Curt Doolittle

Source: Original Site Post

  • Contra David Miller : Confusing Fact and Value

    ==DAVID MILLER== Regarding theories: –“they are nothing more than conjectures or guesses about the unknown state of the world.”– –“the principal function of experience in science is to eliminate mistakes”– –“The principal function of science in technology is again to eliminate mistakes.”– –“Neither experience in science, nor science in technology, can determine that a problem has been solved in an ideal way. The best that they can tell us is that we could have done worse.”– -David Miller ==COMMENT AND CRITICISM== I want to state David Miller’s arguments somewhat differently, by converting them from the language of perception and experience, to the language of action and economics in time. The reason is that objective language assumes discounts that are the equivalent of something more than platonism and less than magic. COSTS Solving something an ‘ideal way’ cannot be stated without consideration of time and cost. As such, the ‘idea way’ that something can be done to satisfy a need is the ideal at that is available at the lowest cost at that moment in time. Induction was a biological necessity given that costs for organisms competing in nature are extremely high, and kept high through competition, just as costs of time and opportunity are very high in the market due to competition. But, induction tells us only about available opportunities for further action, neither about (a) the probability of expanding explanatory power, or about (b) the limit of utility in expanding explanatory power. Induction as a statement of PROBABILITY is an example of the ludic fallacy. If we could determine probabilities that would mean the set of possible permutations would be finite. But given that we have no idea what the ideal solution is to most problems we cannot conduct probabilities. But this criticism is not the only one available. Since efficiency of any given figure action in any given future where we have more knowledge, is determined by the total cost of arriving at that minus the intermediate rewards of production. Further, there are points at which no further increase in precision (efficiency) provides a return that covers the cost of the investment, until we invent additional utility to be obtained from the investment that has been made to date. However, for the purposes of action, our guesswork is informed by induction as a means of identifying opportunities for expansion of our efforts, and it does tell us what further actions are available for us to investigate, and test. THE LOGICS AS INSTRUMENTATION The principle function of the ‘logics’ and ‘methods’ is to reduce error through physical and logical instrumentation. That instrumentation allows us to test our imagination (or theories) against the real world, and limits our mind’s biases in the interpretation of those real world stimuli. This testing is made possible by reducing that which we could not sense without instrument and method, to analogy to experience which we can sense, perceive, compare and test given the help of symbol, measure, instrument and method. CERTAINTY OF FALSEHOOD, UNCERTAINTY OF TRUTH While we cannot prove that a general statement about the world are true, we can prove that specific instances of statements about the world are false. As such, we can say that science has demonstrated X to be false, but we cannot state that science has demonstrated X to be true. We can say however, that given our current knowledge the current candidates for truth available for further action are A, B and C. And we can also say that any further refinement of A,B or C would not sufficiently change the current argument about X, such that it would make any difference at this moment. TRUTH CANNOT BE USED FOR ARGUMENT, ONLY FALSEHOOD You cannot be sufficiently certain of anything such that you can use it in an argument to demand my agreement. You can only seek to obtain my consent by eliminating the possibility or desirability of my position in contrast to yours. This constrains science to voluntary consent, and does not allow science to override the contract for voluntary cooperation we enter when we enter into debate. THE FALSE MYSTIQUE OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY. **The difference between physical science and engineering, as between mathematics and computer science, is simply the UTILITARIAN VALUE we attach to either (a) the product of the test and (b) the extension of deductive power that results from the test. In either case the method is the the same.** Scientific language is LOADED with these value judgements, and it is this LOADING of scientific language with VALUE JUDGEMENTS that generally distracts us (pretty much all of us) from the fact that there is no difference at all in our actions or methods no matter what theory we pursue, but there is a great difference in which products we value. Science can be LOADED with this language because unlike other fields, science ignores costs in exchange for pursuing truths. Whereas, in all other disciplines, costs and utility are the equivalent of truth, since truth is time dependent for the purpose of satisfying human wants and desires. ***By failing to articulate our ideas in operational language we hide these incentives, and reasons from our discourse. And we are rapidly confused when we argue as if they are differences in fact, when they are but a difference in value.*** As such: **As opportunity costs decrease, demand for truth increases.** **As opportunity costs increase, demand for utility increases.** This is the supply demand curve for truth and utility. An individual who seeks to estimate his own costs and utility is different from another individual demanding costs from third parties regardless of utility. A DIFFERENCE ONLY IN VALUE OF OUTPUTS It is a subjective preference, but not a difference in method. All theorizing is the same. We may not make truth claims about our theories, but that does not mean that we cannot LOGICALLY choose how to act on them. IGNORING COSTS AS CHEAP STATUS SIGNALING I guess I should say more clearly that I see scientific pursuit of truth independent of opportunity cost, and necessity for production, as one of the ultimate signs of conspicuous consumption and privilege. The same applies to progressives who ignore the cost of norms and treat them as non-existent, as a means of signaling their conspicuous consumption. One of the externalities produced by western aristocratic philosophy, and its permanent placement in our values, is the demonstration of one’s independence from the market for norms, and the market for production, as the ultimate source of signaling their conspicuous consumption. This is the level that all artists, journalists, and public intellectuals all seek as well. REWARDS FOR ORGANIZING PRODUCTION, INFORMATION, RENTS AND STATUS SEEKING Unfortunately, the material rewards for ORGANIZING PRODUCTION in the private sector, and ORGANIZING EXTORTION in the private sector, are more materially rewarding, than organizing RENTS and STATUS SEEKING in the non-commercial sector. Just as economists should be better trained as philosophers, most philosophers would better trained if they understood economics. And both would be better of if they understood all human behavior was in fact, economic: equilibrium exchanges in pursuit of signals, opportunities, alliances, and mates. So as far as I can tell, the scientific method is a continuous one independent of any form of problems solving, and argument to the contrary is the use of obscurant language to ridicule others for the fact that they must pay costs in time, and that scientists can signal their privilege of acting independently in time – and nothing else. Science may be useful for signaling purposes, but we should not let our signaling purposes interfere with our understanding that all theoretical processes work the same, and must work that way, and that the criticism that we make of one another is over the ECONOMICS of using knowledge for the purpose of persuasion and signaling. As such, the output of any process can be easily categorized as (a) amusement, (b) production (transformation), (c ) knowledge and (d) signal , – or some combination of all four, in exchange for material and/or opportunity costs in real time. But truth, and honesty, and ethics dictate that we understand that any process we follow consist in the value we attach to each output and who benefits from each output at the cost of whom? — Curt Doolittle

  • On Popper's Position, vs Action and Instrumentation

    ON POPPER’S POSITION VS ACTION AND INSTRUMENTATION (reposted from cr page for archiving) All we can say is x set of recipes have y properties in common, and all known recipes have z properties in common, and therefore we will likely find new recipes that share z properties. Logic is one of the instruments we use to construct recipes. Logic is a technology. Just as are the narrative, numbers, arithmetic, math, physics, and cooperation. These are all instrumental technologies or we would not need them and could perform the same operations without them. Science, as in the ‘method’ of science, is a recipe for employing those instruments ‘technologies’. Science is a technology. It is external to our intuitions, and we must use it like any other technology, in order to extend our sense, perception, memory, calculation, and planning. So I simply view ‘fuzzy language’ as what it is. And statements reducible to operational language as the only representation of scientific discourse. Theory means nothing different from fantasy without recording, instrument, operations, repetition, and falsification. A theory is a fantasy, a bit of imagination, and the recipes that survive are what remains of that fantasy once all human cognitive bias and limitation is laundered by our ‘technologies’. Recipes are unit of commensurability against which we can calculate differences, to further extend and refine our imaginary fantasies. Just as we test each individual action in a recipe against objective reality, we test each new fantasy against the accumulated properties stated in our recipes. From those tests of fantasy against our accumulated recipes, we observe in ourselves changes in our own instruments of logic. Extensions of our perception, memory, calculation – knowledge – is the collection of general instruments that apply in smaller numbers, to increasingly large categories of problems. (This is the reason Flynn suspects, for the Flynn effect as well as our tendency to improve upon tests.) It is these general principles (like the scientific method) that we can state are ‘knowledge’ in the sense of ‘knowledge of what’ versus ‘knowledge of how’ (See Gifts of Athena). Recipes are knowledge of ‘what’. General principles of how the universe functions are knowledge of ‘how’. Popper failed to make the distinction of dividing the problem into classes and instrumentation. And he did so because, as I have stated, he was overly fascinated with words, and under-fascinated with actions. And while I can only hypothesize why he is, like many of his peers, pseudo-scientifically fascinated with words, rather than scientifically fascinated with actions, the fact remains, that he was. And he, like Mises and Hayek and their followers, failed to produce a theory of the social sciences. CR is the best moral prescription for knowledge because it logically forbids the use of science to make claims of certainty sufficient to deprive people of voluntary choice. Popper justified skepticism and prohibited involuntary transfer by way of scientific argument. A necessary idea for his time. In science, he prohibited a return to mysticism by reliance on science equal to faith in god. But that is his achievement. He was the intellectual linebacker of the 20th century. He denied the opposition the field. But prohibition was not in itself an answer. Instrumentalism is necessary. Calculation is necessary. Reduction of the imperceptible to analogy to experience is necessary. Morality consists of the prevention of thefts and discounts. Actions that produce predictable outcomes, not states of imagination. That is the answer.

  • On Popper’s Position, vs Action and Instrumentation

    ON POPPER’S POSITION VS ACTION AND INSTRUMENTATION (reposted from cr page for archiving) All we can say is x set of recipes have y properties in common, and all known recipes have z properties in common, and therefore we will likely find new recipes that share z properties. Logic is one of the instruments we use to construct recipes. Logic is a technology. Just as are the narrative, numbers, arithmetic, math, physics, and cooperation. These are all instrumental technologies or we would not need them and could perform the same operations without them. Science, as in the ‘method’ of science, is a recipe for employing those instruments ‘technologies’. Science is a technology. It is external to our intuitions, and we must use it like any other technology, in order to extend our sense, perception, memory, calculation, and planning. So I simply view ‘fuzzy language’ as what it is. And statements reducible to operational language as the only representation of scientific discourse. Theory means nothing different from fantasy without recording, instrument, operations, repetition, and falsification. A theory is a fantasy, a bit of imagination, and the recipes that survive are what remains of that fantasy once all human cognitive bias and limitation is laundered by our ‘technologies’. Recipes are unit of commensurability against which we can calculate differences, to further extend and refine our imaginary fantasies. Just as we test each individual action in a recipe against objective reality, we test each new fantasy against the accumulated properties stated in our recipes. From those tests of fantasy against our accumulated recipes, we observe in ourselves changes in our own instruments of logic. Extensions of our perception, memory, calculation – knowledge – is the collection of general instruments that apply in smaller numbers, to increasingly large categories of problems. (This is the reason Flynn suspects, for the Flynn effect as well as our tendency to improve upon tests.) It is these general principles (like the scientific method) that we can state are ‘knowledge’ in the sense of ‘knowledge of what’ versus ‘knowledge of how’ (See Gifts of Athena). Recipes are knowledge of ‘what’. General principles of how the universe functions are knowledge of ‘how’. Popper failed to make the distinction of dividing the problem into classes and instrumentation. And he did so because, as I have stated, he was overly fascinated with words, and under-fascinated with actions. And while I can only hypothesize why he is, like many of his peers, pseudo-scientifically fascinated with words, rather than scientifically fascinated with actions, the fact remains, that he was. And he, like Mises and Hayek and their followers, failed to produce a theory of the social sciences. CR is the best moral prescription for knowledge because it logically forbids the use of science to make claims of certainty sufficient to deprive people of voluntary choice. Popper justified skepticism and prohibited involuntary transfer by way of scientific argument. A necessary idea for his time. In science, he prohibited a return to mysticism by reliance on science equal to faith in god. But that is his achievement. He was the intellectual linebacker of the 20th century. He denied the opposition the field. But prohibition was not in itself an answer. Instrumentalism is necessary. Calculation is necessary. Reduction of the imperceptible to analogy to experience is necessary. Morality consists of the prevention of thefts and discounts. Actions that produce predictable outcomes, not states of imagination. That is the answer.

