Source: Original Site Post

  • Operationalism Is A Test of Truth Telling (Honesty), Not The Truth Of A Theory

    (possibly the latter bit is profound) [F]rom my notes…. –“An operational definition is produced by defining a process of operationalization and recording the results of operating that process; in order to define a variable, term, or object in terms of a set of tests needed to determine its existence, duration, and quantity or quality. Operational definitions define changes in state as those operations necessary to change state; define unobservable entities concretely in terms of the physical and mental operations used to measure them; and ensures that the definition of each observable and unobservable entity has been uniquely identified with the instrumentation used to define it. Just as the operational naming of numbers via positional numbering gives a unique name to every number, this process of operationalization gives a unique name to an extant entity consisting of the definition for that step, rather than consisting of an analogy that approximates it in some form or other. Operationalism is a process of granting unique names.”– This ensures that we are discussing names of extant entities rather than allegories, functions, experiences, or imaginary projections. Operationalism is not a truth test, it is a test of truth telling.

  • Operations: A General Rule Of Ethics in Politics

    [O]perationalism asks us to demonstrate that we are conducting observations of extant entities not projecting imagination and subjectivity. As a general rule: *** We shall define all phenomenon which we choose to observe, in terms of the sequence of physical operations (actions) used, the instruments used, and the measurements taken with those instruments (whether cardinal or ordinal), rather than either the use of analogies of any form, interpretations of those observations, or subjective experiences of those observations, so that we guarantee to any audience that all entities that we refer to exist, and that no information is added to the observation but that which can be observed when reproduced by the repetition of those actions, instruments and measurements by others.***

  • Operations: A General Rule Of Ethics in Politics

    [O]perationalism asks us to demonstrate that we are conducting observations of extant entities not projecting imagination and subjectivity. As a general rule: *** We shall define all phenomenon which we choose to observe, in terms of the sequence of physical operations (actions) used, the instruments used, and the measurements taken with those instruments (whether cardinal or ordinal), rather than either the use of analogies of any form, interpretations of those observations, or subjective experiences of those observations, so that we guarantee to any audience that all entities that we refer to exist, and that no information is added to the observation but that which can be observed when reproduced by the repetition of those actions, instruments and measurements by others.***

  • Does Our Economy All Come Down To Truth Telling?

    The Militia Creates Truth Telling? The epistemological constraint of warriors? Empirical Science (aristotelianism) has evolved into a universal language. The voluntary organization of production under property and rule of law have evolved into a universal language. Scientific research and production take place within a society. The society vastly impacts the quality of that research and production. The people conducting research carry with them the assumptions of their societies. Some societies excel at conducting scientific research. Some societies are all but incapable of conducting scientific research. Some societies excel at instituting property rights and rule of law. Some societies are all but incapable of instituting property rights and rule of law. Some societies excel at constructing trust Some societies are all but incapable of constructing trust. Some societies excel at institutionalizing telling the truth. Some societies are all but incapable of institutionalizing telling the truth. What makes a society tell the truth, construct trust, institute property rights, and conduct scientific research? Telling the truth. Why tell the truth? For voluntary warriors it’s a matter of life and death. If nearly every man is a warrior, and only warriors possess wealth, and for warriors truth is a matter of life and death. From that position came the west’s rise. —Small numbers + technology + truth + contract—

  • Does Our Economy All Come Down To Truth Telling?

    The Militia Creates Truth Telling? The epistemological constraint of warriors? Empirical Science (aristotelianism) has evolved into a universal language. The voluntary organization of production under property and rule of law have evolved into a universal language. Scientific research and production take place within a society. The society vastly impacts the quality of that research and production. The people conducting research carry with them the assumptions of their societies. Some societies excel at conducting scientific research. Some societies are all but incapable of conducting scientific research. Some societies excel at instituting property rights and rule of law. Some societies are all but incapable of instituting property rights and rule of law. Some societies excel at constructing trust Some societies are all but incapable of constructing trust. Some societies excel at institutionalizing telling the truth. Some societies are all but incapable of institutionalizing telling the truth. What makes a society tell the truth, construct trust, institute property rights, and conduct scientific research? Telling the truth. Why tell the truth? For voluntary warriors it’s a matter of life and death. If nearly every man is a warrior, and only warriors possess wealth, and for warriors truth is a matter of life and death. From that position came the west’s rise. —Small numbers + technology + truth + contract—

