—“It is worthy of notice that the sentence “I smell the scent of violets” has the same content as the sentence “It is true that I smell the scent of violets.” So it seems, then, that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth. “—(Frege?) I disagree. “I smell the scent of violets” has the same content as “I attest that I smell the scent of violets”or “I promise to you that I smell the scent of violets.” Whether it is true or not has nothing to do with your utterance. –“The snow is white, if and only if the snow is white”– The snow can’t ‘be’ anything. It cannot act, nor perceive the passage of time, which gives rise to the ability to determine changes in state. Instead the operationally correct statement is “I observe that the snow appears white in color. I promise that if you observe the snow, that you will also agree that it appears white in color. If both of us observe that it appears white in color, then we can agree that all observers of the snow will also observe that appears white in color.” [N]ow, this is extremely burdensome language. That’s why we don’t use it. But it is a mistake to take an aggregate “the snow is white in color” and attribute the same logical meaning to it as “I observe that the snow appears to be white in color, and I promise that if you observe the snow that you will also agree that it appears white in color.” All aggregates launder (lose) information. That’s the problem with aggregates. It’s not only a problem when we create a category, or when we add numbers together to create a sum, or call the square root of two a ‘number’ when it is a function, but it’s also a problem when we summarize informationally dense statements for the sake of brevity. Operational language is burdensome. But it prevents the evolution of what appear to be complex problems, from that which is merely a byproduct of aggregation (laundering). MORE ON PROMISES AND TRUTH –“Other philosophers believe it’s a mistake to say the researchers’ goal is to achieve truth. … When they aren’t overtly identifying truth with usefulness, the instrumentalists Peirce, James and Schlick take this anti-realist route, as does Kuhn. They would say atomic theory isn’t true or false but rather is useful for predicting outcomes of experiments and for explaining current data. Giere recommends saying science aims for the best available “representation”, in the same sense that maps are representations of the landscape. Maps aren’t true; rather, they fit to a better or worse degree. Similarly, scientific theories are designed to fit the world. Scientists should not aim to create true theories; they should aim to construct theories whose models are representations of the world.”– [T]his is a wordy paragraph that simply states that better theories correspond to and explain reality, than less good theories. But theories can never be identical to reality, since they are always representations (I would call them ‘aggregates that exclude information’). I can promise you that I followed the scientific method, and that my theory is internally consistent, externally correspondent and falsifiable (and perhaps a few other things). If you agree that my theory is useful, internally consistent, externally correspondent, and falsifiable, (and perhaps a few other things) then you can say that I spoke the truth. You may, for sake of manners and brevity say that the theory is then true. But that is merely an abbreviation for the fact that the theory is true, and useful. As far as I know this is the limit of our ability without entering the fantasy world of platonism.
Source: Original Site Post
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Immoral, Unethical, Irrational, Liberty Destroying Rothbardians.
[O]nce you realize that rothbardian libertarians are genetically biased to act immorally, and that Rothbardianism helps them justify their immorality, then you realize that they’re just as impossible to discourse with rationally as progressives. Both are morally blind to the majority of the moral spectrum. Conservatives see the entire moral spectrum. The problem is that they use allegorical language, so it’s very hard to get them to talk about this subject in rational, economic terms. It’s just not intuitive to them that their philosophy is simply one of hyper efficient economics – the most trustworthy society yet developed. And since they’re the most trustworthy, they’re the most economically productive. Meanwhile they’re losing the battle against deceitful left, and immoral libertarians. The only solution for libertarianism is to return its foundations to their original ethics of aristocracy and nobility, and as a consequence to the thought leadership of the conservatives.
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Immoral, Unethical, Irrational, Liberty Destroying Rothbardians.
[O]nce you realize that rothbardian libertarians are genetically biased to act immorally, and that Rothbardianism helps them justify their immorality, then you realize that they’re just as impossible to discourse with rationally as progressives. Both are morally blind to the majority of the moral spectrum. Conservatives see the entire moral spectrum. The problem is that they use allegorical language, so it’s very hard to get them to talk about this subject in rational, economic terms. It’s just not intuitive to them that their philosophy is simply one of hyper efficient economics – the most trustworthy society yet developed. And since they’re the most trustworthy, they’re the most economically productive. Meanwhile they’re losing the battle against deceitful left, and immoral libertarians. The only solution for libertarianism is to return its foundations to their original ethics of aristocracy and nobility, and as a consequence to the thought leadership of the conservatives.
