Source: Original Site Post

  • The Spectrum of Terms for Impulsivity

    [P]reference is a choice. Demonstrated time preference (useful for the economic concept of interest but not scientific in that it’s causally descriptive) appears to be largely genetic, and is determined by what we consider the ‘frustration budget’:our ability to suppress the urge for gratification.

    So the terms, Impulsivity, frustration budget (tolerance), and time preference represent three portions of the impulsivity spectrum. Where the lower our impulsivity, the higher our tolerance for frustration, and the greater our willingness to persist a desire for a long term goal, each represent our social classes.

    As such to discuss time preference outside of the impulsively scale is to attribute to choice that which is no more available to choice than rational thought is to the solipsist, empathy is to the autistic, or operational calculation using abstract rules of deduction is to the imbecile.

    The language of libertinism is rife with upper middle class economic loading and framing: attributing to choice that which is not, in order to perpetuate the fallacy that liberty is a rational preference and choice, rather than the reproductive strategy of an elite minority and the social outcasts that follow them in hopes of status seeking. Instead, science: empiricism, instrumentalism, operationalism and performative truth attempts to explain all phenomenon in least loaded and framed (if not least obscurant) terms.

    It is for this reason that the language of science is the language of the spoken and written truth, and rationalism must always be suspect, because the majority of outright lies, pseudo-rationalism and pseudoscience have been told in rational language.

    So while rationalists say that something is possible or may be possible, science merely demonstrates that rationalism is de facto the optimum means of lying invented by man.

    And the 20th century as Hayek proposed, was merely the high point of cosmopolitan pseudoscience, precisely because those with lesser abilities relied upon rationalism rather than science. And they did so because it was profitable to lie: see various quotes by and about Marx and Keynes.

    Praxeology can be repaired: by restating it as operationalism and testimonial truth. Mises merely failed in his attempt. Because he relied upon rationalism rather than science. And very likely, as did popper, and the rest of the cosmopolitans, because it allowed him to justify preconceptions rather than to discover uncomfortable truths: that the cosmopolitan way of life was systemically immoral, and that western universalism cannot be use as an attempt to preserve separatism.

  • Usufructs Under Propertarianism

    QUESTION: Curt Doolittle, how do you reconcile usufructs with Propertarianism?

    ANSWER:  Just for everyone’s benefit, lets understand what these things mean:

    DEFINITIONS 

    Commons (common ownership) – where the three rights of ownership are held by more than one individual: 

    1 – Usus (use) The right to use or enjoy a commons, directly and without altering it. (Walking in a Park)

    2 – Fructus (the fruits of) is the right to derive profit from a commons. (Selling the blueberries you have grown in the park).

    3 – Abusus (abuse), the right to transfer, consume, or destroy. (Selling off a piece of the park, or building a home on it. So Abusus consists of two categories of rights
    ……(a) Right of transfer. (Emancipation) or ‘Mancipio’,
    ……(b) Right to consume or destroy, or ‘Abusus’.

    – Ownership: (monopoly) Possession of all three rights determines ownership.

    USUFRUCTUS
    The right to use and bear the fruits of some asset without the right to transfer, consume, or destroy it. 

    Usufruct is technically how land is treated in almost all civilizations: land is a commons distributed via some set of property rights or other (including none), and some set of limited ownership rights are transferred to individuals. 

    Under anglo saxon and current property rights I have the right also to transfer, even if I do not possess the right to destroy or consume. (ie: pollute). 

    So while Abusus means an abuse of the commons (Privatization), in the west the right of transfer is separate from the right of privatization, for example just as bitcoin is a fractional asset (divisible), in our western civilization, land is also a allocated as a fractional (divisible) asset. (A fairly uncommon thing as it turns out). 

