“Curt, why do you post where people disagree with you and you disagree with them?”
My first impulse is to say thats a profoundly stupid question. Are you sure you want to ask it?
The next most obvious response is to ask what I will learn from people who agree with me.
Of course the answer is scientific: because I learn more.
Source date (UTC): 2014-07-21 05:29:00 UTC
http://disq.us/8jb0c9YES IT WILL HELP. IT WILL HELP A LOT. IF WE SEND BACK THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WE STOLE FROM UKRAINE IN THE FIRST PLACE. )
Source date (UTC): 2014-07-17 21:45:00 UTC
Robyn,
The red pill.
Source date (UTC): 2014-07-14 12:54:00 UTC
IS STATISM MORE UTILITARIAN THAN ARISTOCRACY?
FROM : Roman Skaskiw
QUESTION: Been reading Fukuyama — Seems state structures replaced kinship-Aristocratic ones b/c states were better at coordinating violence and meritocracy (first in war, then in bureaucracy).
He uses the end of the Chou Dynasty in China to illustrate this.
1. Do you agree with this assessment? 2. Do you think modern technology and understanding could overcome these disadvantages if we reverted to some form of aristocratic kinship?
ANSWER:
Yes. Because they had insufficient property rights.
Yes, Because they had a low trust society.
The monarchies did not have this problem. Nor could they build such great edifices of war. I think, whether Fukukuyama admits it, where all other historians do, the purpose of the Chinese system was the conduct of war and suppression.
By contrast, the purpose of the western model is ADJUDICATION. One cannot had adjudication without property rights. One must have tyranny. One cannot have adjudication without property rights, one must have tyranny.
Command and control under the western model is superior. Rates of innovation under the western modal are superior. The fact that the Chinese got started first, is not much testimony. The fact that no matter what Europe did, when it used science, it exceeded rates of development of all other civilizations. Property rights and science. They are both ‘CALCULABLE’ institutions.
The west, under duress kept the “east” (desert and steppe people) at bay.
The east, under duress, kept the “west ” (desert and steppe people) at bay.
We just chose different models, and the desert and steppe people are still a (fkng) problem to this day.
Curt Doolittle
The Propertarian Institute
Kiev Ukraine
Source date (UTC): 2014-07-08 06:19:00 UTC
—“Surely you understand how individualists might view your little eugenics project as pretty unworkable, fucked and backwards, don’t you”— [I] don’t have a eugenics project, I make the argument that at some point in your chain of reasoning you must have a means of making judgements between one set of preferences and another, and that the progressive preference is dysgenic. To warn against dysgenia is very different from conducting eugenia. I do not see the political reason for redistributing from the middle class to the lower class if this constructs dysgenia that inhibits the formation of the high trust society which is necessary for the standard of living that allows for redistribution. In other words, i’m making an argument against a logical fallacy. This might seem to you as if I am making a sentimental argument,b ecause you argue largely sentimentally. But I don’t. I might actually be largely incapable of it. Most of my arguments are in the general vein of pointing out the fallacy of the libertarian and classical liberal, and progressive canons that do not account for the problem of trust, intelligence, and impulsivity in the construction of a polity capable of constant innovation necessary to stay ahead of both the genetic red queen, the malthusian red queen, and the technological red queen, and how those three red queens must be defeated in order to preserve economic prosperity that allows us to have whatever nonsensical social order we choose. I suspect that this argument is not obvious to you and most others, but that is my fundamental argument and the insight I am trying to incorporate into political science, political economy, economics, and philosophical ethics. -Cheers
—“Surely you understand how individualists might view your little eugenics project as pretty unworkable, fucked and backwards, don’t you”— [I] don’t have a eugenics project, I make the argument that at some point in your chain of reasoning you must have a means of making judgements between one set of preferences and another, and that the progressive preference is dysgenic. To warn against dysgenia is very different from conducting eugenia. I do not see the political reason for redistributing from the middle class to the lower class if this constructs dysgenia that inhibits the formation of the high trust society which is necessary for the standard of living that allows for redistribution. In other words, i’m making an argument against a logical fallacy. This might seem to you as if I am making a sentimental argument,b ecause you argue largely sentimentally. But I don’t. I might actually be largely incapable of it. Most of my arguments are in the general vein of pointing out the fallacy of the libertarian and classical liberal, and progressive canons that do not account for the problem of trust, intelligence, and impulsivity in the construction of a polity capable of constant innovation necessary to stay ahead of both the genetic red queen, the malthusian red queen, and the technological red queen, and how those three red queens must be defeated in order to preserve economic prosperity that allows us to have whatever nonsensical social order we choose. I suspect that this argument is not obvious to you and most others, but that is my fundamental argument and the insight I am trying to incorporate into political science, political economy, economics, and philosophical ethics. -Cheers
—“Surely you understand how individualists might view your little eugenics project as pretty unworkable, fucked and backwards, don’t you”—
I don’t have a eugenics project, I make the argument that at some point in your chain of reasoning you must have a means of making judgements between one set of preferences and another, and that the progressive preference is dysgenic. To warn against dysgenia is very different from conducting eugenia.
