Source: Original Site Post

  • Response to A Criticism of Libertarianism by “Dave” at “Cydoniansignal”

    In response to : http://cydoniansignal.com/2013/12/03/libertariancritiqu/ I can’t respond to all criticisms of libertarianism (there actually aren’t that many). But if I can use them to illustrate something or other I do. Most of the time, the criticisms are from those who lack the knowledge to render the criticism that they levy. There exist legitimate criticisms of libertarianism, and I list a few of them in this response, but rarely are they mentioned.

    gh t
  • On Proximity To The Dark Enlightenment

    THE DARK ENLIGHTENMENT [T]he novel concept that the enlightenment’s optimistic, heroic, equalitarian view of man has proven to be wrong, that the dirty secret of our genome project is that we are profoundly unequal, and that by consequence our civic religion based upon this error, as well as the political system that we use to ritualize and celebrate that religion, is simply a new mysticism that replaces the old mysticism, with an equally false premise. While I am not technically part of this movement, because the purpose of that movement is to understand, make arguments for, and criticize enlightenment equalitarianism, and not to provide solutions given that we know that it is false, I do, in effect, subscribe to its premise. The difference is, that I am working to solve the problem of political order – cooperation in a division of knowledge and labor – DESPITE our inequality, rather than debate who should or should not have power over others because of either equality or inequality. I have abandoned both the optimistic libertarian as well as rational classical liberal prescriptions for social order, because both of them rely upon a requirement that members of a economic polity ‘believe’ in the sanctity or utility of the same social and political order. Both libertarianism and classical liberalism as currently structured require from their adherents a homogenous preference for means and ends. And as I have argued extensively, it is not possible for us to have these similar means and ends, especially given that women’s reproductive and social strategy is in direct conflict to that of men’s. While it may be possible to compromise between men of different classes, it is not possible to compromise between the genders without the armistice provided by the nuclear family. And the nuclear family is a product of that settled and static agrarian order – an order which we no longer live in. Without that agrarian order the truce between male and female reproductive strategies is broken and both fight through the violence of the state to obtain their preferred order at the expense of the other’s preference. While we are unequal, it doesn’t really matter which gender, class, race, or culture is superior or inferior unless you are arguing that one group should control another. While it’s true that some groups are superior to others – and it’s true that much of that superiority comes from the distributions of certain talents within that group and therefore the norms that develop to suit that distribution – that acknowledgement doesn’t, in itself, help us at all. Because even if we are unequal, we must cooperate peacefully for mutual benefit – if only so that we do not engage in mutually harmful conflict. And while this is a less positive and inspirational view of man, it is both true and utilitarian, and as such provides us with a superior premise with which we may create constructive institutional solutions to the problem of cooperation between groups with different distributions of talents, and therefore norms and preferences. If we possess the knowledge that we are unequal and in permanent opposition on desired ends, the question then, is how do we create institutions of human cooperation that do not rely upon a false assumption of equality of ability, interest or preference? The market provides us with some insights, because the market illustrates how people can cooperate on means even if they have opposing ends, or are unaware of each other’s desired ends. But contrary to libertarian reasoning, there are problems that cannot be solved within the market structure because of human moral sensibilities. Mostly, that we create governments largely to make both normative and physical capital investments, which include prohibitions on involuntary transfer or privatization of those normative and physical capital investments. ie: humans consider appropriation of the commons cheating and they deplore cheating. And universally demonstrate that they deplore it, in every conceivable manner without exception. The most obvious example is that it has been extremely difficult to create the normative perception that competition is a good rather than a theft of the commons, despite the pervasive evidence that competition benefits all. The structural problem with our political systems and our philosophy of government is that we carry with them the idea of an abstract common good that is somehow achievable through intentional cooperation on ends. Rather than achievable through unintended cooperation on ends but cooperation on means. And therefore we rationalize the creation of laws in support of a fictional and unknowable common good, instead of using government as a vehicle for constructing contracts that consist of voluntary exchanges between groups or classes as we do in the market, and prohibiting cheating on those contracts. This contractual rather than legislative government allows us to cooperate on means if not ends in those circumstances where ‘cheating’ would create a barrier to shared investment. The English managed to accomplish this feat of inter-class cooperation with parliaments and divided houses. Unfortunately, we did not add additional houses for the proletariat and instead, given our new religious doctrine of the equality of man, we collapsed our houses rather than expanded them. As such, what has occurred, is that government is no longer the vehicle by which people with separate interests reach compromise via exchange for mutual benefit. But that we use every political and extra-political process to attempt to gain control of the monopolistic and dictatorial process of law making. In America the conservatives have hired the capitalists to defend them from government and the proletarians and single women (who are the majority of women) have hired the government to extract revenues from the middle classes. The conservatives use think tanks and the progressives use popular media. The list is infinite. While I am still working out what I believe are the particulars, it is quite possible to have institutions that promote cooperation among people with dissimilar interests. We need not revert to small states – although that would be preferable in almost every way I can imagine. And even within small states, we do not have to conduct constant political competitions all of which are predicated upon lies, because our civic religion and its political institutions are predicated upon the enlightenment lie of human equality of both ability and interest. The Dark Enlightenment presents us with an uncomfortable scientific reality that is as painfully inescapable for our secular religion as was Darwin for the mystical religion of the church. And I am, in some way, part of this movement in the sense that I acknowledge the truth of human inequality. But that said, I do not believe our political philosophy can accomodate this reality without practical institutional solutions. I am not interested in complaints about an obvious institutional ailment, I’m interested in solutions to that ailment. To argue that one political system or another will place one class or another in control of other classes is to argue that some group will agree to suffer deprivation without receiving something in exchange for their adherence to norm, custom and rule. This is as illogical an assumption as is equality. Until both conservatives, classical liberals, and libertarians understand that we require institutions that accomodate the insights of the Dark Enlightenment that do not involve re-nationalization (despite it’s attractiveness) they will continue to spout what is in effect, a religion of HOMOGENEITY OF INTEREST, which is as false as the homogeneity of ability that they criticize in the enlightenment. Our problem is not in developing a consensus on what is best. It is in developing institutions that allow us to cooperate in complex political orders the way that we cooperate in the market: on means if not ends, using contracts, not laws, because privatization of the commons or ‘cheating’ is too high a transaction cost to be overcome without institutions that satisfy the moral prohibition on cheating. In this sense, we have our political philosophy backwards. We think we must create homogeneity in order to achieve a collective end. When in fact, we need to achieve multitudinous ends, and can only do so, if we prohibit ‘cheating’. Morality in all cultures is a set of rules that prohibit cheating – transfer of the commons. It is a necessary and irreversible property of the human animal, without which cooperation could not have evolved. And prohibition on cheating, so that capital can be concentrated, both normative and physical, is, after the ability to calculate using money and numbers, the primary institutional development necessary for a division of knowledge and labor – from which all our prosperity descends. Curt Doolittle December 3, 2012 11:00AM, Kiev, Ukraine.