    So in the west we would separate the following rights in any commons.
    1) Usus, 2) Fructus, 3) ‘Mancipo’, 4) Abusus

    HOW DO I RECONCILE USUFRUCTUS
    These are all just properties of contract. Propertarianism does not allow for incalculable statements of any kind since it is non-operational, undecideable, and therefore this allows for involuntary transfer – and therefore any contractual commons must possess an enumerated set of shareholders, with specifically articulated rights. 

    I can conceive no conditions under which Abusus – destruction of land (pollution) – can exist as a declared right by any shareholders.

    Basic argument is this: those who defend the land own the land, and allocate Usus, Fructus, and Mancipio to fellow shareholders, but never Abusus.

    Now I am pretty sure I know all the directions anyone could run with this but I am confident I can cover all objections.

    Curt Doolittle 
    The Propertarian Institute 
    Kiev

  • Usufructs Under Propertarianism

    QUESTION: Curt Doolittle, how do you reconcile usufructs with Propertarianism?

    ANSWER:  Just for everyone’s benefit, lets understand what these things mean:

    DEFINITIONS 

    Commons (common ownership) – where the three rights of ownership are held by more than one individual: 

    1 – Usus (use) The right to use or enjoy a commons, directly and without altering it. (Walking in a Park)

    2 – Fructus (the fruits of) is the right to derive profit from a commons. (Selling the blueberries you have grown in the park).

    3 – Abusus (abuse), the right to transfer, consume, or destroy. (Selling off a piece of the park, or building a home on it. So Abusus consists of two categories of rights
    ……(a) Right of transfer. (Emancipation) or ‘Mancipio’,
    ……(b) Right to consume or destroy, or ‘Abusus’.

    – Ownership: (monopoly) Possession of all three rights determines ownership.

    USUFRUCTUS
    The right to use and bear the fruits of some asset without the right to transfer, consume, or destroy it. 

    Usufruct is technically how land is treated in almost all civilizations: land is a commons distributed via some set of property rights or other (including none), and some set of limited ownership rights are transferred to individuals. 

    Under anglo saxon and current property rights I have the right also to transfer, even if I do not possess the right to destroy or consume. (ie: pollute). 

    So while Abusus means an abuse of the commons (Privatization), in the west the right of transfer is separate from the right of privatization, for example just as bitcoin is a fractional asset (divisible), in our western civilization, land is also a allocated as a fractional (divisible) asset. (A fairly uncommon thing as it turns out). 

    So in the west we would separate the following rights in any commons.
    1) Usus, 2) Fructus, 3) ‘Mancipo’, 4) Abusus

    HOW DO I RECONCILE USUFRUCTUS
    These are all just properties of contract. Propertarianism does not allow for incalculable statements of any kind since it is non-operational, undecideable, and therefore this allows for involuntary transfer – and therefore any contractual commons must possess an enumerated set of shareholders, with specifically articulated rights. 

    I can conceive no conditions under which Abusus – destruction of land (pollution) – can exist as a declared right by any shareholders.

    Basic argument is this: those who defend the land own the land, and allocate Usus, Fructus, and Mancipio to fellow shareholders, but never Abusus.

    Now I am pretty sure I know all the directions anyone could run with this but I am confident I can cover all objections.

    Curt Doolittle 
    The Propertarian Institute 
    Kiev

  • Does Walter Block Represent The Mindset Of Most Libertarians?

    In the sense that Walter Block advocates the Non Aggression Principle (the “NAP”), as did Murray Rothbard; and in the sense that most self identified libertarians have also adopted the NAP – then, yes, he reflects a common libertine-libertarian rational justification of the common libertine-libertarian moral sentiment.

    However, the liberal libertarians (the classical liberals) – meaning the non-libertine libertarians, do not accept that the NAP is a sufficient moral or legal principle for the formation of a stateless polity with a minimum government. Or even that if it was sufficient that such criteria would be classifiable or interpreted as moral by anyone outside of the libertine-libertarian minority.

