is a measure of future ideas, then the Rothbardians will be successfully marginalized as the movement matures, assuming the different libertarian groups can somehow take over leadership — demonstrating in think tanks that like business, the money is not necessarily made by inventors who cannot transitoin to scale, but by distributors who copy the good ideas of inventors, precisely because they know how to scale, if not invent anything.
This reformation is partly the result of generational turnover – aging Baby Boomers and dying of members of the Silent Generation are being replaced by maturing members of the ‘Jones generation’ which consists of elder children of the 70’s technocrats like myself, Jobs, and Gates, and rising interest by the X, Y, and upcoming Millennial generations reacting to their perception of the state of affairs as possibly depriving them of their childhood dreams.
Demographic Changes
It is also partly driven by demographic stresses as protestants in particular, and whites in general become a minority and grasp for an identity that is no longer national, but out of necessity returns to natural tribal identities because of our instincts for group membership, and a group membership in a nation that is denied under multiculturalism. The only surprise has been the formation of new castes (genetic classes that reflect economic class) by the upper middle class, and by elites that have abandoned traditional society entirely by obtaining ostensibly ideological educations, living and thinking within isolated progressive enclaves.
And the reformation is partly driven by practical political frustration as the polarization of political discourse due in no small part to the integration of the formerly conservative south into its natural home in the republican party. And reinforced our ability to select information sources from the media that confirm our sentimental and cultural biases.
The Lingering Problem In Economics
With the dismantlement of morality along with the institution of organized religion, economics has usurped morality as a means of all political decision making. Further, libertarianism is fundamentally an economic philosophy both in its origins as a revolution in moral thinking under classical liberalism, and in its more technocratic political philosophy today.
But economics currently consists of four or five different branches, each touting as truth whatever methodology that they use, and each methodology used benefits a different portion of society. The lower classes, the government, the entrepreneurial class, or the financial sector.
To make matters worse, despite the long-term predictions of the conservatives, and the short term ambitions of the progressives, the truth is, that economics is a young field of study, lacking sufficient data across a long enough period of time, for any of the branches to claim validity of their method.
It is possible that ALL FOUR GROUPS ARE RIGHT about their policy recommendations. It is even likely that all four are right. It is simply unlikely that we can create a political system that can implement policy along that spectrum. Not because of the affect each of them has on the economy. But because the affect that each of them has on empowering or disempowering the government to interfere with our social lives. So, it’s possible to CONCEIVE of a political system that will make use of the entire spectrum of tools. It’s just not practically possible to implement it.
Why? Because the short term tactical approach favors consumption and redistribution while the long term favors innovation and concentration. And without a systemic and procedural means of balancing those two political extremes, it is not possible for the different advocates to compromise on policy.
A thought experiment might help: Let’s pretend we have four houses of government that roughly correspond to ‘The Fiscal House (Keynesians)’, ‘The Monetary House’ (Monetarists), ‘The Industrial Policy House’ (neoclassicals), and the ‘Human Capital House’ (Austrians). And we have an executive branch that can only execute bills that are approved by all four houses. These houses cannot create laws in the sense that they cannot create binding obligations over the long term. They can only ‘print’, borrow, and allocate fixed amounts of money over fixed time periods with defined dates of conclusion. In that model, all four houses would have to compromise with one another in order for policy to be enacted.
The reason the different camps cannot agree on policy is that each side is actually trying to constrain the other’s political not economic preferences and can only do so by advocating their methodology at the extremes. It’s a winner-take-all proposition.
Our Reformation Can Choose Its Path
In this reformation, we have choices. We can choose the anarchists’ route — which because it’s ideological, is effective, and is effective because it aims at accumulating political power more so than providing institutional solutions. We can choose the classical liberal route. Which is the solution the conservatives advocate, as well as do the classical liberal libertarians — if only we can talk enough that we can somehow convince diverse americans to be more virtuous like we supposedly are. A statement that if uttered aloud shatters even the most willful suspension of disbelief. Or we can choose to correct our institutions– to take avantage of what we libertarians have learned over the past century about human nature, about cultural differences, about economics, and the weaknesses of our political system.