  • On Popper's Position, vs Action and Instrumentation

    ON POPPER’S POSITION VS ACTION AND INSTRUMENTATION (reposted from cr page for archiving) All we can say is x set of recipes have y properties in common, and all known recipes have z properties in common, and therefore we will likely find new recipes that share z properties. Logic is one of the instruments we use to construct recipes. Logic is a technology. Just as are the narrative, numbers, arithmetic, math, physics, and cooperation. These are all instrumental technologies or we would not need them and could perform the same operations without them. Science, as in the ‘method’ of science, is a recipe for employing those instruments ‘technologies’. Science is a technology. It is external to our intuitions, and we must use it like any other technology, in order to extend our sense, perception, memory, calculation, and planning. So I simply view ‘fuzzy language’ as what it is. And statements reducible to operational language as the only representation of scientific discourse. Theory means nothing different from fantasy without recording, instrument, operations, repetition, and falsification. A theory is a fantasy, a bit of imagination, and the recipes that survive are what remains of that fantasy once all human cognitive bias and limitation is laundered by our ‘technologies’. Recipes are unit of commensurability against which we can calculate differences, to further extend and refine our imaginary fantasies. Just as we test each individual action in a recipe against objective reality, we test each new fantasy against the accumulated properties stated in our recipes. From those tests of fantasy against our accumulated recipes, we observe in ourselves changes in our own instruments of logic. Extensions of our perception, memory, calculation – knowledge – is the collection of general instruments that apply in smaller numbers, to increasingly large categories of problems. (This is the reason Flynn suspects, for the Flynn effect as well as our tendency to improve upon tests.) It is these general principles (like the scientific method) that we can state are ‘knowledge’ in the sense of ‘knowledge of what’ versus ‘knowledge of how’ (See Gifts of Athena). Recipes are knowledge of ‘what’. General principles of how the universe functions are knowledge of ‘how’. Popper failed to make the distinction of dividing the problem into classes and instrumentation. And he did so because, as I have stated, he was overly fascinated with words, and under-fascinated with actions. And while I can only hypothesize why he is, like many of his peers, pseudo-scientifically fascinated with words, rather than scientifically fascinated with actions, the fact remains, that he was. And he, like Mises and Hayek and their followers, failed to produce a theory of the social sciences. CR is the best moral prescription for knowledge because it logically forbids the use of science to make claims of certainty sufficient to deprive people of voluntary choice. Popper justified skepticism and prohibited involuntary transfer by way of scientific argument. A necessary idea for his time. In science, he prohibited a return to mysticism by reliance on science equal to faith in god. But that is his achievement. He was the intellectual linebacker of the 20th century. He denied the opposition the field. But prohibition was not in itself an answer. Instrumentalism is necessary. Calculation is necessary. Reduction of the imperceptible to analogy to experience is necessary. Morality consists of the prevention of thefts and discounts. Actions that produce predictable outcomes, not states of imagination. That is the answer.