    Identifying as a Cosmopolitan Rothbardian libertine-libertarian, rather than an Anglo-Empirical classical-liberal libertarian, is a matter of justifying your emotional intuitions. Which is why most libertine libertarians demonstrate anti-social behaviors, such as justifying blackmail, and justifying externalities caused by deception, and externalities caused by hedonistic behavior; while most classical liberal libertarians demonstrate positive social behaviors such as commons-building, norms as a corporeal asset,  and reputation as a property right.
     
    We, all of us, (me included), work to justify our moral intuitions, because our moral intuitions reflect our reproductive strategy.   And so why has Rothbardianism failed as an American political movement: because very few people can morally tolerate the rothbardian levels of unethical and immoral behavior unless they  also possess anti-social personalities.
     
    Rothbrdian libertinism has its origin in the urban ghettos, and as such it discounts externalities, physical commons, and normative commons and instead adopts the socio-pathological justification that we should not pay for commons whether physical or normative, and that we are not responsible for the externalities caused by our behavior.  In other words, rothbardian libertarianism is unethical and immoral – factually, independent of anyone’s opinion.

    Just to clarify that this dispute between Libertine-liberarians, and Moral-Libertarians is more than a problem of psychologism – and that it has taken great effort for libertines to construct an intricate pseudo-sceientific and pseudo-rational ideology – lets look at the counter-factual but complex arguments that the libertine-libertarians rely upon.

    (a) In all but the most rare exceptions, self-identified libertarians do not understand the relationship between Intersubjectively Verifiable Property (IVP) and the NAP’s dependence upon IVP, or that such a relationship is a necessary property of the NAP, and without some definition of property such as IVP, the NAP is meaningless;

    (b) Nor that the reason self-identified libertarians cannot come to consensus is not the nap, but the sufficiency of IVP for the decidability of moral propositions, or as the basis for law sufficient for the formation of a voluntary polity;

    (c) in addition,  research suggests that self-identified libertarians appear to be searching for confirmation of their moral intuitions (see Haidt), and that libertarianism is a narrow moral specialization (Haidt); and that just as progressives are severely morally blind, libertarians are merely less morally blind (Haidt) and therefore underestimate the importance of norms nearly as much as progressives underestimate the importance of both norms and economic incentives;

    (d) combined with the difference between the use of NAP as a moral principle, versus the NAP under IVP as a legal basis for polycentric organically evolutionary common law,  combined with whether the NAP under IVP the basis for a common law is sufficient for a voluntary polity to form and persist, because such a body of law suppresses transaction costs sufficiently for people to rationally choose an anarchic over a statist polity;

    (e) combined with the low trust, and therefore low velocity of production and trade that can occur within a voluntary polity under the NAP/ISV as the basis of common law, providing negative economic incentives;

    (f) combined with the historical record’s demonstration that all low trust polities are subject to ostracization, tariffs, persecution, punishment, war and extermination by higher trust polities – in all circumstances;

     – all of which lead us to the conclusion that Rothbardian libertine-libertarianism is an unscientific, non-rational, impossible, complex verbalism, that confirms the moral intuitions of a small group of moral specialists; and an constitutes not a rational philosophy, but merely a body of arguments are sufficient for use as an ideology that assists in the formation of a cult-of-resistance against the state.

    But this ideology is not sufficiently rational or scientific for use as a moral and religious, or secular-legal, institutional means upon which to base a voluntarily organized society, that makes use of the voluntary organization of production (capitalism),  in the absence of an authority (the state); in which the authority imposes rules of conduct, and/or, prevents retaliation for unethical and immoral actions that are not resolvable in a court of such laws.