Each group can continue to press its strategy — anarchic society, private government, classical liberal representative government, or neo-classical libertarian solutions more tolerant of redistributive sentiments, in the hope that different messages appeal to different pools of voters. We can attempt to gain power through coalescing behind candidates for office rather than on specific platforms regardless of candidate — when supporting platforms demonstrably doesn’t often succeed — becuse, counterintuitively, specifics are often easily criticized, while sentiments are not. The benefit of seeking power rather than marketing solutions is that it’s easier to communicate the message, easier to build a sentimental community, harder to criticize, and the messy administrative details necessary to execute can be left for later. And that failure to have a plan is precisely why political execution fails once new groups come to power. Because when you do get the power you seek, differences become visible, factions feel equally betrayed, and infighting destroys the previous unity and collapses the means by which you obtained power: community.
OUR CLASSICAL LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS
Institutions matter. The classical liberal institutions that were designed to protect our freedoms failed. They failed partly because they made assumptions about the static and supposedly permanent nature of social institutions. They failed partly due to lack of precision and detail in the wording. They failed partly because they did not defend sufficiently against more effort put into the circumvention of their rules, than into using the avenues which they had created for voluntary modification of the constitution.
The Constitution and the Courts
The constitution was too weak, and it allowed antagonists to achieve through the courts what they could not accomplish in the legislature. What the constitution required be achieved through the amendment process was put into place by the courts, and what the constitution required that we achieve through a constitutional convention was put through by the courts. The court has served as a means of conducting violence against the rule of law, rather than a protector of it.
Class Cooperation
The separation of the houses by class into the commons (farmers) and commerce (senate) was destroyed, at the time when our only real similarity with one another — as small business farmers and shopkeepers — was rapidly declining, thereby setting the institutional framework that would force us into inescapable class warfare. And through these various debasements of our constitution by the courts and the legislature they destroyed the constitution itself and the rule of law with it.
Society consists of both social classes and economic classes. Implementing a legislature under the premise of classless democracy violated the English insight that classes could cooperate through the houses of government, and could not do so without them — a fact which we Americans have demonstrated with profound clarity. Instad of undermining the senate, if anything, a house of ‘labor’ should have been added to the government in order to give the newly enabled proletariat access to services, and the labor class access to juridical defense. Instead, the entire government was handed over to the proletariat via democracy and the middle and upper classes had no choice but to resort to extra-political means of self defense — effectively abandoning the society and government to a future of pervasive class warfare and special interest corruption.
The Mistaken Concept Of Separating Church and State Rather Than Services Of Church And State
The founders could not imagine the church, its teachings and its public services, disappearing from the political landscape. When they said ‘separation of church and state’ they would have included in the concept of the church the delivery of education, health care, assistance to the poor, and other social services had they known of the possibility and impact of Darwin. In their view, the purpose of the government is to regulate conflicts, not provide services. Our constitution failed to address that issue because it was inconceivable to the authors. As such we have united church and state in all but written mythology, and violated our constitution’s assumptions against uniting church and state if not violating its explicitly language in the process.
The problem is that there need be no exchange or contract levied for services between heavy producers and heavy consumers, and since the majority of the population controls the legislature, it concerns itself almost entirely with services and very little with competitiveness and productivity and property rights.
The Failure To Account For The Impact of Different Reproductive Strategies
If the abuse of the constitution from the courts was our first failing. If a failure to articulate the meaning of the separation of church (services) and state (diputes) is our second failing. Then our third failing was a failure to modify our institutions to accomodate the addition of women to the voting pool. The founders did not account for the difference in political preferences due to the difference in reproductive strategies between men and women, the breaking of the multi-class house system was our greatest mistake. THey could not foresee that the industrial revolution would free women from much of their drudgery, allow them to obtain an education, and participate in the work force. And while the recognized that women have less political and more familial political sentiments, they would not have understood that adding women to the voting pool would result not in laws that made them equal to men, but that by the passion of their interests, and greater numbers of participation, and longer lives, that they would seek rents not only against the government, but against men themselves, and would willingly destroy the freedoms men had fought for over the millennia.