  • Letter To Lew : On 30 Years Of The Mises Institute

    I posted this on Mises.org in response to The First 30 Years of the Mises Institute [I] was terribly afraid that you would not make this change in direction, and am both excited and pleased that you have decided to. Rothbardian ethics specifically avoids the Protestant requirements for symmetry of information, and warrantee in any transaction, and Rothbard consistently avoids the treatment of norms as a commons – despite the necessity of property as a norm. Both of theses facets of Rothbardian thought permanently render Rothbardian ethics regressive and insufficient for the high-trust society that is the moral ideology of the american population. Hoppe has supplied some of the necessary solutions, but they require institutional changes that first require the support of the population’s moral sentiments. And only constant exposure to morally agreeable ideas will make them tolerate institutional change. Ron Paul, whether intentionally or not, (I do not know) does not make the Rothbardian error in his promotion of libertarianism, and therefore renders social and moral code more acceptable to a broader audience of Americans – most of whom embrace the sentiments of the founders and some variant of the protestant ethic. Conservatives in particular see the morality of the normative commons as equal in importance to the rule of law. This is why Ron Paul’s message sells with the population more than Rothbard’s. Rothbard did give us Propertarian ethics and revisionist history, and the language we needed to talk about freedom. But his ethics is not tolerable by members of a high trust society, and libertarianism is only possible within a high trust society. Ron Paul’s ethics is tolerable, because implicitly, his message does not undermine the high-trust moral code. I’ve felt your use of ideology, education, and technology was always superior to the actual ethical program it contained. Hopefully the ethical program (which people sense, even if they cannot articulate) when subject to the Ron Paul ethos, will change, so that the operational superiority of the Mises Institute will be matched by a philosophical and ethical program that will take us beyond the support of a tenth of the population, with MI as the well-funded and leading organization behind that change. It’s also great to see Tom Woods put to full use, and that his confidence in himself and his ideas has finally taken hold – it comes across in everything he writes, says and does. I’m surprised and thrilled that you’ve brought in Napolitano. It would be helpful if we could recruit more time and effort from Bob Murphy – especially if he had some coaching on presentation of his arguments from Napolitano. (I’ve been toying with the idea of using Karl Smith, to play the foil for our side, because he is the only honest liberal economist emerging from the current generation that is literate in both moral and economic ideas. He has and will engage with Murphy. But the problem is in creating the appropriate venue, and I have enough work on my plate right now.) Anyway, all that said, congratulations on the change in direction. I”m one of the many people that owes an intellectual debt to MI. Curt