  • The Copenhagen Interpretation as an Example of the Problem of Epistemology at Scale

    [A] profoundly good example of the problem philosophers face in reducing that which we cannot sense and perceive without instruments to analogies to experience which we can. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-copenhagen/ As I struggle with the cultural conflation of truth with strategic good, assumed as metaphysical property of reality, and reconciling this with the requirement for ethical testimony, which can only be claimed by observation and measurement, I realize the problems facing those in quantum mechanics and those of ethics and politics of heterogeneous polities, are both products of vast increases in scale and complexity that our minds neither evolved for, nor have our language and epistemological traditions evolved to accommodate. We are still mystics at describing reality at scale, not because we are conservative or unwilling, as we were with religion in reaction to science, but because despite our willingness we do not yet know how. There are two solutions to this problem: to state scale concepts in perceivable terms as best we can, or to restate all concepts in new terms. Under both models language will eventually evolve, and with it the populace. I suppose the former is more pragmatic but less truthful, and the latter more truthful but less likely to succeed. In ethics I face this same problem. And its painful.we must use extant language despite that it is wrong, clarify its meaning by cleansing it of error, and restate relations formed in homogenous polities with the properties of heterogeneous polities. Universalism is an error in scale, measurement, and logic. Its yeoman’s labor.

  • The Copenhagen Interpretation as an Example of the Problem of Epistemology at Scale

    [A] profoundly good example of the problem philosophers face in reducing that which we cannot sense and perceive without instruments to analogies to experience which we can. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-copenhagen/ As I struggle with the cultural conflation of truth with strategic good, assumed as metaphysical property of reality, and reconciling this with the requirement for ethical testimony, which can only be claimed by observation and measurement, I realize the problems facing those in quantum mechanics and those of ethics and politics of heterogeneous polities, are both products of vast increases in scale and complexity that our minds neither evolved for, nor have our language and epistemological traditions evolved to accommodate. We are still mystics at describing reality at scale, not because we are conservative or unwilling, as we were with religion in reaction to science, but because despite our willingness we do not yet know how. There are two solutions to this problem: to state scale concepts in perceivable terms as best we can, or to restate all concepts in new terms. Under both models language will eventually evolve, and with it the populace. I suppose the former is more pragmatic but less truthful, and the latter more truthful but less likely to succeed. In ethics I face this same problem. And its painful.we must use extant language despite that it is wrong, clarify its meaning by cleansing it of error, and restate relations formed in homogenous polities with the properties of heterogeneous polities. Universalism is an error in scale, measurement, and logic. Its yeoman’s labor.

  • The Propertarian Criticism Of Platonic Truth

    (important piece)

    –“We can speak about truth even without a warranty, and we don’t mean truthlike or agreed to be true, just plain true.”—Bruce

    [Y]es, but how do we know you are speaking truthfully? How do we prevent pseudoscience? Or are you, like free speech advocates, saying that the damage that is done by error is less than the good that is achieved by tolerating it? Which is terribly pragmatic. It’s also demonstrably false. Propagating false arguments turns out to be much more effective than true ones. Or do you claim that scientists should be able to engage in untruthful speech? Or are you saying that because truth is unknown and never knowable, that I can never speak the truth? ***What is the material difference between a theory stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent), and a theory not stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent) yet excused as not being possible to be true, and therefore not subject to requirement that it is spoken truthfully?*** This isn’t an immaterial question. It is perhaps THE ethical question facing scientific investigation in ANY field. Evidence is that in hard science this rule is respected. Evidence is that outside of hard science it is not. Then difference is that hard science is a luxury good without opportunity cost, and everything else is — particularly politics and law, where laws do not perish like falsified theories. The communist manifesto, the labor theory of value, the possibility of a universally DESIRABLE moral code vs a universally moral set of laws. These are all false statements, because they are false in construction, not in prediction. You see, science is pretty much ‘irrelevant’ because it is a luxury good, but truth must apply universally no? or it is not truthful definition of truth? ***While it may be true that the ultimate truth (the most parsimonious statement possible) is the optimum definition of true, does that obviate us from pursuing it with truthful statements? Furthermore why not simply state the truth: that all truthfully constructed arguments and theories are true but incomplete, and constantly open to revision, rather than no theories are true except the one most parsimonious statement that we can never make?*** You see, you might think it’s clear and simple – but it’s not. It’s just experience that has convinced you so. You see, popper’s warning is merely moral, not necessary. And I submit, like the ethics of the ghetto peoples whose verbal methodology, and whose ritualistic literature, was purely pragmatic, that there are vast consequences to platonic truth just as there are vast consequences to platonic (false) anything. As far as I know I am correct. I cant get away from it. because we are currently the victims of a century and a half of pseudoscience the immorality of which has not been achieved since the forcible conversion to christianity or the muslim conversion to scriptural perfection. If we look at just the one’s that I see as catastrophic; kant, freud, marx, cantor, russell/frege, keynes, mises, rothbard, then all of these fallacies were preventable by a requirement for operational definitions – proof of internal consistency: proof of existence. Analogy and meaning are properties of myths. Action and measurement are properties of reality. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • The Propertarian Criticism Of Platonic Truth

