Form: Question

HELP?

Anyone want to tell my why this is terribly difficult to comprehend? It’s about as dumbed down as I can make it, and apparently it’s not dumbed down enough….

JCL: In a short sentence, what problem are you trying to solve?

CD: I want to know if you have solved the question of the definition of private property expressible in law that is necessary for the formation of a voluntary property. I think not.

JCL: In a short sentence, what solution do you propose?

CD: That law must mirror high-trust morality, and that morality is defined as a prohibition on imposed costs (parasitism, free riding, et al), leaving only productive, fully informed, warrantied, voluntary exchange free of externality. Conversely, that Rothbardian property (intersubjectively verifiable private property) provides insufficient scope of dispute resolution for the formation of a voluntary polity in the absence of demand for the state. People will demand a state in low trust polities. They do.

JCL: In a short sentence, how do you think my theory of liberty is relevant–if it is?

CD: While you have correctly stated the subjective point of view, this does not resolve the problem of obtaining consensus on the necessary scope of property rights, expressed in law, that are required for the rational formation of a voluntary property. (It is apparently not important or clear to you that morality is synonymous with your definition of liberty. This does not matter in your line of reasoning. It matters in determining the scope of rights defined in the law, since humans retaliate against unethical and immoral action, and people demonstrate demand for authoritarian states to suppress retaliation in low trust societies.)

JCL: In a short sentence, what is mistaken about my theory of liberty?

CD: As you intend it, nothing. However it does not solve the problem facing libertarians unless it is actionable; and it remains in-actionable without a consensus on the scope of property rights that must be articulated in law. There is nothing erroneous about your theoretical definition of the experience of liberty. But the experience you describe is insufficient for the solution of the problem of decidability.

I reached the same conclusion that you did, but I did so by asking a different question: what scope of dispute resolution is necessary to eliminate demand for the state as a suppressor of retaliation or an enforcer of rules. And I looked to the evidence.