  • Freud Distracted Intellectual Progress As Much As Did Marx

    FREUD WAS A FOOL AND AS MUCH OF AN INTELLECTUAL DISASTER FOR MANKIND AS MARX [H]umans are driven by status signals. The purpose of status signals may in fact INCLUDE access to reproduction, but that is only one of the may uses of signals. Without signals we cannot know whom to imitate. Without those signals we literally cannot think. We cannot think without signals any more than we can perceive beyond our fingertips without numbers, counting and arithmetic. We cannot think without signals any more than we can think about the future in a division of knowledge and labor without the tools of time, money and prices. The human accounting system is status signals. Unlike the properties of the physical world, which we need numbers, measures, counting, arithmetic to sense, and unlike the economic world of our productive cooperation where we need money and prices to sense each other’s wants and needs, we need no tools to sense status signals. They are the only fine measurements we can grasp without abstract tools.

  • Is Austrian Economics Falsifiable?

    COMMENTS ON THE COMMENTS ABOVE

    1) Falsification requires the failure of an empirical test, sufficient to contradict the theory. The purpose of falsification is to require us to rely on evidence that is unobtainable by our senses alone, and independent of the frailty and error of the mind and its perceptions.  None of the criticisms above pass this criteria. 

    2) That austrianism, or any body of work, contains insufficiencies is not the same as it whether or not it contains errors.  The failure to see the stickiness of prices is a natural consequence of micro analysis.  Just as the failure to see cognitive biases and irrationality are a natural consequence of macro analysis.   The value in micro analysis is that it correctly informs us as to the behavior that will result from incentives. So it is perhaps best to understand that we need both macro and micro analysis (top down and bottom up).

    3) Austiranism (as ten basic principles:  http://www.capitalismv3.com/menu… )
    makes only one significantly controversial premise: the theory of the business cycle: that government actions increase the severity of necessary experiments and corrections we call booms and busts. Competing interpretations (Keynesianism and Modern Monetary) assert that the economy is a perpetual motion machine that is possible to universally correct with good policy.

    4) Praxeology contains both stated and unstated propositions.  The stated proposition is that the incentives of the rational actor are deducible from the incentives available to him.  The unstated proposition is that by exposing these propositions, it becomes visible when and where involuntary transfers of property are occurring.  It is the latter statement that is of value to the libertarian movement because a) humans detest involuntary transfer, even if their construct of property varies   and b) the progressives use involuntary transfer to fund programs which the libertarians object to.  c) all involuntary transfers can be enumerated as thefts, and as thefts, the state may be attacked as a system of legitimized theft.

    5) Most of the comments by others in this thread, confuse Rothbardianism libertarianism, or Misesian Praxeology, with austiranism.  While it may be true that Mises followed Menger, and Rothbard relied upon Mises, Rothbard’s assertions are  an attempt to restate the church’s Natural Law in the defense of property rights in order to preserve individual freedom, and to demonstrate the exploitation that will occur whenever we empower the state. While Rothbard does attempt to address the business cycle that is the central tenet of austrian economic argument, it is not clear that he added anything to the debate.  Rothbard was an ANARCHIST. and Mises was a CLASSICAL LIBERAL.  Rothbard however did not succeed. He effectively prohibited all organizations and their ability to add additional rights an obligations to personal property rights which would disallow privatization of the commons (“Cheating”). (An argument that is too technical for this forum but which I’ve addressed elsewhere.)  It required Hans Hoppe to finish Rothbard’s political work, and provide us with a solution to the problem of bureaucracy.  Hoppe succeeds in replacing the bureaucracy with private institutions where Rothbard only placed a universal moral ban them.

