Form: Excerpt

  • Incentives at The Bottom

    Nov 3, 2019, 9:39 AM (Michael Churchill ) There is no incentive for the people on the sub-optimal side of the curve to voluntarily go along with the extinction of their own DNA line. There is declining incentive for the people at the top to enforce laws to prevent reproduction of those who are on the sub-optimal side of the curve. And there are strong IN-centives for both capital and fifth-columnists to encourage reproduction on the sub-optimal side of the curve. Overall human DNA is weakening in western societies, and the effect is cumulative over generations. (Curt Doolittle) The Incentive for people on the sub-optimal side of the curve is compensation NOT to reproduce, as well as prosecution IF they reproduce. (Martin Štěpán) I do see that. We’ve let it go too far. But if we isolate from the left though, I’m pretty sure there won’t be that many on the sub-optimal side of the spectrum. And ones that are, what can you really do with them besides paying them to obey the law and not reproduce, at least not more than one kid? If that’s not okay and they still commit crime, they need to be disposed of. And if we keep doing that, we’ll slowly keep improving. I advocated for the same thing in healthcare as welfare, actually. You either pay your own or you use the tax-subsidized healthcare but in the latter case, you submit to one-child policy too, at least unless you manage to pay the money back. (Curt Doolittle) Yes. That’s the correct Incentive and policy.

  • Marxian Economics Do Not Merit More than A Footnote

    by Daniel Gurpide Having been proved empirically wrong, Marxian economics do not merit more than a footnote. Marx’s lasting enthusiasm for the working class was due to his belief that within the framework of bourgeois society the factory hand would be condemned forever to a life of misery in eternal bondage. He never realized that modern technological society, with or without exploitation, could ever provide the working man with a middle-class existence. The New Left had to abandon its innermost hopes for a revolutionary rising of a no longer existing proletariat now integrated with all its material interests into the process of production. In addition, no modern industrialist wants merely to exploit his workers- they should be happy, well-paid consumers. The utter inanity of Marxian economics is so evident that the person who is first and foremost a revolutionary and merely seeks for a rational excuse to preach the overturn of the existing order has to look in other directions, towards other social layers to whom preach the revolutionary gospel. That’s why the New Left, Cultural Marxism and Postmodernists appeal to the outcasts of modern society, to the eternal Lumpenproletariat, the term understood not in a sociological sense.

  • Marxian Economics Do Not Merit More than A Footnote

    by Daniel Gurpide Having been proved empirically wrong, Marxian economics do not merit more than a footnote. Marx’s lasting enthusiasm for the working class was due to his belief that within the framework of bourgeois society the factory hand would be condemned forever to a life of misery in eternal bondage. He never realized that modern technological society, with or without exploitation, could ever provide the working man with a middle-class existence. The New Left had to abandon its innermost hopes for a revolutionary rising of a no longer existing proletariat now integrated with all its material interests into the process of production. In addition, no modern industrialist wants merely to exploit his workers- they should be happy, well-paid consumers. The utter inanity of Marxian economics is so evident that the person who is first and foremost a revolutionary and merely seeks for a rational excuse to preach the overturn of the existing order has to look in other directions, towards other social layers to whom preach the revolutionary gospel. That’s why the New Left, Cultural Marxism and Postmodernists appeal to the outcasts of modern society, to the eternal Lumpenproletariat, the term understood not in a sociological sense.

  • The Stack

    Nov 17, 2019, 7:55 PM by Luke Weinhagen SOVEREIGNTIST NOMOCRATIC MONARCHY Free men of agency and autonomy participating in reciprocal, voluntary interaction via markets and bound in value by a culture whose aesthetic and function are preserved by those demonstrating greatest merit and protected by a judge of last resort in a system specifically imbued at every level with the power to deny power.

    • KINSHIP CAPITALISM
      Full-accounting preventing individual profit subsidized by the transfer of inter-generational value to out-groups.

    • FAMILIAL POLITIC
      The autonomous family (non-dependent), representing reproductive viability and therefore inter-generational transfer, is the smallest political unit with direct voting power, with non-familied citizens represented by dedicated houses (underclass, unmarried, etc…).