So we have taken a homogenous protestant english speaking upper class male minority administering a homogenous, predominantly agrarian population, where the lower classes are uneducated and largely illiterate, and transformed it to a heterogeneous multicultural, multi-racial, multi-gender, street-fight where the races are subject to constant status signal pressures, the majority of cultures have inbreeding and tribal mating patterns, and inbreeding and tribal loyalties, and gender reproductive strategies which are highly consumptive and egalitarian (if not dysgenic) and that are in permanent conflict with the homogenous political system that was put in place– thereby making decisions ont those of choosing priorities among similar preferences, but instead, where all decisions are polarized not because of reason, as they would be between farmers, but because of biological sentiments that are entirely counter to the very system of political conflict resolution that the operate within.
People this diverse cannot agree on any problem involving scarcity and transfers. They can only agree to those policies that ignore scarcity and enable transfers. Because they do not have similar enough interests. And those interests if marginal, are conducted on genetic or biological grounds rather than collective grounds.
IDEOLOGICAL BLIND SPOTS
All ideologies contain blind spots. Progressives, socialists, and marxists, are blind to incentives and scarcity in economics, and they are intentionally blind to differences in ability, and the value of those differences in ability.
The conservatives and progressives both are blind to the fact that political sentiments reflect the differences in reproductive strategies between men and women, and that these sentiments have serious implications for their genes – the very reason we exist. As such, it is not possible by argument, nor preferable by political violence, to convert opponents to ones belief: we actually need these opposing views.
The libertarian blind spot is that the majority of people do not want freedom. They want the result of it. They want consumer comforts. Freedom consists as much in self-denial as it does in self expression. THey do not want to work at self denial. But only at self expression.
LIBERTARIAN INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS
But what libertarians offer themselves, the progressives and the conservatives, is an institutional framework in which we do not have to convert one another in order to live in the world we each desire: we simply need a government that, like the market, conducts exchanges, rather than takings and givings. We need a government of contracts, not a government of laws. We do not need laws that persist and which can be broken by the next legislature, we need contracts that cannot be broken by any legislature, but which expire in a short period of time, when specific criteria are finished. We do not need extra-market bureaucracies and their unintended but unavoidable corruption, with the government as the insurer of last resort, we need insurance companies that are not given corporal privileges and immunity, and a government that is only an insurer of last resort to the citizens. Whether we even need representative government is questionable. There is no reason why, given current technology, we cannot directly vote for initiatives, and therefore make lobbying and rent seeking almost impossible. At the top of society we certainly do not. At the bottom of society it may be a necessity due to limitations on time and effort. But if we are to have representatives, lottocracy defeats democracy in preventing corruption.
BUT WHO CAN UNITE THE FACTIONS?
No libertarian or Libertine organization can unite the factions today. That is because the libertine fallacy is a failure. It is merely an individual communist manifesto rather than a collectice one.
RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS
Unfortunately there are problems with any strategy of uniting different groups. Some libertarian anti-reformation forces are financial: each party will commit the innovator’s dilemma by protecting their donor pool instead of pursuing the new donor pool that would be available in far larger numbers, if the message were able to become more mainstream. Also, there is a lot of bad blood between the people in some of these organizations, and our generation and the one that follows it, must leave that history behind. After all, it’s pretty meaningless to the rest of us why someone did or did not like Cato, or the NEI, or why the GMU crowd pridefully argues with the Anarchists in an attempt to promote the superiority of their ideas.
I also feel that funding for radical anarchists will decline rapidly with the current generation, as the people who grew up combating socialism and social democracy (democratic secular redistributive humanism) are replaced with the people who seek freedom and identity for its own sake. Further, I suspect that this period of economic discomfort and social polarization will continue in concert with the changes in racial and cultural composition, as well as changes in urban density. And that in that environment libertarian sentiments among some set of groups will continue to expand. As such I think both Rothbard’s memory, and Misesian insights, can be best preserved by expanding inclusion of other groups by an annual scholarly reality show which because of its popularity attracts investors, rather than a declining rothbardian extremism that has lost its relevance due to its own success. There is no reason one has to run a single sports team instead of an entire league of sports teams.
Either way, some group will obtain enough funding to be able to accomplish this goal. But given the history, I don’t see it easily done by anyone else. It’s a purely administrative problem by people who understand both community and education, and marketing and fundraising.
THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND VOLUNTARY EXCHANGE
Libertarians understand the explanatory power…… and that social cooperation and coordination is provided by property rights and voluntary exchange. But some libertarian ideas are a justification for a prohibition on organizing in large groups. But we do not need to prohibit humans from organizing in order to concentrate capital, even if they seek to establish and police a marketplace. The question only arises when those activities seek involuntary transfers from others. Libertarians know how to create Institutions allow people to cooperate toward different ends and means as long as they do not use theft, fraud or violence, and do not seek rents (corruption) or seek to create obstacles (corruption) to voluntary exchanges. Libertarians understand the explanatory power of the propertarian ethical system, and have spent decades thinking through the implications. Even if they do not equally understand that the reason that property has such explanatory power, is that property is a biological feature of human beings without which we could not exist — albiet, the variety with which humans allocate communal, shareholder, and private property is nearly endless.
It is that variety of property definitions, and the difference in the distribution of necessary and competing mating strategies between the genders, that determines many of those property definitions — with the masculine preferring that we err on the private and the feminine preferring that we err on the communal, and the libertarian preferring that we err on the side of shareholder constructs that do not oppress one another regardless of those different preferences.
It is possible to create a set of institutions that repair the failings of classical liberal society. I believe Hoppe’s insight is that insurance companies can perform all regulatory functions, and do a better, cheaper and faster job of it. I believe Hayek was right about the importance of a hard constitution with the rule of law that limits the government, and a judiciary that relies upon discovery in common law, and that government as we understand it is almost irrelevant if we have those protections. I also believe that it is possible to use fiat money and monetary policy (if not Keynesian spending as currently conceived) if we create sufficient institutional protections in those institutions, and I believe those protections are something we now understand.
WE ARE ALL SHAREHOLDERS NOT JUST SEVERAL PROPERTY OWNERS
Community property is no longer possible. In a village it is possible to measure overconsumption (privatization of public goods — or in the case of shareholder property, violation of the shareholder agreement.) In a complex economy such observations are impossible. We must rely on tools that let us calculate the transfer of resources within those interactions using numbers. We cannot sense those transfers without the power of numbers to provide us with information beyond our perceptions. And they help us to correct our perceptions when they fail us. Community property cannot exist where individual actions are not observable and measurable against the actions of all others. We all cheat the market now and then. The unwed mother conducts an involuntary transfer: she makes irresponsible mating decisions that she expects others to pay for, and her actions are irrevocable since we cannot ‘unmake’ the child without violating the principle that supersedes our principle of property rights. The concentration of capital in order to create scarcity and raise prices is just a more complex transfer of the same kind. As such, community property must disappear in favor of shareholder property – the ownership of and interest in which is calculable and traceable. Morality is a nice word for preventing ‘cheating’. For morality to exist we must be able to sense it. to sense it we must be able to quantify it. And that means that community property is forever forbidden to us.
Limited Redistribution that Varies With Productivity Is Justified – Or Property Fails It’s Self-Test
I also believe, along with the Bleeding Heart libertarians (despite the fact that even with Roderick Long on board, they don’t have an articulated solution — or apparently, even a coherent logic to their ideas as does Hoppe) that according to Hoppian/Rothbardian/Misesian ethics, that the institution of property is a NORM that is paid for by citizens with a multitude of daily forgone opportunities for theft fraud and violence. And therefore anyone who pays for entrance into the market by respecting the constitution, rule of law, and who forgoes opportunity for theft, fraud, violence, and corruption (seeking rents, or blocking due process), and who buys his way into the society if an immigrant — is due his share of ‘dividends’ from the share he has earned by forgoing those opportunities and buying his way into the market that we call society. Albiet we all are due equal dividends, regardless of income or lack of it, so progressivity remains a property of income not one of dividends.
Markets Were Made By Shareholders, They Didn’t Evolve By Accident
And perhaps more importantly, that in the west, where we developed freedom and the rule of law, markets did not evolve: they were invested in and paid for by shareholders, most of whom were warriors, some of whom were merchants, all of whom were consumers. In this sense, there is no ‘natural market’. They are created by people who used force to forbid theft, fraud and violence, in order to profit from it. As such we are today, all shareholders, as long as we do not belong to the bureaucracy (Government workers), seek rents (corporations), conduct blocking (unions), or engage in corruption (financial institutions that profit from distribution of fiat money then socialize the losses), and as long as we do not commit theft, violence or fraud.