    6) Caplan’s “Why I am Not An Austrian” is a political piece that I have criticized elsewhere.  One should see this piece as a complaint against the Rothbardian wing’s attempt to hijack Austrianism for its political ends, more than an attack against Austrian economics.   To quote:

    “My equation of Austrian economics with Mises and Rothbard rather than F.A. Hayek is bound to be controversial.”  -Caplan

    Caplan (and the entire George Mason group), consistently express frustration that the anarchists have been ideologically successful and have intentionally conflated anarchism and austiranism such that austrianism’s dependence upon classical liberalism has been lost in the popular vernacular.

    Caplan’s argument must be understood in this context. Unfortunately the rather weak conflated argument he puts forth in his essay has posed a bit of trouble for all of us, myself included.  Since the article is mis-titled.  It should be “Why I am not a Rothbardian Praxeologist”. 

    I am a supporter of Caplan’s work (particularly his new work on education).  But as I am the only theorist trying to resolve this conflict by extending praxeological analysis to preserve the insights of both the anarchic and classical liberal wings, I find the use of Caplan’s essay unhelpful and confusing to the general reader.


    CLOSING
    I hope this somewhat clarifies the topic for readers here, rather than muddying the waters further.  There is a place for both micro analysis and it’s emphasis on prohibition of involuntary transfers in order to create a natural aristocracy, and macro analysis and its emphasis on maximizing involuntary transfers in support of redistribution in order to create communal egalitarianism.  These two ends of the spectrum promote different choices, not truths.  There are certainly statements within each set of preferences which can be subject to tests of truth. But the collections of statements we categorize as macro and micro, because they promote subjective preferences, are not subject to tests of truth or falsity.

    https://www.quora.com/Is-Austrian-economics-falsifiable

  • “Women Do Everything Here” : The Absence of Chivalry In The Byzantines

    “I cook, I clean, I work, and my husband sits on the couch demanding beer. Women do everything here. We want to be soft. But we can’t be.” – Nikka.

    [C]hivalry is yet another positive western value constructed by the church. I often write how the church granted women property rights, and forbid cousin-marriage out to six or eight degrees, in order to make it more difficult for the clans to maintain consolidated property holdings and associated financial and political power, while at the same time making it easier for the church itself to acquire lands. But the forcible introduction of the myth and philosophy of Chivalry is as important to the development of the unique western character, in suppressing paternalism and tribalism, as the forcible implementation of property rights by the church. Humans have existed in excess since the advent of domestication of plants and animals. The germanic princes and their retinues were not as barbaric and predatory as secular fantasies argue. However, the militarism of the Carolingians and Vikings, and the power of the states that they constructed in western Europe were impossible for the trading states of the south, and the church to resist. So, just as the church had used its power of literacy and legitimacy to manage the Christian monarchs, they used the crusades and the myth of chivalry, to direct the energies of these professional warriors to productive ends. This ethic of chivalry conveyed status upon those who served christendom. It codified service of others as masculine. It could be obtained through demonstrated action, and spiritual reflection, as well as daily posturing, rather than the more expensive requirement of land holding, and was therefore more widely available to retinues. It also provided a code of conduct that the aspring classes could imitate, making the ethics pervasive. The need for commoners to rent land from land holders, participate as infantry, and to demonstrate their capacity for honorable hard work, before marriage and reproduction were possible, reinforced this set of chivalrous values – allowing laborers and craftsmen to also adopt the chivalrous ethic, and to demonstrate their status signals through conformity to it. THe corresponding delay of childbirth and consequential inclusion of women into the work force, as well as their possession of rudimentary property rights, worked along with suppression of the breeding of the lower classes to create the european universalist and commercial character. This code of chivalric conduct does not exist here in the east among the men. Service is immasculine. It violates the primary principle of manliness which is independence from external direction. Whether that external direction come from service to an employer or service to the commons – society. Manliness, and masculinity have not been hybridized. It is not even as mature here as it is among the peacock strutters of the mediterranean — even if it is less ignorant, brutal and barbaric than that of the Arabs, and less familial and hierarchical than that of the Asians. And while we will certainly argue that masculinity has been overly feminized in much of the west, so much so that lower class males are returning to their individualistic migratory roots, the ethic of masculinity through service remains — for now. There are a few lessons to be learned from this that westerners might want to remember: 1) The church made what is unique about the west, and did so without monopoly powers of violence that are possessed by the current secular west. 2) The west is unique for artificial reasons. it is not a natural social order. It was forcibly constructed by wit and wisdom due to the weakness of the church. Whereas the paternalistic orders in the rest of the world were forcibly constructed by violence. 3) The west is unique because we were a small, weak, poor minority in the world who relied upon technology to compensate for our numbers, and property rights and the denial of centralized power to any and all. WE were lucky to inherit from the greeks the tool of reason which allows warriors to debate and science to develop. But it seems we are reversing our trend and denying our history. As for the Byzantines: without the church, I see no means of introducing chivalry into the civilization quickly, and we must hope that the commercial society eventually provides men with the incentives to build a high trust society of service like that of the west. Affections to all. Curt Doolittle

  • “Women Do Everything Here” : The Absence of Chivalry In The Byzantines

    “I cook, I clean, I work, and my husband sits on the couch demanding beer. Women do everything here. We want to be soft. But we can’t be.” – Nikka.

    [C]hivalry is yet another positive western value constructed by the church. I often write how the church granted women property rights, and forbid cousin-marriage out to six or eight degrees, in order to make it more difficult for the clans to maintain consolidated property holdings and associated financial and political power, while at the same time making it easier for the church itself to acquire lands. But the forcible introduction of the myth and philosophy of Chivalry is as important to the development of the unique western character, in suppressing paternalism and tribalism, as the forcible implementation of property rights by the church. Humans have existed in excess since the advent of domestication of plants and animals. The germanic princes and their retinues were not as barbaric and predatory as secular fantasies argue. However, the militarism of the Carolingians and Vikings, and the power of the states that they constructed in western Europe were impossible for the trading states of the south, and the church to resist. So, just as the church had used its power of literacy and legitimacy to manage the Christian monarchs, they used the crusades and the myth of chivalry, to direct the energies of these professional warriors to productive ends. This ethic of chivalry conveyed status upon those who served christendom. It codified service of others as masculine. It could be obtained through demonstrated action, and spiritual reflection, as well as daily posturing, rather than the more expensive requirement of land holding, and was therefore more widely available to retinues. It also provided a code of conduct that the aspring classes could imitate, making the ethics pervasive. The need for commoners to rent land from land holders, participate as infantry, and to demonstrate their capacity for honorable hard work, before marriage and reproduction were possible, reinforced this set of chivalrous values – allowing laborers and craftsmen to also adopt the chivalrous ethic, and to demonstrate their status signals through conformity to it. THe corresponding delay of childbirth and consequential inclusion of women into the work force, as well as their possession of rudimentary property rights, worked along with suppression of the breeding of the lower classes to create the european universalist and commercial character. This code of chivalric conduct does not exist here in the east among the men. Service is immasculine. It violates the primary principle of manliness which is independence from external direction. Whether that external direction come from service to an employer or service to the commons – society. Manliness, and masculinity have not been hybridized. It is not even as mature here as it is among the peacock strutters of the mediterranean — even if it is less ignorant, brutal and barbaric than that of the Arabs, and less familial and hierarchical than that of the Asians. And while we will certainly argue that masculinity has been overly feminized in much of the west, so much so that lower class males are returning to their individualistic migratory roots, the ethic of masculinity through service remains — for now. There are a few lessons to be learned from this that westerners might want to remember: 1) The church made what is unique about the west, and did so without monopoly powers of violence that are possessed by the current secular west. 2) The west is unique for artificial reasons. it is not a natural social order. It was forcibly constructed by wit and wisdom due to the weakness of the church. Whereas the paternalistic orders in the rest of the world were forcibly constructed by violence. 3) The west is unique because we were a small, weak, poor minority in the world who relied upon technology to compensate for our numbers, and property rights and the denial of centralized power to any and all. WE were lucky to inherit from the greeks the tool of reason which allows warriors to debate and science to develop. But it seems we are reversing our trend and denying our history. As for the Byzantines: without the church, I see no means of introducing chivalry into the civilization quickly, and we must hope that the commercial society eventually provides men with the incentives to build a high trust society of service like that of the west. Affections to all. Curt Doolittle

  • Why Should A Person Believe In Austrian Economics?