    • CRAFTSMEN ARISTOCRACY
      Leadership meritoriously demonstrating the blending of aesthetics with functionality, with the later never sacrificed for the former and the former never detached from the later.

    • MARKET MONARCH
      Judge of last resort. Rules where limits are otherwise undecidable. Insures decisions via exposure to market risk.

  • The Stack

    Nov 17, 2019, 7:55 PM by Luke Weinhagen SOVEREIGNTIST NOMOCRATIC MONARCHY Free men of agency and autonomy participating in reciprocal, voluntary interaction via markets and bound in value by a culture whose aesthetic and function are preserved by those demonstrating greatest merit and protected by a judge of last resort in a system specifically imbued at every level with the power to deny power.

    • KINSHIP CAPITALISM
      Full-accounting preventing individual profit subsidized by the transfer of inter-generational value to out-groups.

    • FAMILIAL POLITIC
      The autonomous family (non-dependent), representing reproductive viability and therefore inter-generational transfer, is the smallest political unit with direct voting power, with non-familied citizens represented by dedicated houses (underclass, unmarried, etc…).

    • CRAFTSMEN ARISTOCRACY
      Leadership meritoriously demonstrating the blending of aesthetics with functionality, with the later never sacrificed for the former and the former never detached from the later.

    • MARKET MONARCH
      Judge of last resort. Rules where limits are otherwise undecidable. Insures decisions via exposure to market risk.

  • Is the Rate of Scientific Progress Slowing Down?

    by Tyler Cowen November 18, 2019 at 1:09 am in Data Source Economics History That is the title of my new paper with Ben Southwood, here is one segment from the introduction:

    Our task is simple: we will consider whether the rate of scientific progress has slowed down, and more generally what we know about the rate of scientific progress, based on these literatures and other metrics we have been investigating. This investigation will take the form of a conceptual survey of the available data. We will consider which measures are out there, what they show, and how we should best interpret them, to attempt to create the most comprehensive and wide-ranging survey of metrics for the progress of science. In particular, we integrate a number of strands in the productivity growth literature, the “science of science” literature, and various historical literatures on the nature of human progress. In our view, however, a mere reporting of different metrics does not suffice to answer the cluster of questions surrounding scientific progress. It is also necessary to ask some difficult questions about what science means, what progress means, and how the literatures on economic productivity and “science on its own terms” might connect with each other. Mostly we think scientific progress is indeed slowing down, and this is supported by a wide variety of metrics, surveyed in the paper. The gleam of optimism comes from this: And to the extent that progress in science has not been slowing down, which is indeed the case under some of our metrics, that may give us new insight into where the strengths of modern and contemporary science truly lie. For instance, our analysis stresses the distinction between per capita progress and progress in the aggregate. As we will see later, a wide variety of “per capita” measures do indeed suggest that various metrics for growth, progress and productivity are slowing down. On the other side of that coin, a no less strong variety of metrics show that measures of total, aggregate progress are usually doing quite well. So the final answer to the progress question likely depends on how we weight per capita rates of progress vs. measures of total progress in the aggregate. What do the data on productivity not tell us about scientific progress? By how much is the contribution of the internet undervalued? What can we learn from data on crop yields, life expectancy, and Moore’s Law? Might the social sciences count as an example of progress in the sciences not slowing down? Is the Solow model distinction between “once and for all changes” and “ongoing increases in the rate of innovation” sound? And much more. Your comments on this paper would be very much welcome, either on MR or through email. I will be blogging some particular ideas from the paper over the next week or two.