    CONTEXT OF THE LIBERTINE VS LIBERTARIAN MOVEMENTS
    The Moral-Anglo-Libertarian movement, and the Libertine-Austrian-libertarian movement, are divided by the backgrounds of primary authors, into the Christian Enlightenment ethical system (classical liberal and Hayekian and Hosperian Libertarian), and the Jewish Cosmopolitan ethic (Misesian Cosmopolitan, and Rothbardian libertinism).  IN addition, as a mini-reformation,  Hoppe attempts to transform the Jewish Cosmopolitan ethic and system of thought, into the german rationalist ethic and system of thought. Both the jewish cosmopolitan and german rational systems of though, were proposed as alternatives to the anglo-empirical system of thought.  The long-standing reason for this opposition between anglo, german and jewish, is couched as the difference between empirically dominated thought and rationally dominated thought (a technical argument in philosophy between empiricism and rationalism).  However this is an artificial distinction. The reason Germans and Jews prefer rationalism is that the philosophy of German civilization and Jewish civilizations are hierarchical in the case of german, and authoritarian in the case of the jews. 

    At present, only Walter Block and Lou Rockwell advocate the Rothbardian libertine position in full. Others emphasize largely the economic aspects of libertine-libertarianism, not the moral.  Walter Block advocates what he argues as the morality of traditionally immoral topics.  The presumption of his ethical position is that individuals are not responsible for externalities (the opposite of the christian position) and that norms in any polity are not constructed as, produced as, maintained as, and used as, an institutional commons. 

    Hoppe by contrast argues in favor of a contractually explicit commons, not that the NAP is morally sufficient, or legally sufficient (as I understand him) for the formation of a voluntary polity.  Hoppe merely assumes that desirable human behavior will evolve if given the opportunity – not that property was forced upon people, outbreeding was forced upon them,  delayed marriage was forced up on them,  rule of law was forced upon them, and the competitive market was forced upon them – by aristocracy.

    BLOCK AS SPECIALIST IN IMMORALITY

    Block has written a number of books now that advocate unethical and immoral activity as individually beneficial – without acknowledging that all criminal, unethical, immoral, conspiratorial, parasitic behavior is beneficial to individuals or small groups.  That does not answer the question of why moral groups should cooperate with immoral groups, or should not conquer, enslave, or kill immoral groups, since cooperate is irrational if all it means is another group can engage in parasitism against your group.  

    So in this sense, Block represents the position of anti-social libertines in the libertine-libertarian movement who hold to the immoral and unethical the body of thought, that originated in the application of ghetto ethics to german continental moral philosophy, as a reaction against the anglo-enlightenment-libertarianism’s universalism. 

    SUMMARY
    So while most libertine-libertarians, and many moral-libertarians, refer in some way or another to the NAP, in all cases the cross-cultural consensus is meaningless as other than a simple signal of group membership – like a secret handshake, or mason’s ring, or religious jewelry or clothing – because the NAP is merely a recognition of the fact that libertarians dislike state aggression against them, not because the NAP is a sufficient rule for any political, moral, or legal purpose.

    So while Walter is the leading figure in libertinism, that is largely because libertines are justifying empathic, non-rational, sentimental approval of arguments that they clearly do not understand, and whose value to them, is that the are sufficiently complex to mirror the reflects of religious texts: that they are extremely difficult to refute, and they justify the speaker’s moral sentiments. Not because they are rationally complete, scientifically demonstrable or demonstrated, or sufficient for legally basis or morally foundation.

    That’s enough for now.  Although I should probably continue.
    Curt Doolittle
    The Philosophy of Aristocracy
    The Propertarian Institute
    Kiev, Ukraine.

    https://www.quora.com/Does-Walter-Block-represent-the-mindset-of-most-libertarians

  • Does Walter Block Represent The Mindset Of Most Libertarians?

    In the sense that Walter Block advocates the Non Aggression Principle (the “NAP”), as did Murray Rothbard; and in the sense that most self identified libertarians have also adopted the NAP – then, yes, he reflects a common libertine-libertarian rational justification of the common libertine-libertarian moral sentiment.