The Challenge Of Propertarian Logic
I do not see how this is logic is avoidable if the propertarian ethic is to be based upon praxeological foundations rather than some vague moralistic assumption. A set of assumptions I believe are designed entirely to circumvent the fact that praxeological analysis and property rights must lead one to conclude that redistribution of some sort, albiet fixed and equal, is due to all citizens. That is, unless one states that some sub-group ‘owns’ the market, and that observation of property rights are the means by which we gain right of entry. And that owner must eventually become the state which can dictate our behavior to us in exchange for our very survival in market society.
MULTIPLE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
There are certainly more radical institutional solutions available to us. The anarchic is only possible for a diasporic minority. The night watchman state is only possible in a small population. The Hoppeian private government is entirely possible if the geography is small and the population homogenous. Although none of the small state solution will compensate for problems of gender biases, and cultural breeding differences, they will just ignore them. The limited classical liberal is possible and preferable, but services are now so expansive it’s difficult to see how to get there without warfare. Pulling institutional ideas from Hoppe’s insurance companies into the classical liberal model, then modifying the houses to accomodate the classes, the modify the constitution so that representatives make contracts with one another, not laws. And modifying the constitution so that we return to common law, and rule of law, without fear of stacking the court. And finding a means of testing the court’s judgement for strick compliance with constitutional intent, and requiring constitutional modification by established process rather than judicial modification of the constitution by fiat.
LIBERTARIANS HAVE THE SOLUTION
Libertarians have the answers to institutional problems. These solutions come from analysis of how to use property rights and voluntary agreement within contracts to achieve different ends by different means: helping each other succeed in our objectives despite having different means and objectives. Libertarians simply must promote institutional solutions in order to become mainstream. Freedom alone, as a sentiment, as we libertarians understand it, is a demonstrably minority preference among human beings. However, a libertarian solution to the problem of institutions that allows people with different objectives to cooperate in pursuit of different ends, is possible using libertarian institutional solutions.
That is, unless we’re as dim and dishonest as Saul Alinsky and the Progressives: relying upon power and emotion to achieve what we cannot through the use of reason and by providing solutions.
Curt Doolittle
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Note: I have given money to MI. At one time (before I lost millions during a divorce and the recession) I promised to raise a considerable amount of money for them. So I’m not neutral. I’m not ideological. I just understand how they operate as an institution and they really did understand the web, how to use it, and how to create a community far better than anyone else in the space.
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Baiting? See Saul Alinsky, Strategist Of The Proletarian Left
I get a lot of heat from the left for adopting one of their tactics: baiting. But let’s see where those tactics comes from. Saul Alinsky. Our president’s hero. The western concept of political debate originated in the right of the enfranchised warrior to debate tactics in order to gain consensus on those tactics — since unlike eastern militaries, western tactics required individual initiative. The citizen warrior’s right was predicated on forgoing theft, fraud, and violence, and speaking the truth and only the truth in the process of that debate. If truth was abandoned, error was presumed, passons could be forgiven. But if RIDICULE was employed, then the prohibition on violence for the purpose of debate was forgone, and the ridiculed could fight and kill the man who broke the contract by which we put down our weapons and enter debate. While Marx and marxists were wrong in their understanding of the physical world, of human nature, and of economics, they could be counted upon to adhere to rational