I do not see the political reason for redistributing from the middle class to the lower class if this constructs dysgenia that inhibits the formation of the high trust society which is necessary for the standard of living that allows for redistribution. In other words, i’m making an argument against a logical fallacy. This might seem to you as if I am making a sentimental argument,b ecause you argue largely sentimentally. But I don’t. I might actually be largely incapable of it.
Most of my arguments are in the general vein of pointing out the fallacy of the libertarian and classical liberal, and progressive canons that do not account for the problem of trust, intelligence, and impulsivity in the construction of a polity capable of constant innovation necessary to stay ahead of both the genetic red queen, the malthusian red queen, and the technological red queen, and how those three red queens must be defeated in order to preserve economic prosperity that allows us to have whatever nonsensical social order we choose.
I suspect that this argument is not obvious to you and most others, but that is my fundamental argument and the insight I am trying to incorporate into political science, political economy, economics, and philosophical ethics.
-Cheers
Source date (UTC): 2014-07-04 13:28:00 UTC
Peter, [I] have spent years on this question and I am fairly certain now that Mises’ work, like Bridgman’s was an unsuccessful attempt at developing operationalism. Both Mises and Popper can best be understood as cosmopolitan intellectuals bringing their pseudoscientific allegorical culture to their work, just as Kant brought continental duty and authority to his – both rebelling against anglo empiricism. Hayek could not solve the problem of the social sciences either. He correctly intuits that the problem exists, but he can only offer us laments, criticisms, and classical liberal solutions. Unfortunately he did not have decades of computer science to provide him with an alternative conceptual framework and terminology to replace his classical liberalism and moral psychology. Post mainstream economists cannot yet solve the relationship between mathematics, logic, ethics and economics. And Austrians should have. But the sad state of our ranks and the distraction of philosophers by the marxist, socialist, and postmodern programs misallocated intellectual capital in pursuit of the impossible. So when hayek says the 20th century will be remembered as an era of reemergent mysticism, he only knows something is wrong : endemic pseudoscience – but he does not know why or how to fix it. He was a herald and a critic but he did not solve it. So did Poincare, Mandelbrot, Bridgman, the mathematical Intuitionists. So did mises. The interesting insight that I have only recently understood, is that the other disciplines succeeded but their scope was narrower than that of economics. And had mises not failed. Had popper not failed. Had Hayek not failed, then the missing argument would have been available to the less complicated fields of math, logic and science, as well as economics. The insight that the only truth that can exist is performative, and the only possible claim to sufficient knowledge necessary to make a truth claim, is the demonstration if construction by operational means and measures. Ie: the problem is ethical. I am fairly certain now, that I have solved that mussing bit -by accident. And that the necessary insights exist in the multiple attempts at articulating operationalism in multiple fields – thereby solving, finally, the nature and definition of truth. This allows us to repair praxeology as an empirical research program whose theoretical constructs are reducible to operational statements, each of which is sympathetically testable by human perception, as to the rationality and volition of those statements. Ie: truth. Mises was too much on a mission, too arrogant, too culturally biased, and too ignorant of mathematics, science and philosophy to solve the problem. But he came closer than anyone else had to date.