    However, the liberal libertarians (the classical liberals) – meaning the non-libertine libertarians, do not accept that the NAP is a sufficient moral or legal principle for the formation of a stateless polity with a minimum government. Or even that if it was sufficient that such criteria would be classifiable or interpreted as moral by anyone outside of the libertine-libertarian minority.

    Identifying as a Cosmopolitan Rothbardian libertine-libertarian, rather than an Anglo-Empirical classical-liberal libertarian, is a matter of justifying your emotional intuitions. Which is why most libertine libertarians demonstrate anti-social behaviors, such as justifying blackmail, and justifying externalities caused by deception, and externalities caused by hedonistic behavior; while most classical liberal libertarians demonstrate positive social behaviors such as commons-building, norms as a corporeal asset,  and reputation as a property right.
     
    We, all of us, (me included), work to justify our moral intuitions, because our moral intuitions reflect our reproductive strategy.   And so why has Rothbardianism failed as an American political movement: because very few people can morally tolerate the rothbardian levels of unethical and immoral behavior unless they  also possess anti-social personalities.
     
    Rothbrdian libertinism has its origin in the urban ghettos, and as such it discounts externalities, physical commons, and normative commons and instead adopts the socio-pathological justification that we should not pay for commons whether physical or normative, and that we are not responsible for the externalities caused by our behavior.  In other words, rothbardian libertarianism is unethical and immoral – factually, independent of anyone’s opinion.

    Just to clarify that this dispute between Libertine-liberarians, and Moral-Libertarians is more than a problem of psychologism – and that it has taken great effort for libertines to construct an intricate pseudo-sceientific and pseudo-rational ideology – lets look at the counter-factual but complex arguments that the libertine-libertarians rely upon.

    (a) In all but the most rare exceptions, self-identified libertarians do not understand the relationship between Intersubjectively Verifiable Property (IVP) and the NAP’s dependence upon IVP, or that such a relationship is a necessary property of the NAP, and without some definition of property such as IVP, the NAP is meaningless;

    (b) Nor that the reason self-identified libertarians cannot come to consensus is not the nap, but the sufficiency of IVP for the decidability of moral propositions, or as the basis for law sufficient for the formation of a voluntary polity;

    (c) in addition,  research suggests that self-identified libertarians appear to be searching for confirmation of their moral intuitions (see Haidt), and that libertarianism is a narrow moral specialization (Haidt); and that just as progressives are severely morally blind, libertarians are merely less morally blind (Haidt) and therefore underestimate the importance of norms nearly as much as progressives underestimate the importance of both norms and economic incentives;

    (d) combined with the difference between the use of NAP as a moral principle, versus the NAP under IVP as a legal basis for polycentric organically evolutionary common law,  combined with whether the NAP under IVP the basis for a common law is sufficient for a voluntary polity to form and persist, because such a body of law suppresses transaction costs sufficiently for people to rationally choose an anarchic over a statist polity;

    (e) combined with the low trust, and therefore low velocity of production and trade that can occur within a voluntary polity under the NAP/ISV as the basis of common law, providing negative economic incentives;

    (f) combined with the historical record’s demonstration that all low trust polities are subject to ostracization, tariffs, persecution, punishment, war and extermination by higher trust polities – in all circumstances;

     – all of which lead us to the conclusion that Rothbardian libertine-libertarianism is an unscientific, non-rational, impossible, complex verbalism, that confirms the moral intuitions of a small group of moral specialists; and an constitutes not a rational philosophy, but merely a body of arguments are sufficient for use as an ideology that assists in the formation of a cult-of-resistance against the state.

    But this ideology is not sufficiently rational or scientific for use as a moral and religious, or secular-legal, institutional means upon which to base a voluntarily organized society, that makes use of the voluntary organization of production (capitalism),  in the absence of an authority (the state); in which the authority imposes rules of conduct, and/or, prevents retaliation for unethical and immoral actions that are not resolvable in a court of such laws.

    CONTEXT OF THE LIBERTINE VS LIBERTARIAN MOVEMENTS
    The Moral-Anglo-Libertarian movement, and the Libertine-Austrian-libertarian movement, are divided by the backgrounds of primary authors, into the Christian Enlightenment ethical system (classical liberal and Hayekian and Hosperian Libertarian), and the Jewish Cosmopolitan ethic (Misesian Cosmopolitan, and Rothbardian libertinism).  IN addition, as a mini-reformation,  Hoppe attempts to transform the Jewish Cosmopolitan ethic and system of thought, into the german rationalist ethic and system of thought. Both the jewish cosmopolitan and german rational systems of though, were proposed as alternatives to the anglo-empirical system of thought.  The long-standing reason for this opposition between anglo, german and jewish, is couched as the difference between empirically dominated thought and rationally dominated thought (a technical argument in philosophy between empiricism and rationalism).  However this is an artificial distinction. The reason Germans and Jews prefer rationalism is that the philosophy of German civilization and Jewish civilizations are hierarchical in the case of german, and authoritarian in the case of the jews. 

    At present, only Walter Block and Lou Rockwell advocate the Rothbardian libertine position in full. Others emphasize largely the economic aspects of libertine-libertarianism, not the moral.  Walter Block advocates what he argues as the morality of traditionally immoral topics.  The presumption of his ethical position is that individuals are not responsible for externalities (the opposite of the christian position) and that norms in any polity are not constructed as, produced as, maintained as, and used as, an institutional commons. 

    Hoppe by contrast argues in favor of a contractually explicit commons, not that the NAP is morally sufficient, or legally sufficient (as I understand him) for the formation of a voluntary polity.  Hoppe merely assumes that desirable human behavior will evolve if given the opportunity – not that property was forced upon people, outbreeding was forced upon them,  delayed marriage was forced up on them,  rule of law was forced upon them, and the competitive market was forced upon them – by aristocracy.

    BLOCK AS SPECIALIST IN IMMORALITY

    Block has written a number of books now that advocate unethical and immoral activity as individually beneficial – without acknowledging that all criminal, unethical, immoral, conspiratorial, parasitic behavior is beneficial to individuals or small groups.  That does not answer the question of why moral groups should cooperate with immoral groups, or should not conquer, enslave, or kill immoral groups, since cooperate is irrational if all it means is another group can engage in parasitism against your group.  

    So in this sense, Block represents the position of anti-social libertines in the libertine-libertarian movement who hold to the immoral and unethical the body of thought, that originated in the application of ghetto ethics to german continental moral philosophy, as a reaction against the anglo-enlightenment-libertarianism’s universalism. 

    SUMMARY
    So while most libertine-libertarians, and many moral-libertarians, refer in some way or another to the NAP, in all cases the cross-cultural consensus is meaningless as other than a simple signal of group membership – like a secret handshake, or mason’s ring, or religious jewelry or clothing – because the NAP is merely a recognition of the fact that libertarians dislike state aggression against them, not because the NAP is a sufficient rule for any political, moral, or legal purpose.

    So while Walter is the leading figure in libertinism, that is largely because libertines are justifying empathic, non-rational, sentimental approval of arguments that they clearly do not understand, and whose value to them, is that the are sufficiently complex to mirror the reflects of religious texts: that they are extremely difficult to refute, and they justify the speaker’s moral sentiments. Not because they are rationally complete, scientifically demonstrable or demonstrated, or sufficient for legally basis or morally foundation.