discourse and confine themselves to moral criticism. Saul Alinsky was one of the first people to strategically abandon the western principle of honest discourse and promote argumentative ‘the ends justify the means’. To those of us who are from the aristocratic manorial tradition, within which dishonesty, cowardice, or loose and libelous words are reason to end someone’s life, Alinsky’s tactics are a violation of every civic principle, and draw out our basic conservative instinct to kill threats to our hierarchy, social order, and group competitiveness. His strategy (from a lost link) is this: CREATE AN IDEOLOGICAL ARMY OPERATING ON EMOTIONAL ANTAGONISM NOT A PROGRAM OF RATIONAL SOLUTIONS THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO INTELLECTUALLY DEFEND ON THEIR OWN. Through a process combining hope and resentment, the organizer tries to create a “mass army” that brings in as many recruits as possible from local organizations, churches, services groups, labor unions, corner gangs, and individuals. Alinsky provides a collection of rules to guide the process. But he emphasizes these rules must be translated into real-life tactics that are fluid and responsive to the situation at hand. SUN TZU: DECEPTION IS MORE POWERFUL THAN HONESTY Rule 1: Power is not only what you have, but what an opponent thinks you have. If your organization is small, hide your numbers in the dark and raise a din that will make everyone think you have many more people than you do. SPEAK IN THE IGNORANT VOICE OF YOUR PEOPLE SO THEY FEEL THEY SPEAK THROUGH YOU Rule 2: Never go outside the experience of your people. The result is confusion, fear, and retreat. Rule 3: Whenever possible, go outside the experience of an opponent. Here you want to cause confusion, fear, and retreat. ARGUE FOR BLACK OR WHITE FALLACIES THAT FORCE THE CRITICISM OF YOUR OPPONENT BUT WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE YOU TO DEFEND YOURSELF OR PROPOSE SOLUTIONS Rule 4: Make opponents live up to their own book of rules. “You can kill them with this, for they can no more obey their own rules than the Christian church can live up to Christianity.” AVOID REASON, IT WOULD ONLY EXPOSE YOUR LACK OF A SOLUTION OR UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICAL REALITY. Rule 5: Ridicule is man’s most potent weapon. It’s hard to counterattack ridicule, and it infuriates the opposition, which then reacts to your advantage. THE LOWER CLASSES HAVE NOTHING USEFUL TO DO, SO GIVE THEM AN EXCUSE TO ENTERTAIN THEMSELVES AND CELEBRATE A UNITED IDENTITY. SUCH RELIGIONS ARE OPIATES OF THE MASSES. Rule 6: A good tactic is one your people enjoy. “If your people aren’t having a ball doing it, there is something very wrong with the tactic.” A MEANINGFUL ARGUMENT IS OPEN TO CRITICISM AND REQUIRES INTELLECTUALIZATION OF THE SOLUTION. INSTEAD, MAINTAIN THE GROUP’S EMOTIONAL AND MORAL ANTAGONISM TOWARD YOUR OPPONENT AND AVOID THE SELF DOUBT THAT WOULD OCCUR IF THEY HAD TO BECOME INTROSPECTIVE. Rule 7: A tactic that drags on for too long becomes a drag. Commitment may become ritualistic as people turn to other issues. CONTROL THE INITIATIVE BUT PREVENTING YOUR OPPONENT FROM DETERMINING THAT YOU HAVE NO PROPOSED SOLUTION OTHER THAN THE ACCUMULATION OF POWER. THE RATIONAL MAN CNANOT UNDERSTAND THIS SIMPLISTIC A STRATEGY: OBTAIN POWER. ONCE YOU HAVE POWER YOUR ARGUMENTS DO NOT MATTER. POWER CAN BE OBTAINED THROUGH MORALIZING, CRITICISM AND DISTRACTION. IT DOES NOT NEED TO BE OBTAINED BY SOLUTION, ARGUMENT OR REASON. THAT ONLY WEAKENS YOU. Rule 8: Keep the pressure on. Use different tactics and actions and use all events of the period for your purpose. “The major premise for tactics is the development of operations that will maintain a constant pressure upon the opposition. It is this that will cause the opposition to react to your advantage.” RELY ON TERRORISM WHENEVER POSSIBLE. CREATE FEAR BECAUSE UNCERTAINTY AND FEAR IS A GREATER THAN THE ACTUAL RESULT. PEOPLE WILL ABANDON MAORAL AND TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES IF YOU MAKE IT HARD ENOUGH FOR THEM TO RESIST YOUR PURSUIT OF POWER. Rule 9: The threat is more terrifying than the thing itself. When Alinsky leaked word that large numbers of poor people were going to tie up the washrooms of O’Hare Airport, Chicago city authorities quickly agreed to act on a longstanding commitment to a ghetto organization. They imagined the mayhem as thousands of passengers poured off airplanes to