    It is not a question of ‘belief’. There are five or six different strategic economic biases in favor of a different set of levers for encouraging an economy. These different levers vary from the fastest and most redistributive and distorting to the slowest, least redistributive and distorting.   They are loosely Modern Monetary (fastest), Monetarism, Fiscal Policy, Industrial policy, and Human Capital policy (slowest – austrianism).

    The other criticisms of the ideas of these schools as consisting of ‘true’ or ‘false’ propositions are absurd. All schools are merely utilitarian, and reward one or more sectors of an economy and one or more social classes, asymmetrically. All have side effects that are positive or negative.   Austrianism trades slower growth for greater personal freedom, greater innovation, smaller boom and bust cycles, with greater development of a natural aristocracy, and natural intertemporal increases in the rate of expansion of the economy between the classes.

    The competition between the schools is merely a preference for one set of EXTERNALITIES over another set of externalities.  With austrianism preferring to cause the lowest redistribution of capital, and the greatest reward, and greatest incentive for entrepreneurship, and the least incentive for political actors, and the greatest diversity of wealth (inequality), in exchange for greater relative wealth for all.  It also has the best system of feedback for the expansion of positive norms – which conservatives feel (correctly) are more important for the expansion of an economy than any other property.

    Claims that austiranism is apodeicitcally certain are specious.  Any system so certain must be substantially complete, and praxeology as it is currently constructed is incomplete enough that it cannot render judgements of certainty except in the most reductio (absurd) cases. (I am trying to fix this problem but it will take me another year or so.)   Instead, praxeological analysis simply exposes the the incentives of individuals and illustrates their rational actions,  IN effect allowing us to judge whether our ascertations about human behavior are true or false.   This leads to exceptional insights about human nature in an economy.  However, a) this does not invalidate the other schools only opens the door for discussions of trade offs.  b) we have been wrong on a number of topics that appear to be rational to individual actors but in practice are false (stickiness of prices, and irrationality of actions.)  

    The central tenet of austiranism, is the business cycle theory, which states that any  intervention in an economy will pervert incentives and information and causes worse busts and booms.  This argument appears to be correct. It is just questionably useful in a democracy where voters will demand action from government.

    A wise man would say, that each of these sets of levers and externalities has value to moving an economy.  But that it appears to be impossible in our democratically structured politcal system, to use each lever for the purposes to which it is suited, and for the benefit of all.  Politics in democracy is a means of obtaining power to conduct rents.   And since each of the different schools and their levers allows a different kind of rent to be sought for a different class of citizens, we merely fight over the control of these levers for our sects.

    You will not likely hear this explanation elsewhere. You may not understand this explanation.  Because I cannot take the time, sitting in my hotel room, to write a twenty page essay on the topic.  However, it is most likely the only correct analysis of the different economic schools currently available.

    Cheers.
    Curt
    (Thank you for asking me to answer this question. Although I think only the most sophisticated of students will understand it.)

    https://www.quora.com/Why-should-a-person-believe-in-Austrian-economics

  • Why Should A Person Believe In Austrian Economics?

    It is not a question of ‘belief’. There are five or six different strategic economic biases in favor of a different set of levers for encouraging an economy. These different levers vary from the fastest and most redistributive and distorting to the slowest, least redistributive and distorting.   They are loosely Modern Monetary (fastest), Monetarism, Fiscal Policy, Industrial policy, and Human Capital policy (slowest – austrianism).

    The other criticisms of the ideas of these schools as consisting of ‘true’ or ‘false’ propositions are absurd. All schools are merely utilitarian, and reward one or more sectors of an economy and one or more social classes, asymmetrically. All have side effects that are positive or negative.   Austrianism trades slower growth for greater personal freedom, greater innovation, smaller boom and bust cycles, with greater development of a natural aristocracy, and natural intertemporal increases in the rate of expansion of the economy between the classes.

    The competition between the schools is merely a preference for one set of EXTERNALITIES over another set of externalities.  With austrianism preferring to cause the lowest redistribution of capital, and the greatest reward, and greatest incentive for entrepreneurship, and the least incentive for political actors, and the greatest diversity of wealth (inequality), in exchange for greater relative wealth for all.  It also has the best system of feedback for the expansion of positive norms – which conservatives feel (correctly) are more important for the expansion of an economy than any other property.