    That’s enough for now.  Although I should probably continue.
    Curt Doolittle
    The Philosophy of Aristocracy
    The Propertarian Institute
    Kiev, Ukraine.

    https://www.quora.com/Does-Walter-Block-represent-the-mindset-of-most-libertarians

  • Winter Victories, and Letting God Sort Them Out

    [I]t’s winter in Kiev. It’s 27F. It’s noticeably dark early again. I’ve hung up the leather jacket, switched to the wool coat and layers. The shops have heavily discounted what remains of fall, and those without winter stock are empty. They’ve skipped the ‘autumn’ coat season here and gone right to winter-wear. The music playlists have returned to normal – more synth and rock suitable for clubs, less pop suitable for cafes. Slavic men look GOOD in continental urban winter men’s wear – rather than our american faux-outdoorsman-look that hides our bulging american bellies. Winter wear is elegant here and varied. You can’t find mens’ shoes that aren’t insulated.

    [O]n my part, my body must have known, because I gained 3.5 kilos in the past two months, and it’s time to stop storing up fat for the winter already. 🙂 I also realized that I am subconsciously afraid of another winter here, because last winter, between the US government trying to kill me, the financial catastrophe it put me into, the hostile takeover of my previous company, the revolution putting my new business at risk, Putin’s invasion of these beautiful people, and being sick for 12 weeks in the late winter and spring, that there is a left over bit of trauma in there I haven’t been able to expunge.

    Meanwhile I still managed to fight off the government, settle the take-over amicably, get the men out of the country, nearly complete the product, open the intellectual attack on libertine Rothbardians, drop the winter weight, write some pretty solid philosophy.

    [L]iberty just requires we demand truth-telling. Never surrender. Give no quarter. Show no mercy. If necessary, kill them all and let god sort it out. 😉

    Cheers.

  • Winter Victories, and Letting God Sort Them Out

    [I]t’s winter in Kiev. It’s 27F. It’s noticeably dark early again. I’ve hung up the leather jacket, switched to the wool coat and layers. The shops have heavily discounted what remains of fall, and those without winter stock are empty. They’ve skipped the ‘autumn’ coat season here and gone right to winter-wear. The music playlists have returned to normal – more synth and rock suitable for clubs, less pop suitable for cafes. Slavic men look GOOD in continental urban winter men’s wear – rather than our american faux-outdoorsman-look that hides our bulging american bellies. Winter wear is elegant here and varied. You can’t find mens’ shoes that aren’t insulated.

    [O]n my part, my body must have known, because I gained 3.5 kilos in the past two months, and it’s time to stop storing up fat for the winter already. 🙂 I also realized that I am subconsciously afraid of another winter here, because last winter, between the US government trying to kill me, the financial catastrophe it put me into, the hostile takeover of my previous company, the revolution putting my new business at risk, Putin’s invasion of these beautiful people, and being sick for 12 weeks in the late winter and spring, that there is a left over bit of trauma in there I haven’t been able to expunge.

    Meanwhile I still managed to fight off the government, settle the take-over amicably, get the men out of the country, nearly complete the product, open the intellectual attack on libertine Rothbardians, drop the winter weight, write some pretty solid philosophy.

    [L]iberty just requires we demand truth-telling. Never surrender. Give no quarter. Show no mercy. If necessary, kill them all and let god sort it out. 😉

    Cheers.

  • Speaking Honestly vs Truthfully (vs Dishonestly)

    [I]’m really happy with having captured the difference between speaking honestly, speaking truthfully, and the mere concept of .

    • Platonic (Analytic) Truth: the most parsimonious description that is not a tautology.
    • Speaking Truthfully: promising an epistemic warranty, that you possess the knowledge of construction(causation) and of use(correlation), necessary to make a truth claim, consisting of the minimum error, bias, imaginary content, deception that is possible for you to render with current technology.
    • Speaking Honestly: that you testify only to experiential knowledge (correlation) but not to causation, and that your testimony is free of deception, because you cannot have warrantied that your testimony is free of error, bias, and imaginary content.

    This is relatively important because, as I said yesterday, apriorism cannot be true, unless all all properties and contexts under such a general rule remain constant. This is very, very close to being limited to a tautologies – something I will have to work on further.