discover every washroom occupied. Then they imagined the international embarrassment and the damage to the city’s reputation. STICK WITH YOUR ATTACKS, NEVER OFFER SOLUTIONS THAT WOULD ExpOSE YOU TO CRITICISM Rule 10: The price of a successful attack is a constructive alternative. Avoid being trapped by an opponent or an interviewer who says, “Okay, what would you do?” DEMONIZE INDIVIDUALS. DO NOT ENGAGE IN REASON. DO NOT ENAGE IN FACTS. SIMPLY DEMONIZE AND RIDICULE THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS POLITICAL POWER TO INFLUENCE OTHERS WILL DIMINISH. Rule 11: Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, polarize it. Don’t try to attack abstract corporations or bureaucracies. Identify a responsible individual. Ignore attempts to shift or spread the blame. CONTROL YOUR ENEMY’S RESPONSES TO YOU SO THAT HE BECOMES EMOTIONALLY RATHER THAN RATIONALLY ENGAGED AND LOSES HIS ONE REAL STRENGTH: RATIONAL SOLUTIONS. According to Alinsky, the main job of the organizer is to bait an opponent into reacting. “The enemy properly goaded and guided in his reaction will be your major strength.”
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Defending Hans Hermann Hoppe On Immigration
I have to defend Hoppe a lot less frequently these days from passionate critics who don’t understand him, but here is another one. I don’t think I do a very good job really. But I get the discussion started.
By Garry Ladouceur:
THIS IS WHAT THIS ACADEMIC HAS TO SAY ABOUT IMMIGRATION-HE IS OF COURSE A MADMAN.
First, with the establishment of a state and territorially defined state borders, “immigration” takes on an entirely new meaning. In a natural order, immigration is a person’s migration from one neighborhood-community into a different one (micro-migration).
Is Garry saying that neighborhoods consisting of parcels of private property, or which consist of domicilies that are collectively ‘owned’ by shareholders (a defined community) as a ‘commons’ are a natural order without the existence of a “state”, or without the tribal equivalent that consists of a headman and a few warriors who have been arguably as defensive of resources and norms or more so than states? Where does Gary get his concept of ‘natural order” Is he making the fallacy of primitivism? The noble savage fallacy?
In contrast, under statist conditions immigration is immigration by “foreigners” from across state borders, and the decision whom to exclude or include, and under what conditions, rests not with a multitude of independent private property owners or neighborhoods of owners but with a single central (and centralizing) state-government as the ultimate sovereign of all domestic residents and their properties (macro-migration).
Is Gary saying that the state behaves differently than do the tribesman? Because we don’t have much evidence of that. Another mouth to feed is another mouth to feed, and an immigrant’s mouth to feed is not a member of our gene pool to which we have filial instincts.
If a domestic resident-owner invites a person and arranges for his access onto the resident-owner’s property but the government ex- cludes this person from the state territory,it is a case of forced exclusion (a phenomenon that does not exist in a natural order). On the other hand, if the government admits a person while there is no domestic resident-owner who has invited this person onto his property, it is a case of forced integration (also non-existent in a natural order, where all movement is invited).
This argument limits the determination of just action to the act of movement, not to involuntary transfers, or their effects on supposed commons. So it’s just false on it’s premise. Groups encourage transport and trade. They always have, regardless of political construct. What they discourage is appropriation of the ‘commons’, and most importantly the disruption of the commons that we call ‘norms’. Norms are highly expensive. More so than property. And we protect them voraciously by instinct.
Firstly, Hoppe has migrated endlessly. This means that he is not honest. I find him a liar. That is not a good start to developing a teacher taught relationship.
Secondly, He is German of the Austrian school. He speaks of natural order. He is of course a fascist as well. He does not speak to the favourite form of immigration in Europe and Europe to elsewhere which is at the point of a bayonet. So in other words he is dishonest.
You simply do not understand what Hoppe is saying.