    Claims that austiranism is apodeicitcally certain are specious.  Any system so certain must be substantially complete, and praxeology as it is currently constructed is incomplete enough that it cannot render judgements of certainty except in the most reductio (absurd) cases. (I am trying to fix this problem but it will take me another year or so.)   Instead, praxeological analysis simply exposes the the incentives of individuals and illustrates their rational actions,  IN effect allowing us to judge whether our ascertations about human behavior are true or false.   This leads to exceptional insights about human nature in an economy.  However, a) this does not invalidate the other schools only opens the door for discussions of trade offs.  b) we have been wrong on a number of topics that appear to be rational to individual actors but in practice are false (stickiness of prices, and irrationality of actions.)  

    The central tenet of austiranism, is the business cycle theory, which states that any  intervention in an economy will pervert incentives and information and causes worse busts and booms.  This argument appears to be correct. It is just questionably useful in a democracy where voters will demand action from government.

    A wise man would say, that each of these sets of levers and externalities has value to moving an economy.  But that it appears to be impossible in our democratically structured politcal system, to use each lever for the purposes to which it is suited, and for the benefit of all.  Politics in democracy is a means of obtaining power to conduct rents.   And since each of the different schools and their levers allows a different kind of rent to be sought for a different class of citizens, we merely fight over the control of these levers for our sects.

    You will not likely hear this explanation elsewhere. You may not understand this explanation.  Because I cannot take the time, sitting in my hotel room, to write a twenty page essay on the topic.  However, it is most likely the only correct analysis of the different economic schools currently available.

    Cheers.
    Curt
    (Thank you for asking me to answer this question. Although I think only the most sophisticated of students will understand it.)

    https://www.quora.com/Why-should-a-person-believe-in-Austrian-economics

  • Is The “right To Die” A Human Right?

    The question, as stated is irrational.  One has the right to die, because one cannot have it taken away.  If you want to die, and can act to kill yourself, there are a legion of ways to accomplish it. 

    So, it’s not that suicide is difficult to accomplish nor that people fail to.  Instead, it is difficult to understand how those that say that they wish to, can somehow fail to.  And therefore we argue that if you wanted to you could and would. So that like many human utterances, a desire for suicide may be a situational expression of emotional frustration, pain and exhaustion, rather than a desire to end one’s life. It is impossible for others to know.  And like many thoughts of human beings, it may be impossible for the individual himself to know.

    That said, the moral and legal prohibition in the west, is against assisting others with suicide, not against suicide itself.  The moral counsel against suicide exists only to encourage those who consider suicide to seek assistance in removing the source of their suffering rather than resorting to suicide. 

    So instead of asking why one may or may not have the right to die, the question must be “Why can others not kill me if I desire it?”    And the reason is that it is an irreversible decision, and we cannot ever really know whether it is a true desire unless one performs the act one’s self. It may be simply that the individual is venting exhaustion or frustration at that moment but at somepoint would change his mind.  And it is unjust to ask others to bear the risk of participating in a decision that we cannot know. Because the only demonstration of a human beings preferences is not his verbal statements but his actions.

    Secondly, as someone says above: “an elderly terminally ill patient may feel an obligation to commit suicide to relieve their family and the society of them as a perceived burden.” Which obscures the more common and problematic circumstance: that the elderly patient who is terminally ill, or even, or who is a substantial burden on family and society, will be pressured to commit suicide and comply despite their desire not to, and to hold onto life a little longer.

    Therefore the moral and legal prohibitions against assisting with suicide are rational in philosophical and practical terms.

    ——-
    Afterward: It is somewhat interesting to see among these answers, the prevalence of  the misapplication of scientific principles to a problem of moral exchange.  The inability to tell the difference between a problem that has can be objectively resolved by relying on an analysis of outcomes, rather than one consisting of an exchange between individuals that can be intersubjectively tested. That our citizens no longer rely on scriptural analogy may be beneficial. But that they do not see morality as a system of exchanges, rather than a means of achieving a utilitarian end, is somewhat more frightening than the misapplication of those moral principles to questions about the physical world.

    https://www.quora.com/Is-the-right-to-die-a-human-right