  • Is the Rate of Scientific Progress Slowing Down?

    by Tyler Cowen November 18, 2019 at 1:09 am in Data Source Economics History That is the title of my new paper with Ben Southwood, here is one segment from the introduction:

    Our task is simple: we will consider whether the rate of scientific progress has slowed down, and more generally what we know about the rate of scientific progress, based on these literatures and other metrics we have been investigating. This investigation will take the form of a conceptual survey of the available data. We will consider which measures are out there, what they show, and how we should best interpret them, to attempt to create the most comprehensive and wide-ranging survey of metrics for the progress of science. In particular, we integrate a number of strands in the productivity growth literature, the “science of science” literature, and various historical literatures on the nature of human progress. In our view, however, a mere reporting of different metrics does not suffice to answer the cluster of questions surrounding scientific progress. It is also necessary to ask some difficult questions about what science means, what progress means, and how the literatures on economic productivity and “science on its own terms” might connect with each other. Mostly we think scientific progress is indeed slowing down, and this is supported by a wide variety of metrics, surveyed in the paper. The gleam of optimism comes from this: And to the extent that progress in science has not been slowing down, which is indeed the case under some of our metrics, that may give us new insight into where the strengths of modern and contemporary science truly lie. For instance, our analysis stresses the distinction between per capita progress and progress in the aggregate. As we will see later, a wide variety of “per capita” measures do indeed suggest that various metrics for growth, progress and productivity are slowing down. On the other side of that coin, a no less strong variety of metrics show that measures of total, aggregate progress are usually doing quite well. So the final answer to the progress question likely depends on how we weight per capita rates of progress vs. measures of total progress in the aggregate. What do the data on productivity not tell us about scientific progress? By how much is the contribution of the internet undervalued? What can we learn from data on crop yields, life expectancy, and Moore’s Law? Might the social sciences count as an example of progress in the sciences not slowing down? Is the Solow model distinction between “once and for all changes” and “ongoing increases in the rate of innovation” sound? And much more. Your comments on this paper would be very much welcome, either on MR or through email. I will be blogging some particular ideas from the paper over the next week or two.

  • Human Government Demand

    by Anne Summers (98^℅) of Humans are either Canidae (/K and alpha [domesticated]) or Sheep (/r and beta or less [semi-domesticated]) or /r feral and low IQ [wild]) The only type of government we were meant to have is Equals Under The Law flock (or pack; beta-) with differentiation and reference to the Alpha when deliberations or arbitrations are necessary. (LAW-UNIVERSAL) Representative for intrastate confederacies; diplomats for international. (FEDERAL) Democracy should be limited to local laws that affect the Commons. (LOCAL)

  • Human Government Demand

    by Anne Summers (98^℅) of Humans are either Canidae (/K and alpha [domesticated]) or Sheep (/r and beta or less [semi-domesticated]) or /r feral and low IQ [wild]) The only type of government we were meant to have is Equals Under The Law flock (or pack; beta-) with differentiation and reference to the Alpha when deliberations or arbitrations are necessary. (LAW-UNIVERSAL) Representative for intrastate confederacies; diplomats for international. (FEDERAL) Democracy should be limited to local laws that affect the Commons. (LOCAL)

  • The Four Great Inventions

    The Four Great Inventions are inventions from ancient China that are celebrated in Chinese culture for their historical significance and as symbols of ancient China’s advanced science and technology. The Four Great Inventions are: CompassGunpowderPapermakingPrintingFAILURE by James Santagata

    1. Compass – China oriented Walls | West explored Worlds
    2. Gunpowder – China made multicolored fireworks | West put Men on the Moon.
    3. Papermaking – China made toilet paper | West copied toilet paper as top notch, give credit where credit due.
    4. Printing – China printed Decrees & Death Sentences | West printed Treatises, Theories + Technical Manuals

    (By why did she fail? They printed wisdom literature. Conversely, Europeans printed technical literature “how to”. When they set out to see the world, they found it awful (disharmonious), when europeans set out to see the world they found it profitable. ) HISTORY Printing evolved in china from ‘taking rubbings’ of carved Confucian texts. Eventually evolving into raised letters, and then raised letters with ink. European Mechanical presses Mechanical presses as used in European printing remained unknown in East Asia. Instead, printing remained an unmechanized, laborious process with pressing the back of the paper onto the inked block by manual “rubbing” with a hand tool. In Korea, the first printing presses were introduced as late as 1881–83, while in Japan, after an early but brief interlude in the 1590s, Gutenberg’s printing press arrived in Nagasaki in 1848 on a Dutch ship.