  • On Popper’s Position, vs Action and Instrumentation

    ON POPPER’S POSITION VS ACTION AND INSTRUMENTATION (reposted from cr page for archiving) All we can say is x set of recipes have y properties in common, and all known recipes have z properties in common, and therefore we will likely find new recipes that share z properties. Logic is one of the instruments we use to construct recipes. Logic is a technology. Just as are the narrative, numbers, arithmetic, math, physics, and cooperation. These are all instrumental technologies or we would not need them and could perform the same operations without them. Science, as in the ‘method’ of science, is a recipe for employing those instruments ‘technologies’. Science is a technology. It is external to our intuitions, and we must use it like any other technology, in order to extend our sense, perception, memory, calculation, and planning. So I simply view ‘fuzzy language’ as what it is. And statements reducible to operational language as the only representation of scientific discourse. Theory means nothing different from fantasy without recording, instrument, operations, repetition, and falsification. A theory is a fantasy, a bit of imagination, and the recipes that survive are what remains of that fantasy once all human cognitive bias and limitation is laundered by our ‘technologies’. Recipes are unit of commensurability against which we can calculate differences, to further extend and refine our imaginary fantasies. Just as we test each individual action in a recipe against objective reality, we test each new fantasy against the accumulated properties stated in our recipes. From those tests of fantasy against our accumulated recipes, we observe in ourselves changes in our own instruments of logic. Extensions of our perception, memory, calculation – knowledge – is the collection of general instruments that apply in smaller numbers, to increasingly large categories of problems. (This is the reason Flynn suspects, for the Flynn effect as well as our tendency to improve upon tests.) It is these general principles (like the scientific method) that we can state are ‘knowledge’ in the sense of ‘knowledge of what’ versus ‘knowledge of how’ (See Gifts of Athena). Recipes are knowledge of ‘what’. General principles of how the universe functions are knowledge of ‘how’. Popper failed to make the distinction of dividing the problem into classes and instrumentation. And he did so because, as I have stated, he was overly fascinated with words, and under-fascinated with actions. And while I can only hypothesize why he is, like many of his peers, pseudo-scientifically fascinated with words, rather than scientifically fascinated with actions, the fact remains, that he was. And he, like Mises and Hayek and their followers, failed to produce a theory of the social sciences. CR is the best moral prescription for knowledge because it logically forbids the use of science to make claims of certainty sufficient to deprive people of voluntary choice. Popper justified skepticism and prohibited involuntary transfer by way of scientific argument. A necessary idea for his time. In science, he prohibited a return to mysticism by reliance on science equal to faith in god. But that is his achievement. He was the intellectual linebacker of the 20th century. He denied the opposition the field. But prohibition was not in itself an answer. Instrumentalism is necessary. Calculation is necessary. Reduction of the imperceptible to analogy to experience is necessary. Morality consists of the prevention of thefts and discounts. Actions that produce predictable outcomes, not states of imagination. That is the answer.

  • Is Philosophy A Vehicle For Theft?

    Is nearly all of philosophy then, outside of logic, an artful construct for the purpose of justifying theft? One can justify suppression of, prevention of, and restitution for, the taking of discounts. (thefts) One can justify the selection of one priority of investment over another. But one cannot argue for the necessity of a monopoly of investments. Nor the mandatory enforcement of participation in investments, other than the suppression of free riding. One can argue the necessity for a homogeneity – monopoly – of property rights for the purpose of logically resolving disputes over property and contract – albeit, private property solves that problem, and articulated shareholder rights, retains that ability even under complexity. But once a monopoly of property rights exists, one cannot argue the necessity for a monopoly of law making. In fact, logic and evidence suggest precisely the opposite is true: that laws evolve and evolve best under the common law, since they must be interpreted by ordinary citizens, and are open to constant revision without external approval as the world evolves. The failure of the common law was (a) its usurpation by the state, and (b) failure to define property rights sufficiently in the face of industrialization. (c) its use by the middle class to dispossess the aristocracy, and consequential use by the proletarians and feminists to dispossess the middle classes. Philosophy is quite simple really. It’s only complicated if you’re trying to lie. And theft requires lying. And lying is best covered by obscurity. Cheers.

  • Is Philosophy A Vehicle For Theft?

    Is nearly all of philosophy then, outside of logic, an artful construct for the purpose of justifying theft? One can justify suppression of, prevention of, and restitution for, the taking of discounts. (thefts) One can justify the selection of one priority of investment over another. But one cannot argue for the necessity of a monopoly of investments. Nor the mandatory enforcement of participation in investments, other than the suppression of free riding. One can argue the necessity for a homogeneity – monopoly – of property rights for the purpose of logically resolving disputes over property and contract – albeit, private property solves that problem, and articulated shareholder rights, retains that ability even under complexity. But once a monopoly of property rights exists, one cannot argue the necessity for a monopoly of law making. In fact, logic and evidence suggest precisely the opposite is true: that laws evolve and evolve best under the common law, since they must be interpreted by ordinary citizens, and are open to constant revision without external approval as the world evolves. The failure of the common law was (a) its usurpation by the state, and (b) failure to define property rights sufficiently in the face of industrialization. (c) its use by the middle class to dispossess the aristocracy, and consequential use by the proletarians and feminists to dispossess the middle classes. Philosophy is quite simple really. It’s only complicated if you’re trying to lie. And theft requires lying. And lying is best covered by obscurity. Cheers.

  • What Are Bleeding Heart Libertarians? How Do They Differ From Libertarians?

    The BHL’s rely on the classical liberal Psychological Arguments as justification for the moral sentiments of care-taking, and grab ideas from everyone else. Good marketing but no arguments as yet other than psychological (moral).

    The Cato Institute group relies more on a mix of historical, moral and legal arguments. But we can also classify them as a mix of Psychological school. Their blog tends to the Continental, even if their publications and policy recommendations remain Psychological.

    The Austrian leaning libertarians at George Mason University rely on economic arguments. There arguments tend to mix Empirical and Psychological. Their error is that they keep trying to find an optimum morality for a polity to believe in. Which is irrational for an economist in particular.

    The Misesians at Ludwig Von Mises Institute use the rationalism from continental jewish cosmopolitan arguments derived from the ethics of the ghetto during the jewish enlightenment. Unfortunately for liberty, their use of the internet was brilliant, and so the three other think tanks above (I’ll have to include myself in that group) are trying to restore liberty to the anglo empirical tradition, or the anglo psychological tradition. The reason being that Ghetto Ethics may be useful between states, but they are insufficient for the formation of a high trust polity. Unfortunately, the wealth of literature they produced sounds all well and good to some of us, but to conservatives (aristocratic egalitarians) they sound completely immoral. And people like Walter Block constantly advocating the morality of things like blackmail, or the right of extortion, simply make the case for liberty worse.

    So I’ll argue that Vijay Krishnan’s positioning is OK in the sense that it’s true but insufficient to help the curious mind understand the moral content of these different philosophical traditions and the method in which they’re argumentatively structured. The better answer would be that these groups use parts of this spectrum of arguments:
    1. Sentimental (emotional intuition)
    2. Mythical (metaphor)
    3. Historical (analogy)
    4. Psychological (moral arguments = classical liberals)
    5. Rational ( continentals, ghetto cosompolitans, leftists of all stripes)
    6. Empirical (scientific and economic arguments – anglos)

    These groups rely on some combination of arguments, with only the last three combined as something bordering on scientific.

    Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard, and Hoppe tried to reconcile their continental backgrounds with anglo-analytic arguments and economics. But they did not rely on science. Instead argued against science. But they didn’t have the evidence we have today.

    https://www.quora.com/What-are-Bleeding-Heart-Libertarians-How-do-they-differ-from-Libertarians

  • What Are Bleeding Heart Libertarians? How Do They Differ From Libertarians?

    The BHL’s rely on the classical liberal Psychological Arguments as justification for the moral sentiments of care-taking, and grab ideas from everyone else. Good marketing but no arguments as yet other than psychological (moral).

    The Cato Institute group relies more on a mix of historical, moral and legal arguments. But we can also classify them as a mix of Psychological school. Their blog tends to the Continental, even if their publications and policy recommendations remain Psychological.

    The Austrian leaning libertarians at George Mason University rely on economic arguments. There arguments tend to mix Empirical and Psychological. Their error is that they keep trying to find an optimum morality for a polity to believe in. Which is irrational for an economist in particular.

    The Misesians at Ludwig Von Mises Institute use the rationalism from continental jewish cosmopolitan arguments derived from the ethics of the ghetto during the jewish enlightenment. Unfortunately for liberty, their use of the internet was brilliant, and so the three other think tanks above (I’ll have to include myself in that group) are trying to restore liberty to the anglo empirical tradition, or the anglo psychological tradition. The reason being that Ghetto Ethics may be useful between states, but they are insufficient for the formation of a high trust polity. Unfortunately, the wealth of literature they produced sounds all well and good to some of us, but to conservatives (aristocratic egalitarians) they sound completely immoral. And people like Walter Block constantly advocating the morality of things like blackmail, or the right of extortion, simply make the case for liberty worse.

    So I’ll argue that Vijay Krishnan’s positioning is OK in the sense that it’s true but insufficient to help the curious mind understand the moral content of these different philosophical traditions and the method in which they’re argumentatively structured. The better answer would be that these groups use parts of this spectrum of arguments:
    1. Sentimental (emotional intuition)
    2. Mythical (metaphor)
    3. Historical (analogy)
    4. Psychological (moral arguments = classical liberals)
    5. Rational ( continentals, ghetto cosompolitans, leftists of all stripes)
    6. Empirical (scientific and economic arguments – anglos)

    These groups rely on some combination of arguments, with only the last three combined as something bordering on scientific.

    Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard, and Hoppe tried to reconcile their continental backgrounds with anglo-analytic arguments and economics. But they did not rely on science. Instead argued against science. But they didn’t have the evidence we have today.

    https://www.quora.com/What-are-Bleeding-Heart-Libertarians-How-do-they-differ-from-Libertarians

  • Truth: No Man Is An Island. No Logical Argument Is Either.

    My definition of Truth under Scientific Realism, is that any notion of Truth can only exist if we say it is a) Performative, consisting of b) Correspondence and c) Coherence (internal consistency). And that all other statements are analogies to some subset of these properties. And that d) formal theories of truth (the ‘logics’) are each subsets of Coherence, which test certain properties of any “True” and therefore Performative, Correspondent and Coherent statement. And that e) property and involuntary transfer constitute a missing logic of cooperation, that renders all transfers open to analysis and criticism. And that f) praxeology constitutes a missing logic of the rationality of decisions and incentives, that renders all actions open to subjective testing. But because humans are marginally indifferent in their rationality and incentives, such subjective, SYMPATHETIC testing functions as an objective test of the rationality of incentives. And that: g) Constructive (meaning socially constructive, including Consensus theories) and Pragmatic theories of truth are failed attempts at obscurant coercion (theft) by adherents to enlightenment democratic equalitarianism, socialists, postmodernists, and totalitarian humanists. Just as the Rawlsian veil is yet another attempt at obscuring involuntary transfers, while relying on the impossibility of human judgement to make such decisions as would be required to achieve the abstract concept of ‘justice’. As such I view truth as Performative (attestation) constrained by and consisting of { i) Correspondent (with reality); ii) Cohesive (internally consistent and formal); iii) Identitarian (categories, properties and names) iv) Propertarian (cooperative moral action); v) Praxeological (rational action) } properties – each subset set of properties requiring separate logics for the isolation and analysis of each subset. Conversely, no ‘complete attest-able truth’ can be constructed in any subset without consideration of all. It may be (as in the case of any of the formal logics) that no external dependency is present (although I cannot think of one). But I am unaware of any formal logic without external dependency. This is a non contradictory, fully explanatory theory of the criteria for truth. And so far I am unable to formalize a criticism of CR, because for all intents and purposes that I can imagine, the CR definition of truth is platonic and non existent, and impossible. Since the only truth that can exist is attestation: the constant reduction in our own errors as we try to describe the properties of the universe. We can know what is false. That is our only certainty. But we can never know a platonic truth other than a tautology, because only tautological statements are complete. A complete statement is not open to attestation. If any statement is not tautological, and therefore incomplete, it is open to attestation. But how can we say an attestation is meaningful if it’s tautological? We are, with the concept of truth, improving our attestations about the universe. This is what we improve. That is the purpose and function of truth. Since only by improving our attestations and constantly testing them can we improve our actions, and by our actions, continue to increasingly outwit the deterministic processes in the universe by constructing minor alterations to that universe such that we can make use of the universe as we will. If I am to defend the claim that obscurantism must be prohibited from political speech (argument), then I cannot make this claim on irrefutable terms, without at least addressing the relationship between the logical disciplines, and the very nature of philosophy, as a moral endeavor. No man is an island. No argument in any sub discipline is either.