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Trust Is The Most Scarce And Most Expensive Form Of Capital
Rothbardian Libertarianism is an attack on the high trust society. It an obscurant, rationally justified, excuse for advocating, low trust, parasitic ethics of the ghetto. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_capital
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Trust Is The Most Scarce And Most Expensive Form Of Capital
Rothbardian Libertarianism is an attack on the high trust society. It an obscurant, rationally justified, excuse for advocating, low trust, parasitic ethics of the ghetto. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_capital
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The Promise Of Honesty As Truth
(sketch) [I]s following the scientific method like honest testimony? An honest statement may be true or not. We may speak truthfully (honestly) but, we may still err. So is a scientist who does not follow the scientific method dishonest? I think so. He does not speak the truth. Because in science we have established the moral rule of the scientific method. Is a politician or public intellectual arguing for taxation with postmodern language dishonest? I don’t know. It depends upon whether we apply the scientific method as a criteria for honesty, and he avoids it. If so. Yes. We cannot ever know the truth, but one can speak ethically, which is the best that we have. Is a mathematician advocating a mathematical reality dishonest? I don’t know. It depends if we apply the scientific method as a criteria for honesty, and he avoids it. If so. Yes. But are each of these people’s statements false if they put forth their arguments dishonestly? Or is honesty in each discipline unrelated to truth and falsehood? Can I make dishonest but true statements? I think so. I certainly can make honest but false statements. Is there any relationship between testimony and truth? I don’t think so. But since we can never know the objective truth, we must abide by the best criteria at our disposal, yes? Isn’t that what ethics require of us? That is why we have established ethical norms. Because when it is impossible to know, following the norms means we are blameless if we err. But can I know if I speak the truth? Well, I’m kind of after the inverse concern. Popper is terribly concerned about error and overly optimistic claims. I’m terribly concerned about self deception, and the deception of others. If we can’t know the truth, then what constitutes moral speech? It is one thing to fall victim to bias, another to fall victim to error, another to avoid operational language in order to justify to one’s self or others that which one does not truly understand, and yet another to engage in obfuscation for the purpose of self, or other, deception. I think that if I, as a speaker, reduce my statements to operational language, and that I can construct any abstraction I refer to in operational language, that I can attest to the truth of my statements in the original sense of the term: honesty. Conversely if I cannot so so, then I cannot make that claim. I think that if I follow the rules of the scientific method that this is the same as speaking honestly with the promise of having followed that method. This is honesty. I am speaking the truth or am I speaking honestly? Because the original meaning of ‘truth’ is ‘speaking honestly’ about events. I think that if I follow rules of operations in the logics this is the same as speaking honestly and with the promise of not committing an error. Since the logics are imperfect, the rules are a contract for communication. If I follow those rules then I have acted honestly. I think that if I observe that the snow is white, that if I state to you that the snow is white, it is a promise to you that the snow is white. This is I think, a description of truth in ethics. I think all other versions of the word ‘truth’ are analogies to these statements.