    (important piece)

    –“We can speak about truth even without a warranty, and we don’t mean truthlike or agreed to be true, just plain true.”—Bruce

    [Y]es, but how do we know you are speaking truthfully? How do we prevent pseudoscience? Or are you, like free speech advocates, saying that the damage that is done by error is less than the good that is achieved by tolerating it? Which is terribly pragmatic. It’s also demonstrably false. Propagating false arguments turns out to be much more effective than true ones. Or do you claim that scientists should be able to engage in untruthful speech? Or are you saying that because truth is unknown and never knowable, that I can never speak the truth? ***What is the material difference between a theory stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent), and a theory not stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent) yet excused as not being possible to be true, and therefore not subject to requirement that it is spoken truthfully?*** This isn’t an immaterial question. It is perhaps THE ethical question facing scientific investigation in ANY field. Evidence is that in hard science this rule is respected. Evidence is that outside of hard science it is not. Then difference is that hard science is a luxury good without opportunity cost, and everything else is — particularly politics and law, where laws do not perish like falsified theories. The communist manifesto, the labor theory of value, the possibility of a universally DESIRABLE moral code vs a universally moral set of laws. These are all false statements, because they are false in construction, not in prediction. You see, science is pretty much ‘irrelevant’ because it is a luxury good, but truth must apply universally no? or it is not truthful definition of truth? ***While it may be true that the ultimate truth (the most parsimonious statement possible) is the optimum definition of true, does that obviate us from pursuing it with truthful statements? Furthermore why not simply state the truth: that all truthfully constructed arguments and theories are true but incomplete, and constantly open to revision, rather than no theories are true except the one most parsimonious statement that we can never make?*** You see, you might think it’s clear and simple – but it’s not. It’s just experience that has convinced you so. You see, popper’s warning is merely moral, not necessary. And I submit, like the ethics of the ghetto peoples whose verbal methodology, and whose ritualistic literature, was purely pragmatic, that there are vast consequences to platonic truth just as there are vast consequences to platonic (false) anything. As far as I know I am correct. I cant get away from it. because we are currently the victims of a century and a half of pseudoscience the immorality of which has not been achieved since the forcible conversion to christianity or the muslim conversion to scriptural perfection. If we look at just the one’s that I see as catastrophic; kant, freud, marx, cantor, russell/frege, keynes, mises, rothbard, then all of these fallacies were preventable by a requirement for operational definitions – proof of internal consistency: proof of existence. Analogy and meaning are properties of myths. Action and measurement are properties of reality. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • Under Propertarianism, Operationalism Prevents Exporting "Harm" (Costs)

    —“[A]ll arguments put into the marketplace of ideas function as conceptual goods – products for our use. Now since we are producing goods we do have the ability if not the necessity to provide consumer protection. This is all that operationalism does for us. It doesnt say you’re doing good (telling the truth) it tests whether or not you are doing HARM. It makes sure that you’re not using verbalisms. Under Propertarianism we require you warranty your goods and services. And those warranties are subject to legal enforcement by universal standing where the loser pays.”—-