  • Speaking Honestly vs Truthfully (vs Dishonestly)

    [I]’m really happy with having captured the difference between speaking honestly, speaking truthfully, and the mere concept of .

    • Platonic (Analytic) Truth: the most parsimonious description that is not a tautology.
    • Speaking Truthfully: promising an epistemic warranty, that you possess the knowledge of construction(causation) and of use(correlation), necessary to make a truth claim, consisting of the minimum error, bias, imaginary content, deception that is possible for you to render with current technology.
    • Speaking Honestly: that you testify only to experiential knowledge (correlation) but not to causation, and that your testimony is free of deception, because you cannot have warrantied that your testimony is free of error, bias, and imaginary content.

    This is relatively important because, as I said yesterday, apriorism cannot be true, unless all all properties and contexts under such a general rule remain constant. This is very, very close to being limited to a tautologies – something I will have to work on further.

  • Citizens vs Shareholders

    —“Service guarantees citizenship. – This is why I served in the US military even though I wasn’t compelled to.”—David M.

    [S]o, for use by our Corporations we have created various forms of stock: including Controlling, Various Preferred, Common, Non-Voting, and Options. These different shares roughly reflect the different value that we bring to companies. Controlling is for management and founders, preferred for professional investors (board members), common for uninformed lenders (‘pseudo-investors’ via the stock market), and non-voting (options in the event of a sale) and options (bonuses) for employees.

    When we use the term ‘citizenship’ today it carries with it the current assumption that citizenship is at best equal to a common, non-voting, or option form of stock. When democratic indo europeans use that term, they mean it as a member that the corporation of the aristocracy or church has agreed to insure. In the pre-democratic era, Citizen refers to the heads of households, families or businesses, that have demonstrated investment in the corporation. In the greek era, that was less than 10% of the population (what we would consider the oligarchy (<1%) the nobility (1%), and the upper middle class (<10%)

    I don’t really agree with Mencius’ approach, but if you told me instead, that we voted for ‘motions’, (internal contracts between shareholders), that any voting shareholder could put forward a motion, that such motions were perishable (had to collect votes in a specific period of time), that all voting was conducted publicly, entirely transparently, and recorded in the public block chain; that each share granted an individual one vote, and that all individuals were prohibited from possession of more than one share, and that a majority or supermajority of **each** class of shares had approve any vote, then I think that is a successful means of running some sort of juridical democracy under nomocratic rule (rule of law).

    This approach, direct voting. does not eliminate public intellectuals, and their propensity to overload, lie, obscure, frame and load,  but it does eliminate politicians (agents) who are subject to opaque influences. If the normative and intellectual commons is as I have stated, property that the corporation agrees to defend, and all shareholders possess standing in court in suits concerning the commons, and that we require truthful speech in all matters of the commons, because we require warranty of products, services, and public speech, then public intellectuals can be independently regulated.

    Rather than classify individuals ‘as’ something or other, we can issue (and possibly limit) shares (block chain / public-ledger accounts). Shares can be earned (purchased) through demonstrated actions, but not purchased by any material exchange, not transferred, and not awarded, granted, given, for any other reason). If one has earned a higher status share, he must trade in any existing share to redeem the new one.

    Repeat felons for example, are effectively wards of the corporation, as are children, not shareholders. I suspect that the class of wards would be fairly large, the class of non voting shares – non-contributing people – fairly large, voting -contributing- fairly large, preferred services shares (care-taking), preferred production(professional, business, and industry), and preferred aristocracy (military, militia, law) fairly large. The most interesting problem is the judiciary, because the law has managed to create a secular ‘priesthood’ (cult) over time due to the very high investment costs in rituals, and to self- manage that cult. Which I find fascinating. And as long as one can preserve that cult via military service, indoctrination, truth-telling, and propertarian calculation, then I think it only requires a small number of people, all of whom have extraordinary interests in it, to preserve liberty.

    I will cover this idea in greater depth as we go along.