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The Promise Of Honesty As Truth
(sketch) [I]s following the scientific method like honest testimony? An honest statement may be true or not. We may speak truthfully (honestly) but, we may still err. So is a scientist who does not follow the scientific method dishonest? I think so. He does not speak the truth. Because in science we have established the moral rule of the scientific method. Is a politician or public intellectual arguing for taxation with postmodern language dishonest? I don’t know. It depends upon whether we apply the scientific method as a criteria for honesty, and he avoids it. If so. Yes. We cannot ever know the truth, but one can speak ethically, which is the best that we have. Is a mathematician advocating a mathematical reality dishonest? I don’t know. It depends if we apply the scientific method as a criteria for honesty, and he avoids it. If so. Yes. But are each of these people’s statements false if they put forth their arguments dishonestly? Or is honesty in each discipline unrelated to truth and falsehood? Can I make dishonest but true statements? I think so. I certainly can make honest but false statements. Is there any relationship between testimony and truth? I don’t think so. But since we can never know the objective truth, we must abide by the best criteria at our disposal, yes? Isn’t that what ethics require of us? That is why we have established ethical norms. Because when it is impossible to know, following the norms means we are blameless if we err. But can I know if I speak the truth? Well, I’m kind of after the inverse concern. Popper is terribly concerned about error and overly optimistic claims. I’m terribly concerned about self deception, and the deception of others. If we can’t know the truth, then what constitutes moral speech? It is one thing to fall victim to bias, another to fall victim to error, another to avoid operational language in order to justify to one’s self or others that which one does not truly understand, and yet another to engage in obfuscation for the purpose of self, or other, deception. I think that if I, as a speaker, reduce my statements to operational language, and that I can construct any abstraction I refer to in operational language, that I can attest to the truth of my statements in the original sense of the term: honesty. Conversely if I cannot so so, then I cannot make that claim. I think that if I follow the rules of the scientific method that this is the same as speaking honestly with the promise of having followed that method. This is honesty. I am speaking the truth or am I speaking honestly? Because the original meaning of ‘truth’ is ‘speaking honestly’ about events. I think that if I follow rules of operations in the logics this is the same as speaking honestly and with the promise of not committing an error. Since the logics are imperfect, the rules are a contract for communication. If I follow those rules then I have acted honestly. I think that if I observe that the snow is white, that if I state to you that the snow is white, it is a promise to you that the snow is white. This is I think, a description of truth in ethics. I think all other versions of the word ‘truth’ are analogies to these statements.
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Worth Repeating: The Choice Of Nobility
WORTH REPEATING : THE CHOICE OF Nobility “Nobility is a choice we make, and a burden we carry, in exchange for the freedom to flourish to the best of our abilities. Yet we cannot ask those whose flourishing depends on collective efforts to adopt individual risk and reward.” Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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Worth Repeating: The Choice Of Nobility
WORTH REPEATING : THE CHOICE OF Nobility “Nobility is a choice we make, and a burden we carry, in exchange for the freedom to flourish to the best of our abilities. Yet we cannot ask those whose flourishing depends on collective efforts to adopt individual risk and reward.” Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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The Enlightenment Aristocracy Of Everybody Vs The Dark Enlightenment Aristocracy Of The Willing
(Edited and Reposted) [T]he intention of the anglo enlightenment was to create an aristocracy of everyone, by granting aristocratic property rights and obligations to everyone. The program succeeded as long as there were members of the non-aristocratic classes, that observed aristocratic traditions. But with first the introduction of the catholic non-aristocratic classes, and then women, and then eastern european jews, and now members of third world socialistic cultures, this model could not survive. It could not survive because meritocracy is not to the advantage of cultures that depend upon systemic free riding both within the family, and between the family and the state. [A]ristocratic Egalitarianism of the Dark Enlightenment returns to the intention of the enlightenment with one exception: I seek to limit aristocracy to those that desire it, will act to obtain it, and will act to defend it. There is no reason whatsoever that a society needs an homogenous set of rules, rights and obligations for all members. If certain people want to maintain their socialistic policies between themselves, and others to maintain their aristocratic policies between themselves, then this is adequate as long as neither group makes a claim on the property of the other, and obtains the property of the other only in voluntary exchange. Aristocracy is a high risk way of life, that rewards that high risk, or punishes it. Not all people and all peoples are capable of this way of life. Collective insurance and collective risk is more appropriate to their wants and abilities. It is immoral to ask them to embrace aristocratic life and aristocracy’s requirement for self-insurance. Likewise many of us desire liberty and meritocracy, and the status and wealth that comes from it, even if we must carry the risk of self-insurance against the vicissitudes of life. For ‘the best’ our competitive ability, our wits, our will, our strength, is our insurance against the vicissitudes of life. It is immoral to ask us to pay collective insurance and to limit ourselves to collective risk. [W]e are unequal. We must make use of unequal strategies if each of us is to flourish to the best of his abilities, in the meager time we have on this earth. [A]ristocracy is a choice we make, and a burden we carry, in exchange for the freedom to flourish to the best of our abilities. Yet we cannot ask those whose flourishing depends on collective efforts to adopt individual risk and reward. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine