Curt Doolittle

Source: Original Site Post

  • Categories of Knowledge: Improving on Mokyr

    Wondering…. Hmmm. I don’t like Mokyr’s categories of knowledge. I tend to state them as “knowledge of construction” and “knowledge of use”. Now he’s been trying to talk about the knowledge economy, so only usable knowledge is meaningful to him. But I think this is the correct expanded hierarchy. 0) Knowledge of identity. (we are aware of it) 1) Knowledge of consequence. (what changes in state we can observe) 2) Knowledge of use. (how to put it under out control to change states) 3) Knowledge of construction. (what its made of and how its made) Curt

  • Q: "Curt, Why Is Praxeology A Pseudoscience And Therefore False?"

    A: For a host of reasons: 1) The different properties of axiomatic (proof) vs theoretic (truth) systems. Axiomatic systems are not bounded by correspondence with reality, and theoretic systems are not bounded by our understanding of causes. The reason that we can describe the physical universe with mathematics is not only that the universe consists of constant relations, but that mathematics is constructed on purpose as a set of general rules independent of scale; and since the sale of a single unit (“1”) can be anything imaginable, then it is possible to describe literally anything that consists of constant relations regardless of scale. By contrast, the universe is not constructed of single units but more complex building blocks, and like protein foldings, and various number fields, and as we see demonstrated by the Periodic Table, cannot construct all possible permutations. As such while mathematics can describe all of the universe, the universe cannot describe all of mathematics. The same criticism applies to logic: It is possible in any logically axiomatic system to describe far more than is semantically meaningful. And vastly more than it correspondent with physical reality. As such, axiomatic systems are PRESCRIPTIVE sets that are not bounded by semantic meaning, or correspondence with reality, while theoretic systems consist of DESCRIPTIVE sets that ARE bounded by semantic meaning and correspondence with reality. Reality consists of often innumerable causes, while any given event, that we describe for the purpose of any given utility, is possible to describe by a limited number of causes beyond which the outcome produced is marginally indifferent for that articulated utility. Completeness (truth) of any theory then is limited to the utility of the expression. 2) The impossibility of deducing emergent (unpredictable) properties of systems. Despite the possibility of deducing the causes of emergent phenomenon once they are observed, as the consequences of human decisions. The absurd kantian confusion, exacerbated by Mises, that the a prioiri: “knowledge that proceeds from theoretical deduction rather than from observation or experience” is somehow extant prior to experience, rather than reconstructed via introspection from memories by the observation of memories and use of logical instrumentation. What we CAN honestly say is apprehensible a priori is the result of our sympathetic testing of the rationality of any incentives given the same amount of information as any other person. This is because all humans are marginally indifferent in their incentives if we possess sufficient understanding of their incentives, even if they may be marginally different in their sets of moral preferences because we are marginally different in our reproductive strategies, and our reproductive strategies determine our moral preferences. Note: This is a much longer topic, but hopefully the obvious statement that introspection and observation are synonyms, and logic is a form of instrumentation required for the reduction of that which we cannot perceive to something which we can perceive and compare, just as physical instrumentation is required for the reduction of that which we cannot perceive to that which we can perceive and compare. Our comparison ability is severely limited and subject to a multitude of errors and biases. And all but the most reductio of experiential concepts require either logical or physical instrumentation in order to reduce the imperceptible to the comparable. 3) The claim that praxeology is a science and therefore follows the scientific method, rather than a logic. For a set of statements to be classified as pseudoscientific requires only (a) that the author (speaker) argue that his process or claims are scientific, without having followed the scientific method. For falsification purposes that defend the scientific method itself, we can further stipulate (b) that the claims of the author(speaker) are not not produced. Under both the minimum criteria of having followed the scientific method, and the falsification criteria, of having produced stated outcomes, praxeology fails to meet the criteria of a science. 4) The evidence that science identified emergent properties of economics, while deduction did not. (the list is long but sticky prices are enough of an example). 5) The evidence that science identified cognitive biases, while deduction from first principles did not. Furthermore: (a) The evidence is that as productivity increases the prices for the purpose of consumption evolve to price points of marginal indifference, and as a consequence signaling and moral factors determine the majority of choices. Preferences then are not cleared ordinarily but as various weights in a network of preferences that exist independently of prices. Substitution rates of consumption are extremely sticky, just like prices and contracts. Because the cost of reordering networks of choices and preferences and the signals that result as a consequence, is extremely high. Habits must be restructured, expectations set, and time devoted to new solutions to problems of household production, maintenance and care. (Bouridan’s ass never starves.) ie: we clear networks of partial preferences, not ordinal stacks subject to cheap substitution by price. Even businesses avoid this at all costs. (Only an investor or banker, who does not engage in production, would make Mises’ error – compounded by Rothbard.) 6) The evidence that reason (deduction) is inferior to ratio-scientific analysis (internal consistency plus external correspondence) for the purpose of exploration. ie: the requirement that any theory of human cooperation consist of both correspondent tests (actions) that we call and internally consistent tests (logic) that instrumentally compensate for our inherent frailty of reason. Science (ratio scientific argument) requires both tests of action and tests of logic, both of which are stated in operational language. Without operational language we do not know if the author (speaker) relies upon knowledge of construction, or knowledge of use. He can attest to consequences via knowledge of use, but he cannot attest to cause without articulating knowledge of construction. Without the full set of tests, including: constructed, consistent, correspondent, and falsified, we cannot claim to morally attest to the truth of any argument by means of our own cognition. (The profundity of that statement is not something to ignore.) The scientific method “the ratio-empirical method” is a moral constraint on our utterances. There is no platonic universe we are describing when we assert the truth of something. Conversely, without demonstration that one has articulated a theory as constructed, consistent, correspondent, and falsified, any truth claim, is predicated on the platonic, magical or the divine, and one cannot ‘attest’ to he truth of it. One cannot morally claim that he speaks the truth. Truth is a performative action, necessary for recreating meaning – not an intrinsic property outside of human attestation. One of our many human cognitive biases is our instinctual avoidance of blame wherever and whenever possible. It is usually destructive to, and antithetical to debate. As such, over the millennia, in the art of our arguments, we have systematically avoided the social discomfort of blame by using verbal contrivances to cast truth as a platonic construct rather than what it is: an attestation that one’s testimony (theory, construction, proof, demonstration and falsifications) are true witness, not dependent upon deception, here-say, assumption, imagination, or error. (This version of the performative theory of truth is an extremely important concept which solves many of the empty verbal problems of philosophy.) (Note: To avoid further complexity, I have not above, included the additional requirements of “context or utility” of a theory which determines the scope of the attestation, the “completeness” of the theory, and the “parsimony” of its causes. The compete set of tests of the ratio-scientific method should include: Utility (problem), theory, construction, proof, demonstration, falsification, completeness and parsimony. This places a much higher constraint on truth than all other theories of truth, and relegates all other statements of ‘truth’ as subservient to the performative theory. The discussion of the resulting hierarchy of truth claims and what they claim and do not can be reduced to “I can say X given the partial truth condition Y”. This solves, completely, the problem of multiple competing definitions of truth. But that discussion is outside of the scope of this one.) 7) The stipulation that any set of statements describing cooperation, that are reduced to a sequence of human actions, are open to the individual, sympathetic test of rational voluntary transfer. As such, the value of “praxeological” analysis is not in determining outcomes, or emergent phenomenon, but in the determination of whether any exchange is rational, ethical and moral to the actors. This is the proper value of the logic of cooperation. Just as we can loosely test whether red = red, we can also loosely test whether an exchange is rational, ethical and moral or not. 8) Even if we can subjectively test the rationality of incentives, it turns out that we are (Libertarians in particular) morally blind enough that we cannot ascertain the sympathetic appreciation of incentives available to the majority of peoples when they conduct an exchange or transfer when any moral question is a member of the set of preferences that must be satisfied (cleared). As such our ability to correctly value moral properties of human interactions is extremely ‘nearsighted’ and limited to the very obvious forms of harm and visible theft, but as we enter ethical, moral and political questions we cannot correctly sympathize and therefore test the rationality of incentives. For these reasons as well as others that I don’t think are necessary to go into, Praxeology is a pseudoscience. Economics and human cooperation are, as I have stated, an empirical endeavor. Our rational abilities are quite frail. It is only through instrumentation both logical and physical that we sense, perceive, and judge that which is beyond the very simple and pre-cognitive. This is not my final word on this matter, but it is my first draft, and while extensible it should be sufficient enough that we discard Praxeology and instead work upon articulating a theory of cooperation expressible as a formal logic of institutions. If we combine this effort with a theory of property that corresponds completely to the criminal, ethical, moral and political spectrum, then it is possible to render all possible disputes in and across all groups resolvable by means of the common law. And thereby eliminate demand for the state as a means of suppressing criminal, unethical and immoral transaction costs. What remains then, is merely the need for formal institutions that allow for the construction of commons while preventing the privatization of and socialization of losses onto those commons. Competition in the marketplace is virtuous, but competition in the production of commons produces transaction costs that always and everywhere create demand for the state. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

    COMMENTS Curt Doolittle That ought to keep a few smart guys busy for a while. lol

  • Q: “Curt, Why Is Praxeology A Pseudoscience And Therefore False?”

    A: For a host of reasons: 1) The different properties of axiomatic (proof) vs theoretic (truth) systems. Axiomatic systems are not bounded by correspondence with reality, and theoretic systems are not bounded by our understanding of causes. The reason that we can describe the physical universe with mathematics is not only that the universe consists of constant relations, but that mathematics is constructed on purpose as a set of general rules independent of scale; and since the sale of a single unit (“1”) can be anything imaginable, then it is possible to describe literally anything that consists of constant relations regardless of scale. By contrast, the universe is not constructed of single units but more complex building blocks, and like protein foldings, and various number fields, and as we see demonstrated by the Periodic Table, cannot construct all possible permutations. As such while mathematics can describe all of the universe, the universe cannot describe all of mathematics. The same criticism applies to logic: It is possible in any logically axiomatic system to describe far more than is semantically meaningful. And vastly more than it correspondent with physical reality. As such, axiomatic systems are PRESCRIPTIVE sets that are not bounded by semantic meaning, or correspondence with reality, while theoretic systems consist of DESCRIPTIVE sets that ARE bounded by semantic meaning and correspondence with reality. Reality consists of often innumerable causes, while any given event, that we describe for the purpose of any given utility, is possible to describe by a limited number of causes beyond which the outcome produced is marginally indifferent for that articulated utility. Completeness (truth) of any theory then is limited to the utility of the expression. 2) The impossibility of deducing emergent (unpredictable) properties of systems. Despite the possibility of deducing the causes of emergent phenomenon once they are observed, as the consequences of human decisions. The absurd kantian confusion, exacerbated by Mises, that the a prioiri: “knowledge that proceeds from theoretical deduction rather than from observation or experience” is somehow extant prior to experience, rather than reconstructed via introspection from memories by the observation of memories and use of logical instrumentation. What we CAN honestly say is apprehensible a priori is the result of our sympathetic testing of the rationality of any incentives given the same amount of information as any other person. This is because all humans are marginally indifferent in their incentives if we possess sufficient understanding of their incentives, even if they may be marginally different in their sets of moral preferences because we are marginally different in our reproductive strategies, and our reproductive strategies determine our moral preferences. Note: This is a much longer topic, but hopefully the obvious statement that introspection and observation are synonyms, and logic is a form of instrumentation required for the reduction of that which we cannot perceive to something which we can perceive and compare, just as physical instrumentation is required for the reduction of that which we cannot perceive to that which we can perceive and compare. Our comparison ability is severely limited and subject to a multitude of errors and biases. And all but the most reductio of experiential concepts require either logical or physical instrumentation in order to reduce the imperceptible to the comparable. 3) The claim that praxeology is a science and therefore follows the scientific method, rather than a logic. For a set of statements to be classified as pseudoscientific requires only (a) that the author (speaker) argue that his process or claims are scientific, without having followed the scientific method. For falsification purposes that defend the scientific method itself, we can further stipulate (b) that the claims of the author(speaker) are not not produced. Under both the minimum criteria of having followed the scientific method, and the falsification criteria, of having produced stated outcomes, praxeology fails to meet the criteria of a science. 4) The evidence that science identified emergent properties of economics, while deduction did not. (the list is long but sticky prices are enough of an example). 5) The evidence that science identified cognitive biases, while deduction from first principles did not. Furthermore: (a) The evidence is that as productivity increases the prices for the purpose of consumption evolve to price points of marginal indifference, and as a consequence signaling and moral factors determine the majority of choices. Preferences then are not cleared ordinarily but as various weights in a network of preferences that exist independently of prices. Substitution rates of consumption are extremely sticky, just like prices and contracts. Because the cost of reordering networks of choices and preferences and the signals that result as a consequence, is extremely high. Habits must be restructured, expectations set, and time devoted to new solutions to problems of household production, maintenance and care. (Bouridan’s ass never starves.) ie: we clear networks of partial preferences, not ordinal stacks subject to cheap substitution by price. Even businesses avoid this at all costs. (Only an investor or banker, who does not engage in production, would make Mises’ error – compounded by Rothbard.) 