Peter, [I] have spent years on this question and I am fairly certain now that Mises’ work, like Bridgman’s was an unsuccessful attempt at developing operationalism. Both Mises and Popper can best be understood as cosmopolitan intellectuals bringing their pseudoscientific allegorical culture to their work, just as Kant brought continental duty and authority to his – both rebelling against anglo empiricism. Hayek could not solve the problem of the social sciences either. He correctly intuits that the problem exists, but he can only offer us laments, criticisms, and classical liberal solutions. Unfortunately he did not have decades of computer science to provide him with an alternative conceptual framework and terminology to replace his classical liberalism and moral psychology. Post mainstream economists cannot yet solve the relationship between mathematics, logic, ethics and economics. And Austrians should have. But the sad state of our ranks and the distraction of philosophers by the marxist, socialist, and postmodern programs misallocated intellectual capital in pursuit of the impossible. So when hayek says the 20th century will be remembered as an era of reemergent mysticism, he only knows something is wrong : endemic pseudoscience – but he does not know why or how to fix it. He was a herald and a critic but he did not solve it. So did Poincare, Mandelbrot, Bridgman, the mathematical Intuitionists. So did mises. The interesting insight that I have only recently understood, is that the other disciplines succeeded but their scope was narrower than that of economics. And had mises not failed. Had popper not failed. Had Hayek not failed, then the missing argument would have been available to the less complicated fields of math, logic and science, as well as economics. The insight that the only truth that can exist is performative, and the only possible claim to sufficient knowledge necessary to make a truth claim, is the demonstration if construction by operational means and measures. Ie: the problem is ethical. I am fairly certain now, that I have solved that mussing bit -by accident. And that the necessary insights exist in the multiple attempts at articulating operationalism in multiple fields – thereby solving, finally, the nature and definition of truth. This allows us to repair praxeology as an empirical research program whose theoretical constructs are reducible to operational statements, each of which is sympathetically testable by human perception, as to the rationality and volition of those statements. Ie: truth. Mises was too much on a mission, too arrogant, too culturally biased, and too ignorant of mathematics, science and philosophy to solve the problem. But he came closer than anyone else had to date.
Peter, [I] have spent years on this question and I am fairly certain now that Mises’ work, like Bridgman’s was an unsuccessful attempt at developing operationalism. Both Mises and Popper can best be understood as cosmopolitan intellectuals bringing their pseudoscientific allegorical culture to their work, just as Kant brought continental duty and authority to his – both rebelling against anglo empiricism. Hayek could not solve the problem of the social sciences either. He correctly intuits that the problem exists, but he can only offer us laments, criticisms, and classical liberal solutions. Unfortunately he did not have decades of computer science to provide him with an alternative conceptual framework and terminology to replace his classical liberalism and moral psychology. Post mainstream economists cannot yet solve the relationship between mathematics, logic, ethics and economics. And Austrians should have. But the sad state of our ranks and the distraction of philosophers by the marxist, socialist, and postmodern programs misallocated intellectual capital in pursuit of the impossible. So when hayek says the 20th century will be remembered as an era of reemergent mysticism, he only knows something is wrong : endemic pseudoscience – but he does not know why or how to fix it. He was a herald and a critic but he did not solve it. So did Poincare, Mandelbrot, Bridgman, the mathematical Intuitionists. So did mises. The interesting insight that I have only recently understood, is that the other disciplines succeeded but their scope was narrower than that of economics. And had mises not failed. Had popper not failed. Had Hayek not failed, then the missing argument would have been available to the less complicated fields of math, logic and science, as well as economics. The insight that the only truth that can exist is performative, and the only possible claim to sufficient knowledge necessary to make a truth claim, is the demonstration if construction by operational means and measures. Ie: the problem is ethical. I am fairly certain now, that I have solved that mussing bit -by accident. And that the necessary insights exist in the multiple attempts at articulating operationalism in multiple fields – thereby solving, finally, the nature and definition of truth. This allows us to repair praxeology as an empirical research program whose theoretical constructs are reducible to operational statements, each of which is sympathetically testable by human perception, as to the rationality and volition of those statements. Ie: truth. Mises was too much on a mission, too arrogant, too culturally biased, and too ignorant of mathematics, science and philosophy to solve the problem. But he came closer than anyone else had to date.