Hoppe atttempts (and some of us think he has succeeded) in deducing a means of making political judgments by relying upon the single principle of property rights. Property rights are dependent on the principles of avoiding fraud and theft, and prohibiting involuntary transfers. All that’s going on here, like most people who criticize Hoppe, is that you don’t know all the types of involuntary transfer (theft) you advocate with your beliefs. Hoppe has tried make all those ‘thefts’ and acts of violence visible. A Few Definitions:
Order : any system of human cooperation (avoiding theft fraud and violence) that avoids chaos (pervasive theft fraud and violence).
Natural Order = natural rotation of elites by voluntary exchange in the market, rather than by military force or political force. (Oversimplified).
Immigration vs Migration. migration is what occurs whenever a person transfers geographic location without fraud, theft or violence. Immigration is what happens when they PAY for migration. When people immigrate without PAYING for that immigration they are committing an act of theft, fraud or violence.
Citizenship mens you have obtained membership in an ORDER by avoiding theft fraud and violence, and that you maintain your membership in that order by forgoing theft, fraud and violence.
Any forcible transfer by a government from ont or more people to one or more people is an involuntary transfer under the treat of violence. Any contractual transfer between people in mutual exchange is a voluntary transfer, and therefore not an act of theft, fraud or violence.
Hoppe is arguing that open immigration is incompatible with a welfare state because it causes theft from the existing tax payers to the immigrant. This argument is pretty hard to defeat.
Your only defense is that you have the right, by some divine authority, to determine who can be solen from under the threat of violence in order to give to someone else — which is an act in which you profit by not having to satisfy your wants with your own resources.
Hoppe would argue that we can have as many voluntary little ‘countries’ that we want, and that rednecks and racists, and homophobes, and every feminist, separatist anad whatever advocacy one has should exist voluntarily without conducting transfers from people who disagree with that.
In other words, there is no moral argument for stealing from people to give to other people.
I suspect from your emotionally loaded posting that analytical philosophy is not something you have exposure to. It requires that we make a long series of testable statements. Hoppe uses that language. It is not the simple moralistic language of the public intellectual or the common person. Which is why he is poorly understood.
One of the reasons people dislike him is that he has put forth arguments that are very difficult to dismiss. Both he and rothbard may START from different positions ( evolutionary necessity and natural law respectively.) Since they produced their works, we have improved our understanding of economics, psychology (jonathan haidt), political history (Fukuyama on one end and North on the other). And people like me have attempted to reduce their original premises to something more scientifically mandated.
You might not understand that Hoppe started out as a marxist and through his work adopted his current position. His first major work was written on socialism and in that work he shows how it is logically impossible. (As does mises on one end, and hayek on another — although hoppe opposes hayek.)
Hopefully I’ve helped you with Hoppe. (Although I kind of doubt you care.)
Also, please define “facist”. One cannot be a ‘fascist’ without a state. So how, if he rejects the state can he be a fascist?
I will happily debate you on Hoppe to your heart’s content. And I know him quite well and he does not mitigate. Ever.
Curt
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Do We Have Occasion To Verbally Criticize The Feckless?
Murray states:
we must change the language that we use whenever the topic of feckless men comes up. Don’t call them “demoralized.” Call them whatever derogatory word you prefer. Equally important: Start treating the men who aren’t feckless with respect. Recognize that the guy who works on your lawn every week is morally superior in this regard to your neighbor’s college-educated son who won’t take a “demeaning” job. Be willing to say so.
This shouldn’t be such a hard thing to do. Most of us already believe that one of life’s central moral obligations is to be a productive adult. The cultural shift that I advocate doesn’t demand that we change our minds about anything; we just need to drop our nonjudgmentalism.
It is condescending to treat people who have less education or money as less morally accountable than we are. We should stop making excuses for them that we wouldn’t make for ourselves. Respect those who deserve respect, and look down on those who deserve looking down on.
via Why economics can’t explain our cultural divide – Society and Culture – AEI.
I understand that we can use this approach in the various media. But as a people who have also become spatially independent and therefore socially isolationist, and who converse with little more than our televisions while watching shows that reinforce our sentiments, in an society where politics rewards polarity, in an economy that must desperately seek the favor of consumers and can brook no negative feedback, where the few people with whom we share no sentimental differences, then there remains an interesting question: In what circumstance may we provide this feedback? Really.