6) The evidence that reason (deduction) is inferior to ratio-scientific analysis (internal consistency plus external correspondence) for the purpose of exploration. ie: the requirement that any theory of human cooperation consist of both correspondent tests (actions) that we call and internally consistent tests (logic) that instrumentally compensate for our inherent frailty of reason. Science (ratio scientific argument) requires both tests of action and tests of logic, both of which are stated in operational language. Without operational language we do not know if the author (speaker) relies upon knowledge of construction, or knowledge of use. He can attest to consequences via knowledge of use, but he cannot attest to cause without articulating knowledge of construction. Without the full set of tests, including: constructed, consistent, correspondent, and falsified, we cannot claim to morally attest to the truth of any argument by means of our own cognition. (The profundity of that statement is not something to ignore.) The scientific method “the ratio-empirical method” is a moral constraint on our utterances. There is no platonic universe we are describing when we assert the truth of something. Conversely, without demonstration that one has articulated a theory as constructed, consistent, correspondent, and falsified, any truth claim, is predicated on the platonic, magical or the divine, and one cannot ‘attest’ to he truth of it. One cannot morally claim that he speaks the truth. Truth is a performative action, necessary for recreating meaning – not an intrinsic property outside of human attestation. One of our many human cognitive biases is our instinctual avoidance of blame wherever and whenever possible. It is usually destructive to, and antithetical to debate. As such, over the millennia, in the art of our arguments, we have systematically avoided the social discomfort of blame by using verbal contrivances to cast truth as a platonic construct rather than what it is: an attestation that one’s testimony (theory, construction, proof, demonstration and falsifications) are true witness, not dependent upon deception, here-say, assumption, imagination, or error. (This version of the performative theory of truth is an extremely important concept which solves many of the empty verbal problems of philosophy.) (Note: To avoid further complexity, I have not above, included the additional requirements of “context or utility” of a theory which determines the scope of the attestation, the “completeness” of the theory, and the “parsimony” of its causes. The compete set of tests of the ratio-scientific method should include: Utility (problem), theory, construction, proof, demonstration, falsification, completeness and parsimony. This places a much higher constraint on truth than all other theories of truth, and relegates all other statements of ‘truth’ as subservient to the performative theory. The discussion of the resulting hierarchy of truth claims and what they claim and do not can be reduced to “I can say X given the partial truth condition Y”. This solves, completely, the problem of multiple competing definitions of truth. But that discussion is outside of the scope of this one.) 7) The stipulation that any set of statements describing cooperation, that are reduced to a sequence of human actions, are open to the individual, sympathetic test of rational voluntary transfer. As such, the value of “praxeological” analysis is not in determining outcomes, or emergent phenomenon, but in the determination of whether any exchange is rational, ethical and moral to the actors. This is the proper value of the logic of cooperation. Just as we can loosely test whether red = red, we can also loosely test whether an exchange is rational, ethical and moral or not. 8) Even if we can subjectively test the rationality of incentives, it turns out that we are (Libertarians in particular) morally blind enough that we cannot ascertain the sympathetic appreciation of incentives available to the majority of peoples when they conduct an exchange or transfer when any moral question is a member of the set of preferences that must be satisfied (cleared). As such our ability to correctly value moral properties of human interactions is extremely ‘nearsighted’ and limited to the very obvious forms of harm and visible theft, but as we enter ethical, moral and political questions we cannot correctly sympathize and therefore test the rationality of incentives. For these reasons as well as others that I don’t think are necessary to go into, Praxeology is a pseudoscience. Economics and human cooperation are, as I have stated, an empirical endeavor. Our rational abilities are quite frail. It is only through instrumentation both logical and physical that we sense, perceive, and judge that which is beyond the very simple and pre-cognitive. This is not my final word on this matter, but it is my first draft, and while extensible it should be sufficient enough that we discard Praxeology and instead work upon articulating a theory of cooperation expressible as a formal logic of institutions. If we combine this effort with a theory of property that corresponds completely to the criminal, ethical, moral and political spectrum, then it is possible to render all possible disputes in and across all groups resolvable by means of the common law. And thereby eliminate demand for the state as a means of suppressing criminal, unethical and immoral transaction costs. What remains then, is merely the need for formal institutions that allow for the construction of commons while preventing the privatization of and socialization of losses onto those commons. Competition in the marketplace is virtuous, but competition in the production of commons produces transaction costs that always and everywhere create demand for the state. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

    COMMENTS Curt Doolittle That ought to keep a few smart guys busy for a while. lol

  • Q: "Curt, Why Is Praxeology A Pseudoscience And Therefore False?"

    A: For a host of reasons: 1) The different properties of axiomatic (proof) vs theoretic (truth) systems. Axiomatic systems are not bounded by correspondence with reality, and theoretic systems are not bounded by our understanding of causes. The reason that we can describe the physical universe with mathematics is not only that the universe consists of constant relations, but that mathematics is constructed on purpose as a set of general rules independent of scale; and since the sale of a single unit (“1”) can be anything imaginable, then it is possible to describe literally anything that consists of constant relations regardless of scale. By contrast, the universe is not constructed of single units but more complex building blocks, and like protein foldings, and various number fields, and as we see demonstrated by the Periodic Table, cannot construct all possible permutations. As such while mathematics can describe all of the universe, the universe cannot describe all of mathematics. The same criticism applies to logic: It is possible in any logically axiomatic system to describe far more than is semantically meaningful. And vastly more than it correspondent with physical reality. As such, axiomatic systems are PRESCRIPTIVE sets that are not bounded by semantic meaning, or correspondence with reality, while theoretic systems consist of DESCRIPTIVE sets that ARE bounded by semantic meaning and correspondence with reality. Reality consists of often innumerable causes, while any given event, that we describe for the purpose of any given utility, is possible to describe by a limited number of causes beyond which the outcome produced is marginally indifferent for that articulated utility. Completeness (truth) of any theory then is limited to the utility of the expression. 2) The impossibility of deducing emergent (unpredictable) properties of systems. Despite the possibility of deducing the causes of emergent phenomenon once they are observed, as the consequences of human decisions. The absurd kantian confusion, exacerbated by Mises, that the a prioiri: “knowledge that proceeds from theoretical deduction rather than from observation or experience” is somehow extant prior to experience, rather than reconstructed via introspection from memories by the observation of memories and use of logical instrumentation. What we CAN honestly say is apprehensible a priori is the result of our sympathetic testing of the rationality of any incentives given the same amount of information as any other person. This is because all humans are marginally indifferent in their incentives if we possess sufficient understanding of their incentives, even if they may be marginally different in their sets of moral preferences because we are marginally different in our reproductive strategies, and our reproductive strategies determine our moral preferences. Note: This is a much longer topic, but hopefully the obvious statement that introspection and observation are synonyms, and logic is a form of instrumentation required for the reduction of that which we cannot perceive to something which we can perceive and compare, just as physical instrumentation is required for the reduction of that which we cannot perceive to that which we can perceive and compare. Our comparison ability is severely limited and subject to a multitude of errors and biases. And all but the most reductio of experiential concepts require either logical or physical instrumentation in order to reduce the imperceptible to the comparable. 3) The claim that praxeology is a science and therefore follows the scientific method, rather than a logic. For a set of statements to be classified as pseudoscientific requires only (a) that the author (speaker) argue that his process or claims are scientific, without having followed the scientific method. For falsification purposes that defend the scientific method itself, we can further stipulate (b) that the claims of the author(speaker) are not not produced. Under both the minimum criteria of having followed the scientific method, and the falsification criteria, of having produced stated outcomes, praxeology fails to meet the criteria of a science. 4) The evidence that science identified emergent properties of economics, while deduction did not. (the list is long but sticky prices are enough of an example). 5) The evidence that science identified cognitive biases, while deduction from first principles did not. Furthermore: (a) The evidence is that as productivity increases the prices for the purpose of consumption evolve to price points of marginal indifference, and as a consequence signaling and moral factors determine the majority of choices. Preferences then are not cleared ordinarily but as various weights in a network of preferences that exist independently of prices. Substitution rates of consumption are extremely sticky, just like prices and contracts. Because the cost of reordering networks of choices and preferences and the signals that result as a consequence, is extremely high. Habits must be restructured, expectations set, and time devoted to new solutions to problems of household production, maintenance and care. (Bouridan’s ass never starves.) ie: we clear networks of partial preferences, not ordinal stacks subject to cheap substitution by price. Even businesses avoid this at all costs. (Only an investor or banker, who does not engage in production, would make Mises’ error – compounded by Rothbard.) 6) The evidence that reason (deduction) is inferior to ratio-scientific analysis (internal consistency plus external correspondence) for the purpose of exploration. ie: the requirement that any theory of human cooperation consist of both correspondent tests (actions) that we call and internally consistent tests (logic) that instrumentally compensate for our inherent frailty of reason. Science (ratio scientific argument) requires both tests of action and tests of logic, both of which are stated in operational language. Without operational language we do not know if the author (speaker) relies upon knowledge of construction, or knowledge of use. He can attest to consequences via knowledge of use, but he cannot attest to cause without articulating knowledge of construction. Without the full set of tests, including: constructed, consistent, correspondent, and falsified, we cannot claim to morally attest to the truth of any argument by means of our own cognition. (The profundity of that statement is not something to ignore.) The scientific method “the ratio-empirical method” is a moral constraint on our utterances. There is no platonic universe we are describing when we assert the truth of something. Conversely, without demonstration that one has articulated a theory as constructed, consistent, correspondent, and falsified, any truth claim, is predicated on the platonic, magical or the divine, and one cannot ‘attest’ to he truth of it. One cannot morally claim that he speaks the truth. Truth is a performative action, necessary for recreating meaning – not an intrinsic property outside of human attestation. One of our many human cognitive biases is our instinctual avoidance of blame wherever and whenever possible. It is usually destructive to, and antithetical to debate. As such, over the millennia, in the art of our arguments, we have systematically avoided the social discomfort of blame by using verbal contrivances to cast truth as a platonic construct rather than what it is: an attestation that one’s testimony (theory, construction, proof, demonstration and falsifications) are true witness, not dependent upon deception, here-say, assumption, imagination, or error. (This version of the performative theory of truth is an extremely important concept which solves many of the empty verbal problems of philosophy.) (Note: To avoid further complexity, I have not above, included the additional requirements of “context or utility” of a theory which determines the scope of the attestation, the “completeness” of the theory, and the “parsimony” of its causes. The compete set of tests of the ratio-scientific method should include: Utility (problem), theory, construction, proof, demonstration, falsification, completeness and parsimony. This places a much higher constraint on truth than all other theories of truth, and relegates all other statements of ‘truth’ as subservient to the performative theory. The discussion of the resulting hierarchy of truth claims and what they claim and do not can be reduced to “I can say X given the partial truth condition Y”. This solves, completely, the problem of multiple competing definitions of truth. But that discussion is outside of the scope of this one.) 7) The stipulation that any set of statements describing cooperation, that are reduced to a sequence of human actions, are open to the individual, sympathetic test of rational voluntary transfer. As such, the value of “praxeological” analysis is not in determining outcomes, or emergent phenomenon, but in the determination of whether any exchange is rational, ethical and moral to the actors. This is the proper value of the logic of cooperation. Just as we can loosely test whether red = red, we can also loosely test whether an exchange is rational, ethical and moral or not. 8) Even if we can subjectively test the rationality of incentives, it turns out that we are (Libertarians in particular) morally blind enough that we cannot ascertain the sympathetic appreciation of incentives available to the majority of peoples when they conduct an exchange or transfer when any moral question is a member of the set of preferences that must be satisfied (cleared). As such our ability to correctly value moral properties of human interactions is extremely ‘nearsighted’ and limited to the very obvious forms of harm and visible theft, but as we enter ethical, moral and political questions we cannot correctly sympathize and therefore test the rationality of incentives. For these reasons as well as others that I don’t think are necessary to go into, Praxeology is a pseudoscience. Economics and human cooperation are, as I have stated, an empirical endeavor. Our rational abilities are quite frail. It is only through instrumentation both logical and physical that we sense, perceive, and judge that which is beyond the very simple and pre-cognitive. This is not my final word on this matter, but it is my first draft, and while extensible it should be sufficient enough that we discard Praxeology and instead work upon articulating a theory of cooperation expressible as a formal logic of institutions. If we combine this effort with a theory of property that corresponds completely to the criminal, ethical, moral and political spectrum, then it is possible to render all possible disputes in and across all groups resolvable by means of the common law. And thereby eliminate demand for the state as a means of suppressing criminal, unethical and immoral transaction costs. What remains then, is merely the need for formal institutions that allow for the construction of commons while preventing the privatization of and socialization of losses onto those commons. Competition in the marketplace is virtuous, but competition in the production of commons produces transaction costs that always and everywhere create demand for the state. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

    COMMENTS Curt Doolittle That ought to keep a few smart guys busy for a while. lol

  • Q: “Curt, Why Is Praxeology A Pseudoscience And Therefore False?”

    A: For a host of reasons: 1) The different properties of axiomatic (proof) vs theoretic (truth) systems. Axiomatic systems are not bounded by correspondence with reality, and theoretic systems are not bounded by our understanding of causes. The reason that we can describe the physical universe with mathematics is not only that the universe consists of constant relations, but that mathematics is constructed on purpose as a set of general rules independent of scale; and since the sale of a single unit (“1”) can be anything imaginable, then it is possible to describe literally anything that consists of constant relations regardless of scale. By contrast, the universe is not constructed of single units but more complex building blocks, and like protein foldings, and various number fields, and as we see demonstrated by the Periodic Table, cannot construct all possible permutations. As such while mathematics can describe all of the universe, the universe cannot describe all of mathematics. The same criticism applies to logic: It is possible in any logically axiomatic system to describe far more than is semantically meaningful. And vastly more than it correspondent with physical reality. As such, axiomatic systems are PRESCRIPTIVE sets that are not bounded by semantic meaning, or correspondence with reality, while theoretic systems consist of DESCRIPTIVE sets that ARE bounded by semantic meaning and correspondence with reality. Reality consists of often innumerable causes, while any given event, that we describe for the purpose of any given utility, is possible to describe by a limited number of causes beyond which the outcome produced is marginally indifferent for that articulated utility. Completeness (truth) of any theory then is limited to the utility of the expression. 2) The impossibility of deducing emergent (unpredictable) properties of systems. Despite the possibility of deducing the causes of emergent phenomenon once they are observed, as the consequences of human decisions. The absurd kantian confusion, exacerbated by Mises, that the a prioiri: “knowledge that proceeds from theoretical deduction rather than from observation or experience” is somehow extant prior to experience, rather than reconstructed via introspection from memories by the observation of memories and use of logical instrumentation. What we CAN honestly say is apprehensible a priori is the result of our sympathetic testing of the rationality of any incentives given the same amount of information as any other person. This is because all humans are marginally indifferent in their incentives if we possess sufficient understanding of their incentives, even if they may be marginally different in their sets of moral preferences because we are marginally different in our reproductive strategies, and our reproductive strategies determine our moral preferences. Note: This is a much longer topic, but hopefully the obvious statement that introspection and observation are synonyms, and logic is a form of instrumentation required for the reduction of that which we cannot perceive to something which we can perceive and compare, just as physical instrumentation is required for the reduction of that which we cannot perceive to that which we can perceive and compare. Our comparison ability is severely limited and subject to a multitude of errors and biases. And all but the most reductio of experiential concepts require either logical or physical instrumentation in order to reduce the imperceptible to the comparable. 3) The claim that praxeology is a science and therefore follows the scientific method, rather than a logic. For a set of statements to be classified as pseudoscientific requires only (a) that the author (speaker) argue that his process or claims are scientific, without having followed the scientific method. For falsification purposes that defend the scientific method itself, we can further stipulate (b) that the claims of the author(speaker) are not not produced. Under both the minimum criteria of having followed the scientific method, and the falsification criteria, of having produced stated outcomes, praxeology fails to meet the criteria of a science. 4) The evidence that science identified emergent properties of economics, while deduction did not. (the list is long but sticky prices are enough of an example). 5) The evidence that science identified cognitive biases, while deduction from first principles did not. Furthermore: (a) The evidence is that as productivity increases the prices for the purpose of consumption evolve to price points of marginal indifference, and as a consequence signaling and moral factors determine the majority of choices. Preferences then are not cleared ordinarily but as various weights in a network of preferences that exist independently of prices. Substitution rates of consumption are extremely sticky, just like prices and contracts. Because the cost of reordering networks of choices and preferences and the signals that result as a consequence, is extremely high. Habits must be restructured, expectations set, and time devoted to new solutions to problems of household production, maintenance and care. (Bouridan’s ass never starves.) ie: we clear networks of partial preferences, not ordinal stacks subject to cheap substitution by price. Even businesses avoid this at all costs. (Only an investor or banker, who does not engage in production, would make Mises’ error – compounded by Rothbard.) 6) The evidence that reason (deduction) is inferior to ratio-scientific analysis (internal consistency plus external correspondence) for the purpose of exploration. ie: the requirement that any theory of human cooperation consist of both correspondent tests (actions) that we call and internally consistent tests (logic) that instrumentally compensate for our inherent frailty of reason. Science (ratio scientific argument) requires both tests of action and tests of logic, both of which are stated in operational language. Without operational language we do not know if the author (speaker) relies upon knowledge of construction, or knowledge of use. He can attest to consequences via knowledge of use, but he cannot attest to cause without articulating knowledge of construction. Without the full set of tests, including: constructed, consistent, correspondent, and falsified, we cannot claim to morally attest to the truth of any argument by means of our own cognition. (The profundity of that statement is not something to ignore.) The scientific method “the ratio-empirical method” is a moral constraint on our utterances. There is no platonic universe we are describing when we assert the truth of something. Conversely, without demonstration that one has articulated a theory as constructed, consistent, correspondent, and falsified, any truth claim, is predicated on the platonic, magical or the divine, and one cannot ‘attest’ to he truth of it. One cannot morally claim that he speaks the truth. Truth is a performative action, necessary for recreating meaning – not an intrinsic property outside of human attestation. One of our many human cognitive biases is our instinctual avoidance of blame wherever and whenever possible. It is usually destructive to, and antithetical to debate. As such, over the millennia, in the art of our arguments, we have systematically avoided the social discomfort of blame by using verbal contrivances to cast truth as a platonic construct rather than what it is: an attestation that one’s testimony (theory, construction, proof, demonstration and falsifications) are true witness, not dependent upon deception, here-say, assumption, imagination, or error. (This version of the performative theory of truth is an extremely important concept which solves many of the empty verbal problems of philosophy.) (Note: To avoid further complexity, I have not above, included the additional requirements of “context or utility” of a theory which determines the scope of the attestation, the “completeness” of the theory, and the “parsimony” of its causes. The compete set of tests of the ratio-scientific method should include: Utility (problem), theory, construction, proof, demonstration, falsification, completeness and parsimony. This places a much higher constraint on truth than all other theories of truth, and relegates all other statements of ‘truth’ as subservient to the performative theory. The discussion of the resulting hierarchy of truth claims and what they claim and do not can be reduced to “I can say X given the partial truth condition Y”. This solves, completely, the problem of multiple competing definitions of truth. But that discussion is outside of the scope of this one.) 7) The stipulation that any set of statements describing cooperation, that are reduced to a sequence of human actions, are open to the individual, sympathetic test of rational voluntary transfer. As such, the value of “praxeological” analysis is not in determining outcomes, or emergent phenomenon, but in the determination of whether any exchange is rational, ethical and moral to the actors. This is the proper value of the logic of cooperation. Just as we can loosely test whether red = red, we can also loosely test whether an exchange is rational, ethical and moral or not. 8) Even if we can subjectively test the rationality of incentives, it turns out that we are (Libertarians in particular) morally blind enough that we cannot ascertain the sympathetic appreciation of incentives available to the majority of peoples when they conduct an exchange or transfer when any moral question is a member of the set of preferences that must be satisfied (cleared). As such our ability to correctly value moral properties of human interactions is extremely ‘nearsighted’ and limited to the very obvious forms of harm and visible theft, but as we enter ethical, moral and political questions we cannot correctly sympathize and therefore test the rationality of incentives. For these reasons as well as others that I don’t think are necessary to go into, Praxeology is a pseudoscience. Economics and human cooperation are, as I have stated, an empirical endeavor. Our rational abilities are quite frail. It is only through instrumentation both logical and physical that we sense, perceive, and judge that which is beyond the very simple and pre-cognitive. This is not my final word on this matter, but it is my first draft, and while extensible it should be sufficient enough that we discard Praxeology and instead work upon articulating a theory of cooperation expressible as a formal logic of institutions. If we combine this effort with a theory of property that corresponds completely to the criminal, ethical, moral and political spectrum, then it is possible to render all possible disputes in and across all groups resolvable by means of the common law. And thereby eliminate demand for the state as a means of suppressing criminal, unethical and immoral transaction costs. What remains then, is merely the need for formal institutions that allow for the construction of commons while preventing the privatization of and socialization of losses onto those commons. Competition in the marketplace is virtuous, but competition in the production of commons produces transaction costs that always and everywhere create demand for the state. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

    COMMENTS Curt Doolittle That ought to keep a few smart guys busy for a while. lol

  • I Didn't Realize The Power of My Argument Against Libertarian Perception Of Reality

    [B]ut that’s the final nail in the coffin of praxeology. If we are morally blind (and science says that we are) for the reasons that I’ve stated (genetics, reproductive strategy, discounting of the dependence upon others for information and opinion, and higher intelligence discounting of transaction costs) then that which is possible to apprehend in the context of voluntary exchange, is open to, and the victim of, cognitive biases – just like all other judgements. As such, the logic of cooperation must forever be empirically and instrumentally derived as a theoretic construct, and can only be treated as theoretic construct, not an axiomatic one. (Given the strict difference between axiomatic-non-correspondent-with-reality and theoretic-correspondent-with-reality systems.) So I have finally put an end to the argument that ethics, and the logic of cooperation are axiomatic, and we can discard praxeology. Have to run now, but I’ll continue with this argument over the next month or two as I refine it further. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

    COMMENTS Eric Field and Douglas Darby like this. Roman Skaskiw This will be big.

  • I Didn’t Realize The Power of My Argument Against Libertarian Perception Of Reality

    [B]ut that’s the final nail in the coffin of praxeology. If we are morally blind (and science says that we are) for the reasons that I’ve stated (genetics, reproductive strategy, discounting of the dependence upon others for information and opinion, and higher intelligence discounting of transaction costs) then that which is possible to apprehend in the context of voluntary exchange, is open to, and the victim of, cognitive biases – just like all other judgements. As such, the logic of cooperation must forever be empirically and instrumentally derived as a theoretic construct, and can only be treated as theoretic construct, not an axiomatic one. (Given the strict difference between axiomatic-non-correspondent-with-reality and theoretic-correspondent-with-reality systems.) So I have finally put an end to the argument that ethics, and the logic of cooperation are axiomatic, and we can discard praxeology. Have to run now, but I’ll continue with this argument over the next month or two as I refine it further. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

    COMMENTS Eric Field and Douglas Darby like this. Roman Skaskiw This will be big.

  • I Didn't Realize The Power of My Argument Against Libertarian Perception Of Reality

    [B]ut that’s the final nail in the coffin of praxeology. If we are morally blind (and science says that we are) for the reasons that I’ve stated (genetics, reproductive strategy, discounting of the dependence upon others for information and opinion, and higher intelligence discounting of transaction costs) then that which is possible to apprehend in the context of voluntary exchange, is open to, and the victim of, cognitive biases – just like all other judgements. As such, the logic of cooperation must forever be empirically and instrumentally derived as a theoretic construct, and can only be treated as theoretic construct, not an axiomatic one. (Given the strict difference between axiomatic-non-correspondent-with-reality and theoretic-correspondent-with-reality systems.) So I have finally put an end to the argument that ethics, and the logic of cooperation are axiomatic, and we can discard praxeology. Have to run now, but I’ll continue with this argument over the next month or two as I refine it further. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

    COMMENTS Eric Field and Douglas Darby like this. Roman Skaskiw This will be big.

  • I Didn’t Realize The Power of My Argument Against Libertarian Perception Of Reality

    [B]ut that’s the final nail in the coffin of praxeology. If we are morally blind (and science says that we are) for the reasons that I’ve stated (genetics, reproductive strategy, discounting of the dependence upon others for information and opinion, and higher intelligence discounting of transaction costs) then that which is possible to apprehend in the context of voluntary exchange, is open to, and the victim of, cognitive biases – just like all other judgements. As such, the logic of cooperation must forever be empirically and instrumentally derived as a theoretic construct, and can only be treated as theoretic construct, not an axiomatic one. (Given the strict difference between axiomatic-non-correspondent-with-reality and theoretic-correspondent-with-reality systems.) So I have finally put an end to the argument that ethics, and the logic of cooperation are axiomatic, and we can discard praxeology. Have to run now, but I’ll continue with this argument over the next month or two as I refine it further. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

    COMMENTS Eric Field and Douglas Darby like this. Roman Skaskiw This will be big.

  • Q: "Curt, Why Do You Want To Undermine Praxeology"

    Q: “CURT, WHY DO YOU WANT TO UNDERMINE PRAXEOLOGY?” A: For a host of reasons. 1) Because praxeology, pseudoscience that it is, when we use it, harms the cause of liberty, by justifiably furthering the perception of libertarians as tinfoil-hat wearing social incompetents, engaged in justification, hero-worshipping and hermeneutic interpretation, in a secular version of theological analysis of scripture and the blind belief in prophets, differing only in use of platonic obscurantism rather than anthropomorphic supernatural language. (That’s a choice, and quotable paragraph.) 2) Because praxeology’s claims are patently false (which I’ve addressed elsewhere at length). Furthermore it is false to state that economics is an axiomatic rather than theoretic discipline, because demonstrably it has not been, and logically it cannot be. (Although I suppose I will have to continue to work to defeat ideological praxeology for the rest of my lifetime. ) 3) Because philosophy is indeed missing a solution to, and logic of, the problem of cooperation that we call ‘ethics’ and ‘politics’, that renders commensurable and intelligible the findings of the physical sciences, economic history, and narrative history. Without this uniform system of descriptive ethics it is not possible to rationally construct institutional solutions to the persistent problem of increasing levels of cooperation among peoples with disparate means and ends. 4) Because it is possible to restate libertarian, anarcho-capitalist arguments by Hoppe in ratio-scientific language such that libertarian arguments can be conducted by rational and empirical means as a viable alternative to public choice theory and social democracy. 5) Because I care about actually winning, and obtaining liberty for myself, my progeny, and my people, rather than just making myself feel morally justified as a purely spiritual and psychological form of self gratification. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

    COMMENTS Juan Fernando Carpio Tobar-Subia, Francesco Principi, Alejandro Veintimilla and 8 others like this. Curt Doolittle I’m trying to save the philosophy of liberty. That requires slaying the sacred cows of rationalism, praxeology and rothbardian ethics. I don’t see anyone else standing in line to further Hoppe’s work. (I am advancing Hoppe. Despite his reliance on Rationalism, Praxeology, Rothbardianism, and Argumentation. As Stephan Kinsella said, Hoppe pretty much got it right. The problem is converting hoppe’s correct solutions to liberty from pseudoscientific rationalism to ratio-scientific arguments, and restoring liberty to aristocracy where it came from – rather than its current, laughable, cosmopolitain, ghetto costume.) Ayelam Valentine Agaliba you are liable to upset many cultists. you will also need to address the truth as consensus nonsense Ayelam Valentine Agaliba danny on the CR page has written a pretty comprehensive rebuttal of argumentation ethics, if you ask him he might send a copy on his recent stuff Curt Doolittle Val, Thanks I just went through it. It’s OK. I don’t think it’s any better than Long’s or Murphy’s. And you know, I tend to rely on scientific arguments that are reducible to actions. In the case of argumentation, the available actions at any given point of interaction consist of: 0) violence/theft/destruction; 1) ignorance/avoidance/rejection/boycott; 2) deception/stalling/debate/enticement/verbal coercion; 3) unethical exchange, immoral exchange, and fully informed, warrantied, voluntary exchange. I can’t confirm that in any interaction, anyone attributes ownership of himself to another, only that each party attaches different costs of the different actions available as listed above. And that parties act according to to the costs. Unless one has an asymmetry of power, cooperation is less costly and more rewarding over the long term. So we choose it. As such most human political objectives seek to raise the cost of any action other than cooperation, such that only cooperation is cost effective. In my work I have tried to show that high trust societies raise all costs such that all choices other than fully informed and warrantied voluntary exchange are intolerable. And as far as I know that is all that we can say. What we can say about argumentation, is that if all costs other than voluntary exchange are higher than voluntary exchange, that for all intents and purposes, one treats the other as sovereign over himself and his property, because it is cost effective to do so. From that position it is possible to deduce all that hoppe has deduced. Although, from what I understand, (I am not certain) he justified his solutions with argumentation rather than deduced his solutions from argumentation. But that is second hand information and I don’t really know. Curt Peter Boettke Curt — praxeology is not unscientific, certain bad practitioners give it a bad name. So you don’t want to undermine the systematic study of purposive human action, you want to undermine bad practitioners of that science. Curt Doolittle @Peter Boettke. Bad practitioners Peter. But with a few qualifications. TINFOIL HATS I have one of the same basic objectives that your team at GMU does regarding the ‘brand name’ of liberty and libertarianism. Albeit I’m going about it under the assumption that public choice theory is inferior to private ownership of institutions (limited monarchy) and the civic society. So I am trying to restore legitimacy to libertarianism (Hoppe’s institutions) by restating it in ratio-scientific terms rather than as it stands in continental and cosmopolitan rationalism. My hope is to reform the private government arguments such that the pervasive ‘tinfoil hat’ arguments are not only abandoned, but easily defeated. SCIENCE? On the other hand, when you say ‘the study of purposeful human action” I think you mean the ratio-empirical study of human action which in turn can be reduced to a set of general purpose rules (theories) like any other discipline produces. But in the continental and cosmopolitan rationalist world of Rothbardians (and Hoppeians), economics is a purely deductive discipline and empirical economics (or any other empirical study) has no standing – in no small part because of the purported absence of constant relations. Now technically speaking, a science requires the use of the scientific method, and its theories produce predictable outcomes. A pseudoscience does not follow the scientific method yet claims it is a science. Furthermore, theoretical systems consist of statements that are bounded by correspondence with reality. Axiomatic systems are not. They are not bounded by reality. As such they are logics not sciences. We may use logics as instrumentation in science, but since logics are not bounded by reality they are not ‘scientific’ because they do not adhere to the scientific method whose purpose is to ensure that our statements are bounded by reality. BROADER ISSUE: ETHICAL REALISM My broader objectives is the restatement of what we call praxeology as a formal logic of cooperation, bounded by universal moral rules, which I see as a further extension of Ostom’s institutional work by combining it with Haidt’s research on morality. So my emphasis on ethics (particularly operational language, and constructivism) is toward this end. Thanks for the note. Always have been a fan. Curt. Alberto Dietz Hi, Curt: Is there any truly successful refutation of Hoppe? Curt Doolittle Alberto. Um.. I’m going to tease you and say that refuting Hoppe means that ‘Hoppe does not exist?’ One can criticize hoppe’s Argumentation ethic. One can criticize his rationalism, anti-empiricism and (quite differently from Boettke) his take on Praxeology. One can criticize his take on ethics. One can criticize his critique of public vs private government. One can criticize his solutions to the problem of formal institutions. I think the first two have been pretty successfully attacked (Long, Murphy and others). And I think the next three are pretty successfullly supported. I try to improve his ethics for very specific reasons (reducing demand for the state). But otherwise it’s pretty solid argument. I mean. I like to put a fork in rationalism wherever I can find it, but I still think Hoppe solved the problem of formal institutions (if not ethics and law).